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Abstract: Local Government Scrutiny and Governance: Limits and Possibilities-
Jonathan Wistow 
The central focus of this thesis is the role of scrutiny within the modernised system of 
local government and governance. The study was carried out from an insider-research 
perspective within the scrutiny team of a unitary authority. The scrutiny process 
provided a 'window' through which to analyse the development, and application, ofNew 
Labour's local government modernisation agenda. The thesis contains a critical 
examination of literature about the modernisation of local government and, in particular, 
the role of the scrutiny function. This discussion is located within broader literatures 
about governance and the changing role of local government. 
It is argued that, while there is scope for manoeuvre at both national and local levels, 
global trends have provided powerful drivers for policy development and the subsequent 
fragmentation of the nation state. Empirical data were obtained through case studies of 
four scrutiny inquiries, selected to permit an exploration of limitations and possibilities 
of local government scrutiny within this context of globalisation and the shift from 
government to governance. 
An analysis of the case studies highlighted the importance of four factors in explaining 
variations in governance outcomes; risk to legitimacy, public/pressure group 
engagement, regulation/hierarchy and certainty/agreement. In light of these findings it is 
concluded scrutiny is an imperfect tool within an imperfect (governance) system. 
However, the local government modernisation agenda had created a number of new 
opportunities for local government, and scrutiny, to function more effectively in the 
current governance context. 
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1) Introduction and Methodology 
1.1) Introduction 
This chapter introduces both the topic and methodology of this thesis. The first section 
outlines the key research issue and problematic under investigation. A number of key 
concepts are identified here and are followed by an overview of the contents of each of the 
chapters. The next section focuses on the research problem, namely how to investigate the 
impact of governance on local government scrutiny, and local authorities more generally. 
A number of key research questions operationalise the research issue here so that it can be 
investigated across the scrutiny case studies. The following section outlines the research 
strategy, which is followed by a section introducing the research methods that are applied 
to the research problem. Finally, I briefly introduce a 'working conceptual framework' as a 
conclusion to this chapter and a start-point for much of the discussion which follows. 
It is appropriate to consider the methodology in the context of the overall investigative 
approach used in the thesis, which is why it is discussed here in the introductory chapter. 
The methodology is closely related to the overall structure of the thesis, which is a dialogue 
between a series of working concepts and evidence. The working concepts derive from 
reviews of the existing literature on local government modernisation and governance; from 
this a theoretical framework is developed; the framework is tested in the dialogue with 
evidence from the collection of data across a series of case studies; and this is done by 
operationalising the theoretical framework through a series of research questions. Each of 
these components tests the knowledge gained from the others and the structure of the thesis 
orders the data accordingly. Thus, what follows starts with a statement of the research issue 
as a theoretical problematic, moves on to state this more specifically as a research problem 
and set of research questions, explains the research strategy and detailed design as ways of 
addressing these questions, and concludes with a statement of the working concepts which 
informed evidence gathering. The working concepts form a provisional theoretical 
framework that has guided what questions are asked, where to look to answer them and 
what to make of what is seen. 
1.2) Research Issue/Problematic 
The origins of this study lie in a partnership between Teesside University1 and Hartlepool 
Borough Council (HBC), through the development of a professional doctorate funded by 
the council. Similar to a Research Council CASE studentship the doctorate was based on 
collaboration, which involved the student spending time learning about and supporting the 
scrutiny function in HBC. This established excellent access to the local authority, in 
particular through the 'window' that the scrutiny process provided on the role of a local 
authority. With this access, there was the opportunity to undertake an intensive case study 
of a single local authority, although the scrutiny exercises that form the main source of 
evidence for this thesis were treated as case studies in themselves, given their relevance to 
different aspects of the research problematic. The local context and how the scrutiny 
exercises have been used as case studies is considered in more detaiL later in this section, 
including the strengths and limitations of undertaking a study on a single local authority. 
The key problematic I am focusing on is the role of local government in the local 
governance arena. Local government has undergone an extensive process of change since 
New Labour came to power in 1997. This process has widely become known as the local 
government modernisation agenda, which is explored in more detail later in this chapter 
and, in particular, in the next chapter. The scrutiny process is a key strand of the local 
government modernisation agenda, in particular for non-executive councillors through 
providing a mechanism to hold the council's executive and partners to account and develop 
recommendations for policy development. It is the 'window' through which the study 
examines the role of local government in governance. Consequently, the limits and 
possibilities of local government scrutiny and governance are explored through this 
'window'. The theoretical and policy implications of the emerging/emergent governance 
context, with particular reference to the so-called 'hollowing out' of the state, and the 
1 The student subsequently transferred to Durham University part way through the period of study and 
registered for a Phd. 
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impact of global trends on this, are explored in a literature review2• From this the following 






• Hollowing out of the state; and 
• Accountability. 
These concepts, in relation to the key problematic, offer a working conceptual framework 
for analysing scrutiny processes and outcomes in Hartlepool. Consequently it is necessary 
to test this framework against empirical experience gained from my participant-observer 
role in the case study local authority. 
A key question emerging from the governance issue and central to my key problematic is 
the potential for scrutiny (and indeed local authorities) to effect change in the governance 
system. The role of scrutiny provides a window through which governance arrangements 
are explored in this thesis. The impact of wider governance systems on scrutiny is, 
therefore, an important factor in determining the 'policy landscape' within which scrutiny's 
influence is exerted. I am exploring this through situating the modernising local 
government agenda within broader debates on governance in the academic literature (see 
for example Stewart 2003, Stoker 1998, 2000 & 2002, Wilson and Game 2002, Newman 
2001, Jones and Stewart 2002, Goss 2001, Bevir and Rhodes 2003, Snape et al 2002) 
before considering the role of scrutiny within this context. Having established a theoretical 
framework for considering local government and scrutiny in the local governance 
landscape I then move on to test this framework. This will be achieved by using 
documented examples of scrutiny exercises in the case study authority as a means of 
accessing areas of governance as they relate to the scrutiny issue. This will not provide a 
complete' ptcfUre-or the -rocaf governance landscape for-the locality,-which is beyond-the 
2 In particular in chapter 3. 
12 
scope of my work, but will instead focus on sample areas of this landscape judged as 
important to the well-being of Hartlepool and its residents. Due to the complexities of 
governance arrangements a focus on depth rather than breadth of understanding has been 
deemed preferable. This is because it is better to have a fuller understanding of governance 
for a few issues rather than a shallow understanding of the governance of a whole locality. 
Chapters two to four are informed by a literature review of government policy and 
academic literature geared towards local government and governance, and associated 
concepts and policy ranging from globalisation to partnerships. Through exploring the 
themes arising here (and outlined below) a background to the workings of a local authority 
and specifically its scrutiny function are described and provide a provisional theoretical 
framework for the organisation of my empirical material. This provides both the context 
for exploring the scrutiny case studies in the following chapters, and the basis for the 
theoretical propositions that are tested through these case studies. The final chapters (nine 
to eleven) will return to the theoretical framework to consider the extent to which this has 
successfully 'modelled' at a general, conceptual level what has been found in practise. 
Chapter two introduces and examines the local government modernisation agenda, which 
was introduced by the New Labour government in Modern Local Government: In Touch 
with the People (DETR, 1998). The government identified local government as inward 
looking and paternalistic (DETR, 1998) whilst committing itself to strengthening local 
government. Consequently the three themes3 of improved political management, 
continuous service improvement, and democratic renewal, emerged as the drivers for the 
modernisation agenda. These themes were legislated for in the 1999 and 2000 Local 
Government Acts. Pratchett (2002:331) comments that, 'a dual emphasis on democracy 
and continuous service improvement meant that every aspect of local government life, from 
the role of elected members through to the delivery of each service, was subjected to the 
'modernisation treatment.' 
A key" component of the reform of political management structures was the introduction of 
_____ the new_overview"and -scrutiny -function. ltis,,perhaps, themostsubstantive role for non~ 
3 In chapter two I add a further theme of 'well-being powers, community leadership and partnerships' to fit 
with the overall theme of this thesis. 
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executive councillors as a result of the separation of roles from the executive, under the 
Local Government Act (LGA) 2000, and forms the basis of an insider-research4 approach. 
Consequently the scrutiny mechanism is unpacked and explored, and a particular focus here 
is on the roles, powers and potential influence of the scrutiny function. A critical factor 
alluded to in this chapter and explored throughout the thesis is the notion of an emerging 
(or emergent) local governance arena, which poses questions about the role and capability 
of scrutiny in the broader local governance context. 
The government's agenda for modernisation has been set within a broader context that can 
be viewed through 'cultural analysis'. Newman (2001 :7) sees, 'public and social policy as 
fields which are socially constructed: that is, problems and solutions are formed within the 
framework of particular narratives, ideologies and assumptions. Successful narratives are 
those that come to be taken for granted or viewed as "common sense".' For this reason the 
direction and nature of change are just as important as the quantity and quality of change. I 
will argue that many of the underlying causes, of the problems identified in the 
modernising local government agenda are, themselves, embedded in the dominant narrative 
shaping the government's agenda. In this respect chapter three focuses on the impact of 
global trends and their relationship to the concept of governance, and introduces a 
provisional theoretical framework prior to the accounts of my empirical work. It will 
examine the role of a number of key drivers in the transition from the local state as local 
government to the local state as one player in a system of local governance. 
With the emergence of a variety of actors delivering public services in localities some sort 
of governance solution is necessary to rationalise and co-ordinate the relationships and 
policy of these bodies. Consequently chapter four focuses on the concept of partnerships as 
a local governance solution. The role of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) as co-
ordinating and co-governing mechanisms is examined in light of the increased plethora of 
local bodies and partnerships. In addition the governance landscape in Hartlepool is 
described. This provides a base on which to map the scrutiny case studies. 
4 Which is explained in more detail below. 
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Undertaking research on a single local authority has enabled an intensive research strategy 
to be adopted, with a level of detail that would not be possible for a single PhD student 
researching across more than one authority. Part of this detail is to understand the 
Hartlepool context, where national initiatives like local government modernisation and, 
more specifically, elected mayors have worked out in unique ways. Indeed, embracing 
more than one authority in the study would have invited generalisation that inevitably 
looses the contextual detail of how wider processes such as globalisation or policy change 
work out in a single place. 
Hartlepool is a town situated in the North-East of England, with a population of 90,000 
people. According to Morris (1995:4) it represented, 'an extreme case of the social and 
economic changes that characterised Britain in the 1980s; a town once dominated by male 
employment in heavy industry has passed through a series of transitional phases to emerge 
with a local economy weakened in every sphere.' Whilst the town has undergone 
significant regeneration over the past 10 to 15 years Hartlepool remains a relatively 
deprived town, with nine out of the seventeen wards in the top 10% of deprived wards 
nationally, according to the 2000 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) (Reilly and Eynon, 
2003). The remaining wards fell between 10 and 50% of the most deprived wards 
nationally. Against this backdrop of deprivation Hartlepool has been rated as an 'excellent' 
council, under the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA), since 2002 and has 
remained a 'top performing' council for the past four years. 
Hartlepool council has undergone considerable change in its political make-up in recent 
years. Having controlled the council for more than 20 years the Labour Party progressively 
lost seats towards the end of the 1990s. In 2000 the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats 
formed a joint political group known as the 'Alliance' and did not contest the same seats 
during that year's election. Consequently, the Alliance controlled the council between 
2000 and 2002 with a majority of councillors. However, in 2002 the Alliance broke up and 
the Labour Party became the largest political group once more, but in a hung Council. In 
2004 the Labour group once again became the majority party, with a majority of one 
-------"councillor.-
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Perhaps more significantly since May 2002 the council has been functioning with a directly 
elected mayor as leader. The mayor does not belong to any political group and was elected 
under the guise of the local football team's mascot and had no political experience prior to 
being elected. The mayor, prior to and following his election, publicly expressed his 
distaste for party politics and has subsequently failed to (through a combination of being 
unwilling and unable5) foster meaningful alliances with the majority of councillors. The 
mayor's cabinet has varied between five and seven members between 2002 and 2004. 
During this period there was at all times a single Conservative portfolio holder, between 
two and three independent cabinet members (including the mayor), and the rest of the 
portfolios were taken by Labour councillors. 
The period of study between 2002 and 2004 took place during fairly turbulent times 
politically. During this period councillors were adjusting to new political management 
arrangements set against the rapidly changing political make-up of the council and the 
election of an 'anti-political' independent mayor with considerable power but limited 
experience. Indeed the case study authority is somewhat unusual given that it is one out of 
eleven local authorities (during the period of study) operating a mayoral system under the 
new political management structures. It is necessary to acknowledge that recent research 
conducted by Manchester University's Evaluating Local Government Team6 has suggested 
that scrutiny is better understood and in fact works better in mayoral systems. This has 
implications for the generalisability of this study, as does the uniqueness of the elected 
mayor (highlighted above) leading the case study authority. However, the focus of this 
study is not only on the limits and possibilities of local government and scrutiny in the 
emerging governance system (i.e. looking top down), and making generalisations from this, 
but also on building an understanding (from the bottom up) about the broader governance 
system all local authorities work within, which is developed using the scrutiny case studies 
as a window. In this respect the case studies are holistic and global in design (Yin 2003). 
,·,r: 
5 Through a lack of experience and political skills on his part and also resentment amongst the major political 
-- grotips'at his~eleoction'there'hasbeen·anunwillingness,amongst,locaLcouncillors t9 enter into sustained 
partnership with the mayor. 
6 According to evidence given by Professor Gerry Stoker at a joint Durham I Teesside University 'Urban 
Futures Seminar' in May 2006. 
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Over the course of the period of study the scrutiny function was supported by between 1.5 
and 2 full time equivalent council officers. Initially the democratic services manager7 
(DSM) was responsible for managing both scrutiny and democratic services (the clerking of 
all meetings) support. Within the scrutiny function he was supported by two8 part-time 
scrutiny support officers (both with backgrounds in research). For an additional three 
months a senior scrutiny officer9 was appointed and overlapped with these arrangements -
although they also exercised some responsibilities as a policy officer within the corporate 
strategy department whilst the DSM reduced his scrutiny role. Just less than one year into 
the study period the DSM left the authority and the senior scrutiny officer assumed the role 
of full-time scrutiny manager, with the continued support of two part-time scrutiny support 
officers. 
The authority has four scrutiny forums (resources, environmental stewardship and 
regeneration, health and social care, and culture and leisure) which are co-ordinated by the 
scrutiny co-ordinating committee. Indeed the primary role of the scrutiny co-ordinating 
committee is to co-ordinate the scrutiny work programme so as to avoid duplication 
amongst scrutiny forums and to resolve any issues of dispute between these. The scrutiny 
forums choose scrutiny topics at the start of the municipal year. Scrutiny co-ordinating 
committee then approves the annual overview and scrutiny work programme and manages 
any referrals to scrutiny from the executive or council over the course of the municipal 
year. During the period of study the chairs of the scrutiny forums were allocated to three 
Labour chairs and one Conservative, the Conservative chair remained constant for this 
period (chairing the culture and leisure scrutiny forum), whilst the Labour chairs were 
shared between four councillors over this period. The (Labour) chair of the health and 
social care forum also chaired scrutiny co-ordinating committee throughout the 2002-2004 
municipal years. 
7 This officer had worked for the authority for about ten years, firstly as a research officer and then as the 
-·. --··- -- . DSM."-C'-"..Co 
8 Of which the author is one. 
9 This officer had a background in the private sector, mainly in public relations and advertising, and as a 
communications officer in another locality. 
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This thesis contains four in-depth 10 scrutiny case studies, representing all of the major 
external scrutiny inquiries to take place in Hartlepool over the course of research. These 
external inquiries make up four of the sixteen major inquiries that took place during this 
period. Given the focus of the thesis on how a local authority relates to its wider 
environment, the decision was made to use the inquiries that investigated issues external to 
the authority but in which the authority was engaging as an agent of community well-being. 
In addition, Ashworth and Snape (2004) have argued that the external scrutiny role has 
tended to remain marginal because elected members have often focussed on perfecting the 
function (internally) before moving onto develop this broader role. There was, therefore, 
the opportunity in Hartlepool to research how an authority engaged with this broader role 
given the access that the student had to the scrutiny process. The research strategy section 
(see below) provides an outline of how each of the case studies will be structured. The case 
studies have been ordered in terms of a 'hierarchy of risk' 11 to the local authority. 
Consequently, the case studies are: 
• Ghost Ships; 
• Flooding; 
• Skateboarding; and 
• Health Inequalities. 
Following the case study chapters, chapters nine and ten form the discussion component of 
the thesis. These chapters bring together the findings of the case studies set against the five 
core research questions (outlined below). The research questions, in tum, have been 
derived from the literature review of government policy and academic research in relation 
to the key concepts (outlined above) and into local government and scrutiny more 
specifically. Consequently, the case studies are illuminated by the analysis derived from 
thematic discussions based on the research questions. Finally, chapter eleven provides an 
overall conclusion to the thesis drawing together common themes about the limits and 
10 Which are distinct from the one-off issues and statutory plans that are also explored by scrutiny. 
11 See chapter nine for a more detailed explanation of this. 
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possibilities of local government scrutiny and governance, and identifying a number of 
possible improvements to the system. 
1.3) Research Problem 
The central research problem for the thesis is how to examine the impact of the trends of 
governance on scrutiny inquiries. An associated aim of my study is to explore the role of 
local government in the broader governance landscape, as revealed through selected 
scrutiny exercises, and to make practical recommendations about the nature and scope of 
scrutiny in the light of this. 
The unit of analysis for the study varies, to some extent, for each of the case studies. This 
is because the case study authority and its partners comprise a large component of the unit 
of analysis, but the influences of the wider UK and global governance context on this also 
need to be explored and taken into account. Consequently there are two strands to my unit 
of analysis, the first of which explores the UK and global influences on the policy context 
of governance for local authorities. This is identified as an enabling and constraining 
structure that defines the range of potential strategies and opportunities available to actors 
(Hay 1995 :205). The second strand of the unit of analysis focuses on local authorities (in 
particular Hartlepool) and their role in the governance arrangements of localised 
governance issues. In discussing the importance of structure and agency, Hay (1995:205) 
argues that we must constantly ask, 'how processes external to the immediate unfolding of 
the events we are interested in have an impact (often in ways that are not immediately 
obvious) upon the context and the strategies, intentions and actions of the agents directly 
involved.' The boundaries between the two strands of the unit of analysis are not clearly 
defined, and therefore the theoretical propositions derived from them are not easily tested. 
This is a key research problem and one that is addressed through the research strategy of a 
single case study of a local authority that can be explored further through multiple case 
studies of scrutiny exercises within the local governance context. The case study inquiries 
were each chosen because they represent the closest relationship to the key research 
·---~problematic of the limits and_ possi\)ij_iti~s ot!oc~l_g~vernment scrutiny in governance, 
during a two year period of insider-research between 2002 and 2004. 
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The following research questions operationalise the research issue into a series of questions 
that can be investigated empirically. 
• Key Research Questions 
1) What are the principal drivers influencing the shift from government to 
governance and to what extent are they evident in each of the scrutiny case studies? 
A variety of factors have acted as drivers for the modernisation of local government and for 
the enhanced role of local governance. New Labour has developed a modernisation agenda 
to equip local government to respond more effectively to those drivers (see above and 
chapters two and three). In particular, the changing role for local authorities has been 
encapsulated in the concept of vibrant community leadership through which councils are 
expected to 'steer' local governance systems rather than act solely as direct providers of 
public services. A central concern is whether this role can provide an adequate response 
given the constraints of those drivers on government locally and nationally. 
This analysis leads to a distinction between exogenous and endogenous governance drivers: 
1. Exogenous, global trends influencing the national and local governance 
arrangements; and 
2. Endogenous, national policies, which develop as responses to global influences and 
provide the drivers for local governance arrangements. 
A sub-set of issues relating to these exogenous and endogenous drivers can be de~ived from 
Weiss' (2003) account of governance as a response to systemic risk. Consequently, the 
scrutiny case studies will explore the extent to which the relevant governance arrangements 
successfully respond to such risk through the process of governed interdependence12• The 
case study approach (seecbelow) iscadoptedjncordecto permit a11 aQ~lysis of the ext~nt to 
12 See Weiss (2003) in chapter three. 
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which these drivers have a consistent impact in a range of different policy contexts and 
settings. 
2) To what extent, and in what ways, do the new powers and roles of 'modernised' 
local government constrain or enable its contribution to wider systems of governance? 
A number of subsidiary questions flow from this core research question. Has the local 
state's powers/policy making capacity shrunk? Have they been distributed to other actors? 
It is clear that there has been a changing pattern of constraints and opportunities in terms of 
the wider potential for the institutions of local government to influence the patterns and 
outcomes of local governance. The potential constraints on local authority powers include: 
• Funding -whilst the Local Government Act 1999 abolished crude and universal 
capping of local authorities, ministers retain the power to limit what they see as 
excessive tax rises. The threat of capping and its application remain as constraints 
on local authority behaviour and powers. In addition, there has been a shift 
towards increasingly 'ring-fenced' budgets, the principal example of which is the 
requirement that local authorities passport LEA money to schools, which means 
that councils cannot transfer money from this budget to other priority areas. This 
is a substantial constraint on local autonomy and budgetary discretion, which has 
the potential to limit the exercise of well-being powers and the wider community 
leadership role. 
• Reduced roles in direct servtce delivery - New Labour's local government 
modernisation agenda and earlier reforms by Conservative governments have 
reduced the scale of direct service delivery. Examples are in social care, where the 
provider role of the local authority has been substantially reduced, the local 
management of schools, and the transfer of council housing to registered social 
landlords. 
•-The Secretary of State has unprecedented-powers-for intervention under the Local_ 
Government Act 1999. This has been allied with further constraints on local 
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discretion through the growth of target setting, performance management and audit 
on the part of central government. 
At the same time the local government modernisation programme offers a number of 
potential opportunities for the enhancement of councils' role and influence. These 
opportunities include: 
• The new community leadership role has the potential to shape the whole local 
governance agenda. Local authorities are given the lead role here and they 
should seek to be the co-ordinating force, bringing together different institutions 
through developing an enabling role. There are three major vehicles for this role 
the LSP, the Community Strategy and Local Area Agreements. 
• The new well-being power is linked to the above role. It has shifted the balance 
of local authority powers away from doing only what they are permitted to do, 
to allowing them to act for the well-being of their communities unless they are 
forbidden to do so. The impact of the culture created through the constraints 
listed above on this role will be explored through the case studies. 
• Scrutiny provides a real opportunity for contributing to community governance. 
It is not limited to a role within local government but can look across the 
governance system and involve a range of stakeholders in its work, including 
the public. Consequently, scrutiny can be a vehicle for extending the role of 
local authorities and be a catalyst for bringing governance actors together to 
agree common goals and aims. 
3) Are the powers, resources and capacity of scrutiny adequate for it to meet the 
aspirations, expectations and responsibilities generated during an inquiry? 
Accepting that there is a wider governance context in localities (as the government seems to 
do-in-the 1998 White Paper 'Modem Local "Government'} has implications for_ the scc:>pe._()f 
scrutiny as a tooVfunction. A critical issue is whether the powers, resources and capacity 
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allocated to scrutiny may relate to (or are more appropriate for) a local government, as 
opposed to a local governance context. If so, do such limited powers undermine the ability 
of scrutiny to function effectively in the wider governance context? What impact does this 
have on the aspirations, expectations and responsibilities of scrutiny? This is a key point 
because if scrutiny is not sufficiently ambitious to scrutinise beyond local authority 
functions it will not understand the context these functions operate within, and without this 
understanding the functions, roles and objectives of scrutiny will be incomplete or 
deficient. In consequence, the quality of scrutiny will be restricted by its limited 
understanding of the system within which it operates. 
Scrutiny has the power to call witnesses, although only local authority and NHS officers are 
compelled to attend. It is also possible to call-in executive decisions and refer them back to 
the cabinet, which then must either change its policy or decline to do so and explain why to 
the relevant scrutiny body. Nevertheless, the key power of scrutiny is as an influencer 
through in-depth evidence based work the reports of a scrutiny committee can influence 
those with more direct decision making powers. Local authorities were not directly given 
any new resources for supporting scrutiny, although funding has gone to national bodies to 
disseminate best practice in scrutiny. Dedicated officer support and the councillors 
themselves are the key resources for the scrutiny function. The extent to which the powers, 
resources and capacity of scrutiny are adequate in relation to aspirations, expectations and 
responsibilities will be tested through the case studies. 
4) To what extent is scrutiny as a process of local government reform able to influence 
wider processes of governance? 
The potential for scrutiny to extend its values and influence across local governance 
processes is related to the powers of local government within the governance system. 
However, scrutiny is part of the wider governance system and its influence can extend 
beyond the formal powers of local authorities by making recommendations to and giving 
advice to external partners in the governance system. The influence of scrutiny in relation 
-to thisrole_is a key consideration,ofthe_,thesis. _ 
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The scrutiny function has been created in local authorities to balance the new political 
management arrangements, act as a forum for councillors to represent the public to the 
council, and help integrate, within the wider local governance system, the council's role as 
a community leader. Through an investigative evidence-based approach councillors are 
expected to hold the council and external partners to account. Scrutiny is also intended to 
be a key influencer in the governance system, and must do so with no formal decision 
making powers. Many elected members are unhappy with the new political management 
structures of local authorities and they perceive a reduction in political influence, for the 
majority of councillors, over the management of local authorities (see, for example, 
SCTLG&R 2002 and Stoker et al 2002). Consequently a number of questions emerge in 
relation to the influence of scrutiny: 
1. To what extent is scrutiny able to influence the executive function following the 
separation of the executive and scrutiny, under the local government modernisation 
agenda? 
2. How far can scrutiny impact on the executive's influence in the community 
leadership role? 
3. What other routes, if any, does scrutiny have into the community leadership role? 
4. Does it have more or less influence in areas not directly managed by the executive? 
5. What impact does scrutiny have over areas directly managed by the executive? 
Modem councils operate within a wider governance system. What they do in localities 
cannot be understood fully without examining the vertical and horizontal power 
arrangements between local authorities and the various actors involved in the governance 
process. The following research question explores the changing role of the state and 
scrutiny's relationship to it. 
5) Wbat light does ~tbe study ofsc_tutiny sb~~!lc t"e r~!e of, and nature ~f tbe ~~~e 
locally and nationally? 
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While the influence of scrutiny is an important facet ofthis thesis, the scrutiny process also 
provides a window for scrutiny members, officers and participants into the role of, and 
nature of the state locally and nationally. Scrutiny is part of the local governance system 
and it is also part of the regulatory processes of governance. It is a reflection of the 
changing role of the local state, and also an instrument of it. Consequently, the scrutiny 
process offers the opportunity to explore the role of local government in local governance. 
Through undertaking scrutiny inquiries governance actors can come together for particular 
issues to explain what they do, and to work towards a common agenda. The extent to 
which this is happening will be explored throughout the case studies. 
Governance is a rejection of the rigid polarization between the anarchy of the market and 
hierarchy of the state, in favour of heterarchy, i.e. horizontal self-organisation among 
mutually interdependent actors (Jessop 2000:15). The role of the state nationally and 
locally and the governance arrangements that exist across different sectors are important 
factors, which need to be explored here. Whilst governance and government exist at 
different levels and in different contexts so success at one level may be dependent on 
decisions and influences at other levels (Jessop 2000:19). 
Kooiman (2003) identifies three orders of governance. The first of these entails day-to-day 
interactions between governance actors; the second involves the maintenance of the 
institutions, in which attention is focused on the structural aspects of interactions; and the 
third order is metagovernance, in which various norms are established that form a 
framework that directs and sets boundaries for governing at the first and second governance 
orders. 
1.4) Research Strategy 
The research strategy was for the researcher to have the role of a scrutiny officer, providing 
opportunities to acquire professional competencies in this role as well as take the approach 
- -----ofan-insider-"researcher engaging in reflective practice.~,1'he, nature,and extent of the access 
I 
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gained from the insider approach provides a good basis for assessing the impact of the local 
government modernisation agenda on a local authority. 
The work role involves the following elements: 
• Attendance at all scrutiny meetings; 
• Attendance at a limited number of scrutiny chairs briefings; 
• Attendance at a limited number of cabinet meetings; 
• Attendance at full council meetings; 
• Formal and informal discussions with members and officers in the council; 
• Working on reports and preparation of briefing notes for scrutiny meetings; 
• Presenting reports; and 
• Local knowledge from living and socialising in the town. 
The research approach methodologically is, to a large extent, defined by the work role as 
the focus, scope and methods of the study must relate to the scrutiny process and the 
window it provides onto the governance landscape. Because the study is limited to one 
local authority I have adopted the case study method for my work. The single case study 
provides an opportunity for a detailed and intensive investigation, using methods of 
participant observation and documentary analysis (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The scrutiny 
case studies are 'embedded' in the single-case study of Hartlepool Borough Council; 
consequently the context involves grounded experience in a local authority through a 
participant-observer/reflective-practitioner role. The scrutiny case studies are holistic and 
global in design (Yin 2003:52). In this respect the 'whole system of governance' is 
explored through each individual case study for the topic under scrutiny. 
The scrutiny process itself will be used as a basis for 'tracing' the outline of the system of 
governance. This is further informed through the structure I have used for the case studies, 
which is a combination of 'linear-analytic structures' (Yin 2003:152-3) and 'theory-
building' (Yin 2003:154). The former starts with the issue or problem being studied and a 
review of-the relevant "priot'liternture;~ar.a- then proceeds to"-cover-the'metliods-used;-the 
findings from the data analysed and the conclusions and implications of the findings. The 
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latter is concerned with the development of a sequence of sections that will follow some 
theory-building logic, with each section revealing a new part of theoretical argument being 
made. Furthermore, through undertaking a multiple-case study approach, which includes 
multiple narratives and a series of questions and answers, the reader can make cross-case 
comparisons from the questions and answers to each individual case (Yin 2003:147-8). 
The case studies will be organised under the following headings, the reasons for which are 
explained below. 
• Background and Purpose of Scrutiny Inquiry - it is necessary to establish the 
origins of each scrutiny inquiry and briefly describe the broader context from which 
it emerges. In addition it is important to summarise the reasons for topic selection -
every scrutiny inquiry starts for a reason and this partially determines the route of 
scrutiny through the governance landscape. Particular scrutiny topics are chosen 
due to referrals from the executive/council; committee members expressing an 
interest in pursuing a topic; officers scoping issues, and getting member feedback; 
and in response to central government legislation or to statutory responsibilities e.g. 
through changes to health service provision in localities. The remit for inquiries are 
established at the start. This may change during an inquiry, but where an inquiry 
'comes from' often determines the angle of the 'window' into the governance 
landscape. By tracking an inquiry from the outset the rationale, scope and 
appropriateness of the original purpose are tested. This should demonstrate both the 
impact of local governance on an inquiry, and also the impact of governance on the 
scope of the scrutiny process as a whole - and associated issues such as whether 
scrutiny should only focus on issues it can influence directly. 
• Role of Scrutiny - there are commonly held to be four or five roles for scrutiny to 
undertake (dependent on whether the policy development and review role is 
separated). These five roles are: holding the executive to account; policy review; 
policy development; best value reviews; and external scrutiny (DETR, 2000). An 
inquiry does not have to be rigidly set within one of these roles but can cut across 
them. It is important to track which of these functions scrutiny fulfils during an 
inquiry so as to able to -judge -4he ~effectiveness of an inquiry in line with the~ 
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approach it takes. Furthermore the effectiveness of scrutiny generally within these 
various roles, can be tested here. 
• Governance Actors Involved - it is important to identify the various actors who 
are involved in a scrutiny inquiry, and those who are not but have exerted some 
influence over the issue. There are different categories of actors involved in the 
governance process. A provisional list of these categories includes: council 
officers/departments; portfolio holders; government departments; regulatory bodies; 
regional and sub-regional arms of government; 'other' public bodies; private 
companies; public and community involvement; and the media. 
• Conduct of the Inquiry -this section will provide a record of each of the scrutiny 
meetings, and also other council meetings such as cabinet and full council meetings 
of relevance to the scrutiny inquiry. The purpose of each of the meetings will be 
introduced and this will be followed by an overview of; the evidence provided, key 
issues raised and the findings reached during the meeting. 
• Discussion - the final section of the case studies will be in the form of a general 
discussion of the lessons learnt from the case studies in relation to the key research 
issue of the limits and possibilities of local government scrutiny and governance. In 
addition a number of issues of relevance to the key research questions will be 
flagged up in this section, prior to a more systematic analysis of these in the 
discussion chapters. 
The case study chapters are supported by systematic data collection based on a variety of 
sources of evidence gathered from the participant-observer role within the council. 
Consequently, the minutes and reports from each of the scrutiny meetings have been used 
as the basis on which the scrutiny case studies have been constructed. In particular, the 
'conduct of the inquiry' sections in each of the case studies rely heavily on these 
documentary sources to provide an account of what happened at the scrutiny meetings. 
Appendix B provides a record of the minutes and reports that have been used for each of 
the case studies. The data collection here is further supported by a research diary based on 
my own account of each of the scrutiny meetings. Supplementary (hand written) notes and 
-- observations were-also-added4ohand-outs and reports-presented atmeetings and_have been 
used to add further insights to the case study data collection. 
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1.5) Research Methods 
Robson (2002:382) argues that it is increasingly common for researchers to carry out a 
study directly concerned with the setting in which they work. This is not only a reflection 
of the growing influence of reflective practice in professional development but provides a 
degree of access that is not otherwise easily achieved: in other words, 'insider-research'. 
Robson (2002) argues that there are clear advantages with insider research. These include 
intimate knowledge of the context of the study and the politics of the institution (both its 
formal hierarchy and how it 'really works'), and that the researcher will know how best to 
approach people, and should have 'street credibility' as somebody who understands what 
the job entails. However, the insider research role has a number of disadvantages according 
to Robson (2002:382), which include having the dual role of being both a researcher and a 
colleague and thus being 'different' from co-workers; the possible discomfort of 
interviewing colleagues as 'research subjects'; having access to confidential or sensitive 
information; and more fundamentally achieving objectivity given the close contact with the 
host organisation and colleagues. However, some of these dichotomies are breaking down 
as reflective practice becomes a more common approach among public services 
professionals. And while the research is clearly undertaken from the 'standpoint' of a local 
government officer, it is referenced against a set of research questions framed for the 
purpose of intellectual enquiry rather than to serve one or other interest. 
Insider research provides good opportunities for 'participant observation', given that the 
role by its nature requires participation and detracts from introducing a research instrument 
such as a questionnaire. Robson (2002:31 0) argues that a major advantage of observation as 
a technique is its directness - you do not ask people about their views, feelings or attitudes; 
you watch what they do and listen to what they say. Robson (2002) moves on to argue that 
data gained from observation contrasts with, and often usefully complements, insights 
gained from other techniques. In my case this approach complements and tests insights 
from my literature reviews and theoretical framework which were then used to inform my 
· --~research-·questions~ -The use of the participanLobserver_ approach to the rese~r~lLw~ 
effectively given to the researcher through the nature of the access that had been negotiated 
29 
prior to the study starting. However, this role was also used in preference to interview and 
questionnaire responses, which according to Robson (2002:31 0) are notorious for 
discrepancies between what people say they have done, or will do, and what they actually 
did, or will do. The approach of this thesis has been to observe what happens in a 'direct 
encounter' with my data. 
Jacobs {1970:ix) talking about participant observers argues that, 'the real skill of the 
sociologist lies in his perfection of that which is essentially social in his ability to "take on 
the role of the other".' The professional role adopted formalises the 'other' and provides 
access to the subject area through working as a scrutiny support officer, which then forms 
part of the basis for the research. However, there is a classical dilemma over the 
participant-observer role as a research method as it calls on the researcher to fulfil two 
(often conflicting) roles (Yin 1972:3). As a participant the researcher is gaining insights an 
outsider would not but these tend to be subjective experiences, whilst as an observer he/she 
is dealing with the objective world. A participant-observer is trying to maximise 
opportunities in both these roles (Yin 1972:3). Participant-observer evaluation can be an 
eclectic blend of techniques designed to interpret the real world of the 'area of focus' 
(Salmen 1987:6). 
A major concern about the participant observation role is that the observer will affect the 
situation under observation. Robson (2002:311) identifies a key problem here as being 
how can we tell what behaviour would have been like if it had not been observed? 
Consequently, it is difficult to claim with certainty that the situation under investigation has 
not been affected by the research. Nevertheless, the participation of the key actors 
(councillors) in my research is not really open to question because the council and scrutiny 
process are long-standing and embedded forums for participation. The nature of the access 
described here also means that the setting is not contrived and, therefore, the direct 
observations derived from participation in this setting avoid artificiality (Robson 
2002:311 ). My interventions in the organisation, through writing and presenting reports, 
conducting background research for these, and arranging contributions to scrutiny meetings 
--' fromofficers.and externaL-witnesses are_unlikely~to"influence whether participation occurs, 
but may influence the nature of participation, in terms of the nature of discussion in 
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scrutiny meetings. A further criticism (Robson 2002) of participant observation is that it is 
a time consuming method. However, in some ways this is ideally suited to the timescale of 
a PhD. 
The notion of reflective practice is closely associated with that of 'learning by doing' 
(Schon 1987:2). Schon argues that in professional practice there is a core of 'artistry' 
which is rigorous in its own terms. There is an art of problem framing, art of 
implementation and an art of improvisation for different professions (Schon 1987: 13). In 
this respect I am not being taught what I need to know, but 'coached' - i.e. learning by 
doing. This provides a valuable insight into the local government and scrutiny 'community 
of practitioners'. By learning a practice the researcher learns the conventions, constraints, 
languages and appreciative systems, their repertoire of exemplars, systematic knowledge 
and patterns of knowledge-in-action (Schon 1987 :36-37). The data is timely because it 
occurs at the time of happening rather than through post-hoc recollection and 
rationalisation. In my case, my own notes and observations can be supported with reports 
and minutes from scrutiny or council meetings 
Yin (2003:13) focuses on two elements to the 'logic of design' for case study research. 
Firstly a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly defined (Yin 2003: 13). Applied to my research the 'phenomenon' is 
local government modernisation, and the development of the scrutiny function in particular, 
set within the 'context' of governance. The contextual conditions are highly pertinent to 
the role of scrutiny in local governance. Secondly the case study as a research strategy is 
an all encompassing method covering the logic of design; data collection techniques; and, 
specific approaches to data analysis (Yin 2003:14). The prior development of theoretical 
propositions helps to guide the data collection and analysis (Yin 2003:14). The findings are 
limited (up to a degree) to the case study authority, but I believe that it is possible to draw 
some general conclusions/recommendations from them as well. This is because my work is 
concerned with situating a local authority, and its scrutiny function, within the broader 
- ------'-trends of governance,-that cut across all-localities to a greater-odesser extent. 
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Yin (2003:114) argues that developing a descriptive framework for organising the case 
study is a general analytic strategy. In this study case study headings have been developed 
to provide a framework for description. However, this is not the only analytic tool being 
used for the research. Yin (2003: Ill) identifies relying on theoretical propositions as the 
preferred strategy for case studies. Theoretical propositions about causal relations can be 
extremely useful in guiding case study analysis, according to Yin. The design of the case 
study has involved the development of theoretical propositions, research questions, reviews 
of literature and new hypotheses (Yin 2003:112). Indeed the case study has been designed 
to be part of a broader multi-method study, in which the larger study encompasses the case 
study (Yin 2003: 150). The overall report of the study will be based on evidence from the 
case study and other methods. As Dopson (2003:224) argues, case studies can shed light 
on complex interdependencies between groups and social processes; uncover underlying 
patterns; assist in understanding unanticipated outcomes of change; and tease out aspects of 
receptive/non-receptive contexts for change. In this respect the insights gained from the 
case study are very useful for informing and shaping the development of the literature 
based, and theoretical aspects, of my research. 
Dopson (2003:222) suggests that failure to give sufficient attention to context often 
happens in case study research, but exploring the context is a critical part of a 'robust 
strategy for analysis synthesis.' The broader theoretical discussion of the thesis attempts to 
place the case study within the context of the local government modernisation agenda 
(Chapter 2) and governance (Chapter 3). Dopson makes the criticism that a lot of case 
study analysis is reduced to isolated processes and a static state. This criticism is bypassed 
to some extent in my thesis through the longitudinal dimension of the case studies. 
Through focusing on the broader exploration of contexts (through the case study issues) the 
profound effects of the relationships and contexts that have emerged over time on the case 
study area are acknowledged. 
Dopson (2003) also highlights the importance of historical factors in defining the 'social 
context'. Alorig similar lines Llewellyn discusses the importance of storytelling and 
- ___ _._ narrative'-in analysing~amodernisation-initiative;c4'his-~is csignificant ·because-storytelling 
allows a certain thrust to be maintained, and the narrative implications of modernisation to 
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be considered when it is linked to a basic narrative structure (Llewellyn 200 I :35). The case 
study can then be understood through pre-existing narratives or, if not, new narratives have 
to be created. As Llewellyn says modernisation lends itself to narrative, it implies 
movement from one state to another. Thus it is possible to make a distinction between 
traditional and modem local government embedded in stories that reproduce the basic 
narrative structure of modernisation in local settings. If traditional practices persist (such as 
scrutiny forums reproducing committee styles of working) or re-emerge this would suggest 
that there is a loss of 'thrust' in modernisation (Llewellyn 2001 :38). Furthermore Llewellyn 
is conscious of the 'subtle mechanisms of control' operating between central and local 
government, and how modernisation can impose a narrative structure that constrains local 
actors. The role of storytelling and narrative can be to focus on the interaction between 
central government definitions of progress and local interpretive practices (Llewellyn 
2001 :38). 
A central component of my thesis focuses on mapping/defining the context (which includes 
the local government modernisation agenda, governance, and broader socio-economic and 
political trends) that is shaping the work that I do in the council for my participant observer 
role. This context is theoretical, and ideological, and therefore contestable. But both theory 
and ideology are prevalent in defining local government institutions, and also within local 
authorities, such as Hartlepool. Because of the contested nature of reality Denzin argues 
that believability is not so much about validity as it is about verisimilitude (mapping the 
real). In qualitative research the truth of a text must always be aligned with the 
verisimilitude it establishes, but the grounding of the text can always be contested, 
therefore, the verisimilitude will always be deferred (Denzin 1999: 316). Denzin moves on 
to argue that truth cannot be established by its verisimilitude and visa versa because they 
can both be challenged. Nevertheless accepting this as a starting point for the research does 
not negate attempting to devise a strategy, which is geared towards meeting challenges to 
the truth of the text in the most robust manner possible. Jessop (2003:7) argues that a 
reflexive approach to considering governance involves inquiring a,bout the construction of 
possible objects of governance and reflecting on why this rather than another object of 
-governance has become -dominant, hegemonic or naturalised'.-Mapping-,the,scrutiny case 
studies on to the theoretical framework of the thesis poses internal challenges to the 
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verisimilitude of the text, which advances the overall theoretical framework when it is 
returned to and expanded on in the concluding chapters (nine to eleven). 
1.6) 'Working' Conceptual Framework 
The development of a 'working conceptual framework' allows for explanation at a deeper 
level than solely empirical observations, and has been developed largely from a literature 
review. The key concepts are tested against the findings from the participant-observer I 
action based research, and in tum the material gathered through the professional placement 
is analysed by returning to the key concepts. Consequently a 'working' conceptual 
framework develops through the dialogue between the concepts and insider based research 
methods. The framework is provisional prior to the accounts of scrutiny exercises and 
consequently serves the purpose of being an organisational framework for this empirical 
material. 
There are important trends surrounding, and within, the governance of local communities 
that need to be highlighted so as to situate the success or failure of local authorities, and 
their scrutiny functions, within a broader context. It will then be possible to assess whether 
there is a more difficult and potentially less rewarding role for local authorities in this 
context. This is critical to the role of scrutiny in local authorities. Conceptually 
globalisation and the associated economic, social and political model has been a key 
(although not always direct) driver in the transformation of the local state, through which 
the role of local government has changed as the local state has become a more complex 
system of local governance. In this context can scrutiny achieve the policy objectives 
defined for it? Two questions emerge from this: do we have a system of local governance 
in Hartlepool in the ways suggested by the literature? Has scrutiny achieved its objective, 
even partly, in this context? 
The onset of globalisation and its relationship to this particular mode of governance has 
created.a .. context in which~there is, growing complexity_and fragmentation in nationaLand 
local politics, and public spheres. However, whilst a model of globalisation is d_eyeloped in 
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chapter three, and used to ground the analysis of factors leading to changes in local 
governance, it is important to acknowledge that this is not an uncontested concept. Indeed 
a prominent critique of globalisation theory from Hirst and Thompson (1996) is that the 
globalisation thesis makes it appear as though national governments are powerless in the 
face of global trends. They move on to argue that most globalisation theory lacks historical 
depth and, therefore, paints the current situation as more unique, and firmly entrenched, 
than it is. A further criticism, outlined by Smith and Baylis (1997:10), is that globalisation 
is very uneven in its effects and, in fact, tends to apply largely to the developed world. 
Consequently, there is a danger that the extent and depth of globalisation can be 
overestimated. Giddens in his 1999 Reith Lectures identified a group of thinkers, he labels 
the sceptics, who do not see anything especially different about the contemporary global 
economy compared with previous periods. Most countries gain only a small amount of 
income from external trade, and a good deal of economic exchange is between regions, 
rather than worldwide (Giddens l999a). In this respect Watson and Hay (2003) argue that 
political rhetoric has triumphed over the economic realities of globalisation. The issue is 
returned to in more detail in chapter three; here it is appropriate to note that the scrutiny 
exercises were used to understand the impact of globalisation in various ways, from the 
global trade in obsolete war ships - and the local regulatory issues this raises - to the spread 
of skateboarding and pressure for local authorities to adapt their local provision to a global 
recreational phenomenon. 
A further key concept in the working conceptual framework is that of post-modernity. 
Bauman has described modernity as the product of two 'novel developments'. Firstly the 
emergence of a new type of state power with the resources and will necessary to shape and 
administer the social system according to a preconceived model of order; and secondly the 
establishment of a relatively autonomous, self-managing discourse able to generate such a 
model complete with the practices its implementation required (Bauman 1987:2). In the 
post-modem world there has been a divorce between the state and intellectual discourse, 
according to Bauman. Bauman (1987:3) rightly stresses that modem and post-modem 
practices co-exist but in varying proportions in each of the two eras. In the current era the 
- ----naturecof~govemance,.is~suit~~ to,many_differentmodels of order, which all hav~ th_eir own 
system of logic and autonomous practices. Increasingly the functions of the state have to 
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be carried out by different agencies that specialise in different expert systems. The relative 
chaos here creates a decline in accountability, and increased complexity that combine to 
create a 'confused' state, which in effect reduces the efficacy (if not the amount) of state 
intervention. This raises questions over the role of scrutiny, not only in processes of 
governance, but also meta-governance, and the remit, powers and capacity it has to fulfil 
this role. 
The increasing number of agencies delivering services at a local level is a governing 
reaction to the conditions of governability, which require governance solutions. The key 
concepts of partnership, accountability and governance relate to this part of the conceptual 
framework. A related issue here is whether scrutiny can have a meaningful role in 
responding to the processes of fragmentation; or does the very nature of this fragmentation 
undermine the potential that scrutiny might otherwise have to be an effective force? The 
potential to direct change at a local level is limited by the capacity and resources of local 
authorities to cut across and through this confusion. Scrutiny has an important role in 
firstly highlighting the confusions inherent in contemporary governance, and secondly 
through holding the actions of those in the complex local governance arrangements to 
account. In this respect it is a key enabling governance mechanism/tool. This context also 
challenges the expectations about the role of local government, and the ability of local 
government to meet those expectations. The local government modernisation agenda is the 
latest attempt by central government to react to the role of local government in this 
developing context. The scrutiny function is, therefore, both a key part of the local 
government modernisation agenda and my route into testing some of the key concepts 
underpinning the shift to local governance. 
1.7) Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the key research issue, elaborating it as a problematic 
concerning the role of local government in a local governance arena framed in 
~--contemporary conditions of-globalisation. It has identified. the use,ofa 'scrutiny window' as 
the main tool for examining the limits and possibilities of scrutiny and local government in 
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this context, investigated from the standpoint of an insider-researcher using, predominantly, 
participant observation as a basis for creating a dialogue between concepts and evidence. 
The working concepts for this purpose is derived from literature reviews presented in 
chapters two and three. 
The development of the research questions plays a crucial role in operationalising the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. These represent a sequence of questions that closely 
relate to the overall structure of the thesis and use theory-building logic. Each question is 
devised to reveal a new part of the theoretical argument being made. Consequently, the 
research questions provide a 'bridge' between the literature and theory-building elements of 
the study and the methods used to collect the field data. They both test, and are tested by, 
the findings of the scrutiny case study inquiries. 
Thus, following the account of the case studies a more detailed (theoretical) discussion of 
the findings is provided in chapters nine and ten and the discussions here are structured, and 
ordered 13, around the research questions. Chapter nine is effectively a meta-level of 
analysis through which the limits and possibilities of local government and scrutiny can be 
explored, which are then considered further in chapter ten. 
Essentially the theoretical framework (which is tested across the discussion chapters) 
develops the following arguments. Firstly, in highly globalised markets, which are typified 
by systemic risks, there are strong pressures on actors to co-operate to manage these risks. 
Secondly, under the influence of global trends state capacity has changed and the state has 
consequently become less of a direct provider of services and more of an enabler of service 
delivery. Thirdly, set against this context governance can be viewed as a response to the 
changing demands on governing. Fourthly, following a process of fragmentation of local 
state capacity New Labour's local government modernisation agenda can be viewed as a 
process of reconceptualising the role of local government in light of the trends described 
above. It is the role and capacity of local government within this context, as revealed 
through the scrutiny function when focused on external issues, which forms the empirical 
- --~-heartofthe thesis.· .. ~.- -- -~-~ ---- ~c~- - -'- ,_c...,c - ----------
13 Chapter nine focuses on research questions one and two and chapter ten focuses on research questions three 
to five. 
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2) The Local Government Modernisation Agenda and Scrutiny 
2.1) Introduction 
New Labour came to power in 1997 with the declared intention to modernise local 
government. This chapter examines the local government modernisation agenda within the 
context of how New Labour sees local authorities functioning in the governance of a 
locality. The chapter's structure is divided into two main parts. Firstly the modernisation 
agenda is explored across four key themes: political management structures; continuous 
service improvement; democratic renewal; and governance mechanisms such as the well-
being powers, community leadership and partnerships. Secondly, the overview and 
scrutiny function is explored in greater detail because it is the 'window' through which this 
thesis explores the modernisation agenda, and, therefore, through which the limits and 
possibilities of local government in local governance is explored. Snape et al (2002:105) 
argue that overview and scrutiny is significant because it, 'can be seen as the glue that 
binds together all the elements of the modernisation agenda. It not only binds together the 
internal structure of the executive (or policy committees) and full council, but also the 
council's role as a community leader, linked to the well-being power, the new ethical 
framework, partnership arrangements and best value.' 
2.2) A Brief History of Local Government 
Byrne traces the origins of the local government system as we now know it back to the 
early nineteenth century, and to the impact of industrialisation and urbanisation (Byrne 
1990: 12). These forces required action at a local level, implying a more formal role for 
local government in delivering services. In England, the existence of local government in 
the form of locally elected councils dates from the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act. The 
Act was an attempt to remove corruption and inefficiency through elections, open public 
meetings and carrying out the regular auditing of accounts in about two thirds of the 
boroughs in England and Wales (Byrne 1990: 13). Thus, both the delivery of services, and 
-- - their .. c_political. management and ~accountability _have. been~key_ themes io_ tb~. oyerall 
management of local government from its inception right through to the present day. 
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Local government in Britain does not have independent status or a constitutional right to 
exist; parliament is sovereign and the political party in power has generally been willing to 
deploy these powers to control local government (Weir and Beetham 1999:244). Weir and 
Beetham argue that local councils could only do what central government empowered them 
to do, and central government could direct them to act in great detail, against their own 
assessment of local need, if it chose to do so. Consequently Blackman (1995:19) argued 
that local government in the UK has contrasted with local government in most European 
countries; in which local authorities have 'general competence' where they can undertake 
any activities that meet the needs of their areas. Nevertheless Weir and Beetham (1999) 
state that historically local government in Britain has 'done more' than its European 
counterparts. However John (1997:254) points out that even during the expansion of local 
authority functions during the 1950s and 1960s, local authorities were more agencies 
administering welfare functions than entrenched institutions of the democratic polity. 
Between the 1950s and 1970s there was a broad consensus about the role of local 
government. The public wanted services such as education, community care and housing 
to be provided by local government (Audit Commission 1988). Consequently, Painter 
(1991 :23) argues that during this period local government played a key role in the Fordist 
mode of regulation through providing unprofitable universal services for which there was 
public demand, whilst having widespread involvement in planning and regulatory activity. 
Local authorities, therefore, played a key role in developing the welfare state; however the 
combination of economic recession and the drive to restrain public expenditure under the 
Thatcher governments led to local authorities becoming a prime target for cuts (Rhodes 
1997:113). The Fordist consensus was no more. Under Thatcher the provider role of local 
government was rolled back through the expansion of Compulsive Competitive Tendering 
(CCT) for public services, privatisation of council housing, the growth of a mixed economy 
of social care provision, the loss of powers in education, dependence on private developers 
for regeneration, and cash limited budgets under pressure to keep pace with new needs 
---(Blackman 1995:41). Furthermore, there was a move towards_ centralisation, through 
increased control over local government expenditure, intensification of intervention in local 
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authorities' internal workings and the removal of functions to bodies responsible to central 
government (Jones & Stewart 2002: 17). However during this period an 'enabling' role was 
also advocated for local authorities through which they assessed needs, outsourced service 
provision, worked in partnership with other agencies, made plans for services not directly 
under their control, and reviewed performance (Blackman 1995:29). 
Weir and Beetham (1999:245) suggest that, 'the experience of the past twenty years has 
shown that central government can by increment reduce local government to a mere 
administrative shadow of local democracy.' However, Leach and Wilson (2002:666) see 
this as a transitional phase in the development of local government, where the dominant 
service delivery paradigm was challenged from a number of perspectives - markets, 
partnerships, localism and governance. Although the radicalism of the Thatcher decade 
suggests that local government had a golden age, which was destroyed by the centre, in 
reality there has never been a period in which local government has been stable or 
autonomous (John 1997:254). Furthermore the impact of the Conservative years was not 
simply about a decline in local government powers but also a change towards an enabling 
role within wider local governance system. Thus, Labour's modernisation agenda is set 
within a historical context of central government control, on the one hand, and more recent 
changes in the powers and role of local government, on the other. 
2.3) The Local Government Modernisation Agenda 
This section will explore a number of key strands to the, local government modernisation 
agenda. The government's modernising local government agenda (DETR 1998:5), 'is 
seeking nothing less than a radical refocusing of councils' traditional roles. A fundamental 
shift of culture throughout local government is essential so that councils become outward 
looking and responsive.' Yet, according to an article in the Local Government Chronicle 
(LGC) at the time, councils were concerned that the pressure for reform was accompanied 
by few rewards (LGC 29th May 1998). However Stoker, writing in the LGC on 20th March 
1998, argued that, whilst central government retained the threat of prescriptive intervention, 
-local authorities have an essentiabrole oin delivering objectives. _Moreover councils_are the 
preferred suppliers of local visions and the focus for partnerships; the reform strategy is 
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based on local authorities developing their own solutions and strategies to the challenges 
they face (G.Stoker, in, LGC 20th March 1998). Nonetheless the potential threat of 
interventions could have been perceived by some councils as contradicting the development 
of local visions. Consequently, there were a number of contradictions evident in the early 
stages of the local government modernisation agenda. These centred on whether there was 
a new outward looking governance role for councils set against the growing threat of 
central government intervention in the workings of local authorities. 
The local government modernisation agenda was refreshed in 2004 through a consultation 
process on a ten year vision for local government (ODPM 2004). The government's 
thinking has been influenced by the 'New Localism' debate, which has its origins in a New 
Local Government Network (NLGN) manifesto in autumn 2000, and in Corry and Stoker's 
(2002) pamphlet, New Localism: refashioning the centre-local relationship. The debate 
has emphasised that powers and resources should be devolved from the centre to localities 
and neighbourhoods, within an agreed framework of minimum standards, and that local 
government should focus on community leadership more than on direct service provision 
(Corry et al2004:8). Neighbourhoods have increasingly become the focal point as they are 
deemed to be key to both stronger local democracy, and holistic governance for individuals 
and local communities. The continued importance of joining-up elements of the 
modernisation agenda through additional emphasis on the community leadership role has 
also been emphasised (ODPM 2004 and 2005). 
2.3.1) Political Management Structures 
According to Goss's summary of the government's rationale (2001:123) the reform of 
political structures is central to the modernisation agenda, 'the council committee system 
with its lumbering procedures, nineteenth century formality and endless capacity for 
procrastination was seen as the problem. Councillors were secretive and acted behind 
closed doors.' The government had undertaken an extensive consultation process to support 
--this cview"leading~up-to the publicationcof,the~l998- White -Paper- (DETR l998); Cole. 
(200 1 : 19) argues that the government viewed the old committee system as inefficient and 
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opaque, reinforcing a culture in which members and officers took a paternalistic view of 
services. These views have elements of caricature or over-simplification given 
developments under the traditional structure of, for example, social care markets and the 
local management of schools. Such developments suggest that th~'old structures were not 
incapable of renewal but also raise questions about the extent to,wnich new structures are a 
prerequisite of cultural change. Nevertheless, the reform of political structures can be 
interpreted as an attempt by government to equip local authorities to function more 
effectively in the emerging governance context. 
The Labour government decided that for councils to become community leaders new 
political structures needed to be put in place. With the aim of providing local choice and 
diversity three new models were offered to councils: a directly elected mayor with cabinet, 
cabinet with a leader, and directly elected mayor with a council manager. A last minute 
change to the Local Government Act 2000 introduced a fourth option of a 'revised 
committee structure' for authorities with less than 85000 people. The preferred model of 
the government and some academics alike was for a directly elected mayor, as a highly 
visible politician with clear accountability and powers to act (Goss 2001: 124). However 
most authorities have opted for an executive cabinet, maintaining collective decision-
making and the traditional links to political groups (Ibid). 
The government believes the benefits of the new political management system will lead to 
greater: 
• efficiency- through a smaller, quicker and more responsive executive; 
• transparency - through clearly defining roles and the work of the scrutiny 
process; and 
• accountability - through increased transparency those responsible for decisions 
can more readily be held to account (Stoker 2002:425). 
Leach et al (2003: 17) highlight the need to incorporate speed, efficiency, accountability, 
-transparency, inclusiveness-and-openness--as -key'' objectives~of-the'modernisation-agenda. 
They further argue that authorities tend to prioritise amongst these objectives. This is, 
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perhaps, not surprising given the complexities and internal contradictions (e.g. speed versus 
inclusiveness) of these objectives, together with the sometimes competing pressures of 
broader governance trends (see below). 
A key element m all the new models for political management is the executive/non-
executive split: 'Both the executive and backbench roles of councillors are vital to the 
health of local democracy and community leadership. Each role can only be fully effective 
when it is separated from the other' (DETR 1998:26). The role of the executive is to 
propose the policy framework and implement policies within this, whilst backbench 
councillors represent their constituents' 14 in decisions of full council, suggest policy 
improvements, and scrutinise the executive's policy proposals and their implementation 
(DETR 1998:26). 
Researchers have concluded that strong executive leadership and strong scrutiny, with a 
high degree of independence between the two, has been the model most closely identified 
with effective performance (ODPM 2005:14). However, the Select Committee on Transport 
Local Government and the Regions (SCTLG&R 2002:2) report on, How the Local 
Government Act 2000 is Working, suggests that from the councils they consulted non-
executive members felt excluded and less well-informed, which impacted on their role as 
'community leaders'. The committee concluded that this has been too easily dismissed as a 
transitional, rather than an inherent problem with the legislation. Indeed, this view has 
been supported by Ashworth's and Snape's (2004) audit of scrutiny research, which 
highlights the lack of influence of scrutiny as leading to an imbalance in councillor roles. 
Consequently, Wistow and Banaras (2005:35) suggest that the overview and scrutiny 
function has struggled to become a fully embedded and functioning component of local 
authorities' political management structures. 
Stewart (2003) argues that due to major changes to the legislation over the course of its 
preparation and enactment the separation of executive and scrutiny roles became less 
__ , ________________ :__ ___ - --- -=-·-- - ---
14 Through the separation of roles and the move away from the committee system it is felt that councillors will 
be spending less time in pointless meetings and are consequently able to spend more time with their 
constituents, thereby representing them more effectively. 
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distinct. The new structures are now primarily based on a distinction between the role of 
the council in determining policy and the role of the executive in implementing that 
policy15 (Stewart 2003:74). Leach et al (2003:23) argue that full council has the potential 
to become a powerful politically representative body charged with ensuring local good 
governance. To do so, the council needs to open itself up to public debate, internal debate, 
focus on policy development and on holding the executive to account, and generally 
become more inclusive and deliberative (Leach et al 2003:23). Consequently, full council 
plays an important (and often underplayed) role in the political management of local 
authorities in the governance system. 
2.3.2) Continuous Service Improvement 
The continuous improvement of services has been a key strand of the Labour government's 
modernisation agenda. However, only a brief outline is provided here as the relative 
importance of this strand to the theme of my dissertation does not correspond to its 
importance within the modernisation agenda. 
The Best Value regime has been a central component of New Labour's reform of local 
service delivery, and has replaced compulsory competitive tendering (CCT). Indeed 
Newman (2001:101) states that, 'the Best Value regime can be viewed as a form of implicit 
contract between government and local government in which, in return for abolishing CCT, 
councils were required to demonstrate improvements in both costs and quality.' This 
contractual aspect in New Labour's approach contrasts with the command and control of 
Tory interventions. Indeed the origins of Best Value stem from a strategy proposed by Max 
Culler, then Chief Executive of Barnet Council, which was taken up by the Association of 
Metropolitan Authorities, rather than from central government (LGC 28th February 1997). 
However, it was not long before Best Value came to be viewed as a centralist policy, as 
evidenced by a further contribution to the LGC (6th March 1998), which stated, 'local 
government will live with this new relationship, but lets stop pretending it's a partnership.' 
15 This is particularly true for the leader and cabinet model. 
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Whilst local authorities have greater choice in choosing delivery mechanisms, the Best 
Value framework places a continuing emphasis on competition (Wilson 2001: 297-8). In 
fact, Wilson argues that the place of competition has been strengthened through Best Value 
because it involves all services rather than the restricted list for CCT. Stoker (2002:426) 
adds that the government is aiming to check behaviour through the sheer variety and range 
of those involved in the Best Value process, and also encourages the public to challenge the 
performance of providers. Best Value requires local authorities to work as leaders in the 
governance of their local communities because in many cases Best Value needs to be met 
through many organisations in this system (Jones and Stewart 1998:8). 
The next chapter explores in more detail the increased threat of central government 
intervention in local authorities and the growth in performance management through targets 
for service improvement. These trends have contributed to what Pratchett (2002) and 
Stewart (2003), amongst others, regard as a tendency towards developing an increasingly 
private sector oriented model for the management of local authorities. However Stewart 
(2003: 175) argues that the dominance of the private sector model in local government is 
often a caricature of private sector management. Furthermore, Stewart believes that the 
distinctive purposes and conditions shared by local government services, and the public 
domain generally are being distorted by this model/approach. However, it could also be 
argued, that the role of local authorities as successful leaders of local organisational 
networks depend, to at least some extent, on them being perceived as effective performance 
oriented and business-like organisations. A key mechanism for these perceptions has been 
the introduction of over 170 performance indicators in local performance plans; this 
multiplicity of targets has the advantage of not reducing complex services to single 
measures, but does raise the issue of whether the targets are consistent with each other 
(Stewart 2003: 170). Stewart argues that care needs to be taken in the establishment of 
targets and they need to be used as aids to improving performance, and not seen as an end 
in themselves. 
Thus, the government is continuing the previous Conservative governments' trend of 
----intervention"in the-operation of services and'concem"with individual-authorities (as opposed-
to local government collectively) (Jones & Stewart 2002:21). This is an important point 
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when looking at the powers of local authorities, as the government can intervene and even 
remove relevant functions from authorities if they are falling short of requirements, under 
the Local Government Act 1999. According to Stewart (2003:207) the effects of this can 
be that the threat of intervention can be much the same as intervention itself, which leads 
local authorities to accept central government proposals for action. At the very least, Stoker 
(2002:426) identifies that, 'the fundamental rationale behind much of the New Labour 
reforms is to make it much more difficult for local service providers and local political 
elites to rest on their laurels.' A further development has been the introduction of 
comprehensive performance assessments (CPAs) of local authorities, which are made by 
the Audit Commission and consider current performance and capacity to improve (Stewart 
2003:155-6). From these assessments authorities are rated in five categories from poor to 
excellent and granted increased freedoms and flexibilities (for excellent and good 
authorities) or subjected to increased central government intervention through improvement 
planning (for poor authorities). However, Stewart (2003:156) argues that the process lacks 
an objective basis for the weighting and combinations of data chosen for individual 
assessments and the judgements that are made from these. 
While central government has been quite prescriptive and controlling in service delivery, 
there are also examples of initiatives through which local authorities can exercise some 
autonomy. Local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs) allow all upper or single tier local 
authorities to negotiate directly with central departments to undertake to deliver specific 
targets, and the government undertakes to reward authorities for meeting those targets and 
consider giving new freedoms and flexibilities to assist with this (Stewart 2003:143). 
LPSAs rise to the challenge of national priorities, whilst giving central departments the 
opportunity to discipline unresponsive authorities (Pratchett 2002:341 ). The fact that 
LPSAs stem from an LGA proposal demonstrates that central government can be 
responsive to local authorities in the continued development of the modernisation agenda. 
Furthermore, the introduction of Local Area Agreements (LAAs) can be an important 
catalyst for the community leadership role whilst providing links to LSPs, through bringing 
together partners to identify an increasingly common set of outcomes (ODPM 2005:11). 
--Whilst"-the~ODPM, sees~a-.leadership"rolecfor,Jocal authorities~on these,. the LGC Oftth 
February 2005) has predicted a weakening of the LAAs as a result of tight timescales and 
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the pre-existing allocation of budgets for the first year of these schemes. Perhaps more 
seriously the LGC (Ibid) argues that there has not been a radical shift of resources as a 
result of limited enthusiasm from middle-ranking civil servants driving the programme 
through. This reflects the wishes of some central government departments, notably the 
Home Office and the Department of Education and Skills, which do not share the 
enthusiasm of the ODPM for LAAs and have, therefore, reduced the scope of the LAAs in 
a similar fashion to the LPSAs three years earlier (Ibid). 
2.3.3) Democratic Renewal 
The government has highlighted democratic renewal as a key aim of modernising local 
government. There is a degree of overlap between new political structures and the drive for 
democratic renewal, but they are conceptually distinct. The government identifies councils 
as tending to be inward looking and paternalistic (in service delivery) with the result that 
the public are too indifferent about local democracy (DETR 1998:14). Stewart (2003:36) 
questions whether this generalisation is justified or not, but agrees that the government is 
correct in its approach to democratic renewal by regarding low turnout as a symptom of the 
problem, rather than the problem itself. 
The government hopes the new political structures will enable and encourage people to take 
a greater interest in council affairs, through the more accountable and efficient decision-
making structures highlighted above. However the White Paper (DETR 1998:38) concedes 
that, 'new structures alone will not bring about a renewal of local democracy.' The 
government (DETR 1998:38) believes this will only happen through higher participation in 
elections and 'close and regular' contact between councils and the public between 
elections; 'this cannot happen if local people are not interested or feel that the council, or 
their views about it, are irrelevant.' Pratchett (2002) argues that in some respects the new 
political management structures and increasing public consultation could be said to 
represent democratic renewal, but this view ignores more systemic problems that are 
highlighted in the 1998 White Paper. The process of democratic renewal seems to be 
----stalling, because-ethe,reform-of structures-is not enough,cthereneeds,to,be a change in the 
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political culture of politicians, officers and citizens, which is a much longer term process 
(Pratchett 2002:337). 
Aside from improvements to political structures Stewart (2003:37-42) identifies three main 
proposals from the government for democratic renewal, these are: more frequent elections; 
help for councils to develop their arrangements for participation and consultation; and, 
developments in electoral procedures. His argument is that relatively little has been done in 
relation to these and, with the possible exception of postal ballots, the impact has been 
limited. Furthermore, Goss (2001:3) argues that, 'much of the debate about local 
governance has been 'blind' to the implications of social and economic inequalities. If 
local governance is to play a key role in community leadership, these questions have to be 
faced head on.' However the extent to which individual authorities have the powers to 
reduce these inequalities is questionable; not only in terms of statutory powers but, more 
importantly, in terms of the ability to change/challenge the influence of global economic 
realities. 
Game (2002) has emphasised that the impact of central government focusing on the 
service-provider, rather than the local self-governance role of local government, has had a 
gradual, and yet significant, effect on turnout. Although the present government has 
highlighted democratic renewal as underpinning their objectives in improving service 
delivery, Pratchett (2002:333) argues Labour's interest here is waning and being replaced 
by a much stronger emphasis on service delivery alone, 'as local authorities have sought to 
respond to the wide range of modernisation initiatives, enhanced public participation as a 
feature of democratic renewal (in contrast with public consultation as a feature of new 
public management) seems to have lost its resonance in much ofthe reform agenda.' Game 
(2002) also argues that by focusing on the elected mayor issue the government has ended 
up focusing on what is not happening, thereby disguising what has taken place under the 
2000 Act. By doing so the government has risked much of the democratic renewal agenda 
as well as the wider agenda. However, the Chief Executive of the LGIU has argued that 
through the ODPM's consultation documents, Vibrant Local Leadership, and, Why 
--Neighbourhoods Matter, there is- a- genuine view -of stronger local democracy emerging, in 
which ward councillors are seen as the key to neighbourhood engagement (LGC 18th 
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February 2005). However, these developments are in their early stages and largely fall 
outside the scope of this study. 
2.3.4) The well-being powers, community leadership and partnerships 
The well-being powers, community leadership and partnerships are the themes most closely 
related to the empirical issue and theoretical framework of this thesis. These themes should 
cut across the modernisation agenda, and are intended to enable local authorities to function 
more effectively in their local governance systems. Whilst much of what is discussed here 
will be explored in greater detail throughout the thesis (most notably in chapters three and 
four) it is necessary to situate these components within the modernisation agenda. 
The 1998 White Paper highlights the role councils have to play in community leadership, 
and how they are central to meeting the challenges facing modem Britain16• The 
government has legally made councils responsible for the long-term well-being and 
sustainable development of their areas (DETR 1998:80). Consequently, there has been a 
shift in emphasis, enabling councils to act for the well-being of their communities, unless 
there is a statutory provision preventing them from doing so; as opposed to only being able 
to act where it is statutorily permitted. The White Paper was viewed in some quarters as 
tending to remove territorial, professional and public/private sector boundaries through the 
duty to promote well-being (LGC 28th August 1998). This approach was welcomed 
amongst some senior local government managers as encouraging councils to take risks by 
removing restraints and offering clarity around local authorities' legal powers. The LGA 
(2003:14) argues that the Local Government Act 2000 provided a flexible power for local 
authorities to engage in partnership working to achieve the economic, social and 
environmental well-being of an area. However, the 2000 Act did not introduce a duty (as 
the government previously stated it would) to promote well-being but simply powers to do 
it. Nevertheless, Wilson (2001 :293) considers that at least the most proactive local 
authorities have an unprecedented opportunity to respond to the needs of their localities. 
16 These are identified as sustainable development, social exclusion, crime, education and training. 
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Under the Local Government Act 2003, local authorities were granted new powers to trade 
in relation to any of their advisory functions, and to charge for discretionary services (LGA 
2003:8). This was welcomed by Jones and Stewart (2004:24) for addressing some of the 
previous limitations of the well-being powers, caused by a lack of resources. However, the 
inability of local authorities to make regulations and the lack of attention councils pay to 
by-laws remain as limitations on the powers of well-being and community leadership role 
(Ibid). 
The use of the well-being power should have regard for the community strategy 17 (LGA 
2003 :5). In this respect these powers are linked to the community leadership and 
partnership roles of modern local authorities. Indeed, in the government's paper on Vibrant 
Local Leadership, (ODPM 2005:7) it is argued that councils should champion their areas; 
lead the formulation of community strategies and set out the vision for the local community 
in partnership with other agencies. This is not an easy role to undertake. One of the many 
challenges facing local authorities is to develop the community leadership role in relation to 
the range of local services that contribute to the well being of the area and also strengthen 
the relationships between partners (ODPM 2005:9). This forms the basis for a local 
authority to engage in governance interactions. 
Undertaking the community leadership role effectively is likely to require a stronger focus 
on dealing with cross-cutting issues locally, for which the main vehicle is LSPs (ODPM 
2005: 1 0). The government has given discretionary powers for councils to engage in 
partnership with 'bodies, organisations or agencies that operate locally for any purpose 
which supports their functions' (DETR 1998:82). However the government has more 
recently recognised that there remains uncertainty about the nature and legitimacy of this 
leadership role (ODPM 2004:9). Nevertheless, during the majority of New Labour's first 
two terms of government, the local government modernisation agenda provided a basis for 
proactive local authorities to become increasingly engaged in the governance of their 
communities. 
17 See chapter four for further details. 
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2.4) The Overview and Scrutiny Function 
Under the Local Government Act 2000 all local authorities were required to have at least 
one overview and scrutiny committee in place by June 2002. Snape et al (2002: 13) argue 
that through the separation of roles under the Local Government Act 2000 this is, perhaps, 
the most substantive role for non-executive councillors, and also possibly the greatest 
challenge to the traditions and culture of the previous system of local government. It is 
argued here that overview and scrutiny is indeed central to the modernisation of local 
government, both as an internal reform of the political management of local authorities, and 
as a mechanism through which local authorities can reach out into external governance 
processes and systems. However the introduction of overview and scrutiny has not been 
unproblematic. Consequently, a number of potential constraints on scrutiny will be 
identified in this section, as well as evaluative criteria for 'good' scrutiny 18• 
2.4.1) The Roles and Powers of Scrutiny 
Under Part II of the Local Government Act 2000 the overview and scrutiny function has no 
formal decision-making powers. Scrutiny committees can call-in decisions of the executive 
and recommend that they are reconsidered. It can make recommendations to the executive, 
full council and external partners based on its work. Scrutiny committees can request the 
attendance of council officers at meetings to give evidence, who must then attend. They 
may also request the attendance of external witnesses at meetings, but only those working 
in the health service are compelled to attend. The principles of scrutiny allow for a 
relatively open and flexible approach to working, which has the potential to be a strength of 
the function. The government (DETR 2000) sets out five broad roles for scrutiny in its 
guidance: 
1. Holding the executive to account; 
2. Policy review; 
3. Policy development; 
---4.c.-Best Value reviews;cand 
18 These criteria will be used implicitly throughout the scrutiny case studies, and will be returned to more 
explicitly in the concluding chapters of the thesis. 
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5. External scrutiny. 
Holding the Executive to Account 
Snape et al (2002:42) state, 'this role involves scrutinising executive decisions at a number 
of different stages of the decision-making process: before decisions are made; before they 
are implemented; and after they are implemented.' This can be interpreted as the scrutiny 
side of the overview and scrutiny role for councillors. Snape and Taylor (200 1: 1) suggest 
that, 'to many the separation of executive and scrutiny was seen as a way of sidelining the 
vast majority of councillors, giving them little to do but nit-pick over decisions taken by an 
elite few.' Nevertheless a vibrant scrutiny process is required to provide substantive roles 
for councillors, and is crucial for keeping a balance between executive and non-executive 
roles. The key question is whether the powers and processes of overview and scrutiny are 
compatible with securing that balance. 
Section 13(2) of the LGA 2000 requires that all functions of a council must be the 
responsibility of the executive, unless the functions are covered by specific arrangements 
set out in regulations or other legislation (LGIU 2003:6). The executive is obliged to 
publish all its intended decisions in advance in a 'Forward Plan'. Overview and scrutiny 
committees have the power to call-in decisions of the executive, where that decision has not 
yet been implemented, or to arrange for a decision to be scrutinised by the full council 
(Deputy Prime Minister 2002: 11 ). This power extends only so far as to making 
recommendations requiring the executive to reconsider its policy. However the perceived 
lack of effectiveness of the scrutiny function is partially due to the fact that the executive is 
not obliged to take notice of these recommendations (SCTLG&R 2002:8). Consequently, 
effective scrutiny of the executive will be dependent in no small measure on having a 
responsive executive in place. As Leach (2002:85) observes, 'there may be one or two 
sanctions a scrutiny committee can activate (e.g. referral to full council) but they are few 
and far between. In general, the power of scrutiny is power of influence and that requires 
- preparedness-on"the .part-ofdecision-makers-to"be ·influenced.1 
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Ashworth and Snape's (2004:544) summary of early overview and scrutiny research 
suggests that the function was not a sufficient counterbalance to the executive. Later 
research identified a lack of 'teeth' or influence, inadequate officer support and the impact 
of party politics as contributory factors towards this outcome (Ibid). Johnson and Hatter 
(2004:7) argue19 that scrutiny is not respected as an essential partner to executive decision-
making and that many councillors are concerned that the new system allows power to be 
concentrated in the hands of a small minority. However a shift in the government's 
thinking towards scrutiny can be identified in its document Vibrant Local Leadership 
(ODPM 2004: 17) in which it is suggested, 'there should be more formal requirements for 
an executive to act on scrutiny findings.' Just how/whether this will materialise in practice 
remains to be seen. 
Policy Review and Development 
Snape and Taylor (2001 :4) argue that, in reality there is no neat separation between the 
policy review and development roles; the former necessarily leads to suggestions for the 
latter, unless the policy is deemed to need no revisions. Policy review can vary from 
looking at the 'big picture' in relation to a policy area, to more focused reviews, and tend to 
follow closely the parliamentary select committee approach of oral hearings and written 
evidence (Snape and Taylor 2001:4). These reviews can take place as part of developing 
key policies or as an examination of how well a policy has been implemented (Snape and 
Taylor 2001 :4). According to Snape et al (2002: 19), 'policy development involves shaping 
the formulation of key plans and policies, through examining alternatives against needs, 
resources and issues.' Snape et al (2002) believe this role has produced the most 
impressive work from overview and scrutiny to date. Many members and officers argue 
that the quality of such work would be rare under the committee system, and members are 
becoming more skilled at investigating policies and developing evidence-based approaches 
(Snape et al 2002:20). 
Unsurprisingly the scrutiny function seems to work best when it is part of the whole 
~ --decision-making.cprocess and~ where-a- substantial oamount of'pre'-decision scrutiny is taking 
19 Based on their case study interviews. 
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place, according to Helmsley-Brown et al (2002: 15). This requires a readiness on the part 
of the executive to identify issues where it would welcome such in-depth work from 
scrutiny committees (Leach et al 2003:34). This approach can benefit an authority as a 
whole because cabinets often lack the time to do as much in-depth work as they would like, 
and it involves backbench councillors more fully in the decision-making process (Leach et 
al 2003:34). However Leach et al warn that scrutiny should not compromise its 
independence, and that the executive must avoid using scrutiny to distance itself from 
unpopular or difficult decisions. It is also very important that scrutiny exercises are 
followed-up, particularly in order for members to appreciate how scrutiny is working 
within the council. 
Best Value Reviews 
The government has left it to the discretion of local authorities to determine how they relate 
best value to their new political structures. Snape et al (2002:25) state that government 
guidance permits three options for linking best value reviews to new political structures: 
overview and scrutiny committees can oversee the reviews; the executive can be 
responsible; or, a joint forum of executive and scrutiny councillors can be responsible. 
Dungey (200 1 : 12) argues that whatever approach a local authority adopts for best value 
reviews it needs to be co-ordinated with the wider programme of reviews being carried out 
in scrutiny. Furthermore Snape et al (2002:27) emphasise the importance of a 'whole 
systems' approach to making the connections between the new political management 
arrangements and continuous service improvements. However, according to Snape and 
Taylor (2001 :4) many authorities are failing to make successful connections between best 
value and scrutiny. This can be attributed to the technical and managerial nature of the 
process, the associated difficulty of 'chipping' into the best value documents, and a lack of 
thought towards how councillors can best contribute to this (Ashworth and Snape 
2004:547). Nevertheless, Snape and Taylor (2001 :4) highlight the importance scrutiny 
could have in the longer term in 're-politicising' best value, which is after all not a neutral 
concept- despite the way it may be presented. However, questions remain about whether 
-this isthe,bestuse,ofscrutiny.-members' time,i.e.cin,terms of-thetype"ofrole.scrutiny is best 
equipped to perform, and the time it has to do so. 
54 
External Scrutiny 
Ashworth and Snape (2004:548) indicate that, 'the government has encouraged local 
authorities to develop a strong external focus in order to hold organisations to account and 
enhance stakeholder and public participation in the scrutiny process.' To do so, scrutiny 
bodies are entitled to report on any issue which affects the local area (Dungey 2001: 13). 
However, whilst conceptually there is an important accountability role for scrutiny in local 
governance there are no powers for external scrutiny, with the exception of the health 
scrutiny role. Nevertheless, Johnson and Hatter's (2004:7) research indicates that scrutiny 
is able to achieve 'quick wins' particularly in areas for which the council is not the service 
provider. 
Scrutiny has the potential to review the performance of other bodies and examine how they 
are contributing to the economic, social and environmental well-being of the area (Dungey 
2001: 13). Indeed, through the powers of well-being, local authorities are being encouraged 
to work closely across organisational boundaries (LGA 2003:8). Scrutiny can make links 
to the well-being powers and community leaderships role and combine these with the 
external scrutiny and policy development roles to provide a powerful rationale for the 
involvement of the scrutiny function in governance processes and systems. In this respect 
scrutiny can provide a comprehensive role for non-executive councillors in the broader 
local governance system. Furthermore, the government seems to have recognised the 
important role scrutiny could play in the governance arrangements of the locality by 
arguing there may be a case for the extension of the 'formal' scrutiny remit (similar to that 
of health scrutiny) to reinforce the community leadership role (ODPM 2004: 17). If 
followed through, it will be an important recognition of the role of scrutiny in local 
governance, in contrast to its current underdeveloped role. However, for scrutiny to fulfil 
what will be a larger and more complex role effectively local authorities will need to 
provide, and be provided with, additional funding/resources for this responsibility. 
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2.4.2) Constraints on Scrutiny 
Ashworth and Snape (2004:542) assert that their five year audit of overview and scrutiny 
research reveals the findings are remarkably consistent i.e. overview and scrutiny 
committees are still struggling to become effective bodies, and there is an imbalance 
between their key roles. Role imbalance, particularly between holding the executive to 
account and policy development, is a recurring theme and a real dilemma for scrutiny 
(Ashworth and Snape 2004:551 ). Difficulties here range from opposition members using 
scrutiny as an 'opposition vehicle' whilst colleagues from the same party as the executive 
find it hard to move away from an innate party discipline (Snape & Leach 2002:42). At the 
same time, scrutiny has potentially conflicting roles of holding the executive to account, 
and also of supporting the work of the executive through policy review and development 
(Leach et al 2003:29). However, Ashworth and Snape (2004) argue that the failure of 
scrutiny cannot just be blamed on the breadth of roles and conflict between them: it is more 
fundamentally to do with the nature of power and interest in local authorities20• 
Snape (2002:94) identifies five potential long-term and structuraVsystemic obstacles to the 
development of overview and scrutiny: 
• Re-creating the committee system (culture); 
• Insufficient resources; 
• Opposition from executive councillors; 
• Opposition from senior officers within authorities; and 
• Relationship to the party group system. 
Snape (2002:94) argues that it is relatively easy to change structures, but changing the 
culture of authorities as well is proving more difficult. Consequently, scrutiny committees 
can often operate in a very similar way to the traditional service committees. Furthermore, 
according to Snape (Ibid) the government has provided no additional funding for training, 
dedicated officer support and the ability to commission external research. She argues that 
20 The case study approach allows me to explore these issues within a local context, across a number of 
scrutiny inquiries. 
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overview and scrutiny can often be seen as a threat by the two most powerful groupings 
within an authority: the cabinet and senior officers. Snape (2002) believes that it can be 
viewed as a third power base which could undermine the power and control of the other 
two. Consequently the recommendations of scrutiny are just as likely (if not more so) to be 
scrutinised and picked apart by the executive (and officers), as executive policy is to be 
scrutinised by the scrutiny function. 
Ashworth and Snape (2004:533) view the local context as triumphing over structural 
solutions in relation to scrutiny, and that behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional factors 
shape scrutiny more than centrally imposed structural solutions. They further argue 
(2004:552) that, 'the traditions of the party group system, of inter-party relations, the 
culture of officer-member relations and the organisational culture in general are key 
elements of this crucial local political and organisational context.' These factors are 
important, but local contexts contain many of the same features for the executive as for 
scrutiny. Consequently, the effect of the new structural arrangements should not be 
underestimated, because they can encourage tensions and divisions in the local context to 
appear in the overview and scrutiny function itself. Indeed, Johnson and Hatter (2004:9) 
argue that, 'there is evidence to suggest the negative influence of self-fulfilling prophecies 
in overview and scrutiny: many councillors believe it can achieve little, and so it has.' This 
is both an inherent problem in the new political management structures21 , and a local 
contextual problem. 
Snape and Taylor (2001:6) suggest that, 'ultimately, overview and scrutiny committees are 
not decision-making committees, they are influencing bodies, and their success will depend 
on how well they develop influencing skills and channels.' There is much truth in this 
statement, but it must also be noted that the successful development of 'channels' may, in 
some cases, be beyond their scope of influence, for example: resistant executive and 
external agencies, plus channels blocked by the boundaries of central, regional and local 
government regulatory/responsibility structures and sp,q~res of influence. 
21 Scrutiny can .. provide a fulfilling role for councillors under this, but the new political structures and lack of 
powers for non-executive counciilors tends to encourage a negative response to these new roles. 
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2.4.3) Evaluative Criteria for 'good' Scrutiny 
There is a degree of unpredictability to achieving good scrutiny. From my experience as a 
scrutiny support officer, there have been times when everything is seemingly in place for a 
vigorous scrutiny exercise, and yet the 'torch-paper' will not ignite and a meeting will be 
quite disappointing. Nevertheless the following criteria (developed through my experience 
as a scrutiny officer) could be regarded as benchmarks for effective scrutiny22: 
• Effective links to the executive - Leach et al (2003:34) stress the importance of 
developing an effective channel of communication between the executive and scrutiny 
arrangements. This could help to rationalise and simplify the potentially conflictual 
role the scrutiny process has in relation to the executive. 
• Engagement of non-executive councillors - does it engage members of the scrutiny 
forums, and does it engage all backbench councillors? For scrutiny to function 
effectively members involved in the process need to be appropriately motivated and 
supported. Is scrutiny, therefore, seen by backbench councillors as providing a 
worthwhile activity post local government modernisation? 
• Engagement of third parties- it is important for scrutiny to establish effective links 
with third parties and to encourage them to become engaged in the scrutiny process for 
the benefit of all parties. However, there is a general point here about the limitations of 
the overview and scrutiny function to hold bodies to account (aside from publicising 
issues) when there is a genuine conflict of interest. Good working relationships are to 
be encouraged but not at the expense of fulfilling the community leadership role. In 
addition, the awareness that third parties have of scrutiny in the local governance 
system, and their capacity to engage with the scrutiny process are important 
considerations for scrutiny members. 
• Links to the public - given the community leadership role of scrutiny and the lack of 
·· - __ , --·fotffiarae~Cision makiiifpowers; ·ir isvital-thafscrlitinYinquiries engage with. the -iiut>fic. 
22 In the concluding chapter the scrutiny case studies will be examined against these criteria. 
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This allows scrutiny forums to respond to issues of local concern and enhances the 
potential for scrutiny to influence decision-makers through the connections it can make 
to public aspirations. 
• Is it achievable? - in particular in relation to the complexity of the issue. Are the 
expertise and time required for an investigation available, and is it worthwhile investing 
time and resources for the potential scrutiny issue? To a large extent this depends on 
the resources made available by central and local government. 
• Tractability - what impact can scrutiny have over a particular issue? In particular, 
attention needs to be given to the hierarchical nature of governance, and the effect 
scrutiny can have over the different spheres of influence in the governance system for 
any gtven tssue. 
• Is it adding value?- scrutiny can add value in a number of ways: creating new policy, 
refining and revising policy, bringing issues to the public's attention, and holding 
internal and external actors to account. The overview and scrutiny function should 
avoid repetition and becoming merely a 'talking shop'23 • 
• Tracking decisions- there should be mechanisms in place to keep members informed 
of what has happened to issues coming before scrutiny, and the outcomes of the 
scrutiny process. Members cannot rely on officers alone in this respect. They must be 
sufficiently motivated to find out what is happening to their work; has it been accepted, 
if not why not etc. 
Furthermore, there needs to be a balance between in-depth reviews and one off issues so 
that the scrutiny process can monitor the work of the executive (and other decision-makers) 
whilst developing and reviewing policies. In addition, a successful scrutiny process should 
be able to deliver 'quick wins' as well as more detailed and in-depth inquiries. Sweeting & 
23 However given the marginalisation ofbackbench councillors (perceived or real) there is some benefit from 
scrutiny straying into the talking shop role so that members can become more informed and involved in the 
running of the council. 
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Ball (2002:212) argue that achieving an effective scrutiny system is demanding and must 
be responsive to criticisms and demands. Ashworth and Hunt (2003:14) argue that the 
appointment of specific scrutiny officer teams is beneficial to scrutiny processes, but there 
are concerns in some authorities that scrutiny officer teams are overstretched and lacked 
resources. A lack of resources for scrutiny can mean that tracking decisions can be 
inhibited, as the scrutiny process moves on and officers focus their energies on the topics 
currently under investigation. Furthermore, skills based training for scrutiny members 
tailored to local political circumstances helps members to adapt to the scrutiny role 
(Ashworth and Hunt 2003:16). 
The issue/area being scrutinised is central to whether scrutiny will be effective, firstly in 
terms of whether scrutiny can have an impact, and secondly in whether it motivates 
members sufficiently. Leach (2002:83) states that, 'the ultimate effectiveness test for 
scrutiny is whether the decisions (or policies or services) which result from its intervention 
are better than those which would have resulted had the intervention not taken place (and 
been accepted). However the problem of demonstrating that one decision (or policy or 
service) is better than another is fraught with difficulties.' The lack of formal decision-
making powers for scrutiny and the ephemeral nature of the process, means that it can be 
difficult to pin-point the exact impact of a scrutiny inquiry. It is important that this is 
recognised locally by members and officers. Scrutiny has a complex role in a complex 
governance system, which will be explored in more detail in the following chapters. 
2.5) Conclusion 
Overview and scrutiny clearly marks an innovative way of working and potentially 
provides substantive roles for non-executive councillors. One of the central issues for this 
thesis is the extent to which that potential is capable of being realised and/or has in practice 
been realised to date. The above literature overview has highlighted a number of issues the 
case studies are designed to explore. In particular, they will help to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of overview and scrutiny in relation to the evaluative criteria for 'good' 
~scrutiny. setcout above. However, for~scrutiny-to~be effective it needs an enabling set of-
power relationships and for appropriate knowledge and support to be available. Only then 
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will there be a shift in councillor perceptions, which is required for good practice to 
develop in scrutiny (Johnson and Hatter 2004:9). 
It is also necessary to locate the overview and scrutiny case studies within an understanding 
of the wider modernisation agenda, and an assessment of the limits of local government 
within local governance. This chapter has, therefore, sought to place the role of overview 
and scrutiny within the context of that modernisation agenda. A number of opportunities 
and constraints for local authorities have been identified within the modernisation agenda. 
These will be explored further throughout the thesis, particularly in relation to local 
government's capacity and role within the governance system. The next chapter further 
develops the discussion begun in chapter one about the nature of governance, and the 




Having examined in some detail New Labour's local government modernisation agenda 
and the role of the overview and scrutiny function in modernising local authorities in the 
previous chapter, it is now necessary to take a step back and situate these policy initiatives 
within a broader context that will provide a general theoretical framework for 
understanding the modernisation of local government. The purpose of this framework is to 
understand the development of contemporary governance systems in which an increasing 
number of agencies are delivering local services. In such circumstances, the role of local 
government becomes more complex and challenging. 
The structure of the chapter firstly explores the concept of governance. This is followed by 
an examination of the relationships between global trends and governance, and approaches 
to governing in governance. The next section narrows the focus to the national policy 
level. Finally the chapter considers the extent to which local government is an autonomous 
actor or an agent of the centre. 
3.2) What is Governance? 
Governance, like many concepts designed to explain social and political processes in 
late/post-modem or contemporary society, is a relatively fluid and flexible term. Taken 
loosely Kooiman (2003:4) argues, 'governance can be seen as the totality of theoretical 
conceptions on governing.' Similarly, John and Cole (2000:81) argue governance is a set 
of principles of governing encompassing much of the variation in different countries' 
political systems. By contrast Rhodes (1997:15) suggests, 'governance refers to self-
organising, interorganisational networks characterised by interdependence, resource 
exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state.' Kooiman (2003:3) 
argues persuasively governance is a mix of all kinds of governing efforts by all manner of 
-=social-politicakactors; .candcthat ccdifferent:c..govemance modes' and .. orders are,,. ~societaL 
"responses" to persistent and changing governing "demands", set against ever growing 
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societal diversity, dynamics and complexity.' It follows therefore that there is no one best 
governance mechanism, it is 'reflexive' in that it is almost an organic concept that responds 
to the environment in which it is created.Z4 
Narrowing the concept down somewhat, Stoker (1998:19) defines governance as a, 
'complex set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government.' 
Consequently, the concept of governance embraces a greater awareness of the need for the 
state to interact with other societal actors. It does not render traditional government 
interventions obsolete, but acknowledges that there are limitations to them (Kooiman 
2003 :3). Thus governance describes governing systems in which public services are no 
longer provided predominantly by the state but through an increasing diversity of state and 
non-state organisations. This notion is reinforced by the view that local government has 
been transformed from the dominant public institution to one body amongst many in local 
governance (John 1997). 
Although it is relatively hard to pin-down a precise definition of governance, this is not 
necessarily a conceptual weakness. This flexibility allows us to bring together common 
strands of complex and differentiated governing arrangements for local polities. As 
Newman (200 1:11) states governance is, 'an analytical concept giving rise to questions 
about what forms of power and authority, patterns of relationship and rights and obligations 
might typify a particular approach to governing.' Consequently governance can be used as 
an analytical tool to explore different approaches to governing over time. The next section 
explores what is particular about contemporary governance. 
3.3) Why Governance Now? 
Having identified what governance is, it is necessary to examine why governance is of 
particular importance now. This section explores some of the global trends that are closely 
linked to changes in governing and are central to understanding the emergence of 
-::governance. The second part of this section explores the impact of the separate but cross-
··---.. ·· cutting trends ofglobalisation·and governance,on·goveming in. this context. 
24 This is why the circumstances in which governance are formed are so important, and are explored more 
fully in section 3.3. 
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3.3.1) Global Trends 
In this section I will argue that global trends have had an important role in shaping the 
conditions of, and for, local governance. I have referred to global trends rather than 
globalisation25 because as Giddens stated in his first Reith lecture in 1999, 
'globalisation .. .is a complex set of processes, not a single one. And these operate in a 
contradictory or oppositional fashion.' Consequently Giddens ( 1998:31-32) has identified 
globalisation as 'pulling away' from the nation-state, 'pushing down' by creating new 
pressures for local identities, and 'squeezing sideways' by creating new economic and 
cultural regions that sometimes cross-cut nation-states. Furthermore he sees globalisation 
as comprised of economic, political, cultural and technological strands. These factors have 
a role in shaping governance in a reflexive system. Giddens (1991 :21) describes 
modernity's reflexivity as referring to, 'the susceptibility of most social activity, and 
material relations with nature, to chronic revision in light of new information or 
knowledge.' However despite this reflexivity and the consequent potential for difference it 
is argued here that the economic strand of globalisation is the dominant influence in 
shaping not only the institutions of governance, but also the extent and nature of the scope 
for reflexivity, difference and choice?6 
Giddens (1999a) describes two different groups of thinkers who have adopted strongly 
contrasting views of globalisation as an economic phenomenon. These are the sceptics and 
the radicals. Firstly the sceptics do not see anything especially different about the 
contemporary global economy compared with previous periods. Most countries gain only a 
small amount of income from external trade, and a good deal of economic exchange is 
between regions, rather than worldwide (Giddens 1999a). By contrast the radicals argue 
globalisation is real and its consequences can be felt everywhere. The global market place 
is developing rapidly, and is indifferent to national boundaries - nations have lost much of 
the sovereignty they once had, and politicians have lost much of their ability to influence 
-25'1lowevetnow~tlie distinctioit'lias been nfatlegiObiil"trehas~candglobalisation~can-be regarded as-being similar 
throughout the thesis. 
26 Despite the sometime structuralist slant of this thesis, I believe there are real choices to be made here. It is 
the scope for these choices that is limited. 
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events (Giddens 1999a). Giddens sides with the radicals in this debate, arguing that the 
level of world trade is much higher and more diverse than in the past, with increases in 
financial and capital flows being particularly significant. 
However, there is also value in the argument ofthe sceptics. Watson and Hay (2003:302) 
argue that (because) the contingent politics of labour market and welfare reform has 
seemingly been rendered necessary there has been a triumph, not of the non-negotiable 
character of globalisation, but of political rhetoric and electoral expediency over economic 
reality. However, they also argue that governments of the centre left have been unable to 
halt processes of welfare retrenchmene (Watson and Hay 2003:291). Consequently there 
is some value in the radicals view because globalisation in Watson and Hay's (2003:290) 
own words has increasingly, 'come to be seen as a non-negotiable external economic 
constraint, circumscribing the parameters of political possibility and political choice.' 
These constraints have real effects as the notion of globalisation and the constraints it is 
seen to imply have served to institutionalise many of the consequences the discourse would 
claim to describe (Watson and Hay 2003:295). Consequently, whilst some academics may 
claim that the economic effects of globalisation have been distorted and used to further a 
particular political agenda, there is a (relative) convergence of opinion about its 
consequences. 
Nevertheless King and Kendall (2004: 140) argue, 'for many, globaJisation is primarily an 
economic phenomenon - it refers to the increasing worldwide integration of economies 
over recent decades and is associated with the triumph of liberal capitalism as the dominant 
economic mode.' There is a general recognition that financial investment freedom has 
undermined the economic authority of the nation state and resulted in the convergence of 
polities and economies towards a neo-liberal model around the world (King and Kendall 
2004:140). They also argue, however, that there is some disagreement over whether there 
is a need for state regulation and intervention to overcome flaws, or whether a system of 
'capitalist autopoiesis' (which are self-organising and self-reproducing) should be pursued. 
This disagreement is reflected in the varieties of reactions to globalisation in nation states, 
- ----buLimportantly~cfrQm th~ l'l~-liber~Lh~~-4~scri~ed ~bove. 
27 They are referring to most OECD countries here, and in terms of demand-inflationary pressures, rather than 
in aggregate terms. 
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Whilst governance and government exist at different levels and in different contexts so 
success at one level may be dependent on decisions and influences at other levels (Jessop 
2000:19). Indeed, one view expressed by Hutton (2003:45) is that even if the US were a 
purely passive power, the sheer scale of the US economy would mean that American 
priorities, interests and values would naturally predominate in global affairs to the extent 
that other countries would find their ability to develop alternate economic and social 
models severely limited. However Hutton's view is that, in practice, the US is not a 
passive power. Rather it is an active 'hyperpower' that dominates the global sphere. 
Consequently the US's influence on the governance and government of other countries is 
greater than it would be as a passive power. The argument here is not that the US dictates 
the UK's governance arrangements and solutions, but rather it substantially defines and 
limits the context within which these operate. 
As a consequence of the shift in emphasis described above, Byrne (1999:70) argues that, 
'advanced industrial societies are converging on a norm of social politics organised around 
a flexible labour market and structural social exclusion.' This is driven by the ideology of 
liberal capitalism that is represented as an inevitable tendency, geared towards the 
manipulation of the political process and subordination of policies to business interests 
(op.cit 71). Hutton argues that Blair and Brown have been no less enthusiastic about US 
economic dynamism than Thatcher. Britain defmes itself in Europe as the English speaking 
Anglo-Saxon model - a stock market based capitalism, complete with a minimal welfare 
system28 and flexible labour markets (Hutton 2003:264). Hutton (2003:273) moves on to 
argue that a~\linst this backdrop New Labour has struggled to establish a moderate strain of 
social democracy, not daring to challenge the 'doctrine of shareholder value' or the system 
of corporate governance, and has profoundly defended the least regulated labour market in 
the OECD. 
As Bauman (1998:68) states, rather dramatically, but with some justification, 'the 
separation of the economy from politics and the exemption of the first from the regulatory 
_intervention of the ~ecoi}d, resulting in the dis~rnpowerment of politics as an effective 
28 Hutton here is referring to Britain in the pre-enlargement Europe, but it is important to recognise that there 
are some much more minimal welfare states than Britain worldwide. 
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agency, augurs much more than just a shift in the distribution of social power.' Economic 
globalisation (expanding international trade, fiscal mobility, powerful multinational 
companies and transnational policy-making organisations committed to liberalisation) 
constrains government autonomy in national economic management (Taylor-Gooby 
2002:598). Governments find it hard to ignore tax, fiscal, regulatory, tariff or labour force 
policy for international competitiveness, attracting foreign investment or for relations with 
transnational political bodies (Ibid). 
King and Kendall (2004:143) outline an argument in which economically globalisation can 
refer to more than free trade or trade liberalisation and instead it encompasses the 
development of a world market, in which local economic and political actions are 
increasingly losing influence. Consequently when Hutton (2003:8) states, 'we are all 
becoming American conservatives now,' he is referring to the dilution of the state, through 
the assertion of property rights and business interests over social concerns and public 
interest. New Labour of course would dispute this claim. Key initiatives like the minimum 
wage, tax credits guaranteeing working families £20,000 per annum, and pension incomes 
over £100 per week compared with £65 under the Tories, would suggest that there is the 
potential for real differences to emerge nationally. Indeed King and Kendall (2004:143) 
identify an argument in which the nation state has not withered away because it can engage 
in a range of adjustment strategies. However, the ability to raise taxes, increase social 
expenditure, and generally manage economies as they wish is also limited by global factors. 
Yet, King and Kendall move on to argue that there is, in fact, no clear correlation between a 
country's openness to direct foreign investment and social spending. So therefore the 
particular reactions of nation states to global constraints are key. As King and Kendall 
(2004: 139) argue it is becoming increasingly clear, 'that the processes of globalisation do 
not provide standard or similar outcomes across the world, but are shaped and adopted by a 
variety of local structures and cultures.' 
Perhaps Hutton takes too determinist a view of the effects of globalisation. There are 
political choices to be made here. Indeed Taylor-Gooby (2004:618) concludes from his 
-- -----case"studies-ofwelfare systems_in_ Fr_a:rtc~,cY~IJ!lc~y!___~~~en and the UK that there are 
clear differences between the reform processes in the different countries, which reflect both 
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the regime type and polity. These countries have followed very different trajectories, 
differences and discontinuities are more notable than stability and resilience (Taylor-Gooby 
2002:619). Thus, according to King and Kendall (2004:154), 'there would appear to be a 
number of policy options for countries wishing to compete effectively in the global 
economy.' However, through political globalisation, states are also required to co-operate 
more than before to fmd ways of regulating economic globalisation and cope with 
worldwide issues like the environment and immigration (King and Kendall 2004: 146). But 
whilst there may have been a 'pooling of sovereignty' levels of taxation and social 
expenditure may just as easily reflect a government's domestic economic policies and 
electoral concerns as the influence of worldwide capital (King and Kendall2004:154). 
However, Hutton (2003:8) also argues that, 'political ideas matter. They define what is 
possible and impossible.' Hutton is arguing here that political ideas are limited by 
American power and by its control of the means by which ideas are disseminated to form a 
new 'international common sense'. Within the parameters of this worldview, local 
capacity for service delivery and the resolution of local problems are constrained; whilst 
simultaneously creating all manner of social problems at the local level that are associated 
with post-industrial capitalist societies. It is in this context that we can see the need to 
develop governance solutions in place of government ones. Indeed Taylor-Gooby 
(2002:60 I -602) argues that welfare states have responded to such pressures by adapting 
delivery mechanisms to these pressures rather than by eliminating state responsibilities, 
though the latter remains firmly on the political agenda. King and Kendall (2004: 164) 
argue that adaptability is not the same as weakness and that changing institutional 
configurations do not necessarily lead to a loss of state power. However, it could be 
argued, that the impact of this adaptability at a national level has tended towards a loss of 
state power at the local levef9• Furthermore, if governance is viewed as an 'adaptability 
response' by nation states to global pressures it is necessary to recognise that this 
adaptation is currently part of a transitional phase in the role ofthe state. Whether the state 
-
2~ This will be exploredcfurther.in the next. section, andalso,jnJb_~_foJ!owing chapter which focuses on the 
notion of partnerships and LSPs more specifically. New Labour has committed itselfio ihe imJ)ortanceof 
partnerships as a governance response to the issues highlighted above, there is a realisation and awareness of 
the need for partnerships to tackle these cross-cutting issues. 
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will enhance its control through governance adaptations in the long run, or its 
responsibilities will become diminished is (at this time) unclear. 
Giddens (1999a) has followed Bell in arguing that the nation state has become too small to 
solve the big problems, but also too large to solve the small ones. However, it could also 
be argued that the loss of control over big problems has led nation states to become 
increasingly preoccupied with delivery at the local level because there is less for them to 
do/effect at a broader level. In turn, because local authorities are democratically 
autonomous bodies they are not as easily controlled as bodies appointed directly by 
governments. Consequently the focus of the New Labour government on management, 
audit, and single purpose agencies (like housing companies and foundation trusts) are not 
only viewed by the current government as a route to improved service delivery but also 
create continuity with the previous Conservative administration's policies for local 
government. They can also be seen as an attempt to govern by different means at the local 
level. The effects of this are a key concern ofthis chapter. 
The argument being developed above is that (at least partly) as a result of global trends 
there is a changing role for nation-states. Governing and governance took place in a much 
more closed system in the past, in which the links to money markets were not so close. 
Globalisation has been an engine of economic growth, and national governments have 
bought into this, but to do so they have had to adapt to it as well. The consequences of that 
process of adaptation are reflected in the nature of the welfare state. Taylor-Gooby 
(2002:597) argues that there was a 'golden age' of European post-war welfare states 
characterised by stable, predictable and moderate levels of need for the main services. This 
was accompanied by the confident assumption that national governments were 'masters in 
their own houses', and in full control of their national economies (Taylor-Gooby 
2002:597). However, King and Kendall (2004:162) highlight the importance of 
recognising that nation states have never exerted total control over their economies, and 
that national responses to globalisation vary greatly despite facing similar global pressures. 
There are, for example, many corporatist political systems in central and northern Europe, 
---and-consequently .the neo-lib_~r~ !'Jl()<gpls_ <l!"~_~y no I'Jleans _ubiquitous (King and Kendall 
2004: 162). Nevertheless, for Taylor-Gooby the results of demographic and socio-economic 
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trends and the broader effects of economic globalisation are leading to a 'silver age' of 
welfare. There remains a commitment to citizens' welfare but this is tempered by growing 
concerns about competitiveness, cost constraint and individual choice (Taylor-Gooby 
2002:598). In this respect the state has become an enabler, reducing its role as a direct 
provider - in the post-war welfare state, the state was seen as guarding against the perverse 
tendencies of the market, now the market is seen to guard against the perverse tendencies of 
the state (King and Kendall2004:7). 
As the above overview indicates, the importance of globalisation can be overplayed but it is 
a useful concept for widening the scope of analysis in this study of the respective roles and 
influences of local government and local governance. As Rhodes (1997:197) states, 
'globalisation places change in British government in a broader context. It raises important 
questions about: the impact of the international system on the administrative structuring 
and restructuring of the nation state; the relationship between the nation state, the rule of 
law and the international system; and the effect ofthe internationalisation of policy making 
on domestic steering capacities.' The next section explores the implications of governing 
in the context. 
3.3.2) Governing in Governance 
Having identified the broader processes shaping the emergence of governance, I shall now 
turn to some general conditions of, and for, governance. The concept of governance links 
the move beyond the fragmenting and dislocating market reforms of the 1980s, with the 
need for analysing the complex interactions and interdependencies of government 
institutions, communities, citizens and civil society (Newman 2001: 17). However, 
Newman stresses that to suggest we are moving from hierarchies, to markets and then to 
networks is an oversimplification of this change. Indeed governance can best be viewed as 
encompassing these changes, and as a loose term for the governing arrangements between, 
and across, these. Jessop (2000: 15) argues that governance has emerged as a response to 
the failure of both the state (bureaucratisation and citizen disempowerment) and market 
--(inequality and mark~tf~illiJ~)._ &:Q!!~equently, :p~jnter and Goodwin (2000) argue that new 
- -·- - - --'"---"-~"'·-----+-~-~-=-' ::..... _:: ··: ..... ~..: . _._ .... --- -. 
forms of co-ordination between the public and private sectors are required. 
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However, Painter and Goodwin (2000:42) argue that, by the tum of the century, nothing 
coherent had replaced the Fordist Mode of Regulation (MOR), in which the provision of 
social welfare was deemed functional for economic growth and development, as well as for 
a degree of social cohesion and stability through a 'social wage'. Bevir et al (2003) have 
described the New Public Management (NPM) that developed in the 1980s as replacing 
Fordism to some extent. For Bevir et al (2003:1-2) NPM can be viewed as focusing, 'on 
management, not policy, and on performance appraisal and efficiency; disaggregating 
public bureaucraties into agencies which deal with each other on a user pay basis; the use of 
quasi-markets and of contracting out to foster competition; cost-cutting; and a style of 
management that emphasises, among other things output targets, limited term contracts, 
monetary incentives and freedom to manage.' Whether this produced a coherent system of 
governance is open to debate. The use of quasi-markets and contracting out can be 
regarded as coherent in that they are 'in line' with the more neo-liberal tendencies of 
economic globalisation. However, the impact of these changes have been to produce an 
increasingly complex and less understandable system of governance. 
Whilst the effect ofNPM, and its consequences, represented departures from Fordism, the 
present mode of governance can be seen as a further development (and in some respects a 
continuation) ofNPM under New Labour. However, a distinguishing feature of at least the 
rhetoric of New Labour is its focus on 'joined-up government' and, with rising public 
expenditure, a stronger focus on outcomes rather than just process. This emphasis in tum 
may be interpreted as at least an embryonic strategy for dealing with the increased 
fragmentation generated by NPM and associated forms of governance. 30 
Rhodes (1997:48-49) usefully distinguishes between two meanmgs of NPM. Firstly, 
managerialism - introducing private management techniques to the public sector through 
explicit standards and performance measures, value for money, and managing by results. 
Secondly, new institutional economics - the introduction of incentive structures (market 
competition) into public service provision31 • According to Rhodes the implication of this 
30 This will be explored further in the next section, and more fully in the next chapter. 
31 Both these strands are evident in New Labour's approach to governance, and are explored further in this 
section and in 3.4. 
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has been the transformation of the public sector, which involves less government but more 
governance. Along similar lines Osborne and Gaebler (1992) have claimed that 
government's have become increasingly engaged in 'steering' rather than 'rowing'. Indeed 
for Rhodes (1997:49) NPM is relevant to the discussion of governance because steering is 
central to NPM, and steering is a synonym for governance. 
The shift from the state rowing to steering is critical to the understanding of governance. 
For King and Kendall (2004:129), 'the exercise of public authority in nation states 
increasingly has to take account of other agencies, including private and international ones. 
Many domestic organisations, private and public, rather than government, are critical for 
social steerage.' The central state retains considerable power, but through horizontal rather 
than hierarchical arrangements. In this view sharing power is more likely to deliver 
flexible and innovative responses to the external global environment rather than rigid 
demarcations between the state and the market (King and Kendall 2004:129). This 
produces 'infrastructural power' through which the state can reach out into civil society to 
have its policies implemented, and state power is at its greatest through co-operating with 
society (King and Kendall 2004: 130). Accordingly power is shared but conditionally. This 
can be associated with what Newman (2001:17) describes as an increasing public policy, 
'focus on civil society, institutional renewal, democracy and citizenship (which) can be 
viewed against what is perceived to be the narrow reform agenda of neo-liberalism.' There 
is a subtle, but critical difference between King and Kendall's and Newman's interpretation 
of the state sharing its power in this respect. The former view this approach as almost a 
natural reaction to governing within the global environment, whilst Newman views this as a 
counter-balance to the narrow reform agenda that has emerged through the UK's response 
to global trends. 
These trends have led Rhodes (1997:198) to state that, 'dramatic changes are taking place 
in British government. The shift from government to governance may not introduce the 
post-modem era, but it is impossible to refuse the invitation to ponder the direction and 
pace of change at the end of the twentieth century.' Indeed, the state as an institution of 
--governance has be~n in flux i11_ t:e~nt )'~ar~'-but re_tains many of its core features (Kooiman 
2003:129). Kooiman argues that it is possible to hypothesise that these changes are, at least 
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partially, due to the impact ofthe diversity, dynamics and complexity of modem society on 
the modem state. So it can be argued that by moving from governing through command to 
regulation we are witnessing a governance response by the state to the complexities of 
modem economic and social processes (Kooiman 2003:129). Similarly the shift from 
procuring to enabling reflects the diversity of client-service relations, whilst post-modem 
culture, social and economic globalisation and the assumed IT revolution all impact on the 
nature of the state (Kooiman 2003: 129). In light of these changes, the role of the nation 
state, and New Labour's approach to governance, will be explored more fully in the next 
section. 
There is general understanding that governance is closely associated with the notion of 
adaptability. So Kooiman's (2003:201) assertion that, 'entropy is a tendency present in any 
system to disintegrate and even disappear in the long run,' sheds an interesting light on the 
governance debate. Kooiman argues that all social systems tend towards atomisation and 
anarchy and efforts must be made to maintain levels of integration and organisation. 
Consequently, the emergence of the current mode of governance can be interpreted as a 
means of countering entropy in contemporary governing structures. In this respect the local 
government modernisation agenda can be viewed as the state's response to entropy and 
changing demands in relation to local governance. A key issue here is whether the 
adaptability associated with governance responds effectively to the conditions of entropy 
actually present in current systems of local government and governance. 
O'Neil (2002a) argued, in her first Reith lecture, that the developed world has become 
increasingly aware of risk. This contemporary phenomenon has coincided with the 
emergence of new and more complex forms of governance. This, in tum, is related to the 
emergence of expert systems, within the more differentiated governance structure, in which 
knowledge has become increasingly specialised, and therefore more able (in theory at least) 
to minimise risks. However, as a consequence of reflexive modernity, expert systems face 
a degree of internal and external complexity, dynamics and diversity that cannot be 
mastered directly from a uniform centre (Scharpf 1999). Expert systems require new, more 
__ communicativ,e and co-operatiye mq<l_es o(re-centring from above, allowing for bottom-up 
--·-- ~-- - -- "'---- .:- -~-- ---
articulation of decisions and actions (Bang 2004:159). However, Kooiman (2003:208-9) 
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argues, 'governing, governance and governability themselves have highly dynamic, 
complex and diverse qualities of their own. The lack of insight in this might be one of the 
major reasons why so much present day governance is ineffective.' The argument here is 
that while emerging forms of governance have reflexively reacted to the context in which 
they operate the unintended consequence of this has led to greater complexity and a 
corresponding lack of understanding about the nature of governance systems, and how to 
govern in such situations of complexity32• 
The changing role of the state draws attention to two sharply different contexts/worldviews 
in which the state and intellectual discourse take place, modernity and post-modernity 
(Bauman 1987:2). Bauman identifies the typical modern strategy of intellectual work as 
being characterised by the metaphor of the 'legislator' role. This refers to the authority to 
arbitrate being legitimised by superior (objective) knowledge to which intellectuals have 
better access than non-intellectual parts of society (Bauman 1987:4). Access to this 
knowledge is furthered through procedural rules with universal validity. The role of the 
intellectual here can also be equated to that of the professional expert. In the Fordist state 
issues were captured by professional decisions and bureaucratic processes, in which there 
was a lot of professional autonomy. However this has declined with less trust in 
intellectuals and professionals. In a discussion of Clegg's (1990) research Rhodes 
identifies how there has been a shift from traditional Weberian (formal bureaucratic) 
organisation to new post-modern forms of organisation that don't have clear boundaries 
with their environment. As a consequence of this lack of clarity Bauman identifies the 
typical post-modern strategy of intellectual work as being characterised by the metaphor of 
the 'interpreter' role. Bauman (1987:5) argues that, 'instead of being orientated towards 
selecting the best social order, this strategy is aimed at facilitating communication between 
autonomous (sovereign) participants. It is concerned with preventing the distortion of 
meaning in the process of communication.' The post-modem strategy does not imply the 
elimination of the modern one, but the universalistic ambitions of the intellectuals' own 
tradition. This leads to the territorial claims of 'general' inteJiectuals becoming contested, 
inherently problematic and difficult to legitimise (Bauman 1987:6). In their place the role 
---of specialisLintellectuals_gro_~s aJ!<i isJes~ P~()~l~m~t~~~, _ 
32 This will tested through the scrutiny case studies. 
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The emergence of governance as an increasingly significant concept very much reflects the 
post-modem view of partial intelJectuals and expert systems. This is of critical importance 
to the role and success of the scrutiny function (see below). A key issue to be explored 
through the case studies is the extent to which scrutiny is concerned with negotiating 
between different perspectiveslknowledges (as it would in a post-modem way) or about 
establishing the 'facts' (which is the most desirable strategy in a modem approach)? 
The fragmentation and complexity that has emerged in governing and governance and the 
associated trends in managing specific issues through more efficient and focused 
approaches associated with expert systems are central to the role of scrutiny. Sketcher 
(2003:8) argues that, 'the central features of such special purpose agencies are the 
decoupling of their management and policy-making from direct control by elected 
politicians, and their focus on a single policy sector in contrast to the multi-functional 
responsibilities of the local authority.' 33 Scrutiny is a key governance mechanism in 
localities that allows councillors to react to and explore the governance context in their 
localities. However, there are serious issues surrounding the capacity, resources and 
powers of scrutiny to fulfil this role, as have been highlighted in the previous chapter and 
will be explored further through the case studies. 
Furthermore, the trends towards increasing fragmentation described above have led to 
changing conditions of govemability. Rhodes (1997:3) argues that the concept of 
governance has utility in demonstrating a move from unitary government to one of many 
centres linking many levels of government - local, regional, national and supranational. 
The notion of governance being a 'response' to governing a changing society is an 
important one. Kooiman (2003:194) states that, 'a governing system must be able to 
represent the basic types of variety found in the system to be governed.' However due to 
the nature of fragmented governance Perri 6 et al (2002) suggest that there are difficulties 
in developing governing systems to reflect this variety without creating further 
complexity34• These include: the dumping of problems and costs by one agency on 
33 The extent to which this is addressed/managed through LSPs is ex~ined in the next chapter. 
34 A fuller discussion of fragmentation in governance is provided in the next chapter as a basis for which the 
New Labour holistic governance agenda and partnership based approach to governing have emerged. 
75 
another; conflicting programmes; duplication; conflicting goals; lack of or poor sequencing; 
narrow exclusivity in responding to need; inaccessibility of services; confusion about their 
availability; and gaps in service provision or interventions (Perri 6 et al2002:37-38). 
Because governing and governance are becoming more complex and varied there is a need 
for some meta-structures or interorganisational co-ordination, or 'metagovernance' - the 
'governance of government and governance' (Jessop 2000:23). Kooiman (2003) describes 
'three orders of governance'. 
l. The first order involves governing actors trying to tackle problems or create 
opportunities on a day-to-day basis (Kooiman 2003:135). These processes are 
embedded in institutional settings (Kooiman 2003: 153). 
2. The second order encompasses the care for and maintenance of institutions and 
focuses attention on the structural aspects of interactions, controlling or enabling 
problem solving or opportunity creating practices in modem societies. 
3. The third-order is metagovernance, in which various norms are established that 
form a framework that directs and sets boundaries for governing at the first and 
second governance orders (Kooiman 2003:188). Jessop (2000:23) warns that 
metagovernance should not be viewed as a single all purpose form of governance, 
although it involves, 'defining new boundary-spanning roles and functions, creating 
linkage devices, sponsoring new organisations, identifying appropriate lead 
organisations to co-ordinate other partners, designing institutions, and generating 
visions to facilitate self-organisations into different fields.' 
Returning to the impact of global trends on governing in governance and the transformation 
of the state in the global economy, Weiss (2003:315) argues that, 'globalisation does indeed 
impact on national governance and its domestic structures, but the impact is not only, or 
even generally constraining. Rather, the impact is just as likely to be enabling - in 
particular, enabling the emergence of governed interdependence.' According to Weiss 
(2003:308-9) 'governed interdependence' is a tendency of globalisation, through which 
--state-society relations become clos~_r, JID_QJ!_l!l>lic-~rivl;lte partnerships, policy networks and 
--~-- oc~_:.._ •• c ---~ :=--...__ 
self-regulation under the state's goal setting auspices all increase. Weiss is arguing that this 
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is a more specialised versiOn of infrastructural power, which is vital to the state's 
transformative capacity. The scrutiny case studies will investigate the extent to which there 
has been a change in the infrastructural power/capacity of the state and whether governed 
interdependence is occurring, and what effect this has had on the transformative capacity of 
the state. 
Whether the impact of governed interdependence is capacity constricting or enhancing 
depends to a large degree on the prevailing norms and state-society linkages in the domestic 
environment (Weiss 2003:315). Furthermore, Weiss (2003:299) argues that whether 
institutional interdependence intensifies or softens the constraints on economic governance 
and policy autonomy depends on the normative and organisational configuration for the 
specific issue area in question. It is, therefore, possible to embrace the idea of change 
resulting from globalisation, without resorting to notions of globalisation imposing 
generalised convergence (Weiss 2003:311). Consequently, Weiss moves on to propose that 
the more globalised the market, and the more systemic the risk is, the greater the incentives 
are for a governed interdependence response. The case study inquiries will provide a 
valuable insight into the governance arrangements (and the extent to which governed 
interdependence is apparent for each of the scrutiny case study topic areas) dependent on 
the level of risk for the issue, and whether state power (especially locally) gives way to a 
more negotiated form of co-operation between a variety of actors. 
3.3.3) General Governance Conclusions 
The emergence of governance generally, and this current 'mode' of governance in 
particular, is not taking place in isolation from broader economic, social and political 
trends. Old political systems do not have enough capacity to yield the policies necessary for 
dynamic local economies in an age of rapid change (John & Cole 2000:82). Global 
ideological factors are shaping the emergence of this mode of governance, shaping the 
particular complexities, dynamics, and diversity of governance that Kooiman (2003) talks 
about. Through outlining these strands of globalisation and governance a context emerges 
_ in_whichJhe lo_~ru govemf1!e!lt mod~!flJ~tion a_~~~~~'---h~ been developed. It is necessary to 
stress that this is not a strictly determinist context, although the developments in 
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globalisation and governance have provoked and encouraged the need for (and to a Jesser 
extent) the nature of national and local governance responses. In tum, the choices that 
national governments make within this context strongly influence the role, remit and 
efficacy of local authorities and their scrutiny functions. A key issue for scrutiny here is 
whether this context will allow scrutiny to perform its accountability function. This issue is 
closely linked to complexity in governance. On the one hand complexity makes it more 
difficult for scrutiny to secure transparency in governing arrangements; and on the other the 
power and influence of local government is constrained through complex structures of 
power and influence within the wider governance arena. 
Regardless of the perceived causes of this mode of governance, it is clear that state actors 
seemingly have less control over governing and have to bring other actors into the process. 
When presented neutrally governance can be seen as a way of 'keeping up' with changes in 
governing and governability. However to suggest that market advocacy is not so much an 
ideological choice as a technical necessity as Blair and his government have done (see 
Watson and Hay 2003), is an oversimplification. According to Watson and Hay 
(2003:297), 'Labour's globalisation rhetoric was predicated on the assumption that 
exogenous economic forces ensured that 'choices are constrained' in line with strict 
macroeconomic orthodoxy.' However Watson and Hay argue that this is not so much the 
result of the non-negotiable character of globalisation, but the dominance of political 
rhetoric and electoral expediency over economic reality. I partially agree with this, but 
would argue that the global processes described in 3.3 .1 create the starting point from 
which there is limited room for manoeuvre/negotiation. Furthermore this limited room for 
manoeuvre is just as much an ideological as an economic constraint. This is significant 
because it determines the macro-economic/political framework, within which decisions 
about the role of government and public expenditure have increasingly been seen to be 
determined within. I am not arguing that global/international processes completely define 
governance at all levels, but that they create the starting point from which there is limited 
room for manoeuvre for national and local difference. 
-The·idea-that~ good government is mir1iroal_.gov~rnm~11! h(lS_influen~ed the growth of 
governance (this is explored more in the next section) as New Labour have sought to 
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deliver public services in a more open system. It could be argued that global pressures 
encourage states to enter into increasingly complex and differentiated processes for 
delivering services, because this form of adaptation is critical to ensuring these services 
remain. A good example of this has been the preoccupation with inflation by government's 
in recent years. Watson and Hay (2003:298) quote Blair, speaking in 1995, as suggesting 
that in the new economic environment, 'low inflation is not simply a goal in itself, it is the 
essential prerequisite both of ensuring that supply-side measures can work to raise the 
capacity of the economy to grow.' The consequences of attempting to squeeze inflation out 
of the global economy have been quite profound in terms ofthe emergence of governance. 
Held et al. ( 1999) have suggested that the forms and modalities of the state have differed 
with globalisation, the costs and benefits of policy choices have changed, resulting in more 
multi-layered governance. Through encouraging more agencies/bodies to become involved 
in the delivery of public services the public sector borrowing requirement is lowered and 
controlled, which reduces inflation, and increases the number of actors involved in 
governance arrangements and the complexity of these arrangements. Nevertheless, this is 
not simply a managerial issue, the driving force behind the need for governance, as well as 
the governing mechanisms themselves, stems from an ideological, political and economic 
worldview. Consequently, there seems to be a loss of state autonomy and a growing 
perception by states of the need for a greater degree of cooperation (King and Kendall 
2004:161). 
3.4) The National Level 
I would not be in politics, New Labour would not exist, if we accepted the idea 
that the modem world has somehow made futile the pursuit of our progressive 
values. That all we can do is cling on to the fragments of the post-war 
settlement whilst we let the tide of individualistic modernity wash around us. -
From a speech made by Prime Minister Tony Blair at the Guardian Public 
Services Summit 29/1/04. 
__ As_we~hav_e seen the emergence of this ~current phas7 of governance coincides with, and is 
linked to, developments in a broader global context. The effect of this context has been to 
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prompt a reaction from nation states. This section will outline the UK's reaction to 
globalisation, particularly in relation to issues of governance and the responsibility for 
delivering public services, of which local government is not only a key deliverer but also 
the democratically accountable and representative body in localities. 
Kooiman (2003: 11) states that, 'no single actor has sufficient action potential to dominate 
unilaterally.' However, central government is in a better position than most in this respect. 
Indeed, according to Rhodes ( 1997: 15), the centre has more legal resources than any other 
domestic actor, but there are clear limits to, and constraints on, central government 
intervention; 'there is a persistent tension between the wish for authoritative action and 
dependence on the compliance and actions of others.' However, Painter and Goodwin 
(2000:52) argue that local governance still depends on national government for its powers, 
and there is often a lack of authority given to agencies of local governance. There is still a 
key role for the nation state in allocating regulatory capacity and authority to local 
governance despite the forces of localisation and globalisation (Ibid). 
Indeed, Davies (2002:312) argues that, 'for Harding (1997: 308) the State is now, more 
than ever, influential in determining the way cities and regions respond to the challenge of 
globalisation.' Political action at the national level remains vital in mediating between 
global pressures and local responses. For any social contract there has to be a collective 
agent that can organise it, and a public space to debate its character (Hutton 2003:97). 
Hutton moves on to argue that by not having a constitution reflecting enlightenment values 
and merely bolting representatives onto its monarchical political system, Britain has a much 
weaker conception of the public realm than its European partners. This marks an important 
factor in the emergence of the UK's mode of governance. In his study of European welfare 
states Taylor-Gooby (2002) found that reforms tended to follow regime type -
consequently in liberal states like the UK the market is stressed. 
The influence of the polity during the Conservative years, in relation to governance, needs 
to be explored briefly to understand the position New Labour inherited in 1997. Hood and 
~-James_ (192_7:185) @rglle that ~h~ Cons~ervatiy_es pledged to prune the quango state on 
-- -·--- - -··-·--- - - --.- . -
coming to power. However they were unsuccessful in fulfilling their intention as the 
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number of nationally funded bodies delivering public services, formerly provided by local 
authorities, rose to over 4,500 under their patronage (Hood and James 1997: 185). 
Furthermore an effect ofNPM has been to introduce market competition into public service 
provision, and private management techniques into the public sector. This developed, at 
least in part, as a reaction to governing in a much more open system - in response to the 
global trends described in the previous section. New Labour has a national programme 
aimed at social improvements within the room for manoeuvre it considers it has in this 
open system. The Commission on Social Justice (1994) has described the type of strategy 
adopted by New Labour as that of the 'Investors'. The strategy here is to link the ethics of 
community with the dynamics of a market economy. Extending economic opportunity to 
every individual is a source of economic prosperity and also a basis of social justice, and is 
dependent on strong institutions, families and communities (Commission on Social Justice 
1994:95). In this respect the notion of an adaptive state is crucial for responding to the 
contemporary demands of highly diverse and individualistic societies. At the same time the 
openness of the economic system has resulted in delivery becoming an increasingly major 
theme of government, and as a consequence management and audit have grown in 
prominence. 
According to Newman (200 1 :48), 'globalisation occupies a special place at the core of a 
series of narratives that construct an imperative to change,' cutting across the economy and 
institutions of civil society leading to the drive for modernisation. Accordingly the 
government's modernisation agenda has emphasised the importance of government 
focusing on the causes not symptoms of problems, which leads to a wider recognition of 
the interconnectedness of 'social, economic and political' problems and, therefore, the 
importance ofholistic and joined-up governance solutions (Newman 2001). However, there 
is a paradox at the heart ofthe government's agenda, as there has been a 'hollowing out' of 
the state with power shifting to international financial markets, to global companies who 
can move capital between markets, and to supra-national elites like the EU and World Bank 
(Newman 2001:12). Consequently, the hollowing out of the state reinforces the need for 
holistic/joined-up governance capacities and capabilities as the state increasingly focuses 
-on-funding/commissioning/enablingJ!mctions, i~ @ ropre pluralistic economy of providers. 
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Perri 6 et al (2002) view the holistic governance agenda as a way for governance agencies 
to find solutions to the problems citizens most worry about. These 'wicked problems' cross 
departmental boundaries. To promote health, community safety and employability requires 
the co-ordinated effort of many public, private and voluntary agencies (Perri 6 et al 
2002:35). As Kooiman (2003:194) argues, 'the more diverse the qualities to be governed, 
the more diverse the necessary governing measures, and the more diverse the relation 
between the two.' Whilst this is an important factor in governance, I think that the role of 
the state in directing and intervening in these relationships can be overplayed. The 
complexity here requires an activist state to be able to push policies through. However, the 
willingness/necessity for the state to intervene at this level can be misinterpreted to suggest 
that the state is as powerful as, or even more powerful than, it once was. But I would argue 
that the onset of governance, could equally be interpreted as providing the state with more 
'avenues' to go down at the national and local level (in terms of providing, regulating, 
directing, inspecting, monitoring, and commissioning services), but these avenues have 
been created partially through the trends resulting from globalisation35• So whilst the state 
may be travelling further than it used to, as a result of increased fragmentation and 
complexity in governing and governance, it may not be getting as far as it once did. 
Nevertheless, Taylor-Gooby (2002:599) argues that the high spending welfare systems 
have thus far survived, developed and shown resilience to the more neo-liberal aspects of 
globalisation. Within this bracket the broad line of division between high spending Nordic, 
more moderate continental corporatist, rapidly developing Mediterranean and lower 
spending liberal regimes, like the UK, remains (Taylor-Gooby 2002:599). However within 
the liberal regime there have been developments between governments. Consequently, 
Newman (2001:54) argues that in the UK, 'the "Third Way" can partly be understood as an 
attempt to retain the economic gains of the Thatcher years while also attempting to re-
inscribe a set of moral and civic values that fitted rather uneasily with neo-liberal 
economics.' So whilst it may be the case that Labour has continued with a mixed economy 
of welfare they have done so with an increased role for the 'third' sector, and with a strong 
emphasis on collaboration and partnership (Newman 2001 :83). Nevertheless, Newman 
argues that, 'there Wl:lS a co11tinued . focus. on pqt;~pj_~g organisational efficiency and 
35 i.e. through the privatisation of services and purchaser-provider splits that have become a feature of 
governance arrangements in the UK and other countries. 
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performance, and on the search for business solutions to social problems.' Given the 
developments in governance described above Blair (2004:11) is quite right to assert that, 
'the truth is that diversity in the quality and type of services is not a reform; it is a reality.' 
And in response Blair's (2004) strategy for continuous improvements in public services 
involves greater choice for the public, a greater voice for the public, more personalised 
services, and a reliance on partnerships between (and across) providers and consumers. 
Newman makes the argument that rather than being seen as an example of the hollowing 
out of the state, partnerships could be viewed as further dispersal and penetration of state 
power, drawing local stakeholders into a more direct relationship with the state, and 
drawing them in to deliver the government's agenda. The state's capacity to secure 
political objectives is enhanced by sharing powers with a range of actors, whilst remaining 
the dominant partner (Newman 2001:125). 
According to Kooiman (2003:120) the, 'state may change its ambitions but seldom will it 
give up or wither away completely. It will redefine its hierarchical mode of governance in 
the light of shifting aspiration.' Along these lines Bevir and Rhodes (2003:55) contend 
that, 'New Labour's notion of governance seeks to transform the state into an enabling 
partner by promoting the notion of networks of institutions and individuals acting in 
partnership and held together by relations of trust.' Perri 6 et al argue that Blair's is a 
centrist government. It wants to institutionalise social peace between rival forms of social 
organisation (through governance and partnerships), it sees itself as correcting the excesses 
of the previous direction in policy and public administration towards fragmentation and 
incoherence (Perri 6 et al 2002: 17). Indeed Blair argues that during the 1960s and 1970s 
there had been an unprecedented growth in public services, which was dominated by the 
professions at a local level and this led to low standards, unacceptable variability in 
delivery and the disempowerment of service users (Blair 2004:8). The Prime Minister 
(2004:8) argues that, 'by arming the public with greater choice and by strengthening their 
individual and collective voice we are making them partners in service improvement.' But 
Perri 6 et al (2002) take the view that this is based on a programme of social peace between 
capital and labour, which necessitates focusing on more modest goals than previous 
--governments-e.g. combating so_cllil exclusion in~tead of narrowing inequalities. 
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The notion that 'social peace' between capital and labour has produced more modest goals 
is directly linked to the governance arrangements that have emerged to deliver these 
goals36• These are, in tum, linked to the broader global context, which encourages the use 
of quasi-markets and contracting out in a more competitive economic system. Taylor-
Gooby (2002:601) argues that governments have not responded to new pressures by 
'rolling back' their welfare states but there have been real changes in approach such as 
through recalibration, transition, and restructuring. In this respect two main policy 
directions stand out- cost containment (through wider ranging targeting and stricter control 
over budgets to contain current and future spending) and activation (through developing 
measures to decrease dependency on the state) {Taylor-Gooby 2002:601). Indeed Blair 
(2004:8) argues that through explicit contracts, regulation and inspection, and the 
publication of performance indicators, the accountability and standards of public service 
professions have been raised. 
Consequently, national governments can, and do, play a major role in meta-governance 
according to Jessop (2000:23-24), who identifies the following ways this can take place: 
• Provide groundrules and regulatory order; 
• Ensure compatibility and or coherence of different governance regimes; 
• Act as the primary organiser of the dialogue amongst policy communities; 
• Shape cognitive expectations; 
• Serve as the 'court of appeal' for governance issues; 
• They can rebalance power differentials; 
• Try to shape the interests of collective and individual actors to suit preferred 
strategies and tactics; and 
• Assure political responsibility in the event of governance failure. 
Jessop argues that a consequence of these factors is that networking and negotiating 
occur in the shadow of hierarchy. Other modes of co-ordination (markets, hierarchies 
and heterarchies) still exist but in the context of 'negotiated decision making' (Jessop 
36 This in tum is linked to the how the third order of governance- 'metagovemance'- Kooiman (2003) 
describes (and is discussed above) has shaped the first and second orders. 
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2000:24). This is an important development, and one not without its problems. Perri 6 
et al (2002:95-99) argue that this 'excessively hierarchical bias' has led to: 
• Impatience - the government wants "quick wins" but this can stifle integration 
because it takes time to build trust between agencies and develop the right 
strategies; 
• Initiativitis - this can make a nonsense out of integration because the volume of 
special projects, discretionary funds and demands to produce plans can swamp 
local authorities; and 
• Fragmented holism - in which conflicting policy priorities, priorities for different 
services and manifesto commitments often fail to produce integration. 
The modernisation programme is closely linked to the third way as a programme of public 
sector reform (Newman 200 I :52). In part it is a reaction against state provision through 
large scale bureaucracies, emphasising the retention of the mixed economy of service 
provision with a stronger emphasis on the importance and value of the 'third sector' 
(Newman 2001 :52). In British governance command bureaucracy remains a major way of 
delivering public services, but it does so alongside privatisation, purchaser-provider splits 
and management techniques from the private sector (Bevir & Rhodes 2003:54). Newman 
argues that purchaser-provider splits have been 'softened' and that consumerism of choice 
remains but with less reliance on market mechanisms alone as the guarantor of choice, in 
contrast to the previous Conservative governments. Consequently, even relatively simple 
services are liable to display a mix of structures, strategies and relationships because the 
government's policy is that services should be provided by the sector (public, private, 
voluntary) best placed to deliver it (Bevir & Rhodes 2003:57). Some examples of holistic 
governance under New Labour are Education, Health, and Employment Action Zones, 
which are created around particular geographical areas, in which large consortia of central 
and local public agencies, voluntary bodies and private companies are assembled (Perri 6 et 
al2002:23). 
In-summary Labour has tried to distance itselffrotn~the outright assault on public services 
which took place under the previous Conservative administrations (Newman 2001 :52). 
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However, the success of this has been limited by a relatively uncritical acceptance of the 
global context that shaped many of these reforms. Nevertheless, the modernisation 
programme has been strongly oriented towards the delivery of policy agendas in health, 
education and social welfare and there has also been an emphasis on involving citizens and 
communities in decision-making at the local level (Newman 2001 ). However, a key factor 
in delivering policy agendas has been the continued shift towards governance solutions, 
which are increasingly seen to be the only way (in the UK) to respond to the pressures of a 
more open system, whilst delivering social improvements. The consequences of this on 
local government are quite profound and are explored in the next section. 
3.5) The Local Level 
This section will explore the notion of a system of local governance and the various 
governance arrangements and interactions at play here. The second part of this section is 
concerned with how local government fits into this emerging context. 
3.5.1) Local Governance 
Batty and Hilton (2003: 164) consider local governance as, 'the organisation of local public 
life by a range of community led bodies, led by elected local authorities.' Whilst Bovaird 
and Loffier (2002:16) define, 'local governance as: the set of formal and informal rules, 
structures and processes which determine the ways in which individuals and organisations 
can exercise power over the decisions (by other stakeholders) which affect their welfare at 
local levels.' 
The shift to talking about local governance rather than local government, can partially be 
attributed to the new challenges facing local communities. Boivaird and Loffier (2002:11) 
usefully highlight some key challenges at the start of the twenty-first century: 
• Political pressure from unresolved problems, like crime and economic deprivation; 
• 'Fhe- use of ICT for local seryic_tLpl_art!l_i_Ilg ~-~ -~eJi_yery, and_ deaJjp~ with local 
problems generally; 
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• Greater pressure from the media as more sophisticated local stakeholders; 
• Increasing globalisation - localities become important economic players, whilst 
being exposed to the volatile global economy; and 
• The development of a more differentiated civil society. 
Boivaird and Loftler (2002: 11) move on to highlight the implications this has on local 
authorities: 
• The need for collaboration with other agencies on policy making/implementation; 
• Stronger engagement of all partners in issues of local strategy, planning and 
resource management; 
• More intensive and widely spread knowledge management across the local 
networks; and 
• Sustainability. 
Clearly there has been a shift to governance here, as the challenges outlined by Boivaird 
and Lofller (2002) reflect the complexity, dynamics and diversity that are key features of 
governance. The effect of this has meant that, according to Rhodes (1997:122), 'local 
government's position as the pre-eminent governmental institution beyond Whitehall was 
challenged by the Conservative government, which by-passed local authorities for other 
departments.' Rhodes argues that the importance of this shift should not be 
underestimated, as few policy areas remain the domain of a single agency. The 
Conservative policies of by-passing local government for special purpose bodies, 
increasing competition and responsiveness to consumers had the effect of consolidating the 
trend towards local governance (Rhodes 1997: 130). 
Prior to these developments (between the mid-1940s to early 1980s) local authorities had 
considerable functional sovereignty. Sketcher (2003:7) argues that, 'despite fluctuations in 
the exact duties of local authorities in this period, councils bore the responsibility for a 
substantial package of welfare state services - e.g. education, social welfare, housing - as 
-wen-as the- regtihitory functions andccommunity-services associated with a civilised socie_ty 
- e.g. town planning, libraries, leisure facilities and consumer protection.' However, John 
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(1997:266) maintains that during the 1980s, 'there appeared to be the common themes of 
reducing local authority discretion, creating new unelected quangos, introducing 
institutional and financial incentives for consumer-driven quasi-markets, increasing 
national legal regulation and enshrining the role of the private sector in public provision';' 
The ESRC study into the Local Governance Programme between 1992 and 1997 found that 
network based patterns of interaction were becoming increasingly important - local 
government was becoming a system of governance, involving a plurality of organisations 
across public, private and voluntary sectors (Rhodes 1999). According to Sketcher (2003) 
the process of'agentification' has challenged the functional sovereignty of local authorities. 
The term agentification is used by Pollitt et al (2001) to describe the process of creating 
special purpose bodies at arms length to centres of elected political authority, with a remit 
to make and manage public policy in a specified policy sector (Sketcher 2003:7). 
Jones and Stewart (2002:16) argue that there was nothing remarkable in the removal of 
local government functions between 1979 and 1997, because the nature of local 
government has frequently changed. What they regard as distinctive was giving these 
functions to appointed bodies at a local level, which showed a lack of trust in elected local 
authorities. This has created new tiers of local governance, complicating further the notion 
of where responsibility lies. 
Clearly these new tiers of local governance have a profound impact on the governing 
arrangements of localities, which needs to be explored further. According to John and Cole 
(2000) the centre has restructured local political systems, by creating new layers of the 
bureaucratic state and quangos, to deal with new policy challenges. According to Charter 
88 these are 'unelected bodies spending public money' and the House of Commons Public 
Administration Select Committee has estimated that there are over 5000 of these bodies 
(Wilson & Game 2002:135). Wilson and Game state they are all public bodies appointed 
directly or indirectly by central government, performing functions and providing services 
that were provided mainly by local authorities. They greatly increase the complexity of 
sub-central government and give increased influence to their sponsoring departments at 
-local--level--(Wilson & Game AOQ7: 13,4). Thjs increased complexity in sub-central 
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government has then been driven from the centre 37 and has a direct link to the need for a 
'governing' response at the local level - of which the creation of local partnerships is a 
central strand. The insertion of partnerships into the more general state system involve 
different modes of coordination, access to institutional support and material resources 
(Jessop 2000:19). 
Quangos can perform important functions effectively, bringing expertise and experience 
into government (Wilson & Game 2002: 137). More generally John and Cole argue that 
there have been some improvements in decision-making under these conditions of 
governance. However, the character of governance challenges local accountability 
arrangements and undermines the existing patterns of chain and command, creating a more 
informal form of governing in which the patterns of democratic control are less easy to 
identify (John & Cole 2000:87). The issue of accountability becomes more important as 
the interests of other bodies, both public and private (but not directly accountable) are 
introduced into the local governance agenda. This is not to say that these bodies do not 
reflect the views of some local citizens and stakeholders. However, in terms of direct 
public accountability local authorities remain the pre-eminent body fulfilling this function 
in localities, but the responsibility for accountability is not coterminous with functional 
responsibility over services. The scrutiny function is the key mechanism local authorities 
have for holding the governance arrangements of localities to account, but as is argued 
throughout this thesis, there are serious concerns over its powers and capacity to fulfil such 
a complex and far reaching role. 
The complexity of local governance may be deepening, but it is not a new phenomenon as 
Rhodes (1997:133-134) surmises that, 'the history of local government is compounded of 
multiple contradictions - economic, political and organisational. Monocausal explanations 
are inadequate. Policy-making for local government has generated a policy mess because 
of the failure to appreciate that disaggregation, differentiation, interdependence and policy 
networks are characteristics ofthe British polity.' This was Rhodes' conclusion to the state 
of local governance in 1997. New Labour has at the very least tacitly acknowledged the 
_emergence_"ofJocal_govenHlJlCe, tluo!Jgh initia~iy~~ such as the new powers of well-being 
37 The centre in tum is influenced by broader trends in global politics and economics. 
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and the community leadership role, the creation of LSPs, and scrutiny itself. However it 
remains to be seen whether these measures are sufficiently empowered to come to terms 
with the continually developing governance context Rhodes is describing. Indeed this is 
compounded further by what Painter and Goodwin (2000:52) higHlight as a deficit in local 
regulatory capacity that arises from an inability to cope with social and economic problems 
of 'uneven development'. 
Since the Labour government came to power local public spending bodies or quasi-public 
bodies like regeneration and other partnerships, education zones, health and care trusts have 
all emerged (Wilson and Game 2002:137). Skelcher (2003) thinks that Ministers do not 
realise the problems and complexities they are creating at a local level. They are draining 
away the powers and functions of elected local government, whilst complicating its ability 
to co-ordinate the delivery of public services locally. Wilson and Game (2002: 138) argue 
this has led to a 'fusion' of different styles and working relationships, 'local governance 
brings together governmental and non-governmental agencies in flexible partnerships to 
deal with different problems by using different strategies.' In local governance there is, 
according to Wilson and Game (2002:142), a, 'myriad of overlapping schemes, all 
attracting funding on different bases, with different monitoring and regulation regimes, and 
with different partners involved in each scheme.' A key factor in the development of these 
schemes is New Labour's preoccupation with delivery in a more open system, which was 
discussed in the previous section. Wilson and Game question the possibility of managing 
and co-ordinating these convoluted inter-agency working relationships. The government 
would argue that through community strategies and best value performance plans, outward 
looking local authorities keen to develop their community leadership roles are able to do 
this. In this respect councils are still important but as mobilisers of collaborative efforts 
rather than the primary focus of public policy; the modernisation they have been through is 
about aligning them with this wider transformation project (Skelcher 2003:4). 
Davies (2002:312) argues that if New Labour is serious about generating bottom-up 
partnerships and unlocking local initiative then it needs to roll-back Whitehall's influence 
- on---local~ political- processes_ and. reconstitut~ P-art(1~rs_hjp in a way that will encourage 
'collaborative synergy'. Furthermore too much control on local government finances 
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inhibits the vital (deliberative) nature of localities. Local politics is generally becoming 
increasingly dominated by hierarchies, and new participatory strategies have not given local 
citizens more control over local politics, because they are constrained by hierarchical 
tendencies, and non-state actors do not have sufficient leverage to make a difference 
(Davies 2002:312). According to Newman (2001:124), 'Labour has represented a 
qualitatively different approach - an explicit use of partnership as a way of governing -this 
has been cross-cut by the continuance of forms of governance based on hierarchy and 
markets. The new paradigm has run alongside the old, rather than displacing it.' The effect 
that this has had on the limits and possibilities of local government scrutiny is a key 
consideration of this thesis, which is explored further through the scrutiny case studies and 
discussion chapters. 
3.5.2) Local Government in Local Governance 
Having discussed New Labour's approach to the changing nature of central government in 
the context of governance in section 3.4, it is now time to discuss the role of local 
government in the emerging context of local governance. Stewart (2003:245) stresses that 
effective local government is important in the government of a complex and changing 
society, and that it has a value in its own right but also in the whole system. An important 
factor here is the capacity of local government in this system, which is characterised to a 
large extent by the hierarchical nature of the governance context I am describing. 
The post war expansion of local government could be interpreted as 'administration by 
convenience' to contain the expanding costs of welfare provision (John 1997:254). 
Consequently, according to John, public intervention in Britain never became 
institutionalised to the same extent as it did in some other advanced democracies, and the 
weakness of local government and its leaders meant local political power was not 
embedded in the British constitution. The implication of this is, as local government's role 
has been transferred to other bodies, local authorities have become willing to engage in 
reciprocal horizontal arrangements with other bodies (John 1997:255). Operating under the 
conditions of governance bighlighted ill th~ previQU§ secJion, public-private coalitions 
- -- ~-- ---~-- --- -_ ~-~ -- -- _. - -· ' --
mobilise resources and achieve more than would be the case if they operated alone. As 
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policy-makers realise how difficult it is to 'run' a locality, they attempt to include those 
decision-makers whose actions affect the success of public policy (John & Cole 2000:83). 
However Rhodes (1997:16) argues that the 1979 Conservative government's determination 
to control individual local authorities, but lack of means to impose these policies, created a 
'policy mess' as local government's 'responsibility ethic' was eroded. Rhodes argument 
here suggests that the lack of trust in local government to deliver central objectives 
disempowered local authorities, whilst in some cases they 'rebelled' against the centre. 
Combined with the increasing diversity of governance at a local level, it can be argued that 
local government was (is) operating in a governance framework, but without the 
instruments to govern effectively in this broader context. 
The importance of local government in local governance should not be underestimated. 
John and Cole (2000:77) argue that only councils can pull together partnerships and 
mobilise local economic decision makers, 'the council has the legitimacy, the long-term 
staying power, the finance, and, above all, the professional officer cadre to shape initiatives 
in each policy sector.' John and Cole (2000:78) state, 'local government is able to use its 
control over many functions and its long entrenched position in localities to maintain its 
dominance.' But whilst local government remains important the very onset of local 
governance implies a loss control for local government. The arena in which local 
government operates is itself changing. Local authorities are responding to this loss of 
control by actively working with partners and taking forward the idea of 'community 
governance'; they have (paradoxically) had to become more proactive in the face of 
declining responsibility, and financial and legislative constraint (Wilson and Game 
2002:140). 
The chapter of this thesis on the modernising local government agenda has outlined the new 
powers of well-being and community leadership for local authorities under the New Labour 
government. The powers of well-being and the duty of community planning have 
strengthened local government and its capacity to recognise diversity and to develop 
initiatives (Stewart 2003:245). However Stewart moves on to argue that because the 
powers of-well-being are based on e~i~ti!lg po'\\f~r~ w~ich encou~age existing activities and 
thinking, the use of these powers is not as effective as it should be. In addition Stewart 
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(2003:14) has highlighted that the system of government (locally) is fragmented because it 
is highly differentiated and lacks the requisite capacity for integration. The duty of 
community leadership on local authorities should (in theory) enable the necessary 
integration, which in tum will enable a more coherent response to so called 'wicked issues' 
across the fragmented structure of community governance at the local level (Stewart 
2003;13-14). The success of this role will be explored further in the next chapter and 
throughout the case studies. 
Against these developments that are designed to encourage more outward looking and 
responsive local authorities in a governance context, the Labour government has also 
pursued a principle of selectivity in its relations with local authorities - distinguishing 
between how it treats authorities according to judgements on their perfonnance, or how 
they have modernised themselves (Stewart 2003:205). Blair (1998:22) highlights the 
importance of local authorities working to the Government's agenda, 'if you are unwilling 
or unable to work to the modern agenda then the government will have to look to other 
partners to take on your role.' This serves to highlight that under the wider processes of 
governance central government has a powerful bargaining tool for directing local 
authorities to comply with a relatively narrow modernisation agenda, because if they don't 
there are (now) plenty of agencies or organisations who can fulfil the role and functions of 
local government. Put more simply the onset of governance creates an environment in 
which the notion of selectivity can flourish. 
Added to the uncertainty local authorities face in pursuing their own agendas, the Secretary 
of State can now direct: 
• That a specified function of the authority shall be exercised by the Secretary of State 
or a person nominated by him for a period specified in the direction or for so long as 
the Secretary of State considers appropriate; and 
• That the authority shall comply with any instruction of the Secretary of State or his 
nominee in relation to the exercise of that function and shall provide such assistance 
· ---as theoSecretary-of- State or hiscnominee_may~ require fQr the purp_ose of exercisiog 
the function. (Local Government Act 1999:s.15.6) 
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This is a general power for intervention that is increasingly used or threatened to be used 
(Stewart 2003:207). According to Stewart the effect of the threat of use of this power is 
much the same as it actually being used because authorities tend to accept central 
government's proposals for action once this threat is issued. The notion of selectivity is not 
unproblematic. This is because the government relies on the judgement of inspectors and 
assessors, rather than judgements made from within the authority and from the local 
electors as the key determinants of outcomes (Stewart 2003 :209). Stewart argues that the 
government assumes that interventions will be effective, but these are based on a situation 
which is imperfectly understood, due to central government being geographically and 
organisationally remote from the authorities it is intervening in. This leads Stewart 
(2003:214) to conclude that, 'there is a critical lack of clarity about the whole inspection 
system, and yet it is directed at institutions with a clear basis of accountability.' It is also 
argued that the benchmarking system that emerges from the inspection regime is also 
inappropriate for the system of local governance. Bovaird and Loffler (2002: 1 5) argue, 
'the fundamental problem with benchmarking models is that they only assess dimensions 
which an organisation can directly control. However, as the borders between public, 
private and voluntary sectors become increasingly blurred, responsibilities also become 
increasingly shared between local stakeholders.' Consequently, local government is 
increasingly controlled by the centre, through a system of selectivity unsympathetic to the 
conditions of local governance, furthermore, this is compounded by the parallel process of 
local authorities adjusting to the complex role of governing in a system of governance. 
Despite the 'general competence' provision of the Local Government Act 2000 (see chapter 
two), the government has not relaxed its financial grip on local authorities (Wilson 
2001:302). According to Wilson although the Local Government Act 1999 abolished crude 
and universal capping of local authorities, there is now a set of reserve powers enabling 
ministers to limit what they decide are excessive annual tax increases. This leads Wilson 
(200 1 :302) to conclude, 'central government retains the power to intervene in specific local 
authorities on terms which it determines.' This introduces an element of uncertainty to the 
governance arrangements from i:l. l()(;lil a~thQ!ithls; Rerspcectiye, and creates a shaky 
foundation from which authorities govern localities. Furthermore the excessive grant 
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dependence of local authorities weakens local accountability because changes in 
expenditure level do not match changes in local taxation (Stewart 2003:251 ). 
Aside from mainstream funding through the Standard Spending Assessments (SSAs)38, 
central government allocates funds to local authorities and their partners through 32 
different kinds of area based initiatives (Stewart 2003:215). Each initiative has its own 
rationale, which becomes problematic given the cumulative effect of these initiatives 
through the complexity they create. Concerns arising from this are the waste of local 
capacity through lack of co-ordination; area based initiatives and mainstream programmes 
do not complement each other; the focus is on short-term39 outputs rather than long-term 
outcomes; and it is unclear who in central government is in the best position to tackle 
complex social problems (PIU 2000:31 ). Another concern highlighted by Stewart 
regarding these initiatives is that parts of local authority's budgets are effectively ring-
fenced through the requirements to match funding for these initiatives. Of course local 
authorities do not have to bid for these, but it is unlikely that they will choose not to 
because financial resources are rarely refused, especially in times of financial constraint, 
although local authorities might choose to use this money differently if given the chance 
(Stewart 2003: 217). Furthermore Stewart indicates that there are at least 66 plans required 
by central government from local authorities. Stewart (2003:218) contends that, 'as with 
area based initiatives, each new plan was considered on its own merits without regard to the 
overall impact on authorities of the numbers of plans required.' Although community 
strategies are a key, and statutory, plan geared towards rationalising this that will be 
examined further in the next chapter. Nevertheless a complex and confusing picture of 
local governance is emerging here, and it is very much supported by my practical 
experience working as a scrutiny support officer. The separate plans encourage a 
fragmentation of local authorities' planning procedures, and the lack of joined-up 
government at the centre decreases the likelihood of it at a local level (Stewart 2003:218). 
Stewart (2003 :221) identifies a general problem with the government's approach to local 
government; 'there has been little understanding of the problems of managing with and 
38 Which is based on the government's calculation of a Council's relative need for expenditure based on a set 
formula. 
39 Although programmes like NDC are notable exceptions to this, lasting for ten years. 
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through other organisations and in particular the management of change in an inter-
organisational setting.' The lack of understanding of the workings of central-local relations 
is a weakness of central government, and is reflected in the dominance of command and 
control in its approach to governing (Stewart 2003 :224). Goss (200 1 :5) argues that there is 
a growing sense of muddle due to the unintended consequences of reforms, and the 
government's preoccupation with control is inappropriate in such a complex field. 
Furthermore while the agencies of local public policy become more highly differentiated 
and multi-layered, local democratic politics still revolve around the elected council 
(Skelcher 2003:4). Consequently, Sketcher (Ibid) argues that, 'elections are held for 
councillors who have only the lightest touch over significant areas of local public policy 
and the public accountability processes of quangos and partnerships are poorly developed. 
The institutions of local politics are embedded, but only in relation to a declining 
proportion of the local public policy arena.' 
According to Rhodes (1997:8), 'local government is neither dependent on, nor independent 
of, the centre. The two levels of government are interdependent embedded in various 
relationships with fluctuating local discretion.' John and Cole (2000) argue that despite 
extensive central government reform of local government in the 1980s, local government 
remains as the funder and main policy-maker for most of the services it did in the 1970s. 
Even if contracting out removes the direct provision of services, local government still 
provides funds, sets targets, reviews performance and determines the policy framework for 
these services (John and Cole 2000:76). There is no doubt that the centre relies on local 
government as a mechanism for service delivery, but it does so to a lesser extent than it 
once did. Nevertheless, the development of local governance has the potential to be a 
significant mechanism for the management of uneven development. But as Painter and 
Goodwin (2000:43) argue uneven local development is expressed at a local level, but its 
causes, at least in part, lie elsewhere. It is possible to tailor a welfare system to local 
circumstances but, 'at best, it can only influence the local half ofthe (unequal) relationship 
between global flows and local conditions.' (Painter & Goodwin 2000:43) The 
relationships between national, regional and local actors are important but there is a broader 
_contexLshaping thes~ rel~tiQn§~iJ:!s,_,~hi£h in.iJuences local conditions and defines the 
boundaries of action. 
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Indeed Bevir and Rhodes (2003:56) argue that (as a response to the broader global context) 
New Labour has reinterpreted concerns highlighted by the New Right through emphasising 
that economic recovery would bring unacceptable inflation unless it took place within 
macro-economic stability and supply-side policies to boost industry, by increasingly opting 
for a more positive view of markets. Accordingly the process of agentification started 
under the Tories has continued under the New Labour governments (Skelcher 2003:5). 
However Skelcher argues that more importantly than the agentification process, the 
political sovereignty of the local authority has been challenged through the inclusive 
participation strategies of multi-sectoral partnerships. The local quangos involved in these 
partnerships demonstrate a significant shortfall in formal local public accountability and 
transparency standards in comparison with those expected of local authorities40 (Skelcher 
2003:10). This is a key factor in the role of scrutiny in local governance. This is because 
the shortfall in formal democratic accountability places the onus on scrutiny to fulfil this 
role, but the complexity and 'muddle' in governance arrangements (described above) 
makes it a difficult task for scrutiny to hold these external bodies to account. 
3.6) Conclusions 
Global forces have constrained the discretion and autonomy of both local and central 
government, but there is scope for choices to be made. A good example of this is through 
the forms of welfare state that 'developed' countries have chosen to pursue. Nevertheless, 
there is a general trend towards governance, a feature of which is the greater plurality of 
delivering agencies, and there is correspondingly less direct control over delivery by local 
government. In addition New Labour has been willing to intervene in and direct local 
authorities as a continuation of, and, in some areas, an intensification of the previous 
Conservative government's policies towards local government. 
I would like to return to Kooiman's (2003) 'three orders of governance', which can usefully 
be applied to the governance context I have been describing, and use this framework from 
the~top-down. The~third order relates_ to m~tDgQV~f!l_all_c~ and the framework that directs 
40 Although it should be noted they are perfonnance managed by government offices/departments. 
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and sets boundaries for governing in the first and second orders. It is argued here that a 
potentially enabling and constraining metagovemance context emerges dependent on 
national governments' reactions to the global trends described earlier in this chapter. There 
are links, here, to Weiss' (2003) notion of changes to governing approaches resulting from 
globalisation, without this necessarily leading to generalised convergence in governance. 
Nevertheless, this context has encouraged the onset of governance as more public, private 
and voluntary actors are involved in service delivery. The extent to which this is an 
enabling or constraining context is dependent on the potential for governed 
interdependencies to emerge across these arrangements and achieve outcomes. In tum, this 
is linked to action in the first and second orders of governance. 
The second order of governance is concerned with the 'care of and maintenance of' 
institutions emerging from the meta-governance framework. Changes to the functional 
sovereignty of councils through such processes as agentification generate significant 
challenges for local authorities. The local government modernisation agenda has in part 
recognised the changing role for local authorities and provides new tools for the 
maintenance of local institutions. The community leadership role and well-being powers, 
in particular, provide an outlet for councils to engage with partners in the governance 
system. The first order of governance is concerned with governing actors trying to tackle 
problems or create opportunities on a day-to-day basis. The role of scrutiny in the 
governance system can be closely related to this. However, other governance actors (often 
without mutually reinforcing responsibilities) are attempting to develop their own problem 
solving I opportunity creating strategies, which can undermine the potential for generating 
governed interdependencies. As has been outlined here there are many layers of horizontal 
and vertical interactions in these orders of governance. Consequently, the concept of 
partnerships and partnership working are fundamental to developing effective governance 
arrangements and this is the subject of the next chapter. 
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4) Partnerships and the Local Governance Context 
4.1) Introduction 
The previous chapter has drawn attention to the increasing complexity and fragmentation of 
governance, its consequences for governability, and the practical implications of these on 
the role and actions of local authorities. In the UK, theories of governance have tended to 
focus on the fragmenting effects of New Public Management and the emergence of 'new' 
modes of governance (Newman 2001: 15). It is in this context that Newman (200 1: 15) 
argues, 'the tasks of steering, managing, controlling or guiding are no longer the preserve 
of government but are carried out through a wide range of agencies in the public, private 
and voluntary sectors, acting in conjunction or combination with each other.' Partnerships 
have become a key governance mechanism. Indeed, David Miliband41 and Phil Woolas42 
assert in the forward to the ODPM's (2005a) consultation paper on, Local Strategic 
Partnerships: Shaping their future, that, 'local services are increasingly being delivered in 
partnership - with local authorities working with other public sector agencies, businesses, 
and the voluntary and community sectors. Local Strategic Partnerships are the vehicle for 
this way ofworking.' 
This chapter will explore the role of partnerships as they have grown in importance as a 
governance mechanism and the impact this has had on local political decision making. 
Furthermore, the core research problematic of the limits and possibilities of local 
government scrutiny in governance draws attention to the role of LSPs as the key formal 
partnership mechanism in localities and the connections between these and local 
authorities. I will then outline the governance framework in Hartlepool as an introduction 
to the case study locality. This will be followed by an examination of scrutiny in relation to 
the notion of local governance and an introduction to some key criteria for successful 
scrutiny within the broader governance context. More detailed examination of the 
governance of a locality (and the role of local government in this) will be examined through 
a discussion of scrutiny 'exemplars' (case studies) in the following chapter. 
41 Minister of Communities and Local Government. 
42 Minister for Local Government. 
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4.2) Partnerships 
The emergence of governance implies increased complexity, larger numbers of actors 
involved in governing and delivering services, and the potential for significantly greater 
fragmentation in governing structures, processes and outcomes. On coming to power New 
Labour were faced with this challenge, the challenge of governing in governance. Perri 6 et 
al (2002:40-41) identify five benign factors whose unintended consequences have fostered 
and institutionalised fragmentation: 
1. 'Greater ease of management and expenditure control on inputs' -at the expense of 
focusing on the difference being made to reduce substantive social problems. 
2. 'Accountability for Probity' -linked to the first factor in that systems of audit and 
scrutiny have been put in place around measures of inputs, rather than around the 
problems or outcomes. 
3. 'Consumer-oriented government' - consumers of services are more likely to 
demand vertical and functional integration of services rather than horizontal 
integration of services. 
4. 'Strategic decisions for functional organisation' - over time the civil service and 
local authorities have been organised on functional grounds, with the consequence 
of fragmented governance. 
5. 'Democratic pressures for visible commitments to services in input or throughput 
terms' - similar to the third factor in the support of citizens for increasing effort and 
funding into functions rather than management co-ordination. 
Furthermore, Perri 6 et al (2002:42-43) identify three self-interested forces that are also 
leading to fragmentation in governing systems: 
1. 'Politicians attempt to seize more control over the executive and administration' -
this factor centres on the short-termist, divide and rule strategy adopted by 
politicians to gain greater control, but at the expense of focusing on problem solving 
and 'technically~sound public policy~. 
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2. 'Professional capture, professional monopolies' - public professions that foster 
fragmentation to secure autonomy over decision-making in their sphere, cannot be 
overestimated. 
3. 'Managerial maximisation of span of control' - in which functional organisation 
suits senior civil servants in creating a range of empires over which they preside. 
Against this background of fragmentation in governing systems partnerships have an 
important role to play in generating governance responses to the challenges these poses to 
local governance actors. In short the appropriate unit for analysis has become more 
problematic in the light of broader changes to local governance (Painter et al 2003:31 ). 
Locally the reconfiguration of public service delivery structures, through the transfers of 
powers and functions to other agencies, has brought about changing resource dependencies 
in local governance (Painter et al 2003:35). This has implications for the ways in which 
local authorities work in terms of having to form partnerships with these other agencies, 
and also internally as a response to new ways of working. 
Local authorities had been pressing for some time for a more strategic form of 
management, more involvement with the community, and to not become exclusively locked 
into a service provision role (Painter et al 2003:35). Painter et al argue that this was as a 
reaction to central government restricting their funding and the fragmentation of the local 
state. Pearson (200 1: 58) identifies the Community Development Projects and Urban 
Programme of the 1960s & 70s as the beginnings of partnership working for local 
government. The Conservative governments of 1979 to 1997 introduced quangos, made 
changes to local government finance and developed common performance measures 
(Sullivan 2003:358). As services delivered by local authorities have become increasingly 
fragmented over the years, and as markets have been introduced into them, the need for 
partnerships has become increasingly apparent. Indeed, according to Jupp (2000) the word 
'partnership' was used 6,197 times in parliament during 1999 compared to 38 times ten 
years earlier. It is often argued, therefore, (for example Knight et al 2001; Greig and 
Poxton 2001) that the pressure to join together and collaborate is overwhelming; 
-partnershipjsno Jonger an option it isca requirement. 
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Sketcher (2003:11-12) argues that the partnership agenda has its roots in the ideology of 
New Labour and its association with a third way, stakeholder vision. In this respect 
Newman (200 1) believes that partnerships can provide means of inclusion and collective 
vision through an epistemic community of citizens, public and private actors. Indeed, 
Balloch and Taylor (200 1: 1) argue that superficially at least partnerships make a lot of 
sense, 'it is a rational response to divisions within and between government departments 
and local authorities, within and between professions, and between those who deliver 
services and those who use them.' A consequence of this is that in addition to the micro-
organisation of local authorities we must also look at how local authorities are responding 
to interactions with other actors, in more complex inter-organisational (and multi-
governance) relationships (Painter et al2003:31). 
Pollitt (2003) argues that there are now a huge variety of partnerships across central 
government and local government: public-private; public-voluntary; public-private-
voluntary; or public-public. Consequently, this means that to call something a 'partnership' 
tells you very little, we need to know more about members, their goals, resources and rules 
of procedure (Pollitt 2003:61). However, precisely because, as Balloch and Taylor 
(200 1 :2) suggest, partnership as a term commands widespread support it is important to 
understand the expectations and assumptions underlying it. Partnerships appear to be more 
legitimate than hierarchical bureaucratic relationships because they appear to be based on 
more horizontal and equal relationships, but questions remain over the potential for one or 
two members to dominate them (Pollitt 2003:63). However, despite appearances, 
partnerships may not produce or facilitate more effective leadership. Sketcher (2003:14-
15) argues that the use of partnerships as a central policy instrument maintained the 
challenge to the functional sovereignty of local authorities43 and more importantly 
undermined their political authority as the democratic voice of the community. 
Partnerships construct a new polity - a new political community whose normative, 
inclusive and ambiguous attributes promote the emergence of a discursive coalition that 
engages a range of interests within an overarching project (Skelcher 2003: 15). 
43 See the previous chapter for the effects of'agentification' on local authorities' functional sovereignty. 
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There is a danger that if partnerships are seen uncritically as a 'good thing' without 
counting the cost of time and effort around partnership working, there may be little 
consideration of the cumulative effect of creating partnerships, which can lead to 
'partnership overload/fatigue' (Stewart 2003: 172). Painter et al (2003) argue that local 
government has been moving towards greater joint working over the years, and partnership 
can now be regarded as an embedded concept. However, there are concerns over the 
capacity of private, voluntary and community sectors to respond to growing numbers of 
partnerships because of the sheer numbers of them (Painter et at 2003:48). Balloch and 
Taylor (200 1) identify three areas of concern with partnerships. Firstly, politically they can 
be dominated by the most powerful partners, and not deliver for communities and service 
users - imbalance in resources is key here. Secondly, public service cultures need to be 
transformed for agencies to work effectively with each other. Thirdly, partnerships 
represent major technical, managerial and structural challenges (Balloch and Taylor 
2001:8-9). For partnerships to succeed they are dependent on the capacity and willingness 
of agencies to make them work. 
Stewart (2003: 172) argues that, 'at their best, partnerships can be a means of sharing 
responsibility, but at their worst they are a means of avoiding responsibility.' Under New 
Labour the advance of partnerships is threatening to make them victims of their own 
success, with the proliferation of partnerships and the pace of change stretching agencies, 
service users and communities to their limits (Balloch & Taylor 2001 :4). The 
government's intention is that LSPs will rationalise this. Nevertheless as partnerships have 
grown in number, community governance has become more complex, and for the public, 
partnerships can be invisible or barely visible (Stewart 2003: 172). Scrutiny should, and 
more importantly can, play an important role in increasing the visibility of local 
partnerships. 
Newman (200 1: 117) argues that the discourse of partnership speaks of equality, shared 
values and high trust creating an illusory unity, which masks fundamental differences in 
power. As Stewart (2003) points out the government guidelines make no reference to 
-power-orothe possibility of conflict. Newman-(2001) argues that, whilst in prin_9iple the aim 
has been to devolve down to the regions and local government, in practice the centre has 
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retained tight control, which undermines the flexibility joint action requires. This could 
have a negative 'knock-on' effect on partnerships, as the various interest groups become 
unwilling to make concessions, following central government's example. There is a 
tension between 'joined-up' government and more directive hierarchical forms of 
governance, and the former must show it can d~liver more than the latter (Newman 
2001:111 ). As Davies (2002 :315) points out, 'partnerships may be as much about bringing 
other groups into co-operation with the state as they are about bringing local authorities into 
partnership with other "stakeholders" and creating networks.' The state may be 
relinquishing direct control of some functions, but Davies argues persuasively that in doing 
so it is trying to 'purchase wider effective control', creating a new governance capacity in 
the locality. Furthermore, Sketcher (2003: 17) asserts that the political authority of 'the 
council' has been challenged through partnerships, but only to limited extent and in certain 
circumstances, given the norm of partnerships developing as weak (consultative) rather 
than strong (authoritative) polities. 
John and Cole (2000:86) argue that the fragmentation of local political systems and service 
delivery does not remove the importance of political decision-making. They state that there 
needs to be a political mechanism to bring together the fragmented institutions and private 
actors, and this should be led by elected leaders. Partnerships have been present in 
localities for some time but generally there has been little communication or co-ordination 
between them, consequently there is a need for a corporate approach, working towards the 
same outcomes, minimising duplications and contradictions in a locality (Pollitt 2003:58). 
However John and Cole (2000:86) question whether, 'leaders have enough powers, 
legitimacy, capacity and personal qualities to carry out the difficult job of managing 
complexity?' So whilst the Labour government has articulated a strategy for retaining and 
modernising local government, it is in a more circumscribed service planning, delivery and 
enabling environment, it is within this uncertain environment that LSPs are beginning to 
develop (Johnson & Osborne 2003: 150). 
Pollitt (2003:61) argues that academic research does not indicate partnership forms 
regularly produce performance gains, and_therefQr~ w~ !lll1Stp't l:lSSUme that th~y usually 
work. Indeed Jessop (2000:30) goes as far as to argue that, 'markets, states and governance 
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all fail,' and, 'given the growing structural complexity and opacity of the social world 
failure is the most likely outcome of most attempts to govern it.' It is as a response to this 
structural complexity that partnerships have emerged as an attempt to manage this, but 
paradoxically they often add to the complexity. Jessop states that by emphasising the 
improbability of success, it counters the rhetoric of partnership where success is 
emphasised and failure is seen as exceptional. Nevertheless, partnerships have emerged as 
a prominent response to governance challenges in localities. The following section will 
explore the development of LSPs as the key formal partnership in localities. 
4.3) Local Strategic Partnerships 
An LSP is a single body that brings together the different parts of the public sector as well 
as the private, business, community and voluntary sectors at the local level to ensure 
different initiatives, programmes and services support each other (DETR 2001:1 0). 
DETR44 guidance stated that they are non-statutory and non-executive bodies that should be 
aligned with local authority boundaries. LSPs may not be entirely new bodies, many are 
adaptations of existing partnerships that are creating meta-governance frameworks for 
partnership co-ordination (Painter et al 2003:40). However, the overarching role of LSPs is 
new and can be interpreted as a response (by central government) to the emerging local 
governance context described in the previous chapter. Consequently, it is possible to argue 
that, LSPs should play a key role in the limits and possibilities of local government scrutiny 
in governance. This section will explore the role of LSPs in the governance context, and 
the role of local authorities and community strategies in relation to LSPs. The function of 
LSPs is then analysed more critically, with a particular focus on their accountability in the 
governance system. 
The idea of LSPs came about as a result of the work of the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU), 
and the work of the 'Joining it up locally' Policy Action Team, more specifically (DETR 
2000). LSPs and community strategies were both introduced by the Local Government Act 
2000. Those areas in receipt of NRF are required to have an LSP but outside those areas, 
-- bSPs-are, entirely voluntary, although ~there are_ now _over 36J) LSPs in England, which 
44 Now incorporated into the ODPM. 
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would suggest that most localities have 'signed up' to them (ODPM 2005a:9). Local 
authorities are responsible for initiating LSPs, but it is the decision of the members, once it 
is up and running, who should lead it. The aim of LSPs can be summarised as increasing 
co-ordination, while allowing decentralization and inclusiveness - with a particular 
emphasis on gaining the commitment of the community themselves (Johnson & Osborne 
2003:149). The success ofLSPs will be dependent on the ability to use mainstream funding 
more effectively and in a co-ordinated way (Quest 2002:14). The Quest Network (2002) 
argues that LSPs demand a change in culture so that all partners are involved in decisions 
over funding, which is essential for the community and voluntary sectors to become equal 
partners. 
The membership of LSPs 'will depend on local circumstances' and must include members 
of all sectors and reflect the breadth of issues which fall within its scope (DETR 2001 :12). 
LSPs have several roles, including acting as a forum for all mainstream service agencies, 
together with the business, community and voluntary sectors; aiding local authorities to 
design community strategies; working towards greater co-ordination of plans, partnerships 
and initiatives; and, rationalizing the proliferation of partnerships that have emerged under 
New Labour (Johnson & Osborne 2003:147). Indeed the ODPM (2005a:8) asserts that 
LSPs are working in an increasingly complex and challenging environment with important 
expectations being placed on them, and this has increased the need to ensure that LSPs are 
working effectively and accountably. 
Through the LSP key stakeholders come together and engage with the council on broader 
cross-cutting issues, and the community strategy is the statement of the council's and key 
partner's intentions for the future of the area (Leach et al. 2003:72). According to the 
government's guidance (DETR 2001:22) community strategies will provide an integrated 
approach to the sustainable economic, social and physical development of cities, towns and 
rural area; and a clear strategy and vision for the future. The statutory duty for preparing 
community strategies rests with local authorities (DETR 2001 :22). Community strategies 
must also produce a long-term vision and short-term action plan focusing on outcomes to 
be achieved. This must be a shared <;omrnjtment frgm partJ!ers. Consequently, LSPs need 
to deliver the necessary culture of partnership working to be successful. 
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Balloch and Taylor (200 1 :8) believe that, 'the formation of LSPs with a responsibility for 
developing community strategies could provide the impetus to transform mainstream 
spending, and to bring together under one roof many of the more specific partnerships that 
have developed at a local level.' However, Stewart (2003) identifies a number of potential 
barriers to the development of community strategies. Stewart (2003 :21-31) argues that: 
• Local authorities need to extend their thinking if the new powers of well-being are 
to be fully used, and moving beyond existing activities is central to this. 
• Whilst it is a statutory responsibility for local authorities to prepare community 
strategies, there is not a similar responsibility on partners to co-operate. 
• It is also unclear how central government will respond to community strategies in 
the event of differing policies and priorities. Community strategies can provide the 
answer to joined-up government only if central government takes account of them. 
From the government's guidance 'leverage' appears to be one of the main tools at an LSP's 
disposal, which in tum is based on the commitment of all partnership organisations (DETR 
2001:12). To ensure that this works Stewart (2003:30-1) argues that, 'there is a 
responsibility on central government, having willed the end, to ensure the means, by central 
departments making clear the importance of involvement in community planning to 
organisations and agencies within their remit.' Painter et al (2003:40) raise the issue of the 
challenge facing local authorities in managing the interface between sub-local and 
corporate levels, in terms of linking the former to executive and scrutiny functions and with 
the strategic activities of LSPs. It could be argued that the success of local authorities' 
community leadership role is strongly linked to the development of these governance 
arrangements. As Painter et al (2003:49) assert LSPs are embryonic institutions - whether 
they are the route to meta-governance or just another institutional layer remains to be seen. 
The scrutiny case studies will explore the extent to which local government scrutiny tests 
this hypothesis45 and in the context of two years of scrutiny inquiries in the case study 
authority. 
45 Because theoretically, scrutiny has a role in exploring this, as is outlined elsewhere in the thesis. 
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A key concern about LSPs expressed by Johnson and Osborne (2003) is that the policy 
mechanisms for LSPs fail to support co-governance as strongly as the drivers for co-
ordination. The implications of this are that services are more likely to be delivered in a 
mutually reinforcing way. However, a key issue arising here is on whose 'agenda' will 
these services be being delivered? Johnson and Osborne (2003:150) suggest that, 'there is 
a persuasive argument that the current Labour government's aims constitute a pre-set 
agenda that has the capacity to undermine the possibility for local solutions of a more 
individual and perhaps even creative nature.' The danger here is of an approach imposed 
top-down on LSPs and losing the variety and appropriateness of local solutions that a 'self-
organising network' could attain (Ibid). As Stewart (2003:24) states, 'an effective LSP is 
not easily achieved. A variety of organisations with different interests and different degrees 
of commitment to the process have to be brought together.' Local authorities are facing 
issues of power, conflict and the difficulty of building partnerships, they have to be ready to 
work with the imperfect rather than the perfect (Stewart 2003:25). 
Local authorities may not always do what the electorate wants, but they can be voted out. 
LSPs are not directly accountable to local people other than through councillors and the 
local voluntary and community groups that sit on them and through the accountability that 
scrutiny places on them. Consequently, it is argued that local authorities should be the 
leading players on LSPs as they have the democratic mandate and the obligation to exercise 
civic leadership (Quest 2002: 13). Individual service providers on an LSP will remain 
responsible and accountable for decisions on their own services and the use of their own 
resources (SEU 2001:45). An LSP will be accountable to its partners because the success of 
the common goals will be dependent on its ability to help individual partners to achieve 
their goals. Nevertheless, there are concerns over the accountability of LSPs. For Wilson 
and Game (2002:144) accountability is diminished as appointed bodies are gaining powers 
at the expense of elected members, however, this is offset to a degree by the wider range of 
stakeholders involved in policy making and service delivery. However , Ashworth and 
Sketcher's (2005) Evaluation of the Local Government Modernisation Agenda: 
Accountability, identifies growing evidence that local authorities have been driving 
accountability on LSPs. 
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Sullivan (2003:363) argues that there are three lines of accountability for an LSP: vertical-
upward to central government for meeting targets; vertical - downwards to local people to 
account for progress towards meeting private needs; and horizontally to partners to account 
for delivery of contributions to agreed outcomes. Davies (2002:313) argues that 
partnerships tend to reflect central political priorities, as the influence of the centre over the 
locality appears to be growing. This is reinforced by the somewhat worryingly short 
section on accountability in the government's initial guidance on LSPs (DETR 2001:16), in 
which the government seems preoccupied with accountability to central government, 
'where an individual partner has goals primarily set by central government, the LSP should 
identify the appropriate contribution that other members of the partnership can make to 
achieve those goals.' More recently the ODPM (2005a:36) has indicated that clear 
accountability requires; mutually understood and accepted ways of working, internal 
performance management to check progress, and external scrutiny. 
The key to the accountability (and possibly the success) ofLSPs is participation, indeed the 
government's guidance suggests LSPs will only work if local people are able to influence 
what they do. The Quest Network (2002) suggests that local people can be intimidated 
sitting around a table with those in authority, which gives the voluntary sector an important 
representational role. However, Community Empowerment Networks alone, or similar 
umbrella organisations, representing residents on LSPs are not a satisfactory means of 
representation for residents, as representatives should be properly accountable and 
democratically elected (Quest 2002: 18). 
The publication of the ODPM's (2005a) consultation paper on LSPs: Shaping their future 
has refocused the government's agenda somewhat in relation to these bodies. According to 
the ODPM (2005a:9), 'in the past, their (LSPs') role was to develop a vision for their 
locality through their community strategy. This shared vision for the area remains an 
important part of their role but LSPs across the country are also increasingly becoming 
involved in delivery. A lot is expected of all LSPs, in particular, the development and 
implementation of LAAs.' The ODPM (2005a:9) argues that LSPs should provide the 
_ _goyemance framework for LAAs. furthe_rmore,the_ inc~~t!<l focus on delivery sbQuld be 
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combined with new sustainable community strategies and linked to a revitalised 
community leadership role for local authorities. 
It is possible to conclude that LSPs have a central role in the governance arrangements of 
localities and that scrutiny has an important role in holding them to account. Indeed the 
ODPM (2005a) has indicated that external scrutiny has an important role to play here. The 
purpose of this thesis is not to assess the success of LSPs per se but to use the scrutiny 
'window', provided through the case study approach, to assess the governance 
arrangements and accountability of key governance issues. Much of the discussion above 
suggests that LSPs will have an important role to play in these. The case studies46 will 
explore how this has developed in practice. 
4.4) Hartlepool's Governance Framework 
I will now tum to the example ofHartlepool's local governance framework. Mapping what 
amounts to the 'official' or 'explicit' governance framework in this locality creates a basis 
for using case studies of scrutiny inquiries as a route into exploring the local governance 
landscape more fully in the following chapters. This section also serves to link the shift 
towards a form of governance through partnerships in localities, identified in the previous 
section, with a local response to the government's agenda on local partnerships. 
4.4.1) The Local Authority 
Following the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000, Hartlepool opted for the 
elected mayor and cabinet option under the reform of political management structures. 
Hartlepool Borough Council's (HBC) constitution47 (2002 Part 3:28) states that, 'the 
council's executive, which is made up of the Mayor and councillors in the cabinet, has 
responsibility for all functions other than those categorised as "non-executive".' The 
executive works within the financial and policy framework agreed by the 'full council' and 
-
46 Which haVe been· chosen because they have-the ·closest relationship to governance out of all the scrutiny -
inquiries undertaken over a two year period. 
47 The 2002 version of the constitution has been used here because it is of more relevance to the scrutiny case 
studies than later versions of the constitution. 
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is responsible for taking decisions and issuing guidance on matters that have major 
financial, corporate or strategic implications. Portfolio holders have a range of 
responsibilities connected to the services, plans and functions within their portfolio. Each 
cabinet member is allocated a portfolio by the mayor (see tables 1 & 2 for an outline of 
each portfolio holder's responsibilities). 
Table 1: Portfolio Holder Responsibilities part a (HBC Constitution 2002). 
The Mayor Town Management Social and Health Care 
Portfolio Portfolio 
Policy Best value Housing investment Children's services plan; 
Framework performance plan; programme; and Community care plan; and 
Community strategy; Food service plan. Quality protects management action 
Crime & disorder; and plan. 
Youth justice plan. 
Other Council community Empty homes strategy; Joint investment plan for Welfare to 
Plans & strategy plan; Fuel poverty strategy; Work, Learning Disability, Older 
Strategies Hartlepool Drugs Waste management; People; Action Team annual Health & safety service plan; Mental Health - local 
plan; Trading standard service implementation plan for National 
Sport & recreation delivery plan; Service Framework; 
strategy; Shoreline management; Annual training plan; and 
Youth service plan; Contaminated land plan; Health improvement plan. 
and Voluntary sector compact; 
Racial equality Play facilities strategy; 
scheme. Arts strategy; 
Local cultural strategy; 
Arts, museums & archaeology 
forward plan; 
Supporting people strategy. 
Service Public relations; Waste management; Commissioning of statutory 
Areas & Emergency planning; Horticulture; and discretionary social care 
Functions LSP (Vice-Chair); Town care; services for vulnerable Community safety; Environmental enforcement; 
Crime, youth Housing services (public & children and adults, i.e:-
offending and drugs private); 
• older people; (prevention and Asylum seekers; 
• people with mental 
enforcement); Environmental health; Trading health problems; 
Sports & recreation; standards; Archaeological 
• people with learning Youth service; and service; Community disabilities; Equality. development (&centres); 
• people with physical Cultural services (Arts, 
Museums, & Events); disabilities; 
Parks & countryside; Coastal • people with sensory 
protection; Cemeteries & loss; and 
crematorium; Rights of way; • vulnerable children 
Allotments; and and their families. 
Open market. Directly provided social care 
services. 
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Table 2: Portfolio Holder Responsibilities, part b (HBC Constitution 2002) 
Lifelong Regeneration & the Resources & 
Learning& Economy Portfolio Performance 
Skills Portfolio Management Portfolio 
Policy Educational Development plan; Annual revenue budget; and 
Framework development plan; Local transport plan; and Annual capital budget. 
Early years plan; Local agenda 21 strategy 
Adult learning plan; 
and 
Library plan. 
Other Plans Libraries stock Economic development strategy; Asset management plan; 
& Strategies management plan; and Risk management strategy; 
SEN action plan; Tourism strategy. Insurance strategy; 
Behaviour support Debt recovery strategy; 
plan; and Treasury management 
Education asset strategy; 
management plan. Anti fraud and corruption 
strategy; 
Whistleblowing policy; and 
lEG statement. 
Service School governance; Transport Policy; Corporate strategy; 
Areas & School improvement; Highways; financial services; 
Functions Special educational Traffic and transportation; personnel services; 
needs; Building control; health & safety; 
Access; Development control; ICT; 
Strategic Conservation and ecology; staff & member training; 
management; Economic development; legal services; 
Lifelong learning and Tourism; registration & electoral 
support; Neighbourhood renewal; services; 
Libraries and Regeneration and planning democratic services; 
information; policy; services for members; 
Play and care of Sustainable development; general office services; 
children; and Regional economic strategy; registrars; 
School meals. Tees Valley Partnership issues; strategic asset management; 
Urban Regeneration Company estates; 
issues; and property management; 
Employment training consultancy services; and 
building services. 
The case study authority is one of only 11 local authorities operating a mayoral system. 
The mayor was elected after campaigning as the local football mascot in 2002, in what was 
widely perceived to be a vote against the major political parties and against the mayoral 
system48 • Since the election of the Mayor the political balance of the authority has 
fluctuated between being a hung council and one in which a party has a small majority . 
. Thejndependent mayor_ha~ .. l:>l;!~n _rnostly,l.lmvilHpg or l!O~]lle to gep~rate effectiv~ W9~k}llg 
48 The mayoral option was supported by 51% of people voting in a local referendum from a turnout of 31%. 
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relationships with all the political parties (including an independent or 'administrative 
group'), although it could also be argued that the political groups have failed to create 
effective working relationships with the mayor as well. 
The council's overview and scrutiny function will fulfil the following roles: 
• Review and/or scrutinise decisions made, or actions taken, in connection with the 
discharge of any of the council's function; 
• Make reports and/or recommendations to the full council and/or the executive 
and/or any policy, joint or area committee in connection with the discharge of any 
of the council's functions; and 
• Consider any matter affecting the area or its inhabitants (HBC 2002: Part 2: 17). 
These three roles give the scrutiny function a broad remit within the locality. Over the 
course of the insider-research period scrutiny has been supported by the equivalent of 
between 1.5 and 2 full time equivalent scrutiny officers to fulfil these roles. This placed the 
case study authority in 4 7.2% of unitary authorities with specific scrutiny officer support 
(Stoker et al 2002:52). Johnson and Hatter (2004: 1 0) argue that the level of support for 
overview and scrutiny must be appropriate to the function - and members need to feel that 
it is appropriate. In the case study authority members have frequently voiced concerns over 
the level of support they are provided with. Indeed, the level of support is (at least 
partially) responsible for a lack of regular reviews of the implementation of scrutiny 
recommendations (within the case study authority) which Johnson and Hatter (2004: 1 0) 
argue leads to demotivation amongst members. Johnson and Hatter's (2004:9) research 
into a London Borough Council led them to the conclusion that not only was there limited 
respect among elected members for the scrutiny process, but it was seen as peripheral, with 
little or no impact on decision-making. This view is, more or less, mirrored through my 
own participant-observer experience in Hartlepool. 
The Audit Commission (2002:8) states that HBC has supported the development of the LSP 
- to-allow it, 'to-become the single vehicle-for-setting~the agenda, defining the process by 
which change and service improvements will be made, ensuring that local consultation and 
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participation are central, with all key elements signed up.' Furthermore the Audit 
Commission (2002:9) observes that, 'the community strategy provides the framework 
which focuses all the council's work. This is a considerable strength, which prevents the 
council from being distracted from its priorities.' This framework has been enhanced by 
the restructuring of the council to match the seven community strategy themes, allowing 
departments to better concentrate on one theme, and work more closely with key partners. 
Each chief officer gives strategic leadership for their portfolio responsibility, and provides 
regular briefings to the portfolio holder (Audit Commission 2002:13). 
4.4.2) The Partnership 
Hartlepool Partnership (the LSP for Hartlepool) constitutes what amounts to the 'official' 
horizontal model of governance for Hartlepool. Within this the community strategy 
provides an overall policy framework for all services in the town (Hartlepool Partnership 
2002:1). The community strategy describes a long-term vision for the town, and sets a 
course towards achieving this through a set of principles and seven aims - each with a 
series of detailed objectives. The seven aims are reflected in the seven themes for the 
partnership: 
• Jobs and the Economy; 
• Lifelong Learning and Skills; 
• Health and Care; 
• Community Safety; 
• Environment and Housing; 
• Culture and Leisure; and 
• Strengthening Communities . 
The community strategy themes are explored in more detail in Appendix A. These themes 
are underpinned by the following principles: accountability; community involvement; co-
ordination; equality and social inclusion; integrity; maximise opportunities; maximise 
resources;- partnership; -quality services 'and 'continuous improvement; and sustainability 
(Hartlepool Partnership 2002:4). 
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Due to the council's small size and limited resources the council necessarily works in many 
partnerships, and each partnership is linked to a stated theme in the community strategy 
(Audit Commission 2002: 12). The Audit Commission has indicated that the LSP co-
ordinates action plans to ensure they are complementary and timetabled. The council 
focuses on service improvements for its own services, and through the community strategy 
it ensures all partners' agendas are complementary and realistic (Audit Commission 
2002: 10). This suggests that the council is taking the lead responsibility on the LSP where 
necessary. 
Table 3 demonstrates the linkages between community strategy themes the LSP is working 
towards, and the relevant council departments, portfolio holders and scrutiny forums. This 
serves to connect the various formal lines of responsibility and accountability between the 
LSP and the council. The scrutiny forums in the table are explicitly linked to the 
community strategy themes in the council's constitution. 
Table 3: Local Partnership, Executive, Service Department and Scrutiny Arrangements 
Community Council Portfolio Council Scrutiny Forum 
Strate2}' Theme Holder Department 
Jobs and the Regeneration and the Regeneration and Environmental 
Economy Economy Planning Stewardship and 
Regeneration (ES&R) 
Lifelong Learning Lifelong Learning and Education Culture and Learning 
and Skills Skills 
Health and Care Social and Health Care Social Services Health and Social Care 
Community Safety The Mayor Community ES&R 
Services 
Environment and Town Management Neighbourhood ES&R 
Housing Services 
Culture and The Mayorrrown Community Culture and Learning 
Leisure Management/Lifelong Services 
Learning and Skills/ 
Regeneration and the 
Economy 
Strengthening Cross-cutting theme Cross-cutting Scrutiny Co-ordinating 
Communities theme Committee 
Council functions outside the com_!lll!nity strategy it1~lude the resources and performance 
management portfolio holder, and this broadly relates to the chief personnel services officer 
115 
and chief finance officer and their departments. These are functions that are internal to the 
operation of the council. In addition, the resources scrutiny forum is not in the table 
because it focuses on the council's central support services, the efficient use of resources, 
and also on external auditor reports. Consequently, it underpins the council's progress 
towards all the community strategy aims, rather than focusing on a specific theme (HBC 
Constitution 2002). 
There are clear and explicit links between the council and the community strategy. There is 
inevitably going to be an element of cross-over between portfolio holders, council 
departments, scrutiny forums and theme partnerships. Nevertheless, the Audit Commission 
(2002:20) indicates that, 'the LSP has established itself as the planning forum for the town, 
and specific plans are becoming more explicit and consistent.' (Audit Commission 
2002:20) Consequently, the case study authority appears to have well established 
governance arrangements linked to the government's conception of a partnership based 
approach to governance, centred on the development of the LSP. The role of scrutiny in 
providing accountability for these arrangements is explored below. As such the linkages 
discussed here, and outlined in HBC Constitution and table 3 above, suggest that on paper 
scrutiny should be engaging/interacting with the LSP and community strategy themes. 
Whether this occurs in practice will be explored through the scrutiny case studies. These 
case studies have been chosen for bearing the closest connection to 'governance issues' out 
of any in-depth scrutiny inquiries to take place over a two year period in case study 
authority. 
4.4.3) Summary 
This section has drawn attention to 'official' or 'explicit' governance framework in the case 
study locality. The extent to which this is engaged in the governance issues explored 
through the scrutiny inquiries will be examined by the scrutiny case studies and the 
subsequent discussion chapters. 
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4.5) Links to Scrutiny 
Traditionally at the local authority level the whole council has held the ruling group to 
account, but this may no longer be sufficient to deliver public accountability (Sullivan 
2003:355). As Sullivan (2003:355) argues, 'new mechanisms for securing accountability 
had to be found to control actors who were responsible for managing public services but 
were not themselves traditional public servants.' Sullivan is arguing that new modes of 
accountability which acknowledge the interdependence of actors in the delivery of services, 
need to accompany the old modes of accountability. This is clearly a role that scrutiny ·can 
and should be fulfilling in local governance. 
The increase in central government control in setting, monitoring and regulating local 
government expenditure means that central government has become the key body in 
resource allocation (Sullivan 2003:358). Furthermore, the emerging 'congested state' 
Sketcher (2003) identifies, and the associated reduction in the functional and political 
sovereignty for local government, not only has an important bearing on the nature of local 
governance, but has a knock-on effect in terms of the scope of scrutiny to affect outcomes. 
Considine (2002:22) argues that in this new environment accountability necessitates, 'the 
appropriate exercise of navigational competence: that is the proper use of authority to range 
freely across a multi-relationship terrain in search of the most advantageous path to 
success.' Consequently, it could be argued that one way for councils to adapt to holding 
LSPs and other external bodies to account is to link the power of well-being explicitly to 
the scrutiny function. This will provide scrutiny with the impetus to become actively 
engaged in local governance. However, Sullivan questions whether it is possible to 
determine responsibility and accountability in an environment where so many actors 
contribute to the process of decision-making. For this to be possible scrutiny councillors 
will need a good understanding of the governance arrangements in their locality. 
Chapter two draws attention to the five widely accepted roles for scrutiny. In addition to 
understanding what the (accepted) roles of scrutiny are this thesis is concerned with 
understanding how these can be most effectively exercised in the local governance arena. 
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Very generally, therefore, there is an important role for scrutiny in local governance in two 
broad areas: 
• Firstly, the scrutiny process must develop a sufficiently detailed understanding of 
the governance arrangements in its locality to understand the various 
interdependencies and policy networks that are at work in a locality. This then 
provides an understanding of these arrangements as a basis for holding the 
governance of a locality to account49• This role can be fulfilled in a gradual and 
piecemeal way through the cumulative effect of individual scrutiny inquiries into 
governance issues. 
• Secondly, through the potential or scope for scrutiny to affect change in the local 
governance arena through policy development and recommendations within, and 
beyond, councils. The potential for affecting change varies across issues and 
sectors in the local governance arena, 50 but in all cases it relies on an understanding 
of the governance relationships as a basis for effecting change. 
Consequently, the scrutiny function should be shaping/participating in the local governance 
process in two ways, firstly by holding it to account, and secondly by participating in and 
feeding results of inquiries into the policy making process. A knock-on effect of these is 
the less observable (but no less important) impact on partners' understanding of each others 
roles and the interests they are pursuing. Sullivan (2003) identifies two key challenges to 
practice in local governance that can usefully be applied to scrutiny as necessary 
requirements for holding local governance to account: 
• Develop mechanisms for accountability that can accommodate the achievements 
of the whole, as well as the parts; and 
• Develop and embed ways of working that enhance the capacity to behave 
responsibly within and beyond organisations - requires action to enhance the 
capacity of individuals to act and develop a shared culture of obligations between 
partners (Sullivan 2003:357-8). 
49 An understanding of the governance arrangements of a locality is also essential for holding local authorities 
alone to account, because external factors impact on and are impacted by the actions of a council. 
50 This will be explored further in the case studies of scrutiny inquiries and the discussion chapters. 
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There is an important role for scrutiny in holding the interdependencies of actors to account 
in the governance system. This is reflected in the 'external scrutiny' role, which the 
government has indicated it is considering strengthening (ODPM 2004, 2005, and 2005a). 
Whilst the extension of this role is welcomed here, the health scrutiny role has highlighted 
the additional pressures a more formalised governance role can place on scrutiny's often 
limited capacity (in terms of officer support and councillor's understanding of external 
organisations). Consequently, central government should offer additional support to local 
authorities to fulfil this additional responsibility. This should be targeted at increased 
officer support and member training geared towards scrutiny's governance role. As a result 
scrutiny committees will be better placed to develop the required understanding of 
governance arrangements that are a pre-requisite for affecting meaningful change in this 
system. 
4.6) Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the importance of partnerships as a local response to the 
emerging governance context that has been described in the previous chapter. They are 
important both as a style of working in, and across, governance arrangements, and also as 
more formal/institutional governance mechanisms such as LSPs. However, whilst 
partnerships and partnership working are themselves responses to complexities in 
governance arrangements they can add to these complexities. Additionally, Stewart (2003) 
argues partnerships can be a means of both sharing or avoiding responsibilities. LSPs have 
emerged as the main formal partnership mechanism in many localities, and their role seems 
set to increase with the government considering a shift in role for these from setting visions 
for localities to developing an increased role in delivery (ODPM 2005a). The local 
governance framework of the case study locality has illustrated developed partnership 
arrangements that have been praised by the Audit Commission. The connections between 
the council and the LSP are strong, and the scrutiny forums have been explicitly linked to 
the remits oLthe LSPs theme. partnerships. The"case_studies will test the extent to which 
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the connections between the LSP and scrutiny are evident, as well as less formal 
partnership arrangements, for the governance issues under scrutiny. 
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5) 'Ghost Ships' -Case Study 
5.1) Introduction 
During the late summer/early autumn of 2003 a contract between the US government and a 
private company in Hartlepool to dismantle and recover a number of naval support ships 
became a matter of some public conjecture. The issue was subsequently referred to the 
local authority's scrutiny function, and as such provides an excellent example of the role of 
scrutiny and local authorities in light of global pressures and flows of capital. In addition 
the notion of local leadership, local choice and responsive and outward looking local 
government are usefully tested by the governance processes at play here, through the 
various bodies acting with some responsibility for the matter. The first section of the 
chapter provides a background to the inquiry and outlines the original purpose of the 
scrutiny exercise. This is followed by an examination of the role of scrutiny in relation to 
this inquiry. The roles and responsibilities of the numerous actors involved in the 
governance processes around this issue are subsequently outlined. This is followed by a 
summary of the conduct of the scrutiny inquiry. The final section of this chapter provides a 
general discussion of the case study in relation to the core research problematic of the limits 
and possibilities of local government scrutiny in governance 
5.2) Background and Purpose of the Inquiry 
The scrutiny inquiry into the 'ghost ships' originated from a referral from full council on 
the 11th September 2003. This was the result of a question from a member of the public to 
the portfolio holder for economic development and regeneration, regarding the role of the 
council in the importation of 13 ships from the US Navy's Reserve Fleet for recovery and 
recycling at Able UK's facility in Graythorp, Hartlepool. In response the portfolio holder 
proposed the following motion, which was seconded: 
That the Council ask the Scrutiny Co-ordinating Committee to examine the 
-issues in totality with regard to processes~and projects -undertaken on the 
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site, taking into consideration the sssf' sites in the area which had been 
designated since the planning application approved by the Teesside 
Development Company in 1996, and that the inquiry be held as soon as 
possible. 
Whilst the full council provided scrutiny with an initial remit and scope, scrutiny co-
ordinating committee (SCC) also defined its own terms and agreed the scope of the inquiry 
in its first meeting on this issue on 28th October 2003. It was agreed to include the 
following as a way forward for the inquiry: 
• The impact of the arrival of the ships on the environment; 
• The impact of the arrival of the ships on the local economy; 
• The impact of the arrival of the ships upon local residents; 
• The impact ofthe arrival ofthe ships on the 'brand' image ofHartlepool and the wider 
region; 
• Exploring the manner in which permission is granted for such projects. Is there, for 
example, a case for more local consultation? 
• Determining what areas of responsibility there are, and who is responsible for them. 
How well are these co-ordinated? 
It is clear from this that the SCC took a broader view of the issue than the original remit 
from full council allowed for. This provided the scrutiny process with a route into the 
governance arrangements for this issue and refocused the inquiry on the processes that 
resulted in the ships coming to Hartlepool, rather than on the processes around the 
dismantling of the vessels. Indeed the latter conflates the scrutiny process with the 
planning role of the council somewhat. 
Taking into account the global nature of this issue and the wide range of actors (see below) 
involved in the inquiry, the topic is particularly well suited to testing the theoretical 
framework that has been developed throughout the thesis. It is fair to say that this was an 
exceptionanssue in termcs -ofthe-public and media interest. Nevertheless; there are general 
51 Site of Special Scientific Interest. 
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illustrative points that can be drawn from this inquiry in terms of the role and scope of a 
local authority in relation to private contracts and national regulatory bodies and the impact 
a local decision-making body has over these. Indeed, the issue of the 'ghost ships' draws 
attention to two sharply different contexts/worldviews in which the state and intellectual 
discourse take place, these are modernity and post-modernity (Bauman 1987:2). For a full 
discussion of the relationships between these, governance and scrutiny see chapter three 
and the section on 'governing in governance'. The ghost ships issue serves to highlight the 
variety of regulatory expert systems involved in the governance of this issue and whether 
this is a successful approach for 'governing' and communicating potential solutions. 
5.3) Role of Scrutiny 
The role of scrutiny in relation to the 'ghost ships' issue was broadly a dual one, although 
this was confused/hampered to a degree by an ongoing planning dispute between the 
council and Able UK. The first and predominant role of the scrutiny function in relation to 
this issue was that of 'external scrutiny'. It is worth remembering that the scrutiny process 
has no formal powers in relation to this issue, nor could it force any of the bodies/actors 
outside of the council to give evidence or act on recommendations. Nevertheless, a 
considerable number of external bodies were keen to be involved in this process (see 
below) and one of the first tasks for scrutiny was to establish who had some responsibility 
for this issue, what these responsibilities were, and then invite them to give evidence. The 
second role that scrutiny carried out was to hold the executive to account. This resulted 
from a controversial (non-binding) informal cabinet decision (or more accurately non-
decision) that expressed support for the planned recovery of the ships in principle. The 
nature of the decision, and the method by which the decision was made were both called 
into question by the scrutiny process. In this respect the executive was held to account. 
However a number of questions surrounding the issue of the ghost ships coming to 
Hartlepool were beyond the remit of the scrutiny function. Most of the local authority's 
responsibility in relation to this issue lay within its planning function. The legal view within 
the council was that the scrutiny process should not be allowed to compromise the planning 
issue by encroaching-on the-planning committee's territory. Conseqt1~n_tly the inquiry h_as 
been put on hold until the planning issue in relation to the ghost ships is resolved. 
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5.4) Governance Actors Involved 
• Able UK: 
On 28th July 2003 the Maritime Administration (MARAD) of the US Department of 
Transport announced that Post-Service Remediation Partners (PRP) would be awarded a 
$14.8 million contract to remove 15 ships from the US Navy's James River Reserve Fleet. 
As part of this contract 13 vessels were to be dismantled at the Able UK facility at 
Graythorp, Hartlepool. It was the responsibility of Able to have all the permissions in place 
shortly after the contract had been granted. According to the Environment Agency (EA) 
submission to the Environment Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee on the 19th 
November 2003, it is common practice to bid for a contract without having permissions in 
place, but on the assumption that they soon will be. In addition, Able always made it clear 
that the 'recovery' of the vessels would take place in a dry dock, and the contract and the 
necessary licenses were granted on this assumption. 
Between them the 13 vessels contain 698 tons of PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls), 1400 
tons of asbestos and 3300 tons of fuel oil. Able expects to be able to recycle or reuse over 
98% of the vessels through the recovery process. Able projected that if this contract led to 
further contracts of a similar type (there are over 2000 vessels of a similar type and age in 
need of recovery) then over 200 jobs would be created at the Graythorp facility. However 
the Hartlepool TUC branch was not alone in highlighting that there were no guarantees that 
these jobs would go to local people. Furthermore, the Hartlepool TUC, in its submission to 
the SCC, argued that a number of domestic US firms, with the necessary expertise and 
experience, had bid for the contract. The implication here is that not only was the US 
capable of dealing with its own waste, domestic companies had bid to do so in relation to 
the ghost ships. 
Hartlepool TUC also argued that the environmental concerns around the project would not 
be dissipated by, 'bland statements of denial' by Able UK, but by a full Environmental 
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Impact Assessment (EIA). However, because an existing Waste Management Licence was 
initially modified to allow for the importation of the ships there was no compulsion on Able 
to carry out an EIA. Indeed, at the time of the contract being granted to Able all the key 
agencies and regulatory bodies had agreed that Able UK was qualified to do the job. 
However, the proposed transfer of the ghost ships to the UK was not uncontroversial, 
indeed Friends of the Earth challenged this contract both publicly and legally (see below for 
more details). Following two High Court rulings in December 2003 Able UK is now in the 
process of rectifying their legal position to enable ship dismantling to take place in its 
Hartlepool facility. This requires them to obtain the following permissions: 
• Planning permission for the dismantling of ships and for the construction of a bund, 
dam or lock gate across the entrance to the dock. To fulfil the conditions of 
obtaining planning permission Able must undergo a full EIA52; 
• A Waste Management Licence, granted by the EA, to allow for dismantling of 
ships; 
• A DEFRA licence to permit the construction of a bund/dam to create a dry dock, 
and a separate licence to permit disposal of dredged material removed during 
construction, the dredging of the dock basin and of the navigable channel; 
• PD Teesport (the local harbour authority) agreement to the dredging of the 
navigable channel and the adjacent Able UK berths; and 
• Department of Transport agreement to dredging of the dock basin 
• The Health and Safety Executive (HSE): 
The HSE's primary role is to ensure the health and safety of workers and those, including 
members of the public, who may be affected by work activities. The HSE has powers and 
duties under the Asbestos (Prohibitions) Regulations 1992 (as amended in 1999). These 
regulations ban the importation, supply and use of asbestos in the UK. Regulation 8 gives 
52 The negotiations over what the EIA would contain were a drawn out process between Able, the EA and the 
council. Able did not submit a planning application until March/April 2005, and the planning process is 
ongoing at the time of writing in early 2006. 
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the HSE the power to grant exemptions to the regulations. An exemption was granted to 
Able UK on the grounds that the importation of asbestos was for disposal, not use, and the 
landfill site is situated near to the docks. Furthermore the HSE cited Able's experience as 
licensed asbestos removers and that a precedent exists for oil rigs as reasons for granting 
the exemption. Other factors taken into consideration were local jobs and regeneration; the 
global environmental consequences of not recycling the ships in the UK53 ; and the support 
from other interested parties e.g. local MPs, the Environment Agency, and HBC54. 
The HSE highlighted that this contract would account for 1.8% of asbestos removal in the 
North East, and 0.0013% nationally. In addition they drew attention to the fact it is easier 
to remove asbestos from a ship rather than a building on land. In short the HSE was 
satisfied that Able UK 'could do the job' and they could revoke the exemption if they were 
not satisfied that the conditions were being met. Within the governance system the HSE 
can be regarded as having superior (objective) knowledge under Bauman' s55 (1987) 
categorisation of modem 'legislators'. As the regulator this organisation fits into a modem 
world-view of arbitrary superior knowledge, in which the other governance actors are 
compelled to accept their superior expertise for this given field. However, as repositories 
of specialist knowledge their role extends beyond 'pure' regulation to include contributions 
to policy making. Consequently this reflects a post-modern worldview in which the state's 
responsibility for legislation is shared as no one part of the local or national state had the 
general/universal knowledge to be able to combine that specialist knowledge with state 
power in decision-making. 
• The Environment Agency (EA): 
The EA exists to 'protect and enhance' the environment in England and Wales. As such a 
major role is to regulate industry, which it does through issuing licenses. There were two 
licenses that were of particular importance to the ghost ships issue. Firstly, a Transfontier 
Shipment (TFS) is required for the shipment of waste into the UK. In April 2003 Able UK 
53 During the·course of the 'inquiry'comparisons were made with ship'dismantling in China and ·India; where 
ships are often dismantled on beaches in uncontrolled conditions. 
54 The support from HBC cited here was from an informal cabinet meeting that was not binding. 
55 See chapter three. 
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and MARAD approached the EA to discuss importing the vessels from the US to the UK, 
and on the 22"d July a TFS approval was granted for the 13 vessels. A number of 
conditions were attached to this approval, of which 'all necessary permissions are in place' 
proved to be the most pertinent. The second license was a site Waste Management License 
(WML). On the 31st July Able applied for modification to their existing site WML. The 
EA undertook an assessment of dismantling in a dry dock, and the modification to the 
WML was granted on 30th September 2003. However, a legal challenge by Friends of the 
Earth to this had serious ramifications for the validity of this modification and is discussed 
below. The EA has a similar status to that of the HSE within the post-modem world-view 
described above. The EA effectively performs as a post-modem legislator, in which it acts 
as a regulatory arm of the state, adopting an interpreter role geared towards facilitating 
communication between autonomous participants in the governance system. The EA 
fulfilled this role through consulting with the council and Able UK, in particular, in relation 
to the ghost ships issue. 
• DEFRA: 
It would not be unreasonable to expect DEFRA to be a key actor in this process as the 
sponsoring government department of the EA, but its involvement in the scrutiny process 
was minimal, and from a broader governance perspective it seemed content for the EA and 
HSE to respond to this issue. Given the global nature of the issue and the country of origin 
of the ships it is possible to suggest (and it was suggested repeatedly by some councillors 
and members of the public) that it suited the government to have minimal involvement in 
the issue. However, DEFRA was (perhaps) the only governance actor with the necessary 
state power to join-up this issue and co-ordinate the responses of the other governance 
actors in this process. The lack of involvement from DEFRA highlights Bauman's view 
that there has been a divorce between the state and intellectual discourse (expert systems). 
Furthermore, it could be argued that the state has not been fulfilling its role as an interpreter 
effectively because of the breakdown in communications between the relevant agencies that 
has led to the breakdown in Able's permissions to fulfil its contract. It should be noted that 
-~the-government-has subsequently committeddtselLto_,producing a ship _recycling strategy 
(Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee 2004: 17). 
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• Hartlepool Borough Council (HBC) 
Aside from the scrutiny process (which is outlined in the conduct of the inquiry section 
below) the main role for HBC as an actor was in its planning capacity. In its role as a Local 
Planning Authority (LPA) HBC is required to consider all planning applications put before 
it, on their own merits and only taking material planning considerations into account. In 
March 2003 Able contacted the council, seeking confirmation that existing planning 
permissions allowed for the dismantling of ships at the Graythorp site. An initial and 
informal indication from council officers was that the ships could be dismantled under the 
terms of their existing permissions, but the council qualified this by indicating that they 
would need to discuss this further and seek advice. In a submission to the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs Committee about this issue, the mayor of Hartlepool has stated that 
since 1st July there were ongoing informal discussions between Able UK and the council to 
clarify two related planning issues. These were: 
• Whether there was an extant planning permission to allow for the dismantling of the 
ships. 
• Whether there was an extant planning permission to allow for the construction of a 
bundldam and dock gate(s) so as to create a dry dock. 
In relation to the first issue the council's position was that this was considered to be 
covered by existing permissions. In relation to the second issue, the council took the view 
that there was not extant permission upon which the company could rely. This became a 
matter of contention between the council and Able UK since October 2003. The High 
Court hearing of December 2003 ruled that Able UK did not have planning permission for 
dismantling the ships, and HBC's Planning Committee ruled that the existing planning 
permission was not extant on the 17th December. 
The -arrival~of-the ghost ships in Hartlepoolcalso~"raised ,issues relevant to the council's 
powers to promote economic, social and environmental well-being: 
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• Economically - through the creation of jobs, and the future prosperity of the town. 
There were two arguments over the benefits this would bring, on the one hand there is 
the potential for more contracts of this sort, bringing long-term manual employment in a 
region that has been traditionally reliant on this type of employment. On the other hand 
concerns were expressed over the effect this would have on the image of Hartlepool and 
its long-term strategy of developing as a centre for tourism. 
• Socially - the issue was the subject of high profile media attention, which created a 
large amount of vocal opposition to the ships. Whether this was a case of a silent 
majority not being opposed to the ships coming to town is a matter for debate, but at the 
time a poll in the local paper indicated 91% of people opposed the ships coming to 
Hartlepool. Given the high profile nature of the issue and the groundswell of public 
opinion the council clearly had a need to respond to the issue given its representative 
role. 
~ Environmentally - the importation and disposal of waste from the vessels had potential 
environmental implications for the town. Furthermore, there is a Site of Special 
Scientific Interest (SSSI), and bird and seal sanctuaries near to the docks and landfill 
site. Consequently, there was a justification for the council to pursue the issue on this 
basis 
However, a local authority cannot act on its powers of well-being where there are explicit 
limitations and restrictions in other legislation. Consequently, given the clear 
responsibilities of the EA and HSE, the only field where HBC could exercise its authority 
as the responsible body was in the field of planning, and it can only take into consideration 
planning matters relating directly to the site. This leaves the scope of the powers of well-
being constrained to those of environmental factors alone, and even here the key issue (at 
the time of the scrutiny inquiry) was over whether the existing permission was extant, 
rather than whether a full EIA should be undertaken. Following the planning committee's 
decision on the 17th December 2003 a new EIA now needs to be undertaken. 
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• Friends of the Earth (FOE) 
The capacity of FOE to intervene in this issue was never in doubt, as a large environmental 
pressure group operating on international, national and local levels of governance 
interaction. On the 30th October 2003 FOE applied to the High Court for a judicial review 
of the EA's modification to Able's WML. FOE were concerned that the EA had acted 
unlawfully by failing to ensure there was a proper assessment of the potential impacts on 
the local SSSI. Within a day the EA had written to FOE to agree that the modification 
could not stand, and that they would not oppose FOE's application to quash the 
modification. Able UK, however, took a different view and would not accept that the 
modification to the WML was invalid. Consequently the legal process proceeded and on 
gth December the High Court found in favour of FOE. 
Within the governance arrangements of the ghost ships issue FOE were clearly a key actor, 
and in many respects the most decisive in terms of influence over the eventual outcome. 
However the organisation came in for a fair amount of criticism, most notably from the 
local MP (at the time) at the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, for 
'bullying' the process and putting out statements that 'lacked proportion'. However, the 
evidence FOE submitted to the SCC meeting on 31st October was entirely consistent with 
the other agencies understanding of the toxins contained on the ships. It was the media that 
tended to present the total amount of toxins for the 13 vessels as that contained on each 
vessel. 
• 'Other' Actors: 
There were a large number of actors involved in the governance of this issue. The 
Maritime and Coastguard Agency, English Nature, the Industry and Nature Conservation 
Association (INCA), Tees Valley Regeneration56 and the Habour Master all indicated that 
they had no objections to the recovery of the ships in the Able UK facility in Hartlepool. 
Generally this constituted the extent of these bodies' involvement in the scrutiny process 
and- governance ofthe issue; -All "Of'these-bodies 'have their-own--responsibilities- and remit 
56 A regeneration company operating in the area. 
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and the ghost ships issue was not found to be contrary to these. As we have seen MARAD 
and PRP had the responsibility for granting the contract to Able UK, and also in the case of 
MARAD assurances had to be made in the event of Able not being able to fulfil its 
contract. Consequently, the US government gave a guarantee that it will keep ownership of 
the ships until the contract is completed. This means that they are responsible for ensuring 
that the contract is carried out according to all the relevant regulations and requirements. 
5.5) Conduct of the Inquiry 
Joint Meeting of Neighbourhood Consultative Forums: 3/10/03 
The purpose of this meeting was to hear the views of members of the public and take this 
forward as part of the evidence gathered in the scrutiny inquiry. A short report on the ship 
dismantling process and the roles of various agencies was presented at the meeting. At the 
meeting council officers indicated that after reviewing relevant documentation and legal 
advice, the council could confirm that Able had planning permission for the, 'dismantling 
and refurbishment of ships at the Graythorp site.' However, with regard to the construction 
of a bund or dam to create a dry dock the council was reviewing the scope and validity of 
previous permissions and seeking further evidence. Without such further evidence the 
council would be unable to satisfy itself that planning permission existed for such physical 
works. A lively discussion followed in front of the national and local media. The members 
of public attending this meeting were overwhelmingly opposed to the ships coming to 
Hartlepool. 
Meeting One: 28110103 
The purpose of this meeting was to scope the issues surrounding the dismantling of the US 
Navy ships and to examine how the scrutiny inquiry should be conducted. The general 
approach for the inquiry that was agreed at this meeting is outlined in the background 
section above. Whilst the issue primarily involved national regulations in the management 
of wasn,ninclliding-hazardtms substances) and -a contract between a -foreign government 
and a private company, there was a clear role for scrutiny under the remit of the SCC, 
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which under article 6 of the council's constitution may investigate issues of local concern, 
outside the control of the council and other public bodies in the area, and make 
recommendations to the council, the executive and/or other organisations arising from the 
outcome of the scrutiny process (HBC Constitution 2002). 
The key issues emerging from the discussion at this meeting were: 
• The potential for new jobs in Hartlepool, and whether these jobs would go to 
specialist contractors outside ofHartlepool. 
• The potential for UK Naval vessels to be demolished at this yard, and the potential 
impact of this. 
• Concern was expressed about the amount of asbestos contained on the ships and 
what would happen to the disposal of heavy diesel and other fuels. 
• Concern was raised about a letter sent from the council in response to a request 
from the HSE indicating that there were no formal objections to the contract to 
dismantle the ship. The director of regeneration and planning indicated that he had 
received a letter from the HSE with a very short timescale for the council to reply, 
which did not leave enough time to call a formal cabinet meeting57• Consequently, 
an informal meeting of the cabinet was convened on the 23rd July. At this meeting 
the informal cabinet indicated that it supported the proposal for an exemption 
certificate for the importation of asbestos to Hartlepool on the grounds that it would 
contribute to the economic regeneration of the area. This was subject to all the 
necessary permissions and consents being in place, the imposition of strict working 
conditions and monitoring, that the necessary safeguards were put in place to 
protect the environment, and that reasonable efforts were made to ensure that the 
jobs created were offered to local people. 
• In relation to the letter from the HSE to the director of regeneration and planning 
the sec expressed concern at the reference of bringing the ships into a dry dock, 
which it was now clear did not exist. It was indicated to the committee that this 
issue would be coming before the planning committee on the 3rd November. 
57 The meeting was adjourned for twenty minutes so that copies of the HSE's letter to the council and the 
reply from the council could be provided to members of the committee. 
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• There was concern that the wording contained in the e-mail indicated that the 
council 'supported the proposal'. This gives the indication that the informal 
cabinet had reached a decision, when it was not entitled to do so. 
The issues raised here provided a provisional line of inquiry for the committee to pursue 
during the public meeting with the various agencies involved in this issue on the 31st 
October 2003. 
Meeting Two: 31/10/03 
A day long meeting of SCC was held in which 55 members of the public attended. 
Evidence was heard from: Able UK, the HSE, the EA, English Nature, Industry Nature 
Conservation Association (INCA), The Harbour Master, HBC, Tees Valley Regeneration, 
and Friends of the Earth. In addition the following agencies provided written submissions: 
DEFRA, Greenpeace, the RSPB, ONE Northeast, and Hartlepool TUC. 
Two key findings emerging from this meeting were to have a great influence over the 
scrutiny process. Firstly, the EA indicated that it no longer considered the Transfrontier 
Shipment (TFS) for the vessels to be valid because not all the necessary permissions were 
in place. Furthermore, the Waste Management Licence (WML), which Able required to 
dismantle the ships, was no longer deemed to be valid because there was no permission in 
place for a dry dock to be constructed, which was one of the conditions upon which the 
granting of a (modified) WML and TFS rested. Secondly, the legality of whether or not the 
permission for constructing a bund for the creation of a dry dock was in place was 
contested by a number of actors involved in the governance arrangements for this issue. 
Consequently, the legal process effectively became the key actor in process at this stage. 
This further constrained the scrutiny process in an already congested governance system. 
'Extraordinary' Council Meeting: 4111103 
Whilst the scrutiny process was ongoing an extraordinary meeting of the full council was 
called to discuss the following motion: 
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We request the Chairman call an Extraordinary Meeting of the Council to 
discuss the admission by the Secretary of State at the Ministry of Transport 
that he has the power to reroute the Ghost Ships and turn them back and 
propose the following motion that the Council immediately contact the 
Secretary of State and ask that he use these powers and turn back the ships. 
The motion was unanimously agreed by full council. However, despite at least two of the 
four ships that have arrived in the UK being far closer to the US at the time of this 
statement, maritime advice was that the safest course of action was for the ships to continue 
on their course to the UK. Both the UK and US governments accepted this advice and all 
four ships arrived in the Hartlepool. In addition, full council had referred the ghost ships 
issue to scrutiny on 11th September, thereby setting a process in motion. However, this 
motion effectively pre-empted scrutiny's findings and recommendations, undermining the 
scrutiny process. The high levels of public interest/pressure around this issue may have 
contributed to all members of the council feeling the need to been seen to be responding to 
this matter politically at this time. 
Meeting Three: 16112/03 
The purpose of this meeting was to provide a summary of the evidence gathered at the 
meeting of the committee on the 31st October. In addition, because the scrutiny inquiry 
originated from a referral from the full council, it was agreed that some interim 
recommendations would be agreed in light of the evidence gathered through the scrutiny 
process thusfar. A general conclusion of the inquiry was that, 'whilst there may be serious 
levels of concern in respect of the ships being dismantled in Hartlepool, the real concern 
was with weaknesses in the process rather than the dismantling itself' Consequently, the 
committee made the following interim comments/recommendations: 
1. Concerns about the lack of leadership during the process; 
2. No one individual or_ agency took responsibility_for co-.ordinating the process; 
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3. The council was put in a difficult position as civic leaders which conflicted with its role 
as a planning authority. More robust mechanisms must be put in place to ensure full 
and proper communication with members; 
4. In light of the need for open and transparent decision-making the mayor was urged to 
reconsider the use of informal cabinet; 
5. Proper community involvement at an early stage would have avoided some of the 
problems that emerged later in the process; and 
6. Able UK should enter into a voluntary EIA to placate some of the uncertainties 
regarding the risks to health posed by the ships. 
The chief solicitor also provided a further update on the current position. Attention was 
drawn to the High Court challenge by three Hartlepool residents, which had resulted in a 
summary decision that a ship was not a marine structure and as such meant that ships could 
not be dismantled under the existing planning permission. Details of the judgement, and an 
application for a 'bund' were to be considered formally by the planning committee on the 
17th December, prior to the announcement of a full decision on the 18th December. In view 
of this and the ongoing nature of the legal situation it was felt that the most prudent course 
of action would be to submit one final report following completion of the legal process. It 
was also felt that it would not be proper to comment until the planning committee had 
completed its work. The planning process is still incomplete, although a planning 
application for the construction of a bund and other works was submitted in late 2005. 
Meeting Four: 1115104 
At this meeting the chief executive provided an update on the current situation in relation to 
the ghost ships and responded to the interim recommendations the committee made to 
council. In response to recommendations 1,2, 3 and 558 the chief executive argued that the 
council had not been provided with sufficient formal information around the processes at 
hand to disseminate information to relevant elected members prior to late July/early August 
2003. However, the use of informal cabinet, and more generally the division of executive 
and scrutiny functions under the new political arrangements, meant that m_ost elt!cte_d 
58 Outline in meeting three above. 
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members, and the public were kept in the dark about this issue until early September. 
Consequently, there are concerns about the ability of scrutiny to influence policy as it 
develops. Furthermore, as a result of the use of informal cabinet there was no published 
decision for scrutiny to consider when holding the executive to account. As yet the mayor 
has not responded to the criticisms of the use of informal cabinet (as outlined in 
recommendation four). Admittedly he was not present at the informal cabinet meeting 
under scrutiny, but the overall responsibility for the (continued) use of this type of meetings 
lies with him. In addition members' comments were sought on the cabinet's proposed 
submission to the government's Environmental, Food and Rural Affairs Committee's 
inquiry into the Environmental impacts of the dismantling of defunct ships in the United 
Kingdom. Members of the committee had nothing to add to the chief executive's report. 
5.6) Discussion 
The ghost ships issue draws attention to the global impact on local governance and the 
large number of agencies with responsibilities for carrying out functions in this system. 
The increased complexity in governing has been identified as a driver for modernising local 
government in recognition of the need for local authorities to be more outward looking and 
responsive in this context. Indeed, Stewart (2003) argues that local government has an 
important role in complex and changing societies, and that it has value in its own right and 
in the whole system. However, reconciling the value of local government with the 
governance of the whole system can be complex, and contradictory - there is often not the 
space in the governance system for the competing governance actors to reconcile their 
different objectives, which is why the notion of hierarchy in the governance system is so 
important. In relation to this issue a series of decisions were taken by the US government, 
the UK government, regulatory bodies, and private companies leaving a limited room for 
manoeuvre for the local authority. The powers of well-being and the community leadership 
role can potentially provide local authorities with an increased role in local governance. 
However, they offered a limited outlet for councillors to respond to public concerns and act 
as community leaders for this issue. Nevertheless, these powers provided scrutiny with a 
route into the governance of this issue. 
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Further drivers of the local government modernisation agenda identified here are those of 
efficiency of decision-making and accountability. Indeed, concerns over the lack of 
transparency and co-ordination in decision making between the responsible bodies have 
been highlighted by the SCC, the mayor and the council's chief executive. These concerns 
about transparency and accountability have been mirrored within the council. Indeed one 
of the interim recommendations of the committee on the 16th December was that, 'in light 
of the need for open and transparent decision making the mayor was urged to reconsider the 
use of informal cabinet.' To date he has not done so. The introduction of new political 
structures aimed to provide increased accountability and ensure that local communities 
were fully involved in decisions affecting their lives. The evidence from this inquiry, and 
from my experience in scrutiny generally, is that the new political structures have had the 
opposite effect. Power is concentrated in fewer hands and the (perceived) lack of 
awareness of decisions and involvement in decision-making amongst backbencher 
councillors has become an increasingly dominant theme running across the scrutiny forums 
since the ghost ships inquiry. The working relationships between senior officers and 
cabinet members has led many in scrutiny to claim that they lack parity in esteem and 
advice, which reduces the likelihood of transparency for councillors and the community at 
large. 
The ghost ships case study has been a difficult issue for a local authority to handle. Some 
people have criticised the council for being rudderless and falling behind the planning 
permission issue once a vocal minority put pressure on HBC. However, whilst this 
argument is plausible, the subsequent high court rulings have reinforced the importance of 
the planning permission issue. Nevertheless, if the council has appeared rudderless at 
times, the complexities of governance and the confusion over the co-ordination and lack of 
leadership for the process paint a picture of a small local authority afloat in the murky 
waters of governance. The governability of this matter was beyond the scope of HBC and 
local governance generally. So whilst national regulatory bodies have a role to perform in 
ensuring that all technical assessments are met, Stewart's (2003) argument that the 
fragmented nature of governance is highly differentiated and lacks a requisite capacity for 
integt:ation was highjy pertinen! for thi~ ~!)u~ @Q ~lti!Jl~j_~ly a key f1nding of !he. ca~e 
study. Stewart (2003: 14) moves on to argue that community leadership by local authorities 
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should enable the necessary integration to respond to community problems. Indeed it could 
be argued that through the scrutiny process, and the meeting on the 31st October 2003 in 
particular, that this role was fulfilled. However, whilst the scrutiny process and the local 
authority as a whole adopted a community leadership role, this largely involved holding 
processes to account (essentially a reactive role) rather than developing policy in a 
progressive fashion. Consequently, the community leadership role provided a degree of 
integration once the problem had arisen and the various governance actors had established 
their positions, but not when the issue was being defined. Whether a local authority should 
be (or is capable of being) the lead body in integrating a technical issue such as this is 
debatable given the prominence Bauman (1987) places on the divorce between intellectual 
discourse and the state and the growth in expert systems. Nevertheless, the local 
government modernisation agenda places expectations on local authorities (as the 
democratically accountable bodies in the local governance system) to take the lead for 
issues like this. 
Throughout the scrutiny process the notion of accountability has consistently been behind 
the process rather than driving it. Whilst it would be fair to say that scrutiny has shed some 
light on the process and acted as a forum to examine the issue, it would be stretching 
matters quite considerably to say that scrutiny had influenced the wider processes of 
governance here. The referral of the issue by the responsible portfolio holder to scrutiny 
might suggest that the values of scrutiny had been disseminated across the council, and that 
this was an opportunity for the values of openness and transparency to influence the wider 
processes of governance. Whilst there is certainly some truth in this, and little (material) 
evidence to suggest otherwise, through my insider-researcher I participant-observer role I 
would take a more cynical view in that the referral came after a number of decisions had 
been taken in a less than transparent fashion59, and had subsequently become public 
knowledge, which then motivated the referral to scrutiny. Indeed, scrutiny officers and 
councillors felt that this issue had become a political 'hot potato' passed from the portfolio 
holder to scrutiny. Consequently, it is possible to argue that scrutiny is undervalued to such 
an extent that it is viewed as a mechanism for escaping accountability and 'difficult' 
decisions. Given that- the responsible portfolio-,holder was not called to give evid_ence 
59 Although given the tight timescales the HSE placed on the local authority for a response, there was 
insufficient time to call a formal cabinet meeting. 
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during the scrutiny inquiry by any of the political parties, there is some evidence to support 
this view. Nevertheless, once the matter had been referred to scrutiny there was the 
opportunity for an evidence-based in-depth inquiry to explore the actions of the various 
actors involved in this issue. 
It could be argued that the scrutiny process was at its most effective as a forum for the 
public and interested parties to express their views and aspirations. The scrutiny process 
has no formal powers with regard to calling witnesses, but most of the agencies involved 
were keen to have the opportunity to feed their views into a public and democratic forum. 
The controversial and emotive nature of the issue led to high levels of speculation about 
this issue, and the scrutiny process allowed the responsible bodies to clarify their positions 
on this matter. 
However, by meeting public aspirations so effectively the expectations of scrutiny were 
raised beyond the scope of scrutiny's powers and resources. Consequently, members ofthe 
public were given a forum to express their views (aspirations) over this issue but were 
frustrated at the inability of scrutiny to tum the ships back. The vast majority of local 
people sufficiently motivated to express an opinion in the scrutiny forum simply could not 
understand how the ships were being allowed to come to Hartlepool, and why the council 
was not sending them back. This demonstrates a lack of understanding by the public over 
the general functions of a local authority, and the unrealistic extent to which a local 
authority is held to account by the public it serves. This finding was a little surprising 
because whilst it may be reasonable to expect the public to hold a council to account for 
functions it used to deliver and were within its remit, this particular issue would never have 
been the responsibility of a local authority60• The role of the planning committee shifted 
some of the expectations away from the scrutiny process by November/December. 
Nevertheless, the scrutiny process suffered from the expectations placed on it, as a result of 
being the only available forum for public aspirations to be raised once the issue became 
public between September and November 2003. 
60 This is leaving to one side the planning application -which must be treated on the merits ofthe case and 
not the principle of the issue. 
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Through the inquiry into the ghost ships, scrutiny took on the responsibility of promoting 
the towns' social, economic and environmental well-being. However, the powers to do so 
(in this instance) were limited to those of investigating the issue and publicising its 
findings. There were no formal powers to fulfil this role; instead HBC exercised its 
responsibilities over the issue through the planning committee. However, in light of the 
aspirations and expectations expressed through the scrutiny process the powers and 
resources of scrutiny were clearly not adequate in relation to the heightened responsibilities 
that were placed on it. The heightened responsibilities of scrutiny are a result ofthe referral 
from full council, and the diminished responsibility of the executive - who were unwilling 
to take the lead on this issue and were happy to fudge it through the referral to scrutiny61 • 
The relative lack of involvement of MARAD at the local level of consequence in the UK is 
a telling factor in the governance of this issue. There has been limited contact between 
MARAD and HBC, and it has been a practically invisible actor in the eyes of the local 
population. The lack of contact between local residents and MARAD reduces the potential 
for the local population to understand the process at hand here and highlights the confusion 
over complex responsibilities in a globalising post-modem world. The distance between 
the public and the actors involved in this issue (both geographically, in the case of 
MARAD, and in terms of public awareness of government agencies and their roles) poses 
problems for the notion of accountability locally. A key theme here was that there was a 
general assumption (amongst some sections of the public) about the council (and national 
government) being responsible for decisions which in reality they are not. The scope of the 
local authority to act was, in this case, severely limited by the responsibility of other actors 
to fulfil their functions unimpeded. In the governance system it is natural that the actors 
with the requisite technical expertise should fulfil their functions in granting licenses and 
permissions to Able so that it could fulfil its contract. However, as the democratic and 
accountable body in the locality there were pressures ·on HBC that far outweighed its 
responsibilities, which were reflected during the scrutiny process. 
61 The official line the majority of the cabinet adopted very soon afterwards (from the referral on the 11th 
S~ptt:!llber until.the extra,ordinary Council vote on the 4th November) was we will wait to hear the views of 
the scrutiny-inquiry. However,~tlle~fact tl:lat'tlie-scrutiriy'iriquirfhad-notcconcluded before the vote.at the 
extraordinary council meeting on the 4th November suggests that the issue was being fudged in scrutiny 
during a particularly controversial period rather than members of the council waiting for (and valuing) 
scrutiny's findings/recommendation. 
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This issue usefully highlights whether scrutiny should have a decision-making role. If we 
return to Bauman's conception of 'legislators' and 'interpreters' then the question must be 
asked whether the local state has the necessary knowledge to legislate over this issue? It is 
not unreasonable that in an issue such as this that the expert systems of the HSE and the 
EA, amongst others, are relied upon. However part of the reason that the accountability for 
this issue is so complex is that no one part of the local nor national state had the 
general/universal knowledge to be able to combine that specialist knowledge with state 
power in decision-making. This leads to a variety of actors with their own internally 
logical (but not universally so) expert systems. This poses problems for joining up 
solutions and co-ordinated governance, and for accountability, which in tum is problematic 
for the scrutiny function in terms of fulfilling its responsibilities to hold decision-makers 
that cut across the governance landscape to account. The scrutiny function should not have 
a decision-making role but it should have direct access to a body that does. The interim 
recommendations of the scrutiny forum that one body should be co-ordinating issues of this 
sort would allow for greater awareness of the issues at hand and also for a direct line of 
influence/accountability. It could also be argued that the sponsoring government 
department should have been more actively involved in this issue at a much earlier stage. 
Regarding the limited scope of local government in the local governance arena, it is clear 
that of all the local governance actors HBC was the key one. The various regional and sub-
regional partners expressed their support for the project, but little more, and the LSP never 
formally discussed the matter. The chair ofthe LSP (the local MP) became fairly active in 
the process quite late on, and was keen to stress the economic advantages of the project. 
However, the key issue here relates to the lack of importance the local governance arena 
had with regard to shaping this process. Local actors had very limited involvement in the 
process until the scrutiny process began, and the nature of the involvement then was 
focused on examining the process at hand, rather than shaping it. Although 
recommendations from scrutiny could potentially shape similar governance processes to 
these in the future. 
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5.7) Conclusion 
The main lever the council had over this issue was planning legislation, which is not so 
much a power as a duty. The planning role is tightly prescribed and closely regulated to 
consider matters through only taking 'material planning considerations' into account. The 
role of scrutiny, and by extension the council as a whole, had been to check if all the 
relevant bodies have been doing their jobs properly and whether the correct procedures 
have been followed. The interim findings of the SCC (listed above) suggest that not all the 
relevant bodies performed their functions properly, with Able UK, the EA and HBC all 
open to criticisms. Scrutiny's findings largely relate to the complexities in governance and 
the lack of co-ordination/leadership to bring all the actors together. However, given the 
inquiry was incomplete scrutiny struggled to extend its views across the governance 
arrangements. 
A (if not the) key issue affecting the influence of scrutiny was the withdrawal of the WML 
and TFS by the EA. The scrutiny process was hampered here because a new planning 
permission was required for the construction of a dry dock. sec broadly followed the legal 
advice provided to it and removed planning issues from scrutiny because of the fear of pre-
empting/prejudicing the council's role as an impartial planner. This was a conservative 
approach to the councillors' community leadership role in my view, and demonstrates a 
lack of belief in the powers of well-being, which are intended to empower local authorities 
to act on behalf of their citizens in matters of public concern. Therefore, councillors could 
no longer act in their capacity as elected representatives and community leaders for this 
issue, and there was no other governance mechanism to fulfil this role. It could be argued 
that scrutiny was the correct mechanism for examining topics such as; how had a WML 
modification granted on the 30th September been deemed invalid only one month later? 
However, the local authorities' planning role impeded it from exploring this further. 
Furthermore, if the previous permission had been acted on and deemed 'live' then there 
would have been no mechanism through which local government or governance could have 
influenced the process. As it turned out this issue was the loose thread that unravelled the 
project. 
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6) Flooding- Case Study 
6.1) Introduction 
The flooding case study is an example of the local authority, through its scrutiny function, 
responding to the political and systemic risk of continued sewer flooding in the case study 
authority. Northumbrian Water are primarily responsible for the service delivery of this 
issue. Consequently, the case study provides a good example of the external scrutiny of a 
private company and the various regulatory and governance arrangements that are in place 
for the issue. The case study is structured according to the headings outlined in the 
methodology chapter. 
6.2) Background and Purpose of the Inquiry 
There are a number of areas in Hartlepool that have experienced flooding increasingly 
frequently and of a larger volume over recent years. This has caused damage to property 
and possessions, and the closure of roads on a number of occasions. The flood water itself 
is basically sewage, and this causes a great deal of distress to residents affected by it 
whether it is in their homes, gardens, or streets. Consequently flooding in Hartlepool 
became an issue which attracted a high level of interest amongst the local public and media 
(for example Flood of Concern, Spotlight on Flood Threat, and Flooding experts to give 
views, in the Hartlepool Mail 26th March, 8th July, and 30th August 2003 respectively). 
In agreeing the 2002/3 scrutiny work programme the Scrutiny Co-ordinating Committee 
(SCC) reacted to the mounting groundswell of public concern by agreeing that this was a 
topic that should be considered by scrutiny. It was agreed that the Environmental 
Stewardship and Regeneration Scrutiny Forum (ES&RSF) would consider the topic at 
some point in the 2003/4 municipal year. The original purpose of the inquiry was to look at 
how agencies such as the water companies and the council work together; to examine 
communication issues; to examine the extent to which a coherent and integrated plan to 
tackle~flooding_exists and put f()rward proposals for developing and improving this; and to 
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look to develop a strategy to facilitate an effective co-ordinated response to future flooding 
incidences. 
The increased frequency and volume of flooding in Hartlepool over recent years serves to 
highlight the possible effects of global climate change. CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons) and 
carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere contribute to the global problem of 
stratospheric ozone depletion irrespective of where they are omitted (Greene 1997:314). 
As a consequence of global industrial development, we may have altered the world's 
climate, and damaged a great deal more of our earthly habitat besides (Giddens 1999b). In 
the twelve months before the conclusion of the scrutiny inquiry there were two major 
storms in Hartlepool, classed as once in 250 years and once in l 00 years incidences of 
rainfall by the Environment Agency. Clearly these were exceptional events, but the 
government has made it clear that the global climate is changing and the country will 
experience more extreme weather events, including frequent floods (ES&RSF 25/3/03). 
The consequences of this issue are felt at a local level (i.e. by the residents experiencing 
flooding). However the causes of it are apparent at the global level, firstly through climate 
change, and secondly through the privatisation of public utilities, which is related to the 
UK' s reaction to global trends outlined in chapter three. 
Prior to 1973 local authorities were responsible for water and sewage services. The Water 
Act of 1973 led to the water supply being grouped into ten regional water authorities in 
England and Wales, with local authorities maintaining the majority of sewers on behalf of 
the water authorities under agency agreement (Byrne 1990:285). In December 1989 the ten 
regional water authorities were floated on the stock exchange (Bakker 2003:67). Since 
privatisation the role of local authorities has declined, and water companies are largely 
responsible for the sewage and water system, whilst the council must clean the gullies. 
Consequently two key issues arising in relation to both the scrutiny inquiry and my thesis 
are: 
• What are the responsibilities of the various actors in relation to flooding? 
• What impact can 1-UlC, _throug!t !he overview and scrutiny function, have on the 
governance process in relation to this issue? 
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6.3) Role of Scrutiny 
The scrutiny process for this issue cuts across a number of the roles that the scrutiny 
function can fulfil. Given that the primary service provider with some responsibility for 
flooding in Hartlepool was Northumbrian Water (NW), a private company with no formal 
links to the council or the LSP, the external scrutiny role was central to the inquiry. In 
addition, the scrutiny process fulfilled its policy review role through reviewing the relevant 
policies and procedures in place for flooding. The forum then moved on to make a series of 
recommendations in line with its policy development role. This case study provides an 
interesting exemplar of how the policy development and review roles of the scrutiny 
function can work in relation to external partners. This is particularly significant given the 
growing prominence of governance arrangements in localities, as outlined in the theoretical 
framework, and the need for these to be held to account. 
One area in which scrutiny can look to influence external partners is through adopting the 
community leadership role and the associated powers to promote well-being. Indeed this is 
what happened in Hartlepool in relation to the flooding inquiry. As Stewart (2003) argues 
this role can reflect the needs and aspirations of different areas and backed by the powers of 
community well-being can enhance the scope for local choice. However Stewart (2003:34) 
continues to assert that unless the machinery of central government can respond on a 
joined-up basis to joined-up government at local level, then the potential for community 
planning will not be fully recognised. In addition the fact that NW has no links to the local 
LSP complicates the community planning side of the community leadership role somewhat. 
Nevertheless this new role stemming from the modernisation agenda is intended to 
empower local authorities and councillors as community leaders in the locality. 
6.4) Governance Actors Involved 
When conducting an external scrutiny inquiry it is important for a scrutiny forum to scope 
the issue thoroughly. B)' -~oing so a_ scrutiny forum should gain an initial understanding of 
all the relevant actors involved in the governance of an issue, wliicn -can often- provide a 
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route into the governance landscape for the scrutiny process. This section will provide a 
brief outline of the roles of the relevant governance actors for this issue. 
• DEFRA 
DEFRA plays a central role in water policy, setting standards and formulating water policy 
(Bakker 2003:69). In addition, Bakker argues that although its role is not clearly defined 
by legislation, DEFRA plays a key role in water regulation, and has assumed more 
responsibilities than it was originally assumed it would, for example through chairing the 
'Periodic Review' process of the industry. The scrutiny forum made no connections to 
DEFRA during the process. This was a weakness of the inquiry given the argument by 
Northumbrian Water that it was meeting its service standards despite the flooding in 
Hartlepool62 • 
• OFWAT: 
Following the progressive privatisation of the utility services responsibility for policy over 
the provision of these services is assigned to new regulatory bodies. In the case of water 
this responsibility falls on OFW AT as the economic regulator of NW, which in tum is 
accountable to DEFRA as its sponsoring department in government, and to Water Voice as 
the body that represents the interests of customers of the water and sewage companies on 
behalf of OFWA T. Ernst (1994:37) argues that, 'the introduction of a regulatory system is 
an explicit public policy response to the unique composite of social and economic 
characteristics that differentiate public utilities from other industries in the economy.' 
Bakker (2003:147) asserts that the water industry has primarily been regulated through the 
use of 'price cap regulation'. However, there has been a degree of 'regulatory creep' since 
the industry was privatised, as price reviews take place every five (instead of ten) years, 
largely as a result of above expected profits (Bakker 2003: 147-8). Bakker argues that this, 
combined with variable price caps for individual companies, has led to a weakening of the 
incentive structure underlying the regulatory framework. Consequently, at the time of the 
flooding inquiry the water indu~try was undergoing increasingly heavy capital expenditure 
62 Which is explored later in the chapter. 
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requirements in a less forgiving financial climate than during the first decade following 
privatisation (Bakker 2003: 177). 
OFW AT produces an annual report Levels of service for the water industry in England and 
Wales. This report assesses the level of service for each of the water companies across the 
following areas; customer service, water service and sewage service. Across these areas 
three categories are of particular relevance to the scrutiny issue; written complaints (DG7), 
ease of telephone contact (DG9), and the number of properties at risk from internal 
flooding from sewers (DG5). These are the areas that water companies are regulated on in 
terms of flooding and contact with their customers. The customer service side of the 
regulation has a particular relevance to this inquiry because of the public's experience of 
poor communications with Northumbrian Water. OFWAT only collects detailed 
information from water companies about internal flooding of properties - not external 
flooding. Performance is then monitored by the number of properties deemed to be at 'risk' 
of flooding. The scrutiny forum argued that this was an unreliable approach because it 
relied on the water companies themselves to compile the lists, and the methodology for 
doing so varied from company to company. 
• Water Voice Nortbumbria: 
Water Voice Northumbria represents the interests of all customers of the water and sewage 
companies in its region on behalf of OFWA T, providing a clear distinction between their 
role as customer representatives and OFWA T's role as the economic regulator. Therefore 
Water Voice exists to provide a degree of accountability to 0 FW AT and NW. However, 
given that the Regional Manager claimed at a follow up meeting of the scrutiny forum on 
the 6th April 2004 to be unaware of the serious flooding in Hartlepool in August 2003, the 
efficacy of this body in fulfilling its functions must be open to question. The public 
awareness (or lack of it) of Water Voice is demonstrated through members of the public 
attending scrutiny not reporting their experiences of flooding to them. This serves to 
highlight the lack of accountability that is a by-product of the complexities in governance. 
As a result of privatisation ~~t~r ~ompanies are regulated, and these and the regulator itself 
are held to account by Water Voice as the bod; ~p~~;~~ting customers. Generally there is 
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a lack of understanding of the process here by members of the public. At a non-public 
meeting between a few members of the ES&RSF, council officers, and the chief executive 
and chair of Water Voice to discuss flooding in Hartlepool, the accusation that Water Voice 
were merely apologists for Northumbrian Water was levelled at them. However, Water 
Voice Northumbria could more accurately be described as being reasonably focused on 
holding Northumbrian to Water to account within the existing regulatory framework., but 
were more unwilling to challenge this framework and, therefore, to challenge NW to 
deliver a higher level of service on this basis. 
• Environment Agency: 
The Environment Agency's (EA) responsibility for flooding from the sewage system is 
limited and indirect. The area in which the EA has some responsibility is in classifying 
rainfall events. The water company is then audited on the amount of properties at risk from 
a one in ten years flooding event, and must protect properties against a one in twenty years 
flood or be liable to compensate residents for this. 
• Nortbumbrian Water: 
As the sewage company NW has a general duty (under section 94 ofthe Water Industry Act 
1991) to provide, extend and improve the public sewer system to ensure that their areas are, 
and continue to be, effectively drained (OFW AT 2002:8). They must protect properties 
from flooding resulting from up to a once in twenty year rainfall event, or otherwise they 
are obliged to pay compensation. 
NW achieved first place in OFWA T's overall performance league for water and sewage 
companies in 2001/2. The company made a profit of £92.4 million, and after tax £91.3 
million for the year ending 2001. However, a key finding emerging from the scrutiny 
inquiry was that it was very hard for residents suffering the effects of flooding to contact 
NW and if they were contacted they often did not return calls or visit the customers 
contacting4hem. This genera~~ sp!Pe do,uJ>toverthe accuracy of the figures NW supply to 
OFWA T in relation to the DG5/7/9 categories (highlighted above). In addition the s-crutiny 
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forum, residents and Water Voice all concluded that it was not acceptable to be flooded 
internally or externally, a point on which NW differs. In fact it was stated on a number of 
occasions by their representative that if members of the public wanted a better service they 
must be prepared to pay more water rates. Given the quite sizeable profit the company is 
making in delivering what is still essentially a public utility this did not go down well with 
the public or the scrutiny forum. However, it is the role of the regulator to determine the 
profit level of the water companies. 
• Hartlepool Borough Council (HBC): 
The predominant responsibility ofHBC is to clean the gulleys. At the time ofthe scrutiny 
inquiry a backlog in the maintenance and cleaning of the gulleys was identified. The 
scrutiny forum recommended that action was taken to clear this backlog and a regular 
gulley cleaning programme was put in place. These recommendations were accepted by 
the cabinet and this demonstrates the role of scrutiny as a 'key influencer' within the 
council. Furthermore, through the community leadership role the council (through its 
executive, senior officer and scrutiny functions) was keen to take a lead in the co-
ordination, communication and the development of a flooding policy. This would suggest 
that given the democratic accountability of local government within the governance system, 
and the potential burden (as well as powers) the new community leadership role places on 
local authorities, the council feels the need to take the lead where it is not necessarily its 
responsibility to do so. However, a key question emerges in relation to this; if the council 
is not the governance actor primarily responsible for this issue is it necessarily sufficiently 
empowered/funded to take on this role? 
6.5) Conduct of tbe Inquiry 
Meeting One 2513103 
The first meeting of the ES&RSF in relation to flooding was a meeting to scope the topic 
~a. At th.is_J11€?eti~g the following terms of reference for the inquiry were agreed: 
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• To examine the nature, extent and impact of flooding in Hartlepool. 
• To assess the contributory factors involved in flooding - including past and 
current maintenance. 
o To look at how key agencies deal with flooding and what emergency plans exist 
for this contingency. 
• To estimate where possible the costs incurred by the council and other relevant 
agencies in dealing with flooding. 
• To make recommendations for appropriate action by the Council and other 
agencies. 
Meeting Two 1117103 
At this meeting the roles and responsibilities of a variety of stakeholders were outlined, 
including those of the council, NW, the Environment Agency (EA), property owners and 
Riperian property owners (those who own land adjoining streams, watercourses and rivers). 
In addition the head of technical services highlighted a number of areas in the town 
suffering from flooding, which could be used as potential case studies. Some of the causes 
and potential causes of flooding in these areas were provided. The head of technical 
services also indicated that Hartlepool, along with local authorities across the country, was 
failing in their provision of gully cleansing services. He identified a reduction in budget 
following the reorganisation of the Cleveland County Council and the introduction of 
compulsory competitive tendering - whereby gully cleansing has become part of a general 
cleaning service and had to compete with other services for resources - as contributory 
factors. In addition, poor communications with NW were highlighted (by councillors, 
officers and members of the public) as a key factor exasperating the flooding problem in 
Hartlepool. 
Meeting Three 2217103 
At this stage in the in<tt1iry IJlembers of the forum, accompanied by scrutiny officers and the 
council's principal engineer for environmental issues, went on a site visit to the flooding 
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hotspots in the town. A timetable was drawn up for residents to meet with members of the 
forum at pre-arranged times63 at different locations. Consequently, members of the forum 
met with people who had been experiencing flooding and gained an understanding of their 
experiences and their views on the causes of flooding. Through going out to meet the public 
in locations where flooding occurred the technical knowledge of expert witnesses could be 
supported, and tested, by the experiences of the public in flooded areas. 
Meeting Four I¢'- 2ls1 August 2003 
During the inquiry the need to establish an account of first hand experiences from residents 
was regarded as an important element for informing the scrutiny exercise. One hundred 
and fourteen members of the public attended three (joint scrutiny and neighbourhood 
forum) public meetings in the north, south and central areas of the town. In addition 33 of 
the council's 47 councillors were present at the meetings, as were council officers with 
relevant responsibilities and representatives of NW. On the Sunday prior to these public 
meetings there had been widespread flooding across the town as the result of an 
'exceptional rainfall event'. The effect of this on the public meeting was twofold. Firstly 
the large numbers of people attending the meeting and feeding their views into the process 
could at least partially be attributed to the very recent and extreme flooding in the town. 
Consequently, the scrutiny process benefited from a high level of public engagement. 
Secondly the flooding on the Sunday distorted the process in two ways. Firstly through the 
pressure placed on NW and the council through a rainfall event which was well in excess of 
the levels of service either body has to protect against. Conversely this exceptional storm 
served to deflect a lot of the criticism levelled at the council and NW because it clouded the 
issue, and obscured more general comments and complaints made in relation to the 
continued flooding in the town. 
63 The level ofpublic feeling and i_nt~~esJ llfi)Und this scrutiny topic is usefully highlighted by the fact that 
members of the public came out to meet withth-e scrutiny~forum. It is also notable that by taking scrutiny out 
into the community to meet with the public there are tangible rewards for the scrutiny process by working in 
an innovative way. 
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Key issues raised at these meetings included: 
• The council only has two gully cleaning machines, which operate too infrequently 
and this was, at least in part, responsible for some of the flooding in the town. The 
head of technical services accepted that the level of service was inadequate and 
highlighted it as a priority for his department. 
• One part of the town had flooded seven times in the last five years. NW indicated 
that they were looking at this area as a matter of some urgency, but there was little 
they could, or indeed were obliged, to do from such heavy rainfall as in the last 
flood. 
• A difference of opinion emerged between residents and NW over the existence of a 
switch at one ofthe town's pumping stations. There is frequent flooding in this part 
of the town, and when NW have come out and gone to the pumping station the 
water has dispersed very quickly.64 
• Poor communications in relation to incidences of flooding were a constant theme of 
these meetings. NW were singled out as being particularly poor at this, with 
residents complaining that telephone calls and letters were frequently unanswered. 
• Residents identified some areas of the town that had flooded, which NW had been 
unaware of. NW attended all three public meetings and gained a better 
understanding of the scale of the problem in Hartlepool through this. NW stressed 
that they rely heavily on residents reporting incidences of flooding in order to 
address them. 
• NW confirmed that they would pay compensation to residents experiencing 
flooding at times of normal rainfall but not at times of exceptional rainfall. They do 
have a hardship fund which they provide as a gesture of goodwill only. 
• NW pays all the clean-up costs of flooding, but again unless this is the result of 
exceptional rainfall they are not obliged to do so. 
• The need for greater co-ordination across the town when flooding has occurred was 
a major theme of these meetings. 
64 This has been a recurring theme in the inquiry. On one hand residents want-to know why_can't members of 
the public, or NW employees living in the town, have access to this station. Whilst on the other NW insists it 
is not the problem here, and a switch does not exist. 
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• There was a common perception amongst residents that no one was taking 
responsibility for the problem. 
• Residents were concerned about the effects of building new housing developments 
in the town on the areas already experiencing flooding. NW have no powers to 
restrict housing developments although they could object to applications on the 
grounds of insufficient capacity to deal with surface drainage. 
Meeting Five 219103 
The purpose of this meeting was to gather evidence from expert witnesses about flooding in 
Hartlepool. Representatives of the EA and NW attended this meeting, along with the 
council's own experts. OFWAT had not been invited to this meeting, and it was suggested 
by NW that it could be beneficial to talk to a representative of OFW AT regarding the 
standards set and the consequences of climate change. This illustrates a key theme of the 
case study, namely NW were being criticised for the level of service they provide, but they 
are (largely) meeting their service standards. As a consequence the broader regulatory 
framework needed to be explored and scrutinised. However this was largely ignored during 
the inquiry, which is a significant omission that undermined the scrutiny process somewhat. 
It could be argued that the potential for the scrutiny process in one local authority to change 
the national regulatory framework is limited. Nevertheless, exploring the role of OFWA T 
and inviting representatives to attend scrutiny could have usefully informed discussions 
with NW at this stage of the inquiry. NW did indicate that should OFW AT increase the 
level of protection that they must offer against incidences of flooding, then this could lead 
the company to raise its bilJs to customers to cover the cost ofthis service. 
The issue of granting planning applications for housing developments was again raised at 
this meeting. Both the EA and NW are consultees that have not made a specific 
recommendation to refuse a planning application on the grounds of flooding in the town. 
Both the EA and NW had been consulted about the council's Local Plan, which includes 
new areas of land that have been allocated to meet the growing requirements for housing up 
to 2016. 
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Following this meeting the chair ofthe ES&RSF, the scrutiny manager, technical services 
and NW met to discuss the preparation of a draft final report to be presented to the next 
meeting of the forum. 
Meeting Six 3019103 
During discussions of the draft final report the forum concluded that the problems of 
flooding in Hartlepool had to be addressed and that it was the responsibility of the council 
under its power of well-being to take a positive and proactive lead in this respect. The 
forum recognised that it could not achieve this alone but it had a responsibility to work with 
all the agencies65 involved to establish some real and effective solutions. 
The forum identified a number of areas where action was required. These included:-
(i) Poor co-ordination between agencies and council departments resulting in 
situations of flooding going unrecorded and at times of major incidents a 
disjointed response from agencies without proper fo11ow up. 
(ii) That communication with residents, both on the part of the council and NW was 
poor. Particular reference was made by a number of residents to both telephone 
and written correspondence going unanswered by NW. 
(iii) The provision of information to help residents protect their homes and to assist 
them with appropriate contact numbers was not readily available. 
(iv) That the council has no policy or identified resources to deal with flooding. 
(v) That the council gulley cleansing programme was not performing to appropriate 
standards. The reporting procedure for blocked gullies was unclear. When 
reported there was often no response. 
65 Although the forum did not question OFW AT and the government with respect to overall regulatory 
framework. 
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(vi) That the council was unclear as to its role in relation to incidents of flooding and 
this needed defining as a matter of urgency. 
Furthermore, the forum outlined the following general recommendations: 
• It is not acceptable for people to have their homes flooded with sewage, either 
internally or externally. 
• Ofwat must ensure that sewage companies have the appropriate level of financial 
resource to provide an effective sewage system and are able to deal with problems 
at the earliest opportunity. 
• The council has a duty to protect its residents from circumstances, which affect their 
well-being. Flooding is one such example. 
The report then proceeded to outline a series of recommendations to various actors 
involved in the governance of this issue. The recommendations directed at the council 
itself are listed below (together with the cabinet's response) at the cabinet meeting on 3rd 
November 2003. In addition specific recommendations were made to outside bodies in the 
final report. In relation to NW the forum recommended that it should: 
• Improve its relations with Hartlepool customers; 
• Ensure that in the business plan for the next five years sewage flooding is given 
priority; 
• Work on its relations with partners, particularly Hartlepool council. 
In addition the forum recommended that the government should: 
• Express levels of concern in relation to insurance for flooding victims -the council 
should write to the ODPM expressing the need for adequate and affordable 
insurance cover for householders and businesses affected by flooding. 
& Look at-creating a planning system that St!~ks to minimise the impact of increased 
and more regular flooding. 
155 
The forum's recommendations in relation to OFW AT were: 
• Include instances of external flooding as part of the data collected from water 
companies; 
• Examine targets and triggers relating to flooding; and 
• Develop a more robust method of data collection. 
Finally the forum recommended that the EA should: 
• Clarify exactly how they collect the data to define storms as 1 in 40 years and l in 
1 00 years etc. 
During discussions members suggested that a further recommendation was added to the 
report: 
• That it is recommended that no more houses are built on land in areas that have 
experienced problems with flooding and sewage until the current problems are 
resolved. 
This recommendation was duly incorporated into the final report. 
Meeting Seven 16/10103 
Given the high levels of public involvement during the scrutiny inquiry it was felt it would 
be good practice to hold a public meeting, during an evening, to disseminate the findings of 
the forum. There are no minutes from the meeting. However, I took notes during this 
meeting, which support my recollection that there was some dissatisfaction with the 
conclusions of the forum, and a lack of belief that it would lead to any tangible change in 
the situation. However, there was also support for the process and the belief that something 
wouldcfinally be done about the_ fl<!oclif!g_ ill_ the town. Despite this difference in opinion 





forum for the public to express their experiences of flooding, their views on the water 
company's and the council's services in relation to flooding, and their views on the 
conclusions and recommendations of the forum . 
. Cabinet 3/11/03 
At this meeting the final report ofthe ES&RSF was presented to the cabinet. Following a 
discussion of the contents of the report members of the cabinet proceeded to consider each 
of the forum's recommendations in relation to the council, the minutes of which are 
included below: 
Scrutiny Forum Recommendation (i) -As a matter of some urgency the council clearly 
defines its role in relation to flooding incidents. -Agreed. In response to a proposal made 
by cabinet members, that an acknowledgement should be sent to those customers who 
report faults with gullies, the director of neighbourhood services highlighted the wider 
implications for the contact centre and agreed to provide a detailed report to a future 
meeting of the cabinet. 
Scrutiny Forum Recommendation (ii) - Implement an effoctive regular gulley-cleaning 
programme - Agreed. Identifying funding in the following years budget was highlighted 
as a high priority. 
Scrutiny Forum Recommendation (iii) - Take responsibility for promoting information 
about flood prevention and the necessary action to take if flooding occurs - Agreed. In 
view of the proposal to include an article in Hartbeat66, it was considered unnecessary to 
also send a letter to every household. 
Scrutiny Forum Recommendation (iv) - To examine the development of a council 
Contingency Fund to alleviate extreme hardship in the case of flooding- During discussion 
on the implications of the recommendation a number of concerns were expressed. It was 
.. ! agr~e(j .!hlit ~Ji.1~her repo_rt" be §Ubmitted to a future meeting of the cabinet on the legalities 
66 A magazine produced by the council every month, which goes to every household in the town. 
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of the proposals. The report also should include the requirements of the Northumbrian 
Water Authority's Hardship Fund. 
Scrutiny Forum Recommendation (v)- That it is recommended that no more houses are 
built on land in areas that have experienced problems with flooding and sewage until the 
current problems are resolved- Concern was expressed regarding this recommendation. It 
was agreed that a report be submitted to the cabinet following reconsideration of the issue 
by the scrutiny forum. 
Scrutiny Forum Recommendation (vi) - To produce a more co-ordinated council 
emergency response when flooding occurs - Agreed. Cabinet noted that work was 
ongoing and received an update on the current situation67 • 
The response of cabinet here would suggest that the scrutiny inquiry had been a real 
success, and that the forum had successfully adopted (i.e. in terms of outcomes) a policy 
development role within council. Recommendations iv) and v) were the only ones not 
accepted by the cabinet. Recommendation iv), to examine the development of a council 
contingency fund perhaps took the community leadership role of the council too far by 
attempting to make the council financially responsible for an issue in which it only has 
limited responsibilities. Recommendation v) returned to scrutiny and is discussed further 
below. 
Meeting Eight 25111103 
Following the meeting of the cabinet on the 3rd November 2003 the ES&RSF was asked to 
look further at recommendation v) in relation to, 'the council looking at putting an embargo 
on all building in the affected areas.' The head of technical services attended this meeting 
and expressed a professional opinion that: 
• It was at this stage speculative to conclude that flooding problems in the town are 
caus~d or ex~erbateq by n~w or recent dev~lopment. 
67 Recommendations taken from the Cabinet minute and decision record 3/11/03. 
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e The impact of any development on a sewage or natural drainage system could be 
managed by a variety of solutions to ensure that flooding is not caused from 
predicted rainfall events. 
• A blanket statement discouraging/preventing development on any site currently 
affected by flooding could remove an opportunity to attract funding to deal with that 
flooding. The impact of each site and the technical way of handling surface water 
should be assessed on its own merits and the correct solution determined before 
development takes place. 
There were, however, no guarantees that future developments would not lead to further 
flooding. Consequently, the scrutiny forum decided to standby its original recommendation. 
The key issue here was on the burden of proof Cabinet seemed to be asking scrutiny to 
prove that the Local Plan68 would lead to further flooding. However, following a lengthy 
inquiry members of the scrutiny forum were not convinced that the proposed development 
in the Local Plan would not lead to further flooding. Scrutiny was seeking assurances that 
this would not happen, and to change its recommendations the executive or the council's 
senior officers needed to prove without doubt that the Local Plan would not lead to 
increased flooding. In a sense scrutiny was covering its back here, and courting public 
opinion because the effects of housing developments in the town on flooding had been a 
major public concern during the inquiry. It is not unreasonable that the burden of proof 
was placed on the executive, and that the cabinet should be made to make a difficult (and in 
some quarters unpopular) decision and overturn the scrutiny recommendation. 
Cabinet 15112/03 
At the meeting of the cabinet, the responsible portfolio holder for regeneration and the 
economy considered that it was important that each planning application for new 
developments in Hartlepool give due regard to the recommendations of the scrutiny forum 
and that, therefore, this information be passed on to the planning department. So whilst the 
68 i.e. in terms of proposed future land-use in the town. 
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information was noted, the recommendation as a whole was not accepted. The executive 
has different priorities from those of scrutiny. Whilst all councillors are supposed to be 
working towards the same strategic vision for the town, in practice the executive works 
much more closely towards corporate priorities. Consequently, it is not surprising that they 
would not want to see the Local Plan and the long-term development strategy for 
Hartlepool threatened by a recommendation to place new development in Hartlepool on 
hold. However, given that the forum had adopted the position that flooding of homes with 
sewage is unacceptable, the priority of the ES&RSF was to prevent further flooding to 
residents in the town, at whatever cost. The cabinet would like to see no more flooding in 
the town, but as the executive body it had to take a more balanced view and weigh this 
against other priorities. 
6.6) Discussion 
There are two levels to the governance of this issue; firstly that of the local/regional 
delivery of the public utility of water, and secondly that of the global governance of 
pollution and global warming which is harder to effect and somewhat beyond the scope of 
scrutiny's influence. Environmental issues and sustainable development are so called 
'wicked issues' which cannot be resolved by a single organisation (Stewart 2003: 12). 
Consequently, the need for partnership working is paramount. Through using scrutiny as an 
outlet for the community leadership role a response to the flooding issue could be 'worked 
out' through emergent governance arrangements at a local level. These temporary 
governance arrangements were generated through the scrutiny process and mainly involved 
councillors, council officers, NW, and members of the public. By holding NW (as the main 
service provider) and the council to account the scrutiny process extended its values into 
the wider processes of governance for this issue, whilst creating a forum for the 
development of partnership working between these bodies. 
The privatisation of public utilities in Britain can be interpreted as part of the British 
strategy to adapt to economic globalisation with a more open economy. But Ernst (1994) 
argues that the ._pri:vati~tion __ p~li~ies qf Conservative governments were the result of a 
. ---....---'- - -- ----.o--:.~ __ -::,_._ -··-- ._ ---
diverse set of economic and political objectives, ranging from ideological (rolling back the 
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state) to the pragmatic (e.g. generating additional public revenue). Despite some different 
objectives privatisation was enacted according to a more or less coherent ideological 
agenda, which involved a substantive redrawing of the boundaries between the state and the 
market (Ernst 1994:2). At the time ofprivatisation it was argued that the government failed 
to deliver and achieve productive and allocative efficiency outcomes (Ernst 1994:54). 
According to Ernst regulation is in place because the market cannot deliver efficient and 
equitable water services without some role for the state. As a result this supports Jessop's 
(2000) notion of governance as a response to state and market failure. 
The case study demonstrates that scrutiny, as a local government reform, is able to 
influence the wider processes of governance through the community leadership role, and 
the new powers of well-being (especially environmental). Through tapping into a 
grounds well of public opinion in relation to the ongoing flooding of parts of Hartlepool the 
ES&RSF gathered first hand evidence of the flooding in the town and residents views on 
the water company's and the council's services in relation to flooding. Having established 
this evidence base the scrutiny forum could then look to develop a community leadership 
role through proposing recommendations to the various responsible bodies that had 
widespread public backing. In this respect the values of openness, transparency and 
accountability became relatively influential for the governance of this issue. 
The flooding inquiry was selected largely in response to a public demand for a solution to 
the ongoing flooding problems that had beset the town for a number of years. It could be 
argued that public and media pressure around this matter led to the council, and scrutiny 
specifically, reacting to this mounting pressure by conducting an investigation into the 
issues that were causing this problem. There was a clearly observable problem in the town 
of sewage entering people's homes, and this was deemed to be unacceptable by large 
sections of the public. The council was by no means the body primarily responsible for this 
issue, but there was an initial imbalance in public perceptions over this. Consequently, the 
council as the democratically accountable body was the natural focal point for taking the 
lead on this inquiry. However, by taking on this leadership role the council was raising 
aspirations and expectations around the process, which it was not necessarily empowered to 
fulfil. 
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The aspirations for this inquiry, both within scrutiny and for the public, were relatively 
high. The council lacked an explicit flooding policy, and the head of technical services 
made it clear from the start of the inquiry that he was eager to engage with scrutiny in 
developing a policy or approach to flooding in the town. The willingness of a senior 
officer and his department to engage with the scrutiny process opened up a space for 
scrutiny to take on a policy development role and to affect change, thereby, heightening the 
engagement and aspirations of elected members. Furthermore, public aspirations for this 
inquiry were raised through the extensive public consultation throughout the process. 
Scrutiny meetings were extremely well attended by both councillors and members of the 
public. The influence of scrutiny was enhanced through providing a forum for the 
expression of public aspirations. By engaging with public opinion the scrutiny process 
combined with a powerful ally to ensure that the relevant service providers must listen to, 
or be seen to listen to, the scrutiny recommendations. This raised the expectations for the 
outcomes of the scrutiny inquiry, but also the powers of the scrutiny process to meet those 
expectations. However, scrutiny meetings attended by large numbers of the public could 
prove to be a hindrance to rigorous and systematic scrutiny in terms of limiting the 
opportunity for holding services providers to account when the volume of questions from 
the public allowed the representatives ofNW9, in particular, to 'fudge' any rigorous line of 
inquiry. A key development resulting from the aspirations and expectations generated by 
the scrutiny process is that scrutiny, and by association, the local authority, became the key 
mechanism in terms of public engagement. However the scrutiny process could not fulfil 
all the expectations placed on it because the solutions to these are the responsibility of other 
governance actors - most notably OFW AT and DEFRA, in terms of changing the level of 
service which is regarded as acceptable. The forum failed to extend its recommendations 
adequately to these bodies and as a result did not receive a response from these to its 
recommendations. 
Over the course of the inquiry it became clear that Northumbrian Water were not obliged 
to, and did not intend to, provide a service beyond protecting homes from internal flooding 
from storms not more severe_ than a one_= in ~~11ty year ?infall event. However, 
69 More effective chairing could have ensured that certain questions were responded to, rather than being 
allowed to be bypassed. 
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Northumbrian Water faced a number of 'pressures' to their flooding policy for Hartlepool, 
namely; an extreme weather event causing large-scale flooding, media interest and public 
pressure prior to the scrutiny inquiry - all of which arguably prepared the ground for the 
company to review its water provision for the town. This is the context in which the 
scrutiny inquiry began - so it is possible to argue that a policy space was being created 
prior to the scrutiny process, and to a certain extent this was in anticipation of it. 
Consequently, there was a sense of readiness on the part of Northumbrian Water to work 
with a scrutiny process tapping into the 'pressures' outlined above that could result in a 
change in policy. Indeed, Northumbrian Water acknowledged that they had moved a 
scheme to improve Hartlepool's sewage system up their list of scheduled improvements as 
a result of the scrutiny inquiry. Furthermore, the recommendation around improving co-
ordination and communications at times of flooding were broadly accepted by all partners. 
However, whilst the scrutiny process has positively influenced the type of service 
delivered, it has done so within parameters defined by the regulatory framework. Scrutiny 
struggled to engage effectively with this regulatory framework as part of the inquiry. This 
suggests a lack of ambition on the part of members and officers to influence broader 
processes of governance, plus some mismanagement of the final recommendations of the 
forum. 
Through the community leadership role, and the associated powers of well-being; 
aspirations, expectations and responsibilities are placed on scrutiny that it does not 
necessarily have the powers and resources to meet. The flooding inquiry is a good example 
of this. The onset of governance has meant that there are an increasing number of agencies 
delivering services in localities. In the case of water utilities, the operational tasks 
associated with the production of the utility has been privatised, and the responsibility for 
the provision of these services is assigned to the regulatory agency OFWAT, and the 
sponsoring government department, DEFRA (Loughlin and Scott 1997:205). However, 
one of the key recommendations of the inquiry was that: 
The Council has a duty to protect its residents from circumstances, which 
affect their well-being. Floodin![is one such example. 
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Whilst the local authority is not the primary service provider with responsibility for 
incidences of flooding in the town there are still areas in which it exercises its powers -
over which scrutiny tried to exert some influence. Given that the responsible department 
was keen to establish a flooding policy through involvement with the scrutiny process this 
case study provides a good example of the powers of local government within governance 
because the local authority was (relatively) unified behind a position. As a consequence of 
this proactive approach there was a willingness to utilise the community leadership role and 
powers of well-being as an influencer of the future organisational arrangements for a 
flooding policy. However, as has been highlighted above, the powers of local government 
constrain the impact of scrutiny recommendations to compel external partners/actors to 
follow these recommendations. 
The flooding case study puts the powers of well-being under the spotlight. What exactly do 
they mean to local authorities that have undergone the modernisation process? The 
flooding case study shows that by tapping into these powers and the community leadership 
role scrutiny can take the lead in driving the process surrounding a local governance issue. 
As we have seen real benefits emerged from the scrutiny process in relation to the council's 
and Northumbrian Water's priorities, and the development of a more co-ordinated approach 
to flooding in Hartlepool in general. It could be argued that scrutiny fulfilled a very 
important function in describing and then rationalising (as far as it could) the governance of 
flooding in the locality. 
6. 7) Conclusion 
Given the democratic legitimacy local authorities create in the local governance system the 
scrutiny process tapped into and encouraged the aspirations and expectations of the public 
in relation to flooding in Hartlepool. However, in terms of generating solutions to the 
ongoing flooding problem in Hartlepool, neither scrutiny nor the local authority was the 
body with primary responsibility for solving. Stewart (2003) argues that the community 
leadership role turns on the ability of councils to influence their partners, and for this they 
r~ql!ire lev~~· In relati~_n _to flqoding these levers are limited by the rigidity of the 
regulatory framework, which leaves little room for local flexibility. Consequently, it could 
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be argued that the powers of well-being and community leadership role create an artificial 
role for scrutiny and the local authority in the governance arena, through becoming the lead 
governance actor70 when its responsibilities are not those of a lead agency. As the main 
service provider Northumbrian Water is effectively accountable to its share holders, 
OFW AT, and Water Voice. During the scrutiny inquiry it became clear that these bodies 
are quite remote from the public generally, and also from the public's expectations. This is 
a by-product of the system of governance, in which an increasing number of agencies are 
delivering and regulating public services. The public are failing to 'keep up' with these 
developments. 
Nevertheless, the scrutiny inquiry was successful in securing local improvements to prevent 
future flooding in Hartlepool. Firstly the council made improvements to its gulley cleaning 
programme in accordance with scrutiny recommendations. In addition, the council showed 
a willingness to adopt the forum's recommendations around taking a lead on improved co-
ordination, communication and developing a flooding policy. Furthermore, Northumbrian 
Water showed an increased willingness to co-ordinate services with the council at times of 
flooding and to make improvements to the sewage system. However, there was no 
involvement from the LSP in the scrutiny inquiry, nor in the broader governance of the 
issue during the time of the scrutiny inquiry. None ofthe key governance actors (other than 
the council) sit on the LSP. It is possible that developing closer governance arrangements 
between the actors involved in this issue through the LSP may lead to further 
improvements to the sewage system and could also provide a route for issues to be raised 
about the level of protection provided to homes through the regulatory framework. 
7
° Certainly in terms of accountability. 
165 
7) Skateboarding - Case Study 
7.1) Introduction 
The skateboarding inquiry in Hartlepool was a response to growing demand for 
skateboarding facilities in the town. The development of a skate park in the Mill House 
area of the town, opened on Easter weekend 2002, responded to some of the skating 
demand in the town, but not all. Consequently, the culture and learning scrutiny forum 
(C&LSF) decided to explore skateboarding issues in the town as an in-depth scrutiny 
inquiry. This case study is structured as follows: firstly, the background to, and purpose of, 
the inquiry are outlined; secondly, the role of scrutiny in relation to the inquiry is explained; 
this is followed by a background to each of the governance actors involved in the scrutiny 
process; the next section provides an outline of the conduct of the inquiry, which includes 
information on what occurred during each of the seven meetings concerned with this issue; 
and finally the inquiry is analysed against the core research problematic. 
7 .2) Background and Purpose of the Inquiry 
The inquiry into skateboarding undertaken by the C&LSF was a response to a growing 
trend for a new type of leisure activity amongst young people in the town. According to the 
evidence presented to the forum the craze of skating/skateboarding had come and gone in 
the 1970s. However, over the last 10-15 years in-line-skating, skateboarding and BMX 
biking have all been growing in popularity, and are thought to be here to stay. Not only are 
these new kinds of activity they take place on the 'streets', the significance of which is that 
they occupy street space, can damage the infrastructure and are a highly visible form of 
activity often involving reasonably large groups of teenage boys. They also tend to occur 
in town centres because the surfaces are suitable for skating, and there are a variety of 
shapes and slopes upon which the skaters can perform tricks. Brooke (2003:14) states that, 
'for the past forty years skateboarding has rolled in and out of public consciousness .. .its 
not a sport for everyone, and that's just how skateboarders like it.' Consequently 
skate:bQardiog, a11d the ~sociated yo1.1th CJ.!lt_l:fre, ~~~~tpe_ a perceived public nuisance 
(amongst some residents) in the town as young people practiced their activity in the town 
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centre amongst shoppers and councillors, arriving and leaving the civic centre. 
Furthermore a petition of nearly 1,000 people was collected by young people about 18 
months prior to the start of the scrutiny inquiry to canvas support for the development of a 
skate park. The response of the council to this demand, both through a service department 
and the scrutiny function, is a key feature of the case study. 
The purpose of the inquiry was initially to examine the management of the Mill House 
Skate Park, and its effectiveness in reducing skateboarding in public areas. Under the remit 
of reducing skateboarding in public areas a general overview of issues surrounding 
skateboarding was pursued by the forum. A series of events also served to extend the 
original purpose of the inquiry. Firstly, a proposal for the council to enter into a partnership 
arrangement with a local business for the development of an indoor skate park refocused 
the purpose of the inquiry. Upon reaching its findings in relation to this proposal the forum 
concluded its inquiry for the remainder of the municipal year. The inquiry reopened in the 
following municipal year with many of the issues from the initial phase of the inquiry 
remaining. In addition, the issues ofthe development of a mobile skate park and (again) an 
indoor skate park became particular focuses for the purpose of the inquiry. 
7 .3) Role of Scrutiny 
The scrutiny inquiry into skateboarding fulfilled a number of the roles of scrutiny. The 
forum fulfilled a policy review role in relation to this inquiry. By undertaking this role 
members of the forum gained a understanding of the council's existing service provision in 
relation to skating in the town, against the backdrop of a general understanding of 
skateboarding as an increasingly popular leisure activity and cultural phenomenon amongst 
young people. This approach then led to a policy development role through which the 
forum largely recommended that various policies should not be developed, although there 
were some recommendations that can be seen as new policies for the council. Finally, the 
forum actively engaged in external scrutiny during this inquiry. This occurred through a 
series of referrals to the forum, which involved potential partnerships with outside bodies, 
and thtougb t~ links the fQrum establishC?d to a number of actors in the governance system 
on its own accord. 
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7 .4) Governance Actors Involved 
• HBC 
The key governance actors within the council for this inquiry were the community services 
department, the mayor, and the culture and learning scrutiny forum. At this time the mayor 
held responsibility for the issue under the remit of his portfolio, and had publicly 
committed himself to pursuing the interests of the young and improving leisure facilities 
within the town. The community services department was the responsible department for 
providing services for skateboarders. Over the course of the past few years HBC has been 
undergoing a process of considerable 'efficiency savings' and the community services 
department has been affected more than others by this process. This is because it has the 
least statutory services under its direction. Consequently, in the context of a tight local 
authority budget the community services department was working under particularly 
restricted circumstances at the time of the skateboarding inquiry. 
• Tees Valley Local Authorities 
HBC entered into discussions with the Tees Valley local authorities over the possibility of 
joint working towards the development of a mobile skate park scheme. This process was 
led by Darlington Borough Council. Lack of funding, both capital and revenue, was a 
major factor limiting the response to calls for new skateboarding facilities across the sub-
region. As a consequence there was interest across the Tees Valley to explore, where they 
arise, new funding opportunities, and, where resources are tight, to work collaboratively 
towards common aims. One such opportunity was the Community Young People's Play 
Scheme. This comes under the New Opportunities Fund (see below). 
• Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) 
Tne NRF is part of-the government's Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (NRU) and aims to 
enable England's 88 most deprived authorities, in collaboration with their LSPs to improve 
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services, amongst other things. A key aim behind this process is to encourage local 
authorities to reallocate resources in their mainstream budgets to tackle deprivation better. 
NRF is a targeted grant that can be spent in any way that will tackle deprivation in the most 
deprived neighbourhoods. The grant is based on time-limited funding to facilitate more 
effective long-term targeting of mainstream funding. An NRF grant was used prior to the 
scrutiny inquiry for the development of the Mill House skate park. 
• The New Opportunities Fund (NOF) 
The NOF is an organisation responsible for distributing National Lottery funding to 'good 
cause' schemes to communities across the country. Community Young People's Play 
Scheme is one element of the NOF's Playing Fields and Green Spaces Programme, which 
is managed by Sport England. £90,000 was allocated to the Tees Valley from this scheme, 
for the targeted and innovative development of a small number of projects that demonstrate 
good practice for children's and young people's community play. Recognising the 
limitations of the grant funding available, Tees Valley local authorities chiefleisure officers 
agreed to the principles of a collaborative project, involving the development of a mobile 
skate park, to be led by Darlington Borough Council. 
• Hartlepool Community Network 
Hartlepool Community Network is the name given to the town's Community Empowerment 
Network (CEN). In order to achieve effective community and voluntary sector 
involvement within the Hartlepool Partnership, an effective and inclusive Community 
Network is vital. This means bringing together community and voluntary groups and 
organisations. Government has provided assistance through the Community Empowerment 
Fund (CEF) to help achieve this. CEF funds a number of community development workers 
to operate throughout the town. Their role is to support members of the public, residents 
associations and community/voluntary sector involvement with the Hartlepool Partnership. 
The Community Network is one of the key partnerships in the LSPs Strengthening 
Communities theme partnership. 
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The input of Hartlepool Community Network in the inquiry was to bring members of the 
Hartlepool Skateboarding Association (HSBA) into the scrutiny process, and to attempt to 
further their agenda through this process. The development of further skateboarding 
provision in the town was an issue that the network was pursuing at the time of the scrutiny 
inquiry. The scrutiny forum welcomed their involvement in, and input to, the inquiry, 
which provided an additional thread of evidence for the forum to consider and draw on. 
• Private Businesses 
During the course of the inquiry the scrutiny forum engaged with a number of private 
businesses over the possibility of entering into partnership arrangements for the provision 
of a variety of skate parks. The first private business involved in the scrutiny process was 
the Trans Pennine Group who wanted to use a grant from the council to fund the purchase 
of skate ramps to go into a proposed indoor skate park on the outskirts of the town. The 
findings of the forum in relation to this are outlined in meeting three below. During the 
later stages of the inquiry two further businesses were involved in the scrutiny process. The 
scrutiny forum was seeking to explore examples of skateboarding provision within the sub-
region. Through this process the possibility of entering into partnership arrangements with 
these bodies was explored. 
7.5) Conduct of the Inquiry 
Meeting One: I1h September 2002 
At its meeting on 16th July 2002, the C&LSF expressed a wish to, 'examine issues 
surrounding skateboarding activities within the town.' This was in response to growing 
public demand for something to be done for or about the skateboarders in the town. This 
item was subsequently approved by the scrutiny co-ordinating committee as a topic for the 
work programme of the C&LSF. 
-~The purpo!)e o[!h_is 111~eting_ w~ to seek guidance from members on how skateboarding 
issues should be examined, in particular how to access public views on the issue. After an 
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initial briefing on the development of the Mill House skate park and other skateboarding 
issues members discussed approaches to the inquiry and made a number of observations 
about skateboarding issues in the borough. The forum subsequently agreed to pursue the 
following issues during its inquiry: 
• Site visit to the Mill House skate park 
• Visits to other skate parks in the sub-region. 
• Discussions with a variety of stakeholders, including skate park users. 
Council Meeting: 11h October 2002 
At this meeting of the council the mayor presented a report from the executive requesting 
the use of £35,000 of the council's reserves to be issued to the Trans Pennine Group to 
facilitate the development of an indoor skate park on the outskirts of the town, at a 
development called 'Jesters'. The executive needed to receive council's approval for the 
use ofthe reserves because it fell outside of the budget and policy framework. The chair of 
the C&LSF indicated that his forum were already holding an inquiry into skateboarding 
activities, and consequently, the issue of the use of reserves was referred to scrutiny, with 
the request that its findings were reported back to council by the 21st November 2002. 
Meeting Two: 5th November 2002 
Following the referral from council this meeting now had a dual purpose. Firstly 
background information was provided to the forum about skateboarding and on the 
development of the Mill House skate park, in line with the original remit of the inquiry. 
Secondly, following the referral from council, the details of the proposed agreement 
between the Trans Pennine Group and the council were provided for discussion. 
Members of the forum were briefed on the growing demand for skateboarding facilities 
(especially indoor venues) in the town. Skateboarders, in-line skaters and BMX bikers 
used the~street-fumiture to practice and play on. Consequently, during 2000 and the early 
part of 2001 requests from young people, residents and councillors were made to the 
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council's community services department to consider some sort of provision for 
skateboarders. However, there were no resources available in the department's budget to 
meet this demand. As a result the council had sought funding by making bids to a number 
of agencies and pools of funding. The result of this process had been a £60,000 grant from 
the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) to be spent in 2001/2 financial year. This placed 
tight timescales on the council and the community services department in particular, who 
sought to develop a facility working closely with a group of young skaters. The result of 
this was the development of the Mill House skate park. 
The benefits and limitations of the Mill House site were discussed by the forum. It was 
established that this had not satisfied the demand for skateboarding in the town, but it was 
never the intention that it would do so. The Mill House skate park had been intended as a 
start towards meeting the high levels of demand for this activity. The site had the 
advantages of being on council owned land, away from houses, close to the town centre, 
and in an NRF area. Furthermore, the council was able to use the NRF money within the 
allotted timescales and incorporate young people's views on the layout and design of the 
park into its plan. However, it is a small outdoor facility with no supervision 71 , when many 
skateboarders were looking for a more challenging indoor park. 
Accordingly the mayor72 was keen to explore opportunities for developing new skating 
facilities, which led him to exploratory discussions with Trans Pennine Group about the 
Jesters facility. Jesters is a large industrial unit that would easily accommodate a skate 
park, a refreshments area, equipment shop and terraced seating. However, the cost of 
manufacturing the skate ramps were deemed prohibitive to the company. Consequently, 
the possibility of the council funding the provision of the ramps was discussed. In return 
the council would retain ownership of the ramps for five years, and get free skating sessions 
for Hartlepool residents at selected times (largely 'off-peak'). The forum discussed this 
matter but reserved forming an opinion until they had visited Jesters. 
71 lt is sitUated' in a relatively deprived part oftown with high levels of crime that has caused some problems 
for some of the young skaters. 
72 At this time the mayor was newly elected and his portfolio covered leisure/community services and young 
people, which were areas he was interested in developing. This is explored further in section 7.6. 
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Meeting Three: Il'h & I 8"' November 2002 
At this meeting members of the forum visited the proposed site for an indoor skating park 
at Jesters in Seaton Carew (a small former seaside resort, adjoining the town, and within the 
boundaries of the local authority). They also visited the existing outdoor skate park in Mill 
House. During the main part of the meeting the issue of whether to pay a company public 
money to allow them to buy equipment in exchange for the development of this 
facility/service in the town was contested in the forum. Some members felt that if there 
was such a high level of demand for skating a private company should be able to obtain a 
loan from a bank, rather than requesting public money. Others saw the development of this 
kind of facility in the town, in which the company would provide free sessions for the 
town's residents and the council would retain ownership of the equipment for five years, as 
a reasonable return on the grant. A key consideration in relation to these discussions was 
that the council had no way of financing the development of an indoor skating site from its 
own resources based on current financial planning73• 
During the meeting the forum reacted to a recent article in the local paper concerning 
allegations that the owner of the company had failed to pay rates to the council in the past. 
The council's chief accountant indicated that more work was required in the appraisal 
process to assess the company's viability for the use of £35,000 of the council's reserves, 
and that further information would be provided on this. Consequently, the meeting was 
adjourned. 
The meeting of the Forum was reconvened on the 18th November 2002. It was established 
that the owner of Trans Pennine Group had managed four companies that had all operated 
for less than two years. Furthermore, these companies managed by the owner of Trans 
Pennine Group owed the council approximately £60,000 in rates. Consequently, the forum 
recommended that the council withdraw the proposal to provide a grant to this company 
from the council's reserves. The recommendation was largely based on the financial record 
of the manager ofthe company; it was argued there was no guarantee that the Jester's skate 
P.llf~ wou!d continue to ORerate based on the tr~ck record of previous businesses under the 
73 The notion of reprioritising the council's finances to construct its own skate park was explored later in the 
inquiry. 
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management of the company. During the meeting some issues in relation to the broader 
remit of the inquiry were highlighted including that the site was located out of town, which 
posed a problem for young people to reach it, especially those from poorer families. In 
addition some members of the forum were unconvinced that the proposed development of 
an indoor skate park would dramatically reduce the level of street skating. 
Council Meeting: 2 r1 November 2002 
At this meeting the council supported the recommendation of the C&LSF that £35,000 of 
the council's reserves should not be allocated to the Trans Pennine Group. 
Meeting Four: 121h August 2003 
The skateboarding inquiry reopened close to the start of the next municipal year. At this 
meeting the inquiry was thoroughly re-scoped. A background to the issue was provided, 
along similar lines to the information provided in the previous year, but with a more 
explicit focus on the youth culture surrounding skateboarding. The following terms of 
reference were approved by the forum at this meeting: 
• To examine the nature, extent and impact of skateboarding in Hartlepool. 
• To look at current skateboarding provision - does it meet needs? Is it sufficiently 
resourced? 
• How might any further need be met? 
• To estimate where possible the costs incurred by the council and other relevant 
agencies in dealing with these issues. 
• To make recommendations for appropriate action by the council and other agencies. 
During discussions between members of the forum a distinction was made between the two 
basic types of skateboarding i.e. street scene and extreme. The former basically involves 
skateboarding on the streets, incorporating the built up environment into the activity, whilst 
the latter requires the-more specialist" ramps and equipment that a{"e provided in skate parks. 
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Officers emphasised that it should not be assumed that if more skate parks were built then 
street skating would cease. 
The forum was informed that the Tees Valley authorities were in the process of exploring 
the possibility of entering into a partnership for the provision of a mobile skate park. There 
were ongoing discussions amongst partner authorities about the potential to utilise New 
Opportunities Funding (NOF) for the development of this park. Outlined below are the 
initial views of the forum in relation to entering into a partnership arrangement for a mobile 
skate park: 
Pros: 
• It was versatile 
• It might be used both indoors and outdoors 
• It could be placed around the Borough at a variety of sites 
Cons: 
• There was a large population on Teesside to share this facility with 
• If there was only one mobile skate park provided then each Borough would have 
very limited use. 
• How would young people be notified where the facility was going to be and 
when? This might be overcome by a regular timetable. 
Costs: 
• Employment costs 
• Members wanted to ensure that the benefits of this park would outweigh the costs. 
Meeting Five: 19'h August 2003 
At this meeting the forum focused on the proposal for the development of the mobile skate 
park. An officer from Darlington Council attended the meeting and presented a report on 
the proposed mobile skate park. The concept of the project was outlined and included: a 
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doorstep service or centrally located provision; a targeted resource at the disposal of Tees 
Valley partners; an initiative which tests boundaries; and an approach which balances the 
risks of a fad style activity. The costs ofthe project were estimated at between £6,000 and 
£10,000 p.a. assuming all five of the Tees Valley authorities participated. In return local 
authorities were getting a flexible service for ten weeks a year. Stage 2 submission to the 
NOF was required by 1st September and Darlington as the lead authority was developing a 
business plan. A commitment or withdrawal from the scheme was requested before the 
Stage 2 submission was made. Hartlepool could respond indicating that it is not committed 
at this stage but this would compromise the business plan and may jeopardise the scheme 
for other Tees Valley authorities. It was agreed that members of the forum would visit a 
mobile skate park owned by Sedgefield Borough Council to inform them of how a similar 
facility was operating. 
Meeting Six: 16'h September 2003 
The purpose of this meeting was to form a response to the issue of the mobile skate park. 
Members of the forum agreed that a response would be provided to Darlington council in 
relation to this by the end of September74• In order to do this a response to the mayor's 
portfolio meeting on the 25th September was required. 
Following a site visit to Sedgefield's mobile skate park on 27th August the director of 
community services brought a report to the forum summarising the findings from the visit, 
which was discussed in the meeting. The following issues arose: 
• The mobile skate park that the forum visited was of interest primarily to beginners 
rather than intermediates or advanced skateboarders. Consequently there was some 
concern that mobile skate parks would not cater for all needs across the town. 75 
• There were logistical problems associated with coordinating the scheme around the 
Tees Valley area. 
14 This represents a 'slippage! from the timetable outlined'-by IJilflington Council at the previous scrutiny 
meeting. However, the original date provided to the forum represented a very tight turnaround time for the 
authority to sign up to this scheme. 
15 This was borne out by local skaters attending the meeting of the forum. 
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• If any of the five local authorities were to withdraw from the scheme there would be 
increased availability to the remaining authorities but costs to each would rise in 
accordance with this. 
• The length of time taken for setting up the mobile skate park was a concern (about 1 
Y2 hours with four members of staff in Sedgefield- the Tees Valley scheme had 
been costed with two members of staff, consequently set-up time would be longer). 
• Many residents might be in favour of a mobile skate park so long as it was not in 
their area. 
Additional information in the form of a survey of 47 young people's views in relation to 
further provision for skating in the town was tabled at the meeting by the director of 
community services. Only 7% of those questioned wanted a mobile skate park, 39% 
thought the Mill House skate park should be improved, and 39% thought other skate parks 
should be built around the town. The remaining 15% had other ideas for what the council's 
priority should be in relation to skating. 
One issue that was of concern to members and was also identified by skateboarders was the 
supervision of the existing skate park. The cost of supervision has been estimated as 
follows: 
• £17,000 for 2 x Youth Workers- spring bank holiday and summer 6 weeks. 
• £50,000 for 2 x Youth Workers - Easter holidays to October half-term (this 
provides for early evening and weekends in school terms and full time in holidays). 
Members of Hartlepool Skateboarding Association (HSBA) attended the meeting, 
supported by Hartlepool Community Network, and tabled a brief report on young people's 
views on skateboarding. Members of the HSBA present at the meeting indicated that they 
were not in favour of a mobile skate park. 
The C&LSF's recommendation to the' mayor was to advise -hot to proceed further withe a-
mobile skate park. The recommendation of the forum was unanimous. At his portfolio 
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meeting on 25th September the mayor concurred with these views and decided not to 
participate, although the option of hiring the facility for one-off events was identified as a 
possibility in the future. 
Site Visits: 26'h September 2003 
On the 26th September members of the forum and some skaters visited two indoor skate 
parks in the sub-region in Redcar and Thomaby. Both these parks provided far more 
challenging ramps for skaters to use than those available in Mill House or on the mobile 
skate park. The managers ofboth parks told members of the forum that the sub-region was 
already over-subscribed with these types of facilities. Whilst they had a vested interest in 
minimising competition within the region, it was accepted by the forum that there were 
probably already enough large indoor facilities surrounding Hartlepool. Both managers 
were interested in working in partnership with the council to provide cheap/free sessions 
for Hartlepool skaters 76. 
Meeting Seven: 141h October 2003 
The purpose of this meeting was to present the issues arising from the forums' inquiry into 
skateboarding, and for members to consider and advise the council on its future response to 
skateboarding issues. During the meeting members of the forum were presented with the 
following options: 
• Continue the Inquiry 
• Do Nothing - It was proposed that this option might be chosen by members if the 
forum felt that sufficient was already being done through the existing skateboarding 
facilities in the town. Alternatively, the forum might choose this option if members 
concluded that there was a need to do more, but weighed against other council 
priorities, it was not thought to be a priority. 
76 This is explored further in meeting seven. 
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• Improve Mill House - the results of a questionnaire of local skaters found that 
34% of the 71 respondents77 felt that this was a priority. Areas for improvement 
included supervision (50%), making the site bigger (38%), and the most popular 
suggestions made were for better equipment (62%). 
• Develop more Outdoor Sites - sites such as this would replicate the availability of 
the existing Mill House site, in terms of being used mainly during spring and 
summer. There was also the additional consideration of supervision costs for 
outdoor sites. 
• Collaborate with an Existing Indoor Site - on the 26th September members of the 
forum visited indoor skate parks in Redcar and Thomaby. Managers ofboth parks 
were keen to enter into partnership arrangements with the council. The park in 
Thomaby offered the council the opportunity of entering a collaboration offering 
free sessions in exchange for a subsidy. Based on 5 Authorities sharing, this would 
cost £600 per week for Hartlepool or £31,200 per year. The Redcar facility was 
interested in pursuing a similar arrangement but had not developed a financial plan 
for this as yet. The skaters attending the site visit preferred the Redcar park, but this 
was located nearly twice as far away from Hartlepool as the Thomaby facility. 
• Develop an Indoor Site in Hartlepool - This would undoubtedly be the first 
choice for many skateboarders/in liners and BMXers in Hartlepool. The council's 
role in an indoor facility could either be as a facilitator, as a partner or as an 
operator. The two main difficulties with this would be cost and competition. 
Figures from Thomaby indicate that the cost may be in the region of £156,000 per 
year. Any Hartlepool facility would be competing for users throughout the area. 
Some members raised, at a previous meeting, the possibility of Hartlepool 
becoming a flagship for extreme sports and to market part of its regeneration drive 
around this concept. This indeed would be an exciting prospect for many young 
people, but would require considerable commitment from the council to achieve. 
• Focus on Sports Development Aspects - The above options are largely facility 
driven. A different approach would be to focus on the individual and their needs, 
utilising existing facilities and targeting resources at personal development. This 
could be-achieved through, for example, visiting professionals demonstrating jumps 
71 This had increased from 47 at the time of the previous meeting. 
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and tricks. They could also be involved in training and mentoring programmes. Or, 
groups such as the HSBA could be further encouraged and assisted in their 
development, to the point where they could apply for grants for new equipment, 
supervision or other measures. 
The forum was asked to consider whether: 
(i) There is a need to further improve in line/skating!BMX provision in the 
town and, if so, is it a council priority to respond to this? 
(ii) If it is a council priority to respond, there will be resource implications. Is 
the priority to improve existing outdoor sites, explore indoor options, 
focus on sports development or all three? 
The forum agreed the following recommendations to the mayor and cabinet: 
(i) Short Term 
In the short term it was recommended that Mill House be looked at in terms of 
improvement with priorities on supervision. There should be consultation with 
local residents as part of this process. 
The Hartlepool Skateboard Association should be encouraged and supported where 
possible. 
(ii) Longer Term 
In the longer term the recommendation was that subject to resources, that 
development of the sport with grants, scholarships and competitions etc should be 
pursued. 
lll Cld<litign it was recognised that_ there was ~need for SOf!le reasonably decent facility, 
preferably indoors, for young people to pursue their sporting interests. 
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Having checked the cabinet's minutes and agenda for over a year following the C&LSF 
agreeing its final report, I have found no record of this decision going to cabinet. In my 
role as an insider researcher I would not normally attend cabinet for a matter such as this. 
However, the fact that it only came to my attention when writing up the case study suggests 
that the tracking of decisions within scrutiny officer support was somewhat lacking at the 
time of this inquiry. There are a number of factors that could have contributed to this 
including; under staffing of scrutiny, staff illness, and a lack of ambition about the 
executive implementing scrutiny's recommendations. However, it is unacceptable for 
scrutiny recommendations not to be presented to the decision making body78, and this 
further undermines non-executive councillors faith in the new political management 
structures. Scrutiny is, also, intended to be a member-led process, so members of the forum 
must also accept some responsibility for not chasing up the recommendations they made to 
the executive, during the final phase of the inquiry. 
7 .6) Discussion 
Understanding the challenge of governing today requires a recognition that decision-
making has multiple locations, both spatial and sectoral, and is driven by a complex 
interplay between these (Stoker 2004: 153). Stoker argues that by pursuing partnerships 
New Labour has embraced governance. The skateboarding inquiry clearly demonstrates the 
local authority operating in a governance context in this respect, which in tum demonstrates 
the links the government has attempted to encourage through the modernisation agenda to 
governing in governance. As the government argued in Modern Local Government: In 
Touch with the People: 
Successful council's priorities are to lead their local communities. They organise 
and support partnerships to develop a vision for their locality, and to contribute 
to achieving it ... They involve and respond to local people and local interests. 
Their relationship with local business and other interests is strong and 
effective ... IUs. tbese counc!l~. ifl partnership_ with Govern_m!!nt and others~ w_hich 
78 Ultimately, the scrutiny manager (at the time) must take responsibility for this. 
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are able to make real improvements to the quality of people 's lives. (DETR 
1998:12) 
The skateboarding inquiry 'ticks' a lot of these boxes in terms of the way the local authority 
and scrutiny approached the issue of skating in the town. Through scrutiny the council 
sought to involve and respond to local people and their interests, and the council (through 
the mayor, scrutiny and officers) built up relationships with business and other interests 
(i.e. neighbouring local authorities). However, in practice there were a number of 
imperfections in the system, which made the potential to make real improvements to the 
quality of people's lives somewhat harder to achieve. By this I mean that the partnership 
arrangements on offer to the local authority did not provide a sufficiently enticing outlet for 
the council to extend its skateboarding service provision, when measured against the 
council's other priorities and overall vision. Nevertheless this case study demonstrates the 
importance of local authorities seeking to develop partnership arrangements for delivering 
services and responding to increasingly complex public demands. 
The skateboarding inquiry began at the start of the 2002/2003 municipal year in response to 
growing public interest in skateboarding activities that were increasing around the town. In 
addition a skate park had recently opened in the town. The interest in skateboarding was 
twofold i.e. some sections of the community thought that street skaters were a nuisance, 
and in addition further provision was required for skaters in the town. These two strands 
are not unrelated, but neither are they causally linked. Some people wanted to see an end to 
skateboarding on the streets but were not in favour of further service provision for skaters. 
Whilst, other people wanted further provision for skateboarders but did not expect an end to 
street skating. Councillors in the C&LSF were clearly responding to their community 
leadership role here by responding to an issue of public concern. 
Once the scrutiny inquiry was underway the forum had to refocus its attention twice as a 
result of referrals from within the authority. Firstly, the issue of whether to confer £35,000 
ofthe council's reserves on a private company was referred to scrutiny. The impact of this 
onthe ongoing scrutiny_inquiryJiltQ sk~te!>Ql1!4if!gc~¥ g~!le si~ificant because the initial 
process was overtaken, and largely left behind, as the reserves issue became the focus of 
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the inquiry. Secondly, once the inquiry had reopened in the following municipal year 
another referral, this time about the proposed development of a Tees Valley mobile skate 
park, disrupted the scrutiny process. Nevertheless, the referrals suggest that senior officers 
and the executive were eager to work with scrutiny in relation to this issue. However, 
paradoxically, these referrals distracted from the original policy development role the 
scrutiny forum had scoped for itself. The tight timescales that the scrutiny process worked 
within reflect the pressures of acting within a system of governance that means that local 
authorities cannot act in isolation of broader pressures and timetables. In certain respects 
the scrutiny process here was reflective of the governance system. Through reacting to 
events and opportunities in a short-term fashion, there was little opportunity for the scrutiny 
process or the council to take a step back and develop a holistic policy. 
The drivers for the modernisation of local government are represented here through the 
need to join up responses to issues around skateboarding in the governance system so as to 
be able to achieve a more positive impact for the local community. The enhanced role of 
local governance is reflected here in the two basic arguments Perri 6 et al (2002:34-45) cite 
for joining-up the complexities of governance. These are; firstly, complex challenges 
require input from a variety of sources to be met, and secondly, joined-up problems rarely 
follow the bureaucratic demarcations of government. This is demonstrated through the 
skateboarding inquiry in that, firstly, the local authority alone did not have the resources to 
respond to this issue, and therefore was involved in partnerships, and discussions about 
partnerships, with a variety of sources. These include neighbouring local authorities, 
specific grants such as the NRF and NOF, and proposed partnership arrangements with 
local businesses. Secondly, the variety of sources seeking, or being sought by, the local 
authority for partnerships in response to the emerging youth culture of skateboarding 
suggests that a more diverse social culture is emerging, in which there are more complex 
leisure activity requirements for the local authority to fulfil, and also a variety of (potential) 
partners who are keen to enter into this area. 
Through approaching the inquiry in an in-depth investigative fashion, the scrutiny process 
held external_partn~rs !O accou~t in_ relation to this is~ue as evidence was gathered. The 
most notable example of this was the Trans Pennine Groups' failure to pay rates. However, 
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whether this would have come to the attention of the C&LSF without an article appearing 
in the local paper is debatable. Furthermore, during the latter stages of the inquiry the 
forum made links to the Hartlepool Community Network and the HSBA, who usefully 
informed the scrutiny inquiry further. Generally, therefore, the role of scrutiny to bring 
openness, transparency and accountability to the wider processes of governance was 
fulfilled in relation to this issue, in terms of mapping the horizontal (local) processes of 
governance. 
However, scrutiny was less successful in extending its values to the vertical governance 
arrangements for this issue than for horizontal governance arrangements. The role of 
central government grants, such as the NRF and NOF, proved to be a subtext to the inquiry 
that was drawn on only to a limited extent by the forum. Wilson and Game (2002: 192) 
note that specific grants must be spent on specified projects or services, and these have 
steadily grown as a proportion of central government's contribution to local government 
funding. They argue that these forms of grants provide central government with greater 
control over local authorities' actions in comparison with central grants. The effect of what 
one councillor imaginatively called 'funny monies' was not an explicit focus of the inquiry, 
and yet the allocation of a specific grant from the NRF provided the council with am 
opportunity to develop limited and imperfect skate park provision that skewed much of the 
debate over future provision i.e. the town has one skate park as a result of NRF funding, 
which has not resolved the issue the council was responding to through the use of this 
funding. Furthermore, during the inquiry the allocation of an NOF grant was discussed by 
the forum for the development of a joint mobile skate park across the sub-region. The 
forum decided that the council should not pursue this option. It is interesting to note, 
however, that the council may have been able to use the combined money from these two 
grants in a more holistic fashion if they had been allocated in a less specified and time 
limited manner. However, the forum did not pursue the impact ofthe allocation ofspecified 
grants on skating provision within the town. This may be because members of the forum 
felt there was little that could be achieved in scrutinising the allocation of these grants, and 
because cash-strapped local authorities are unlikely to tum down any/many types of 
funding. 
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The skateboarding inquiry is an example of the flexible nature of the scrutiny process being 
able to seek out and make connections with public aspirations in relation to skateboarding 
issues. The C&LSF tapped into the growing momentum created by public opinion, and 
became the council's outlet for responding to the concerns raised by the public. The 
C&LSF benefited from having the ear of the executive, and the mayor79 in particular, 
during the scrutiny process. This is demonstrated through the acceptance of some of 
scrutiny's early recommendations by the executive. The powers and resources of scrutiny 
to fulfil the expectations of those involved in the scrutiny process were certainly enhanced 
through the close links to the executive in relation to this issue. However, the extent to 
which some members of the forum wanted to fulfil the expectations around skateboarding 
was questionable. For example, the then chair of the forum commented during a site visit, 
'we must be seen to listen to all the evidence, and then say no,' in relation to proposals for 
an indoor skate park. However despite this somewhat prejudicial approach there were 
sound arguments against accepting any of the partnership arrangements on offer to the 
council, namely that there was not deemed to be sufficient demand for skateboarding for 
the council to seek to develop these and the partnerships on offer did not represent value for 
money. So whilst scrutiny engaged reasonably effectively with interested parties in relation 
to this issue, the constraints of local government funding, and the complexities of entering 
into the partnership arrangements on offer, meant the potential for scrutiny to add value to 
this issue in terms altering the council's service provision was limited from the outset. 
However, scrutiny could be said to have contributed to evidence-based non-decision 
making. During the initial phase of the inquiry the recommendation that the council did not 
allocate its reserves to the Trans Pennine Group was accepted. Secondly, the 
recommendation of the forum to the mayor's portfolio that the proposed partnership 
arrangements for a Tees Valley mobile skate park should not be pursued, was also accepted 
by the mayor. The recommendations from the final report of the inquiry were not reported 
to the executive. It could be argued that the recommendations were 'loose' commitments 
to enhance the development of skating in the town. Recommending that improvements 
need to be looked at is far too open ended an approach for ensuring that the executive and 
officers wjll hi!,ve to foll<?w the recommendations of scrutiny or justify why they are not. 
79 From his commitment to youth and leisure issues in the town. 
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The lack of formal powers for scrutiny means that recommendations need to be worded 
very carefully. However, the fact that there is no record of these recommendations going to 
cabinet up to a year after scrutiny concluded its inquiry is a significant weakness of this 
inquiry, which should be overcome through a more robust and systematic approach to 
tracking recommendations and monitoring decisions and their implementation. 
7. 7) Conclusion 
Scrutiny exerted a fairly strong influence over determining the outcomes of local 
governance in relation to skateboarding in Hartlepool. As a result of the skateboarding 
inquiry members remained unconvinced as to whether further leisure service provision, in 
relation to this issue, would seriously reduce the numbers of street skaters. Having 
explored the various partnership arrangements on offer the forum chose to offer a loose 
recommendation of potential future support to skateboarders, rather than recommending 
significant changes to the council's leisure service provision. As has been discussed earlier 
the links between scrutiny and the mayor for this case study topic were good, consequently 
the recommendations of scrutiny were generally accepted. The local authority can be seen 
as the key actor in the governance system for this issue. This is because all the proposed 
developments for skating required the local authority as a partner. The local authority may 
not have been able to deliver this service alone, but nor could the partner organisations. 
Indeed this case study reflects the importance of local authorities in localities to businesses 
and communities. Given the importance of the council in relation to this issue and the 
strong position of scrutiny within the council, it can be argued that the influence of scrutiny 
was strong within the governance system. 
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8) HEALTH INEQUALITIES INQUIRY 
8.1 Introduction 
The health inequalities case study has a notable relationship to the core research 
problematic of this thesis, namely of the possibilities and limitations of local government 
scrutiny within the local governance system. The Health and Social Care Act 200 1 
introduced new powers80 for Overview and Scrutiny Committees (OSCs) in relation to the 
NHS and NHS bodies. As a result the health scrutiny function creates a unique position for 
local authorities in the governance system because of the more formalised external scrutiny 
role these powers create. Consequently, this case study explores the implementation of a 
theoretically significant development of the local government modernisation agenda and 
scrutiny function, in relation to the governance system. 
This case study is concerned with the extent to which the first in-depth scrutiny inquiry, to 
take place in Hartlepool under the new health scrutiny powers, succeeded in this new 
governance role. The first section of the case study focuses on the background to, and 
purpose of, the inquiry. The role ofthe scrutiny exercise will then be explored against the 
five roles that scrutiny is commonly held to undertake, and some new roles for scrutiny in 
the governance of health are suggested. This will be followed by an examination of the 
governance actors involved in the inquiry and an overview of the conduct of the inquiry. 
Finally the findings from the scrutiny cases study will be discussed in relation to the core 
research problematic. 
8.2 Background and Purpose of the Inquiry 
The NHS Plan (2000) introduced the notion of local authority scrutiny of health by stating, 
'local authorities are an important democratically elected tier of government. As they 
modernise, they will become more effective channels for the views of local people.' Under 
the Health and Social Care Act 2001 and the Local Authority (Overview and Scrutiny 
Committees Health Scrutiny Function~) Regulations 2002, NHS bodies have opened up to a 
80 These are outlined below. 
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degree of accountability from locally elected representatives. Under the Statutory 
Instrument No. 3048 (2002:Para 2.1 ), 'an overview and scrutiny committee may review and 
scrutinise any matter relating to the planning, provision and operation of health services in 
the area of its local authority.' According to the statutory guidance an OSC may make 
reports and recommendations to local NHS bodies and to its local authority on any matter it 
has reviewed or scrutinised. An NHS body must respond in writing within 28 days to an 
OSC requesting a response. In addition local NHS bodies must consult with OSCs over 
substantial developments, or variations in the provision of services and OSCs can refer 
these matters to the Secretary of State if they feel it is necessary (Statutory Instrument 2002 
No. 3048). Consequently, the new power of health scrutiny will, according to the 
Department of Health (2003b:39), 'enable councillors to scrutinise how local needs are 
being addressed, how health services are run and how they can be improved. It also 
provides an opportunity for local councillors to offer practical solutions or ways forward.' 
This provides scrutiny with a broad remit to scrutinise the NHS, although there has been no 
additional direct resourcing from central government to fulfil this role. 
According to the Government's consultation on the draft regulations for the health scrutiny 
function, the focus of scrutiny should be on health improvement in the widest sense, 
building on the powers of local authorities to promote social, environmental and economic 
well-being (Department of Health 2003a). The consultation exercise stresses further the 
role of scrutiny in scrutinising the local health system or economy rather than just the 
services provided, commissioned or managed by the NHS. Consequently a local 
authority's power to scrutinise health should be seen in the context of their role in 
community leadership and local partnership (Ibid). However, the extent to which these 
roles are fully understood by the majority of councillors is questionable, and is a theme that 
shall be returned to later in the chapter. 
The role of OSCs is not to become experts, but to ask challenging questions as elected lay 
representatives of their communities (Department of Health 2003a). The government's 
consultation around health scrutiny moves on to stress that early scrutiny reviews should 
fo~us on topics th@.t are not t~chnically complex but wjll sujt a developmental approach. 
However, the guidance also suggests a general role for scrutiny in the local health 
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economy, consequently in Hartlepool there was some confusion about the best way to 
approach health scrutiny in its early stages. 
The health inequalities topic was chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, Hartlepool is a 
town with considerable economic deprivation and poor health outcomes, as a result the 
issue of health inequalities was particularly salient. Secondly, the government has an active 
health inequalities agenda that given the deprivation in Hartlepool is particularly relevant to 
the town. Thirdly, given the relevance of the topic locally, and the cross-cutting nature of 
the issue, it was felt that it would provide a good introduction to the health service and 
partnership working in relation to a key health issue, and consequently the inquiry would 
provide an overarching introduction for health scrutiny. Part of the initial purpose of the 
inquiry was to familiarise councillors with the workings of the health service, and as a 
result a learning and development role was stressed from the outset of the inquiry. 
Background to Health Inequalities 
The health inequalities inquiry is distinctive amongst the scrutiny case studies because the 
governance issue is situated within a far more developed policy framework than any of the 
other issues. Much of the health inequalities debate in the UK can be traced back to the 
Black Report (1980) on Inequalities in Health, which was commissioned by the Callaghan 
government, and largely suppressed by successive Conservative governments. As Wistow 
(200 1 :339) argues, 'the first two Thatcher administrations failed to acknowledge 
relationships between individual health and factors in the economic, social and physical 
environment, not least because to do so would imply an acceptance that inequality in 
income and labour markets were associated with inequalities in health.' Sir Donald 
Acheson's (1998) Independent inquiry into inequalities in health was commissioned soon 
after the 1997 election to review and update the evidence covered by the Black Report as 
the New Labour government sought to make health inequalities a key strand of their health 
policy. The general conclusion of this report was that, 'for many aspects of health, 
inequality has generally worsened in the last few decades, especially in the 1980s and early 
1990s' (Secretary of State for H~~lth 1992_ para 4.5). 
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The Green Paper Our Healthier Nation (Secretary of State for Health 1998) and the White 
Paper Saving Lives (Secretary of State for Health 1999) promised to deliver more 
accessible and continuously improving services, while also focusing on ill-health and 
inequalities. The issue of access to care in relation to health inequalities is an important 
one, a good example ofwhich is the 'inverse care law', introduced by Taylor-Hart in 1971, 
which argues that the availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely with the 
needs of the population being served. In addition to deprivation factors, access to health 
services can relate to geography, in terms of the differing policies for specific treatments in 
different areas, which leads to criticisms of the NHS for generating a 'postcode lottery' for 
certain treatments (Baggott 2004: 194). There is a clear role here for scrutiny to pursue how 
local needs are being met, and to suggest improvements where appropriate. 
The Saving Lives White Paper (Secretary of State for Health 1999:para 1.4) indicates that 
individual behaviour is often vital to health, but stresses that, 'poor health can spring from a 
complex interaction between the genetic make-up and behaviour of individuals and social, 
economic and environmental factors in the community.' Consequently, the government 
(Ibid para 1.7) adopted an approach which involved working across government to 'attack 
the breeding ground for poor health - poverty and social exclusion.' This theme was 
developed further in the subsequent cross-cutting review on health inequalities (Department 
ofHealth 2002:2): 
Health inequalities follow a social gradient, with the health gap increasing 
steadily with poorer social class. Because of this gradient, and the distribution of 
the population in the different social groups, analysis shows that interventions 
must reach more than the most deprived areas and the most 
disadvantaged/socially excluded populations to meet the national targets and 
make progress on health inequalities more generally. (Department of Health 
2002:2). 
Much of the government's early work around health inequalities led to the Department of 
lf~al!h (2_Q9n producing Tackling_ Hea!th I'!f!_ql!_qlifies~ A Pro17amme for Action. The 
document seeks to set out plans to tackle health inequalities over three years, and 
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establishes the foundations to achieve the national public service agreement (PSA) target 
for 20 I 0 to reduce inequalities in health outcomes by 10 per cent as measured by infant 
mortality and life expectancy at birth (Department of Health 2003:3). To achieve this goal 
the government set out four themes: 
• Supporting families and mothers; 
• Engaging communities and individuals; 
• Preventing illness and providing effective treatment and care; and 
• Addressing the underlying determinants of health (Department of Health 2003: I 0). 
Working across these themes the government's has sought to encourage the creation of, 
'strong local partnerships with local authorities, health authorities, and other agencies to 
tackle the root causes of ill-health in places where people live' (Secretary of State for 
Health 1999 para 1.7). Thus, local authorities have a key role in tackling health inequalities 
which, by definition, makes the topic a legitimate one for the scrutiny of their internal 
functions. In addition, the community leadership role, with its emphasis on the well-being 
of local residents, places a clear responsibility on councils to examine the impact of health 
inequalities locally. 
8.3 Role of Scrutiny 
The health inequalities inquiry operated across three of the five roles scrutiny is commonly 
regarded to fulfil: policy development; policy review; and external scrutinl1• Under the 
remit of the inquiry (which is outlined below) the work undertaken by the forum was 
intended to draw on the policy review and external scrutiny roles, and then using the 
evidence gathered here move on to the policy development role. 
However, because the health scrutiny function grants formal powers to local authority 
overview and scrutiny committees (in an external scrutiny capacity) it is possible to move 
81 For this inquiry-there was no scrutiny of the localauthority!s executive. Since _the il!_qlliry fil.li~~d a Pll!>li~:: 
health cabinet portfolio has been created, and scrutiny is seeking to establish links with this. The creation of 
this portfolio is linked to the appointment of a joint director of public health by the PCT and HBC, which 
reflects the need for partnership working and arrangements for public health issues. 
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away from the traditional categorisation of scrutiny roles and focus more on the role of 
scrutiny in the local governance system. Consequently, given the context of the inquiry, 
explored in the background and purpose of the inquiry above, it is possible to identify five 
additional roles for health scrutiny: 
1. to scrutinise internal local authority contributions to the reduction of health 
inequalities; 
2. to scrutinise the work of local NHS bodies in addressing health inequalities; 
3. to scrutinise partnership working between local authority, NHS and other bodies 
in this field; 
4. to assess the impact of all these activities on health outcomes for local people; 
and 
5. to make recommendations to the appropriate bodies in relation to scrutiny 
findings derived from the four roles above (Wistow and Banaras 2005:37). 
8.4) Governance Actors Involved 
The key governance actors for this inquiry were: 
• Hartlepool Primary Care Trust- Around 300 Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) were 
formed in 2002. They have emerged out of the primary care groups formed in 
1999. From April2003 PCTs have directly controlled 75% of the total NHS budget 
(Department of Health 2003c:l5). According to Ham (2004:168) PCTs have three 
main functions, which are to improve the health of the community, develop primary 
and community health services, and commission secondary care services. The PCT 
has a role in improving the overall health of the populations they serve and also the 
requirement to reduce health inequalities that exist within that community 
(Hartlepool PCT 2005:5). Consequently, it was the first port of call for the scrutiny 
inquiry out of the potential health service witnesses. Representatives from the PCT 
proyided ~yid~D~~-to th_e fQr!llll atJh~ Jo:t!f"!h Jl!l_~ _ fiJ!h meetings of the_ in,quiry. The 
earlier meeting involved a general overview by the Acting Director of Public Health 
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into the incidences of inequalities in mortality from CHD and cancer in the town, 
the causes of this and some approaches to reducing inequalities in relation to these. 
The second meeting with the PCT focused more on the preventative and health 
promotion work being undertaken by the PCT and its partners locally. 
o North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Trust - in 2004 there were around 280 NHS 
trusts in England. The NHS trust in Hartlepool is responsible for acute hospital 
services. According to Ham (2004:167), 'the income of trusts derives from service 
agreements negotiated with PCTs and other commissioners and they are expected to 
deliver care to the specifications contained within these agreements.' Due to the 
inquiry being put on hold indefinitely the NHS trust was not involved in this 
scrutiny exercise. However, the forum had intended to explore the role of the trust 
in developing and improving cancer and coronary heart disease services. 
• County Durham and Tees Valley Strategic Health Authority- The creation of 
28 strategic health authorities (SHAs) in 2002 was designed to distance health 
authorities from service planning and commissioning in order to allow them to lead 
strategic development of the local health service (Ham 2004: 165). The health 
authority is responsible for creating a coherent strategic framework, performance 
managing the local NHS and ensuring appropriate development support to 
performance improvement. It provides the link between the Department of Health 
and the NHS, and between national priorities and local plans. Again, due to the 
inquiry not reaching a conclusion by the end of the municipal year this body was 
not involved in the inquiry. However, given the responsibilities of SHAs for 
developing local health strategies for health services and ensuring high-quality 
performance (Department of Health 2003c:l4), it had been proposed that the forum 
may have wished to explore the role of the SHA in linking national health 
inequality priorities to local plans and services, and also whether Hartlepool is 
receiving the correct balance between health promotion, disease prevention and 
treatment and care in the strategies it is producing. 
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• Hartlepool Borough Council - tackling health inequalities should be a priority for 
local authorities as they are expected to contribute to the public service agreement 
(PSA) to reduce inequalities in health outcomes by 10% by 2010, as measured by 
infant mortality and life expectancy at birth (Department of Health 2003b: para 5.8 
and 1.8). Furthermore, the power of local authorities to promote the well-being of 
their communities is a key role that links the health inequality agenda to local 
authorities. Indeed promoting healthier communities and tackling health 
inequalities is one of seven shared priorities agreed between central and local 
government (Department of Health 2003b:40). Furthermore, the duty on local 
authorities to prepare community strategies connects their PSA priorities and well-
being powers to partners in the local governance system. At the sixth meeting of 
the scrutiny inquiry a presentation on the role of the local authority in relation to 
this issue was provided to the forum. 
• Hartlepool Partnership - within the objectives of the community strategy for the 
LSP there is a commitment to reduce health inequalities in Hartlepool. The cross-
cutting nature of the contributory factors leading to inequalities in heart disease and 
cancer fits well with the role of the LSP in bringing services closer together to 
improve the way they are provided. Consequently it was recommended on 20th 
April 2004 that the role of Hartlepool Partnership was examined in relation to 
reducing inequalities in heart disease and cancer. This was to take place in the 
following municipal year but because the inquiry was put on hold it is uncertain 
whether this item will return to scrutiny in the foreseeable future. 
• The North East Public Health Observatory (NEPHO) - OSCs have been 
encouraged to establish links with public health observatories and use them to 
support the scrutiny process. 
During the meeting on 20th January 2004 NEPHO outlined that under Saving Lives: 
Our Healthier Nation the role of public health observatories were to: 
• Monitor health and disease trends and highlight areas of action; 
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• Identify gaps in health information; 
• Advise on methods for health and inequality impact assessment; 
• Draw together information from different sources to improve health; and 
• Carry out projects to highlight particular health issues. 
Of particular interest to this scrutiny inquiry, public health observatories are also 
concerned with: 
• Evaluating progress by local agencies in improving health and cutting 
inequality; and 
• Looking ahead to give early warning of public health problems. 
Representatives of NEPHO attended the third meeting of the inquiry. They 
identified two major causes of mortality in the town that were adopted as the focus 
of the inquiry. As external expert witnesses they proved to be an effective tool for 
scrutiny officers and members alike to call into the scrutiny process to provide 
background data and narrow the focus of the inquiry to a more manageable size. 
8.5) Conduct of the Inquiry 
The health inequalities inquiry took place across five meetings throughout the 2003/4 
municipal year, and one further meeting at the start of the 2004/5 municipal year. An 
important factor in relation to the conduct of the inquiry was that a significant number of 
meetings were 'lost' to other items coming onto the health and social care scrutiny forum's 
agenda under the new health scrutiny role82• This stretched members' and officers' 
capacity and shifted the focus away from the health inequalities inquiry at times. 
Furthermore, a critical factor in the conduct of the inquiry was that it was not completed 
during a single municipal year. This was compounded by 'all-out' elections being held at 
the end of the 2003/4 year, through which the membership of the forum changed more than 
would normally be the case. Furthermore, a new scrutiny framework was introduced for 
82 This included a closure to a GP surgery and a review of the sub-region's hospital services, which involved 
the possibility of the closure of the local hospital. 
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the start of the 2004/5 municipal year. This was the result of scrutiny officers looking to 
strengthen the scrutiny process, through increasing councillor engagement in, and 
ownership of the process, and by providing a redesigned seven stage scrutiny process for 
the conduct of inquiries. Of particular relevance to this case study was the introduction of 
an annual joint scrutiny meeting for the selection of scrutiny topics. 
Meeting One: 5/8103 
During this meeting members of the forum were presented with a number of potential 
topics to select their first in-depth scrutiny inquiry from, under the new health scrutiny 
powers. These topics had been generated during discussions at an earlier scrutiny workshop 
involving all local health partners. The list of topics included: health inequalities in 
Hartlepool, services for older people, transport to health services, access to primary health 
care, drug abuse services, and health promotion/ill health prevention. The lead scrutiny 
officer recommended that a review of health inequalities should be the first scrutiny topic 
because the government (Department of Health 2003a: 12) had identified this as one of the 
major tasks for health scrutiny bodies. In addition a review of the relevant information on 
health in Hartlepool, in relation to health inequalities, would provide the forum with a 
sound background upon which future inquiries could be based. Consequently, the forum 
agreed to pursue this scrutiny topic. 
Meeting Two: 18/11103 
The purpose of this meeting was to scope the issues around health inequalities, and to 
explore how the inquiry should be conducted. Members of the forum were provided with 
background information about the national health inequalities agenda. This included 
Department of Health evidence on life expectancy in England between 1997 and 1999. 
Life expectancy in Hartlepool was 73.2 for males (compared with the national average of 
75.2) and 78.3 for females (compared with the national average of 80.1). Consequently 
Hartlepool was ranked as 321 st for males and 328th for females out of 353 local authorities 
for lif~ ~XJ>ecj:ancy. The high level of poor health outcomes is matched by high levels of 
deprivation in Hartlepool. Nine out of the seventeen wards in the town were in the top 10% 
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of deprived wards nationally, according to the DETR' s 2000 Index of Multiple Deprivation 
(IMD) (Reilly and Eynon:2003). The remaining wards fell between 10 and 50% of the 
most deprived wards nationally. 
Following a discussion about the information presented to the forum it was recognised that 
this was a complex and cross-cutting issue that required partnerships across government, 
local government and the NHS. In the report to the forum it was stressed that the cross-
cutting nature ofthe topic would have implications for the inquiry, requiring a wide range 
of evidence from a number of bodies. Consequently, it was agreed that a more specific 
briefing into health inequalities should be provided at the next meeting, because of the size 
ofthe topic area and so that the focus of the inquiry could be narrowed down to a particular 
area of health inequalities. 
In the meantime the Forum agreed that the term 'health inequalities' should be interpreted 
as covering: 
• inequalities in patterns of disease and health outcomes; and 
• inequalities in access to health services. 
In addition the Forum agreed to pursue the inquiry using the following remit: 
• Public Health - what is the evidence about the pattern of disease and health 
outcomes across and within the town? 
• Health Services- does the level and supply of health services match the level and 
distribution of inequalities? Is there the correct balance between health promotion, 
disease prevention, and treatment and care? 
• Fair Access- do people get access to the services they need, and at the right time? 
The remit was intended to provide the forum with a progressive line of investigation 
through which to pursue the inquiry. Through organising the inquiry in line with the remit 
each of the bullet points represents a stage in the inquiry. The intention here was that by 
following this remit the forum would gain an understanding of the public health of the town 
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(in relation to a particular area of health inequalities), then scrutinise the services provided 
in relation to this, and then the forum would be able to conclude whether or not there was 
fair access to services in relation to this issue, and to make recommendations accordingly. 
Meeting Three: 20/1104 
In preparation for this meeting council officers met to discuss how to focus the inquiry. It 
was felt (by officers) that the inquiry needed to be concentrated on a particular element of 
health inequalities in the town, and given the evidence on mortality rates provided to the 
forum at the last meeting, inequalities in mortality were chosen as the theme of the inquiry. 
It was also agreed by officers that the North East Public Health Observatory (NEPHO) 
should be approached to provide evidence to the next meeting of the forum about the 
pattern of disease and health outcomes in relation to this issue. Upon meeting with 
NEPHO it became apparent that there were two major causes of mortality in Hartlepool and 
that these would be presented to the next meeting of the forum. 
At the third meeting of the inquiry representatives of NEPHO attended the meeting and 
presented more detailed information on mortality in Hartlepool. They confirmed that CHD 
and lung cancer were major causes of death in Hartlepool, causing two thirds of all deaths 
recorded in the 2001 Death Register. During discussions the links between the incidence of 
these diseases and deprivation were highlighted. Indeed, for lung cancer there was a 
marked difference in death rates between people from poor and affluent areas. Also for 
those living in deprived areas the death rate from heart disease was around twice as high as 
those living in affluent areas of Hartlepool. Furthermore, for areas of equal deprivation in 
the north and south, mortality from CHD and lung cancer was higher in the north. It was, 
therefore, agreed by the forum to narrow the focus of the inquiry to these two causes of 
mortality, and that a scoping report on these would be presented to the next meeting of the 
forum. 
Meeting Four: 1613/04 
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At this meeting a brief scoping paper was presented to the forum on the issues identified for 
further investigation at the previous meeting. The PCT's acting director of public health 
provided evidence to the forum on mortality resulting from CHD and lung cancer. He then 
highlighted the following issues during his presentation: 
• Major inequalities existed for life expectancy in 2001 throughout the country, 
which are reflected in a ten year differential between men and a seven year 
differential between women from best to worst case scenarios. 
• Hartlepool was the 18th worst PCT area in the country statistically in terms of life 
expectancy. 
• The 1999/01 Standard Mortality Rates (SMR's) for selected causes of death 
demonstrate a 23% higher death rate for cancer in Hartlepool than the average. 
• Lung cancer was generally high in Hartlepool but proved higher in women than 
men. 
Members questioned whether the statistics for Middlesbrough were similar to Hartlepool. 
It was confirmed that the figures reflected those for the north east and the causes were 
highlighted as genetic, deprivation and poor lifestyles. A member questioned the poor 
levels of recruitment and retention of doctors locally and how this was being addressed 
nationally. Members were advised that there was a national cancer plan to address those 
issues and reference was also made to the Higgins Review, the purpose of which was to 
establish a specialist cancer unit in (nearby) Stockton, which it had been argued would 
make recruitment in the sub-region easier. 
The acting director of public health indicated that the Hartlepool death rate was improving, 
although it continued to fall behind the national average by some 617 years. A member 
commented that although mortality rates were moving in the right direction they were still 
concerning and he made reference to the additional power and influence of PCT's to 
actually buy care in, and gave coronary artery bypass grafts as an example of this. The 
PCT suggested that there may be some evidence of an inverse care relationship in treatment 
for heart disease within the locality. For, eJ!:amnle_tlartleQpol has a simUar n11111ber of 
incidences of mortality through CHD as Middlesbrough but had significantly less coronary 
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artery bypass grafts. At this stage this matter was not pursued by members of the forum83• 
The acting director of public health informed members that Hartlepool PCT received 
additional funding for being in a high deprivation area, although the PCT received 2% less 
than the amount which would put Hartlepool in line with deprivation. This was viewed as a 
significant amount. Nevertheless, it was indicated that money was available to Hartlepool 
PCT for investment in new services and they were working to improve the balance between 
primary and secondary care. 
Meeting Five: 2014104 
During this meeting members of the forum were presented with information from 
representatives of Hartlepool PCT on how they plan and commission services to reduce 
health inequalities in relation to CHD and lung cancer. Given this was the last meeting of 
the municipal year a progress report on the health inequalities inquiry so far was also 
presented to the forum. 
Representatives of the PCT provided evidence to the forum highlighting that a National 
Service Framework (NSF) guides the PCT for its CHD and cancer plans. Work on these 
topics is not the sole responsibility of the PCT or the health service; progress can only be 
made through strong partnership working with a multi-agency approach. A CHD 
Prevention Steering Group was established in Hartlepool towards the end of 2002, which 
has produced a CHD Prevention Strategy. Work to reduce health inequalities is targeted at 
the most disadvantaged wards through employing health development workers using the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) and New Deal for Communities (NDC) funding. 
However, rather than questioning further the development of these governance 
arrangements members were concerned about the number of young people seen eating 
chips, and other fast foods outside of schools at lunchtime. Representatives of the PCT 
confirmed they were aware of the problem and had been encouraging catering 
establishments outside of schools to provide healthy options to children. There had been 
limited success here (a 'healthy diner' had opened in one area in the town) but determining 
the level ofresponsibilityfoq;hildr_en out~ide of schooJ ~t lu!lchtime had been problematic. 
83 Although it was noted by officers with the intention of pursuing it further later in the inquiry. 
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Through Hartlepool Exercise for Life Programme (HELP) a series of activity programmes 
are run for people with, for example, health problems related to obesity and smoking. The 
funding for this project was due to end in a year and members wanted to be reminded of the 
end of this period closer to the date. The PCTs health development leader agreed that it 
was important that the forum should be informed about this matter, although a number of 
other funding sources were being looked into as a high priority to keep this project running. 
A Smoking Cessation Service has been running for the past four years, through multi-
agency partnership working, providing drop-in clinics at a variety of locations and at a 
variety of times. The informal drop-in approach had proved to be very successful, with the 
numbers of people attending dramatically increasing, and Hartlepool was being looked as 
an example ofbest practice by other areas. 
The progress report on the health inequalities inquiry included a brief outline of the 
meetings that had taken place so far, and the key findings emerging from each of these. 
The report also included a section on the future conduct of the inquiry, in which Hartlepool 
Borough Council, Hartlepool Partnership, County Durham and Tees Valley Strategic 
Health Authority, and the North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Trust were listed as bodies to 
provide evidence to the forum at future meetings. It was agreed that gathering evidence 
from these bodies was an appropriate course of action for the inquiry. 
Meeting Six: 5/8/04 
This meeting was the second meeting of the forum in the new municipal year84 following a 
break for 'all-out' elections in June. As a consequence of the elections the membership of 
the forum had changed, with about a third of the forum's members being new, although the 
chair of the forum remained the same. During this meeting members of the forum were 
presented with an updated progress report, to remind those members of the forum who 
participated in the inquiry during the previous year of the issues arising in the inquiry thus 
far, and to brief new members on these issues. The report was noted, and it was agreed that 
the inquiry should continue. 
84 The first meeting focused on the role of the forum, and a presentation on a new scrutiny framework being 
introduced across the authority's scrutiny forums. 
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A further report on the local authority's contribution to the health inequalities agenda was 
presented to the forum. Members were presented with, and accepted; the following interim 
conclusions on the local authority's role and services: 
• Departments of the council are working together to deliver appropriate services to 
the people of Hartlepool. There is however no authority-wide policy or plan of 
action to guide health related activities. It was agreed there may be a role here for 
the new public health portfolio holder and the newly appointed joint (between the 
council and the PCT) director of public health and wellbeing. 
• The council is working in close co-operation with a range of local and national 
organisations to develop and deliver services aimed at reducing health inequalities. 
Relationships with the Hartlepool PCT appear to be particularly productive. 
• External funding from a wide range of sources has often been used to set up and run 
projects. As with other development projects, services are often set up using short 
term funding with no definite prospect of long term, mainstream funding. In some 
cases, e.g. a free swims programme, mainstream funding has been allocated. Other 
projects may rely on other organisations for long term funding which makes co-
operative working even more important. 
• Awareness of, and information about, activities and services in Hartlepool is not 
always readily available either to service providers or service users. This applies 
not only to council services but those of other bodies as well. Co-ordination of 
service planning and provision is obviously important but so too is co-ordination of 
publicity, information and access. 
The intention here was that these interim conclusions on the local authority's role could be 
taken forward and combined with the forum's views on other service providers in relation 
to this issue. The forum would then have to determine whether the various service 
providers were providing fair access in terms of the balance of services geared towards 
reducing mortality through CHD and lung cancer. Because the inquiry was not concluded 
it is-not clear whether the-remit of the inquiry would have-been successful in-achieving this. 
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2219104: Scrutiny Co-ordinating Committee 
In Hartlepool a new Scrutiny Framework was introduced at the start of the 2004/5 
municipal year. The framework was a response from scrutiny officers to a number of 
unfavourable reports (for example, from the CPA and District Auditor) and a general 
perception in the authority that the scrutiny function was not operating as it should be. 
Councillors involved in the scrutiny process continued to complain about their diminished 
role five years after scrutiny had been introduced in the authority. At the same time there 
was a lack of engagement by some members m the process, and an 
unwillingness/unsuitability to work in an in-depth, progressive, investigative and evidence 
based way (as is demonstrated by this case study, amongst other inquiries). Consequently, 
at the start of the 2004/5 municipal year the scrutiny process was relaunched through a new 
scrutiny framework. One of the purposes of this framework was to encourage increased 
councillor involvement and participation in scrutiny. A new approach to topic selection 
was introduced as a mechanism towards achieving this. Consequently, all scrutiny 
members were invited to this meeting to agree the forthcoming year's work programme 
through proposing, challenging and voting on scrutiny topics. The health inequalities 
inquiry was included in the proposals for the health and social care scrutiny forum, but a 
scrutiny inquiry into alcohol abuse amongst young people was the first choice topic. 
The choice of topic in this meeting demonstrates that the health inequalities inquiry had not 
generated much enthusiasm amongst members, within the forum, or across scrutiny 
members as a whole. However, it could also be argued that at an officer level more could 
have been done to emphasise that the health inequalities inquiry was incomplete and 
abandoning it, would effectively leave the inquiry in limbo, and make much of the work 
carried out by the forum redundant. Through the forum a process had been agreed at the 
end of the previous municipal year, identifying the work carried out to date and the work in 
need of completion, which was reinforced at the meeting on the 20th August 2004. Under 
the remit of the inquiry (agreed at meeting two) the investigation had progressed to its 
second stage and evidence had been gathered from the PCT and the council in relation to 
the services_ they provide to reduce health inequalities. Further meetings with the remaining 
governance actors with some responsibility for this issue had been identified. However, the 
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scrutiny workshop meeting to define the work programme for the 2004/5 municipal year 
meant the inquiry was effectively, and indefinitely, put on hold. Consequently, there was 
minimal policy development emerging from the inquiry. The forum did, however, 
highlight the following interim key issues to be explored further in future evidence 
gathering meetings with health partners: 
• Health inequalities are a complex and cross-cutting issue that requires partnership 
across government, local government and the NHS. 
• Health inequalities follow a social gradient, with the health gap increasing steadily 
with poorer social classes. 
• Lifestyle factors such as smoking and diet were highlighted as some of the key 
factors in causing inequalities in mortality rates for CHD and cancer. 
• Members were concerned that a major problem in the town was the shortage of 
GPs, and the long waiting lists associated with this, which deter patients from 
attending surgeries. 
• Hartlepool has a similar number of incidences of mortality through CHD as 
Middlesbrough but has significantly less coronary artery bypass grafts. 
• Hartlepool does receive additional funding for being in a high deprivation area. 
However the PCT is receiving 2% less funding than it should in line with 
deprivation. 
In terms of policy development there is little here that health partners would be unaware of, 
and the forum did not succeed in developing a policy response around these issues because 
the inquiry had not heard sufficient evidence from all the key governance actors to be able 
to reach any definitive conclusions on this matter. 
8.6) Discussion 
The development of health scrutiny demonstrates a clear link between the modernisation of 
local government and an apparently enhanced role in local governance for local 
government-and scrutiny. The-political management~strand of the modernisation agenda 
has been modified to encompass other key local governance actors within the remit of the 
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local authority's overview and scrutiny function. Whilst the health service is certainly not a 
new agent in the local governance arena there have been growing concerns about its 
accountability and role in local governance. Indeed, Baggott (2004:306) comments that 
during the 1990s the notion of a 'democratic deficit' in the NHS centred on the inadequacy 
of existing mechanisms to involve patients and the public in decision-making. 
Given the high priority central government has placed on the health inequalities agenda it is 
possible to make a connection between Weiss's (2003) conception of systemic risk (i.e. 
health inequalities are viewed as an unacceptable risk affecting a large proportion of the 
population) and its relationship to governed interdependence in relation to this issue. 
Consequently, it would be fair to assume that this case study should demonstrate a 
reasonably high degree of governed interdependence for this issue. Indeed strong local 
partnerships are being encouraged between local authorities, health authorities and other 
agencies to tackle the root causes of ill-health. The scrutiny inquiry has demonstrated that 
the government has placed emphasis on joined-up/inter-agency working, and this supports 
Weiss's conception of governed interdependence and its relationship to the transformative 
capacity of the state. The practical implementation of this in the case study authority is 
explored in more detail in chapters nine and ten. 
The case study has demonstrated a new role for local authorities in health inequalities under 
the tackling health inequalities agenda. The role of local authorities in health inequalities 
has also been enhanced through the community leadership role, the government's emphasis 
on partnership working, and the duty to promote the well-being of communities. It could 
be argued that the focus here has been to enhance the transformative capacity of the state 
through bringing more actors into the governance arrangements for this issue at a local 
level. This is further enhanced through the role local authority scrutiny can play in 
bringing agencies together in community governance and thereby encouraging governed 
interdependence through scrutiny's co-ordinating capacity. Consequently, this case study 
demonstrates an enhanced role for local government within this part of the governance 
system. 
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However, local NHS bodies are also accountable upwards to Strategic Health Authorities 
(SHAs) and then to the Department of Health. The introduction of health scrutiny through 
OSCs has led to the development of a local tier of accountability to local authorities, in 
place of the community health councils (CHCs) which had been representing the views of 
the public in relation to the NHS. Inevitably there could be conflict between the internal 
(established) accountability structures of the health service and this new form of external 
scrutiny. Consequently it is important to recognise the relative powers held by these two 
structures of accountability. A SHA can insist upon accountability to it by local health 
bodies because it can issue instructions to these bodies, whereas OSCs have the power only 
to publish recommendations, and refer these matters to the Secretary of State if they feel it 
is necessary. Unfortunately, through not completing the inquiry these hierarchical 
accountability arrangements in the governance system for this issue were not tested. 
The expectations created by the new health scrutiny roles were high, given that local 
authorities are being required to hold the local NHS to account. However, there has also 
been a recognition amongst practitioners and in good practice guides that this is a 
challenging role, which it will take time for local authorities to adapt to and perfect. The 
expectations amongst officers (and to a lesser extent members) in relation to this inquiry 
were too high. Although the focus of the inquiry was narrowed down from health 
inequalities, to health inequalities in mortality rates, and finally to health inequalities 
resulting from mortality from CHD and cancer, the focus of the inquiry was perhaps still to 
broad to be a manageable topic for the first year of health scrutiny in the local authority. 
Whilst it was expected that the remit of the inquiry would create a systematic approach to 
determining whether the balance between health promotion, disease prevention and access 
to services was right, these expectations were not fulfilled through the inquiry. The 
introduction of a much needed new scrutiny framework, which was effectively relaunching 
scrutiny in the local authority, had an adverse impact on this inquiry and was responsible 
for its incompleteness, which left some of the aspirations and expectations unfulfilled. 
However, it would be fair to argue that the inquiry was floundering prior to this partly 
through poor management by officers, and partly through lack of engagement amongst 
members. 
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The scrutiny inquiry into health inequalities highlights the need for partnership working 
across a variety ofbodies to deliver positive outcomes with respect to this issue. However, 
whilst it is argued here that local NHS bodies initially took the role of health scrutiny very 
seriously there remain doubts over the extent to which the values underlying scrutiny have 
extended to the wider processes of governance in health. An important factor here is the 
complexity and highly professionalised nature of an organisation such as the NHS. For 
scrutiny officers and councillors, who are after all 'lay members', an organisation like this 
can be quite impregnable due to the imbalance in technical expertise between health 
professionals and scrutiny officers and members. It was therefore more of a challenge for 
scrutiny to adopt a consistent and rigorous approach to this issue in the early stages of the 
new health scrutiny role, than for other (largely internal) scrutiny inquiries. This obstacle 
may be overcome through training and experience. However, it is possible that unless this 
issue of capacity is addressed (and if members and officers do not take control over this 
new role) then scrutiny will be taken less seriously and the values of scrutiny, such as 
openness, transparency and accountability, will be undermined (further) over time. 
However, whilst this remains a danger (particular when the actors involved in the scrutiny 
process are hostile to the inquiry) this particular inquiry demonstrated the willingness of the 
PCT to work with the local authority in relation to this issue. Indeed it could be argued that 
the scrutiny mechanism enabled the local NHS to put health inequalities on the local 
authority agenda through the scrutiny workshop meeting prior to the agreement of a health 
scrutiny workprogramme in the summer of 2003. Furthermore, the PCT, through 
highlighting a potential inverse care relationship in relation to coronary artery bypass grafts 
within the sub-regional health community, was looking for an ally in the local authority to 
fight for a better deal for Hartlepool. Again the lack of professional and political ownership 
of the inquiry led to this potentially fruitful relationship not being followed up at the time. 
Instead it was noted and would have been pursued further with the acute and strategic 
health trusts and possibly the LSP, had the inquiry not been put on hold. 
The challenge of making scrutiny an influential actor in local governance was made harder 
through a congested and incoherent work timetable, which also reflected additional 
pres_sures on the scrutiny timetable from the loc~l health economl5• Furth~rmore, it is 
85 These included the closure of a GP's surgery and the possible closure of the town's hospital. 
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crucial that councillors are actively involved, and engaged, in selecting and scoping topics 
for scrutiny inquiries so that they have ownership of the process from the outset, and also 
have some idea of where the inquiry will end i.e. in terms of potential recommendations 
coming from any given scrutiny forum. This was not evident for the health inequalities 
inquiry, although given it was the first in-depth health scrutiny inquiry under the new 
powers it was agreed it should effectively be used to 'bed-in' the process. 
Discussions amongst scrutiny officers during the inquiry related to the perceived 
complexity of the inquiry, and whether the approach adopted was too complex for scrutiny 
members to understand86. This highlights an important factor in the development of health 
scrutiny generally, in terms of councillors' and officers' capacity to hold a large complex 
organisation to account. Whilst the membership of the forum was not always 'up to speed' 
with the inquiry, the difficulty here was that to 'dumb down' the information provided to 
the forum further would run the risk of the members having a very limited understanding of 
the government's agenda towards health inequalities. Without focusing on the 'depth' of 
the issue the inquiry would not be sufficiently evidence-based or sophisticated to warrant 
the attention of the health bodies in the locality87• Officers supporting the scrutiny process 
have been left with a challenging role of unpicking the health service and the issues it is 
charged with tackling, and reproducing them in fashion which is understandable to lay 
members and yet ensuring that they are sufficiently sophisticated to challenge the views 
and opinions of the expert systems that comprise the health service. 
Nevertheless, the health inequalities case study has shown that (post-Acheson) tackling 
health inequalities is now a legitimate role for the state, whereas after the Black Report it 
was identified as a key area for state intervention but as a result of a political decision little 
(if anything) was being done to address it. Through the case study inquiry scrutiny has 
shed light on the potential for the local authority and the PCT to collaborate towards 
shifting the balance between public health, primary care and secondary care, towards the 
86 This was demonstrated through the relatively low numbers of questions asked by members to healthcare 
professionals, and a high proportion of the questions asked were not relevant to the subject matter and 
development of the inquiry. 
87 Particularly if it was challenging the nature oftheir service delivery. 
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first two of these. However, the extent to which scrutiny officers and councillors 
understood this was limited. 
The scrutiny inquiry was also used as a way to get wider understanding of the existence of 
health inequalities in the town. By investigating this topic scrutiny was fulfilling part of its 
community leadership and well-being roles. However, the low level of engagement from 
the local media in this inquiry limited the capacity of this role as the findings about 
inequalities within the town were limited to the participants in the inquiry and the people 
they talked to about it. Nevertheless, the scrutiny inquiry could be said to demonstrate 
Kooiman's (2003) first order of governance through the day-to-day interactions between 
governance actors represented here. In terms of Kooiman's (2003) second order of 
governance there has been a change in the structural aspect of interactions in two ways. 
Firstly, the scrutiny process introduces a new way of working across the institutions 
involved in the governance of this issue, and secondly, through the government's health 
inequalities agenda an increasing number of agencies are having a more formalised role in 
relation to this issue. These factors contribute to demonstrating that there is 
metagovernance agenda (through the national government's health inequalities agenda) that 
is establishing norms, which form a framework that directs and sets boundaries for 
governing across the first and second orders of governance. 
8.7) Conclusion 
This case study has highlighted a number of difficulties and constraints in developing an 
effective scrutiny process. In particular, there is a need to recognise that the duty to 
scrutinise NHS bodies, which are approximately the equivalent in size and resources to 
local authorities, places an additional burden on councils for which there has been limited 
funding and support from central government, apart from a one off payment of £2.25 
million to the Centre for Public Scrutiny (CFPS) to aid the long-term development of health 
scrutiny. In addition, it requires a level of understanding and expertise about a separate area 
of government, of which individual councillors generally have little experience. Moreover, 
health inequalities is !l classi_c example o_fa 'wj<;ke~' _issue ill_ the !eflllS used by Rittel and 
Webber (1973) to describe issues that are, 'imperfectly understood, whose causes are not 
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clear and to which the response has to be worked out in uncertainty' (Stewart 2003:12). 
Finally, the challenges created by the health inequalities agenda pose some far-reaching 
questions about the nature of the social and economic order in relation to health outcomes. 
Against this background, it is even more important to be realistic about the limits of local 
governance and thus of health scrutiny to impact on the underlying causes of health 
inequalities. 
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9) Governance Drivers and Constraints 
9.1) Introduction 
The previous four chapters have presented the case studies. The case studies were chosen 
because, firstly, each of them represents an in-depth scrutiny inquiry, and secondly, out of 
the inquiries undertaken in case study authority, during my time evidence gathering, these 
inquiries bear the closest relevance to the key research problematic of the thesis, namely 
what is the role of local government in the local governance system? As a result the case 
studies provide the deepest understanding of the governance system that my 'insider 
researcher' role provided. Consequently, this is not a complete picture of the governance 
system in which Hartlepool Borough Council operates. It is, however, the most complete 
picture offered through the scrutiny window during a two year period. 
By discussing the case studies against the five core research questions of the thesis I hope 
to reach some general conclusions about the role of local government in local governance. 
This chapter focuses on the first two research questions, which explore the governance 
context and the role of local authorities within this. Together they form a meta-level of 
analysis through which the limits and possibilities of local government scrutiny in 
governance can be explored. The research questions are: 
1. What are the principal drivers influencing the shift from government to governance 
and to what extent are they evident in each of the scrutiny case studies? 
2. To what extent, and in what ways, do the new powers and roles of 'modernised' 
local government constrain or enable its contribution to wider systems of 
governance? 
Chapter ten deals with the remaining three core research questions. Taken together these 
two chapters illuminate the findings of the case studies through an analysis based on 
thematic discussions of the scrutiny inquiries organised around these questions. They are 
concerned with mapping-the case study issues against theJollQw_ingl<.ey concepts thC!_t arise 
from the research questions: 
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o Risk and globalisation. When talking of 'risk society' Beck (1992) argues that 
politics has moved from being concerned with the distribution of goods to the 
distribution of risks. Weiss (2003) argues that in highly globalised markets, which 
are typified by systemic risks, there will be strong pressure for co-operation 
amongst actors to manage risks. 
• State capacity and globalisation. The deregulation of fmancial markets and the 
increased volatility of international capital has deprived the state of much of its 
traditional capabilities to govern the economy (Pierre 2000: 1 ). Through the 
influence of global trends the state has become an enabler, changing its role from a 
direct provider both to contain costs and achieve efficiencies (King and Kendall 
2004:7). King and Kendall (2004:129) argue that nation states increasingly have to 
take account of other agencies (and share power with them for 'steerage'), including 
private and international ones. By doing so the state is more likely to be able to 
deliver flexible and innovative responses to the external global environment. 
• Governance as a response to risk and changing state capacity influenced by global 
trends. Pierre and Peters (2000:51-52) assert that, 'governance has become 
important to changes in society . . . and the new governance is a strategy to link the 
contemporary state to contemporary society.' Consequently, governance can be 
viewed as a response to demands placed on governing through a variety of changes 
to society and the role of the state. According to Bevir and Rhodes (2003:55) New 
Labour's strategy has been to conceive of governance as a way to transform the 
state into an enabling partner through promoting the notion of networks of 
institutions and individuals acting in partnerships. 
• Local state capacity in the governance system. Rhodes (1997) argues that the 
Conservative's policy of by-passing local government for other departments has led 
to few policy areas remaining the domain of a single agency. Through the local 
government modernisation agenda the role of local government has been 
reconceptualised under New Labour. Local authorities are increasingly encouraged 
to become involved in the governance arrangements in their localities, most notably 
through the community leadership role and well-being- powers. However, this 
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reconceptualisation has taken place in the context of the three bullet points above, 
which define and limit the scope for action. 
• The role and capacity of scrutiny in the local governance system. As the window 
through which the governance system is explored the role of scrutiny, and its 
capacity within this system, is a key concern of the thesis. Scrutiny is the primary 
outlet for the majority of councillors to fulfil their representative role in the 
governance system. 
These concepts primarily relate to the first two research questions, and inform much of the 
discussion in this chapter. Discussion about the role and capacity of scrutiny is reserved for 
chapter ten. In addition, it is important to emphasise that the concepts of risk and 
governability are fundamental to the role of scrutiny as a whole and, as such, underpin the 
analysis of the case study findings as a whole. Indeed, in emerging as problematic issues, 
each of the case study inquiries had been established, at least in part, to manage risks to the 
governability of the local governance system generally, and to the legitimacy of the local 
authority more specifically. From this perspective a, if not the, central role of scrutiny was 
to manage risk and improving the governance arrangements. The scrutiny function seeks 
to address such problematic issues by a combination of holding the actors involved to 
account and through adopting a policy development approach towards these issues. 
However, as the case study findings demonstrate the scrutiny function often works 
imperfectly in relation to these challenges. Consequently, a key consideration of chapter 
ten will focus on what went wrong and what can be done to maximise scrutiny's role in the 
light of complex governance challenges. Finally, an underlying objective across chapters 
nine and ten is to explore the fit between actual events and the conceptual model developed 
for the thesis. 
9.2) Governance Drivers and Interactions 
This section of the chapter relates to the first of the core research questions. It is argued in 
the theoretical framework of this thesis that there are two interconnected sets of factors 
driving the mQdemisatign of local_gQvernment, and en_ban.cing the ~ole of lqcal governance. 
The first of these is associated with the impact of global trends (or globalisation) on 
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national and local governance. However, it is also argued that how nation states open up 
their economies and manage this process is central to the nature of the governance 
arrangements that emerge. Consequently, the second driver is formed by the national 
government's response to the first, and the various governance arrangements that emerge 
from, and around, it. As Weiss (2003:299) states, 'in short, not all states move in the same 
way in the room they have,' and, 'whether institutions intensify or soften the constraints on 
economic governance and policy autonomy will depend on their normative and 
organisational configuration in the specific issue area in question.' As a consequence of this 
driver policy responses are generated within which different governance arrangements and 
relationships emerge, in different localities, and for different issues. I am conceptualising 
governance here as a multi-levelled system in which each level influences the other. 
Consequently, the two key governance drivers can be described as: 
1. Global trends influencing the national and local governance arrangements. 
National governments can choose to work with the grain of global markets or resist 
them. If they resist them, though, economic performance may deteriorate with 
negative consequences for their populations and electoral success (Gamble 
1997:360). Consequently, Painter and Pierre (2005: 13) argue that globalisation 
generally calls for a new type of political economy, with the state deprived of some 
of its former control and leverage, while policy choice is conducted within a 
narrower range. Jayasuriya (2005: 19) asserts that one of the distinctive features of 
these factors is the development of a new regulatory state in which the exercise of 
public power is fragmented and dispersed. Consequently, global factors provide an 
exogenous imperative for the nature of policy development and the subsequent 
fragmentation of the state88 along these lines. 
2. National policies which are developed as responses to global influences and 
provide the drivers for local governance relationships. Stoker (2004:3) argues that 
changes in the local governance system have resulted from intentional interventions 
by the Conservative and Labour governments since the late 1970s. The focus here 
is on endogenous policy development, based on domestic policy reactions to 
88 See chapter three for further details. 
214 
exogenous factors, which can be associated with how states propose to re-integrate 
the fragmenting tendency of the first driver. Hirst (2000: 18) identifies a further 
trend through the introduction of commercial practices and management styles into 
the public sector, and devolving services to agencies that are self-managing within 
overall policy guidelines and service targets. This is linked to the first driver in 
terms of the benefits of adopting a New Public Management (NPM) approach to 
governance, and through reducing the burden on the private sector and the ability to 
compete in the global economy 
The case studies are analysed across a number factors (which relate to the drivers outlined 
above) and are represented in table four. The extent to which these trends are evident 
within the case studies will be explored below based on the following criteria: 
1. Risk. To what extent is it evident that there is the risk that global forces will 
impede local control in the governance system? Risk is manifested here through 
global influences on the local policy space. Consequently, local authorities are 
confronted with risks to their legitimacy as local representative bodies and 'first 
amongst equals' in localities. These form political risks to the legitimacy of local 
authorities as the bodies with the mandate to intervene on behalf of the 
community's well-being. The extent to which local autonomy to meet the 
challenges of these risks is constrained by global forces is a key concern of this 
section. As Blackman (2006 forthcoming) argues, 'there is still space for countries 
to choose their trajectories of economic and social development, but these choices 
are made in an environment where the interconnectedness of the national and global 
mean that calculations of risk and opportunity have to be done in a global 
framework.' Weiss (2003:311) hypothesises that in 'genuinely globalised markets' 
characterised by strong systemic risk89, the stronger the pressure is for public-
private cooperation and information exchange in managing risks. Consequently, 
Weiss asserts that the greater the risk the greater the incentives will be for a 
governed interdependence response. However, before we test Weiss's hypothesis it 
- - - ~ -
89 Systemic risk relates to the governance system or arrangements delivering sub-optimal outcomes that 
undermine the legitimacy of the system/arrangements. In other words there is the possibility of an imbalance 
between the risk and the capacity to manage that risk in the governance system. 
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is necessary to explore how the second governance driver of endogenous policy 
development has generated the governance arrangements that are in place for each 
of the case studies, prior to assessing the efficacy of the interdependencies amongst 
these. 
2. Governance arrangements. To what extent is there evidence of governance 
arrangements in place locally across the case study issues? Rosenau (2000: 171) 
conceives of governance as, 'systems of rule, as the purposive activities of any 
collectivity that sustain mechanisms designed to ensure its safety, prosperity, 
coherence, stability, and continuance'. As a result the case studies will focus on the 
governance arrangements that are in place for each of the issues and how the 
modernisation agenda has driven and facilitated the various arrangements that 
comprise governance for each of these. A key consideration here is to what extent 
are governance responses encouraged by national policy in relation to the case study 
issues? How effectively can a local authority intervene/interact in governance 
arrangements to maintain its legitimacy in light of the political risks described 
above? Having established this it will be necessary to explore how 
effectively/interdependently these arrangements are working in practice. 
3. Governed interdependence. How effectively are the governance arrangements, 
which have emerged for the case study issues, linking/working together in response 
to the governance drivers? An implication of Weiss's (2003) conception of 
governed interdependence is that, given the pressures of globalisation, adopting this 
form of governance represents best practice, or good governance, in relation to the 
context it emerges in. Through governed interdependence the state shares power 
with businesses and communities, and also the responsibility for delivering. The 
benefit of achieving governed interdependence is that there is enhanced potential to 
deliver shared objectives/priorities. However, governed interdependence is not 
always evident in practice as is demonstrated by the case studies. Governed 
interdependence is, therefore, essentially used as an ideal type for governance here. 
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Table 4: Evidence of governance arrangements and drivers for the scrutiny case 
studies. 
Research Question Ghost Flooding Skateboarding Health 
Ships Inequalities 
1) Governance Political risk to the High High Medium to Low Low 
Drivers local authority's 
legitimacy 
Local systemic risk High Medium to Low High 
High 




Evidence of Medium Low Medium to High Medium to 
governed to High High 
interdependence 
(prior to scrutiny) 






It was argued in the third chapter of this thesis that there has been a global trend towards 
most nation states opening up their economies to generate economic growth (see for 
example King and Kendall 2004, Bauman 1987, Gamble 1997, Painter and Pierre 2005, 
Rosenau 2090, and Watson and Hay 2003 ). _It_ is al~o arglled that this impacts on the 
capacity and nature of local governance arrangements and the type of issues these 
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arrangements 'deal' with. Three of the case studies (ghost ships, flooding and health 
inequalities) illustrate the impact economic globalisation can have on governance issues. 
The nature of the impact varies from the privatisation of a public utility industry (flooding), 
to rising income inequality (health inequalities), and international trade (the ghost ships). 
The skateboarding inquiry provides evidence of global cultural trends impacting on local 
authorities and local governance. Consequently, all of the case studies highlight the 
influence of global drivers on local issues. 
The ghost ships issue was a by-product of the global trade in decommissioning ships. 
The House of Commons Environment Food and Rural Affairs Committee (2004) concluded 
that about 700 large commercial vessels are dismantled every year, largely in Asia in 
poorly regulated facilities and at a very cheap rate. There is pressure on OECD countries to 
dismantle their own vessels but a lack of facilities to do so. Consequently, it is possible to 
argue that Able thought they had found a gap in the global market for dismantling ships in 
the West, whilst promising jobs to an economically deprived comer of the UK. There is 
evidence from the ghost ships inquiry, through the facilitative role the EA and the HSE 
adopted in bringing the ships to the UK that there was a 'pro-business' orientation amongst 
the regulators. As such, this experience appears to be consistent with Bauman's (1987:188) 
argument that, 'the role of the state is reduced to the employment of political means in the 
service of perpetuating the conditions for the domination ofthe market.' However, the role 
of the council as community leader is more complicated than this allows because it needs to 
bring business and investment to Hartlepool90 and must balance economic, social and 
environmental priorities to secure its overall legitimacy (in terms of central government 
objectives and local residents' wishes). Nonetheless, the case study highlights the 
constraints on the local state (with the exception of its tightly prescribed planning powers) 
to determine the balance between the economic, environmental and social well-being of 
residents for this type of issue. Again this finding reflects aspects of a trend identified by 
King and Kendall's (2004:143) for globalisation to refer to the development of a world 
market, in which local economic and political actions are increasingly losing influence. 
90 Indeed, 'Jobs and the Economy' is presented as the first of the seven theme partnerships in the Community 
Strategy and is regarded as critical to the success of the other themes. 
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The flooding case study demonstrates two global strands of drivers for the governance of 
this issue; the case study highlights the increased globalised risk of flooding through global 
warming, and the privatisation of the water industry. Economic globalisation is the 
defining development of our time, according to Barlow and Clarke (2002:81), and they 
argue that through the global market economy everything is seemingly now for sale, 
including natural resources such as water. An additional driver for the privatisation of 
utility sectors in the 1980s and 1990s was distrust in the public operation of services, which 
was rooted in a perception of inefficiency (Loughlin and Scott 1997:209). One of the 
arguments for privatisation was that the state could not achieve allocative and productive 
efficiency; however regulation was required because the market alone was not trusted to 
deliver efficient and equitable water services (Ernst 1994:54). It is in this context King 
and Kendall (2004:7) identify the state becoming an enabler rather than a direct provider. 
According to Brooke (2003:14) skateboarding has had a tremendous impact on society 
worldwide; influencing music, the internet and fashion. Indeed, the physical activity of 
skateboarding is connected to a global sub-culture. Borden (200 1: 13 7) argues that 
skateboarding is a sub-cultural response to a loss of identity, which affects all individuals 
faced with the dissolution of points of reference inherited from the past. This global 
cultural trend became increasingly evident in Hartlepool as young street skaters practised 
their activity in the town centre. The case study demonstrates that in the emerging 
governance system a variety of public, private, voluntary and community actors responded 
to this global driver, but with limited success in developing a new 'solution' to the 
increasingly fragmented leisure activity demands in the locality. 
A further global trend identified by Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2004), in Blackman (2006 
forthcoming), is that globalisation has increased the demand and pay for highly skilled 
personnel while reducing the demand for less skilled workers, and this development has 
largely been held responsible for the rising income inequality documented for most OECD 
countries during the 1980s and 1990s. The government (Department of Health 2002 :2) has 
recognised the connection between income and health outcomes by acknowledging that, 
'health inequalities follow a social grad~ent, with the health gap increasing steadily with 
poorer social class.' So whilst New Labour has intervened in deprivation and low income 
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(through redistribution), it has done so without addressing income inequalities as a whole 
(i.e. tackling the top of the income scale) (Blackman 2006 forthcoming). In this respect a 
central problem of this governance issue is a problem of globalisation. 
Risk 
The legitimacy of the case study local authority, as the democratically elected and 
accountable body in the locality, has been challenged by different levels of risk in the 
scrutiny case studies. Kjaer's (2004:11) summary of governance draws attention to Peters' 
(2000) argument that governance resurrects an old discussion about the relationship 
between legitimacy and efficiency, it (governance) is about how to steer, but also how to 
improve accountability. In this respect governance can be seen as responding to systemic 
(efficiency/steering) or political (legitimacy/accountability) risks. 
As we have seen each of the case studies demonstrates the influence of global drivers over 
each of the issues under examination. It is now necessary to explore the extent to which 
this has generated risks to the political legitimacy of the local state for each of the case 
study issues. In doing so it is useful to briefly recap91 how each of the scrutiny inquiries 
began (see table four above for the levels of risk). The ghost ships inquiry started 
following a referral (in full council) from the responsible portfolio holder once the matter 
had become a hotly contested public issue. The local authority needed to respond to this 
issue to be seen as a legitimate community leader given the strength of public feeling at the 
time92• Similarly the flooding inquiry represents the local authority intervening in an issue 
causing high levels of public concern. Again it can be argued that by doing so scrutiny was 
protecting the legitimacy of the council as the representative body in the locality. The 
skateboarding case study follows a similar pattern through which skateboarding in the town 
had become a matter of public interest/concern. The health inequalities case study is 
somewhat different from the other case studies in terms of the risk it posed to the 
legitimacy of the local authority. The health sector is more tightly regulated for this issue 
than the local authority, and the public are more likely to hold it, rather than the council, 
91 The case studies are ordered here in terms of hierarchy of risk, with the issue deemed to have the highest 
risk coming first. 
92 Whether scrutiny was the appropriate outlet for doing so will explored later in the chapter. 
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responsible for health matters such as this93 • Consequently, this is a shared risk for the 
local authority, which limits the risk to the legitimacy of the local authority itself. 
Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that most of the case study inquiries were initiated in 
response to political risks to the representative legitimacy of the local authority. This 
summary, therefore, supports the assertion in the previous section that all the scrutiny case 
studies emerged as 'problematic issues' in the first instance. 
In addition to political risks the notion of systemic risk to the local governance 
arrangements is also significant in relation to the role of the council given the shift in focus 
of local authorities' roles from direct service delivery to community leadership. The 
government (ODPM 2005:7) argues that, 'it is vital that councils both provide a focal point 
for the development of a collective vision for the future of an area that responds to local 
people's priorities and bring together public agencies and key stakeholders to achieve it.' 
Consequently, central government, through the developing community leadership agenda, 
has placed some responsibility on local government to manage systemic risks in the 
governance system. Scrutiny, through its internal and external accountability roles, has a 
duty to respond to systemic risk in this respect. 
The ghost ships case study ultimately witnessed high levels of systemic risk because the 
governance arrangements for the issue effectively unravelled, leading to the ships resting in 
a Hartlepool dock for two years with no work allowed to take place on them. The flooding 
case study represented medium to high levels of (local94) systemic risk because the water 
system was proven to be not working effectively in terms of preventing flooding and co-
ordinated responses to flooding. The nature of skateboarding as a sport posed a challenge 
to the local authority in terms of its leisure service provision. However, the risk that the 
skateboarding issue posed to the local authority was not sufficient for the variety of 
potential partnership solutions, which were explored through scrutiny, to represent 
sufficiently good value for money to the local authority. The systemic risk from the health 
inequalities inquiry was high (although not particularly high for the local authority at the 
93 Although-it,shouJd,be recognised-that the scrutiny inquiry was chosen on the basis of the highlevels of 
health inequalities in the town, which was a problem that needed addressing. 
94 In terms of the regional water company the overall systemic risk of flooding in Hartlepool was lower to it 
than it was within the locality itself. 
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time ofthe case study). Wanless (2002:119) has identified a major risk to the state in terms 
of the level resources which would need to be invested unless a more preventive strategy 
for public health can be implemented successfully, and this requires a particular emphasis 
on reducing health inequalities. He also cites (in his introductory letter to the Chancellor) 
health inequalities, in particular, as a major resource requirement for health and social care 
- a risk within a risk. The policy framework and governance arrangements for this issue 
reflect the national government's concern with this issue. A consequence of this is a larger 
role/responsibility for local authorities than in the past. 
The ghost ships and flooding case studies, in particular, illustrate how an issue can become 
what Beck (1992) calls a 'recognised modernisation risk' 95 • According to Beck (1992:77) a 
consequence of this (with particular relevance to governance) is that the public gets a say in 
the technical details of an issue; 'everyone suddenly wants to get a word in, and ultimately 
not with comparable precepts, but from a totally different system of reference.' Clearly this 
can create confusion in the governance of an issue, which ultimately challenges the 
legitimacy of the elected representative body. The ghost ships and flooding inquiries both 
reflect confusion and challenges to the legitimacy of the local authority on this basis. 
However, the scrutiny inquiries demonstrated very different governance outcomes, which 
will be explored later. In terms ofthe political legitimacy to the council for the ghost ships 
issue, the referral to scrutiny ofthis issue in full council proved to be an effective approach 
to offset the risk this was posing to the council as a whole, and to the portfolio holder in 
particular. Scrutiny fulfilled the representative role here, whilst the issue was diffused. 
Furthermore, the council subsequently voted unanimously for the ships to be returned to the 
USA, which undermined the scrutiny process, but further protected the political legitimacy 
of the councillors due to the high levels of public disenchantment at the time. 
The two strands of global drivers for the flooding case study have combined to create a 
governance context for the issue, in which the threat of flooding to the public has increased 
whilst the accountability for combating this risk has shifted from representative democracy 
95 Beck (1999:2) argues thaHhe five interlinked p_Jlly!)~s~s of: globlllisation; individualisation; gender 
revolution; underemployment and global risks (environmentarand economic) are the unintended 
consequences of the 'first modernity' and the 'second modernity' must respond to these challenges 
simultaneously. This constitutes 'reflexive modernisation'. 
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to what Kjaer (2004: 15) has termed a 'privatisation of accountability'. Furthermore the 
case study demonstrates high levels of disagreement between the (private) service provider 
and local residents over what Beck (1992:64) highlights as 'acceptable levels' of risk. This 
was manifested in the extent to which flooding of homes was deemed to be acceptable; not 
at all for those residents affected, and in some cases for Northumbrian Water dependent on 
the extent of rainfall. Consequently, the local authority became involved in the issue 
because ofthe relatively high levels of political and systemic risk resulting from this. 
Borden (2001 :262-263) argues that skateboarding is an 'oppositional subculture' that uses a 
range of images to create a generalised rejection of the external world, particularly aspects 
of the family and paid work. The emergence of a 'street-skating' in the 1980s and 1990s 
has provided a highly visible outlet for the skating sub-culture in town centres. 
Consequently, these factors have combined to provide a visible and oppositional sub-
culture that challenged the legitimacy of the local authority as the democratically 
representative body in the locality, and raised the issue of whether there should be a 
partnership response96 to this, linked to Weiss's (2003) conception of governed 
interdependence. The increasingly complex leisure service demands in the locality can be 
viewed as a risk to the local authority, which required a governance response due to limited 
finances to support existing leisure service provision within the locality - let alone to 
develop new services. 
The health inequalities inquiry demonstrates that the notions of legitimacy and efficiency in 
governance have been important drivers for the modernisation of local government, and for 
the enhanced role of local governance in relation to this issue. The former category of 
legitimacy has been broached largely through the new powers of health scrutiny, which is 
explored further through the later research questions. In relation to efficiency in the 
governance system central government has responded to the health inequalities issue by 
encouraging the development of networks geared towards tackling these inequalities. It 
could be argued that government has recognised the importance of partnerships in a 
fragmented governance system (largely comprised of different arms of government, the 
96 Led by the local authority in its representative capacity. 
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NHS and the voluntary sector) for delivering policy outcomes for this issue, and as a 
consequence this has been a key driver for the modernisation agenda here. 
Governance Arrangements 
Each of the case studies represents issues for which governance arrangements emerged, 
were already in place, or were modified during the scrutiny inquiry. The case studies will 
be examined against the governance arrangements in place for the issue under scrutiny. A 
key consideration here will be the extent to which the local government modernisation 
agenda has facilitated these arrangements - how have endogenous policy developments 
prompted local reactions to global trends in terms of the governance arrangements that 
emerge? 
An additional factor here is the current government's reform of local authorities' political 
management structures. Stewart (2003:78) asserts that, 'the executive has taken over 
responsibilities previously exercised by committees and inherited all the decisions those 
committees made.' The effect ofthis has been to concentrate local authorities' power in the 
hands of fewer councillors whilst encouraging non-executive councillors to adopt more of a 
representative community leadership role. Indeed, Snape et al (2002: 1 05) argue that the 
overview and scrutiny function can be an important mechanism for councils to fulfil their 
community leadership role and develop approaches to utilising the well-being powers. 
Consequently, it could be argued that the nature of political decision making in the new 
governance arrangements is both changing and also fragmenting between the executive97 
and community leadership/representative roles. 
The ghost ships case study provides evidence of governance arrangements, which involve 
multiple government actors, all approaching the issue from separate regulatory bases and 
legislative frameworks. Whilst these regulatory bodies overlap and need to be co-ordinated 
more effectively they are all arms of government. Within the council the regeneration and 
planning department, the responsible portfolio and informal cabinet had some involvement 
in the issue prior to the scrutiny ,process. There was further involvement in the issue from 
97 Although the executive has community leadership responsibilities of its own. 
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MARAD (an arm ofthe US government) and Able UK, which broadened the scope ofthe 
governance arrangements for the issue. Indeed, Corry et al (2004:11) argue that because 
there are huge numbers of organisations engaged in delivery the boundaries between 
institutions, responsibilities and accountabilities have become blurred, and require cross-
cutting and flexible responses. Consequently, a further strand to the governance 
arrangements for this issue emerged, in the form of scrutiny, which in tum was responding 
to the political risk for this issue as it dramatically increased through the publicity the issue 
generated. Scrutiny attempted to provide a dual co-ordinating/accountability role for the 
governance of this issue, the success of which is explored later in the chapter. 
As a private (regional) monopoly Northumbrian Water is regulated by Ofwat 
(economically) and its customer representative arm Water Voice. The predominant98 local 
governance arrangements for the flooding case study consisted ofNorthumbrian Water and 
Hartlepool Borough Council as the service providers. The former was largely responsible 
for all service delivery, apart from gulley cleaning, which was the responsibility of the 
council. The governance arrangements for this issue reflect the global pressures for the 
privatisation of the water industry, but they also demonstrate endogenous policy 
development through the community leadership and well-being strands of the local 
government modernisation agenda that provide a route into these governance arrangements 
for elected representatives. 
The role of the local authority in the governance arrangements for the skateboarding 
inquiry was similar to the one it adopted for the ghost ships and flooding case studies in the 
way that it justified its involvement in these through utilising strands of endogenous policy 
development (the community leadership role and scrutiny) to respond to the governance of 
the issue. The existing skateboarding provision in the town consisted of a skate park, 
which the local authority had entered into temporary governance arrangements with the 
NRF to develop. These arrangements were developed as a local policy response to the 
global cultural trend of the use of public space for street-skating. The scrutiny function 
operated in a comparable fashion to the flooding inquiry, in that it sought to make 
connections with, and between, public, private and voluntary components of the 
98 A lack of ambition on the part of the scrutiny forum prevented it engaging meaningfully with Defra, the 
EA, Ofwat and Water Voice during the inquiry. 
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governance system to develop skating provision (as a new challenge to existing local 
authority leisure provision and budgets) within the town. 
The governance arrangements for the health inequalities inquiry are unique amongst the 
case studies in two respects: firstly, a wide and established national policy framework exists 
for this issue (culminating in the Department of Health's (2003b) Tackling Health 
Inequalities: A Programme for Action) and secondly, the health scrutiny function provides 
a more formalised line of accountability for local authorities into these arrangements than 
for other case studies. The health inequalities agenda is an example of the New Labour 
government attempting to stave off welfare retrenchment through involving more actors in 
the governance arrangements of an issue, and 'steering' these actors towards agreed 
outcomes. As a result of the drivers described above, there is an enhanced role for 
partnerships as a form of governance for tackling health inequalities more effectively. 
The case studies support Jayasuriya's (2005:20) contention that, 'globalisation brings with 
it a new ensemble of governance institutions, and it is these new structures that shape and 
influence the architecture of the state as well as constituting new types of policy capacity.' 
This is particularly true for the flooding, skateboarding and health inequalities inquiry. The 
limited success of the ghost ships inquiry could be attributed to the lack of new institutions 
constituting new types of policy capacity, because the (traditionaVgovernment) regulatory 
framework superceded scrutiny's attempts to contribute to a governance-based form of 
policy capacity. Nevertheless, each inquiry supports Skelcher's (2003:20-21) notion of 
local authorities at least attempting to develop and support partnerships so that they can 
demonstrate their commitment to modernisation, whilst enhancing their ability to direct and 
shape the way in which partnership activity is undertaken. 
Indeed the government (ODPM 2005:9) has recently argued that one of the many 
challenges facing local authorities is to develop the community leadership role in relation to 
the range of local services that contribute to the well being of the area and also strengthen 
the relationships between partners. Consequently, there is not only a (potentially) key role 
for tbe lof~l_iluthority in the governance arrangements of these issues, but the community 
leadership role also places an emphasis on the local authority to co-ordinate these. There 
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are a couple of implications from this argument; firstly the community leadership role is 
placed at the heart of scrutiny's potential to contribute to governed interdependence (see 
below) and secondly it provides an opportunity for local authorities to become engaged in 
the governance system (see the following section). Consequently, these case studies have 
demonstrated that the scrutiny function itself can become an important additional actor in 
the local governance system. 
Governed Interdependence 
Weiss's (2003) notion of governed interdependence implies that' the pressures of 
globalisation have led to the state sharing powers and the responsibility for delivery, with 
businesses, voluntary and community sectors. Ideally this will generate enhanced potential 
and capacity to deliver towards shared outcomes across the governance arrangements. 
For the ghost ships issue the council, in addition to its planning role, adopted what can 
loosely be described as a governance approach, and contributed both positively and 
negatively to the governed interdependence of this issue. As we have seen (in the case 
study) the council was approached by the EA and HSE about its views on this contract. 
Senior officers and an informal cabinet meeting indicated their willingness to work in 
partnerships to support the development of the contract in the interests of the economic 
regeneration of the area. However, once the issue became public the council became 
involved in the issue in a different capacity. This was through the representative and 
community leadership roles of the local authority, which are explored in more detail 
elsewhere in this chapter. However, Weiss (2003) argues policy autonomy is affected by 
the normative and organisational configuration for a particular issue. Consequently, the 
ghost ships case study demonstrates the importance of regulatory bodies here, which 
limited the scope for the local authority to generate governed interdependence for this issue. 
The flooding case study links more directly to Weiss's (2003) conception of the 
relationship between high risk and high levels of governed interdependence. The flooding 
issue can be identified as a 'wicked issue' that cannot be resolved by a single agencl9. 
99 As a result of changes to service provision influenced by the second globalisation driver highlighted above. 
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The environmental stewardship and regeneration scrutiny forum in Hartlepool was a key 
driver for developing partnerships, in response to this issue, between the relevant agencies, 
particularly the council and Northumbrian Water. Consequently, the local government 
modernisation agenda (through the more outward looking approach provided by the 
scrutiny function as a component of the reform of political management structures) could 
be said to be an enabling factor in generating 'good governance' for this particular issue, as 
partners re-focused towards delivering shared outcomes. 
The skateboarding case study exhibits relatively low levels of systemic risk. Initially the 
scrutiny inquiry identified highly visible activity amongst fairly large groups of young 
skaters in Hartlepool town centre, which was largely perceived to be anti-social. This 
resulted in the council as a whole and scrutiny working on its own initiative but in 
collaboration with a council department, responding to this issue as a relatively high risk 
issue. As the inquiry progressed the scrutiny forum, the mayor, and the community 
services department all tried to develop partnership arrangements to respond to this issue. 
However, none of the solutions on offer represented a worthwhile partnership for the 
council. The council tried to foster governed interdependence as a governance response, 
but was unable to find an acceptable solution which would create permanent governance 
arrangements for skateboarding in the town. It is, therefore, possible to argue that the level 
of risk was not sufficient to generate governed interdependence. 
The government's response to health inequalities has been to encourage the creation of, 
'strong local partnerships with local authorities, health authorities, and other agencies to 
tackle the root causes of ill-health in places where people live' (Secretary of State for 
Health 1999 para 1.7). Consequently, there has been a move by central government to 
encourage the development of governed interdependence as a solution to an issue 
influenced by global factors and risks, through tackling health inequalities as a deprivation 
issue based on the development of local partnerships/networks. However, the health 
inequalities inquiry has highlighted a local authority (and in particular elected members) 
struggling to come to terms with the complexities ofthis new role. In particular, there is a 
need to recognise that the duty to scrutinise NHS bodies, which are approximately the 
equivalent in size and resources to local authorities, places an additional burden ofi councils 
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for which there has been limited funding and support from central government (Wistow and 
Banaras 2005:41). The capacity of councillors and officers to undertake this complex role 
is discussed further in the following sections. 
If we exclude the ghost ships case study the other scrutiny inquiries support Weiss's 
conception that high levels of risk will lead to governed interdependence. Indeed table four 
above shows that the higher the political risk the greater the tendency towards governed 
interdependence. The next chapter will explore more closely the relationships between risk 
and legitimacy, public engagement, regulation, and certainty/agreement in the outcomes of 
the scrutiny inquiries, and how governed interdependence can be limited/enhanced by 
combinations of these factors. 
Summary of section 9.2 
The scrutiny case studies identify a variety of drivers for the governance arrangements that 
are all connected100 to global trends. They also demonstrate that governance issues evolve 
over time leading to changes in the governance arrangements. The evolution or 
development of governance arrangements for issues can, in tum, affect the potential for 
governed interdependence to emerge, which can either be enabling (as demonstrated by the 
flooding case study) or constraining (as occurred during the ghost ships issue). The 
potential variations in the governing systems for governance issues means that it is 
necessary for the complex, and often competing, responsibilities of actors involved in 
governance arrangements to be fully understood by local government scrutiny functions. 
Without this understanding the potential to generate a governed interdependence response 
to political and systemic risks, is severely constrained. The next section will explore the 
opportunities and constraints of local government to act in this system. 
100 To a greater or lesser extent 
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9.3) Opportunities and Constraints on Local Government within the wider 
Governance System. 
This section focuses on what the case studies tell us about the role of local government in 
governance and, in particular, the extent to which it is equipped to fulfil the local leadership 
and co-ordinating functions envisaged for it within the context of an ongoing shift from 
government to governance. In tum, it explores the nature and extent of the opportunities 
open to local authorities to fulfil these functions together with the constraints, which 
correspondingly limit their fulfilment. A number of opportunities and constraints have 
emerged as products of the local government modernisation agenda and need to be viewed 
within a broader discussion of the relationship between government, governance and the 
role of the local arm of government within the governance system. According to Pierre 
(2000:241 ), 'governance theorists see the role of government in governance as a contextual 
phenomenon; the pursuit of collective interest takes different forms in different political 
and institutional contexts and governments can either be the key, co-ordinating actor or 
simply one of several powerful players in that process.' Consequently, the extent to which 
local authorities are enabled or constrained within the local governance system should vary 
dependent on the issue under consideration and the ability of a particular local authority to 
conceive of and play that co-ordinating role. 
The previous section touched on how, and to what extent, the local government 
modernisation agenda has equipped local authorities to function within the governance 
system. Kooiman (2003:73) argues that for organisations with a public role the co-
ordination of demands is crucial because they usually deal with multi-faceted and multi-
disciplinary subjects and services, requiring not only internal co-ordination of specialised 
units, but often external co-ordination of social actors as well. Through the powers of well-
being, the community leadership role, and the scrutiny function local authorities are 
provided with new roles and responsibilities in the emerging governance arena in this 
respect. Furthermore, the introduction of Local Area Agreements promises to be a catalyst 
for community leadership and to generate links to LSPs, through bringing partners together 
to agr~e and work towards shared objectives (ODPM 2005:11). However, there are a 
number of possible constraints on local autonomy that have also been part of the Labour -
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government's modernisation of local government. These include the continued threat of 
capping individual local authorities, a reduced role in direct service delivery, and 
unprecedented powers of intervention for the Secretary of State under the Local 
Government Act 1999 (Stewart 2003:206). This section will analyse the extent to which 
local authorities (and the scrutiny function) are constrained by a lack of powers within the 
governance system. 
Table 5: Evidence of the case study authority being enabled or constrained by the 
local government modernisation agenda for the scrutiny inquiries. 
Research Question Ghost Ships Flooding Skateboarding Health 
Inequalities 
2) Extent to which Enabled Scrutiny, powers Scrutiny, Scrutiny, powers New policy 
local government is of well-being, powers of of well-being, space created 
enabled or and community well-being, and community through health 
constrained by the leadership role and leadership role scrutiny function 
modernisation combine community combine and central 
agenda in the effectively leadership role effectively government's 
governance system: combine health 
effectively. inequalities 







Constrained Crowded Given Funding is 'Traditional' 
governance Northum brian constrained but thinking amongst 
arena and tightly Water is the scrutiny members and 
prescribed largely process suggests officers in the 
planning powers responsibile local authority local authority 
undermine for this issue, should not seek a acts as a 
powers/roles and has been greater role in constraint within 
enabling local for some time, the governance the governance 
government. the of this issue on system. 
modernisation the terms 
agenda has not available. 







Randle and Hatter (2005:5) argue that, 'as the only over-arching locally elected body, 
councils have a uniquely democratic role within the locality. In this capacity they are 
increasingly being asked to perform a visible community leadership role, focusing on 
bringing partners together, joining up local services, exercising influence in developing a 
shared local agenda and high quality local services, engaging with citizens and creating a 
vision of their localities.' According to the LGA (2003:5) the concept of well-being is 
fundamental to community leadership and its delivery. The breadth of the power is such 
that councils should regard it as a 'power of first resort', rather than searching for a specific 
power, councils can instead look to the power of well-being so long as there is nothing 
preventing them from acting (LGA 2003:5). It is evident from the case studies that the 
community leadership role, and to a lesser extent the power of well-being, provided an 
opportunity for local authorities to become engaged in governance issues. The case studies 
all demonstrate an interplay between these, and largely prove that these roles and powers 
can be combined effectively with the scrutiny function to provide a route into the 
governance arrangements of issues posing political and systemic risks to the legitimacy of 
local authorities. Furthermore, the role that this interplay creates for local government and 
scrutiny in governance is, at the very least tacitly, encouraged by central government's 
modernisation agenda. Whilst this creates opportunities for local authorities we will see 
later in this section, and in the next chapter, that there are a number of concerns about how 
this role is defined across governance arrangements in practice. 
Through the close links between scrutiny and the powers of well-being and the community 
leadership role, the governance capacity of local authorities has (in theory) been enhanced 
through the local government modernisation agenda, and this in tum can enhance the 
governed interdependencies in a locality - given pressures on the council to act or the 
political will to do so. The flooding case study shows that, in practice, there can be a 
significant role for local authorities in the governance of a high risk issue. Through the 
challenges this issue posed to the legitimacy of the council, the influence of scrutiny proved 
_to be an important element in enhancing and encouraging the local authority's capacity to 
act, whilst also being a valuable governance actor in its own right. The skateboarding 
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inquiry followed a similar pattern, which serves to support Stoker's (2004:62) contention 
that the emergence of governance has demanded a new role for local government as a 
facilitative community leader as well as a diminished role as a service provider. This was 
demonstrated through the work of the forum in exploring a variety of partnership 
arrangements to enhance skateboarding provision in the town. 
The health inequalities inquiry generally demonstrates enhanced capacity for local 
authorities within the governance system. The health scrutiny function reinforces the 
ability of local authorities to exercise the community leadership role in relation to the NHS 
and to review the contribution of NHS bodies to the health and well-being of local 
populations. Indeed, Skinner (2004:8) argues that through the powers of weJI-being, local 
authorities are being re-acknowledged for their community leadership as well as direct 
service delivery roles. He continues by asserting that local authorities have the most levers 
for public health improvement through their partnerships with PCTs and many other 
partners at different layers of governance (Skinner 2004:9). Skinner also argues that 
through 'new localism' there should be an enhanced role for better performing local 
authorities in community leadership of public health at both managerial and political levels. 
Furthermore, the government's cross-sector strategy for reducing health inequalities has 
placed a similar responsibility on the NHS to work in partnership with local government. 
However, in Hartlepool (which has been rated as 'excellent' by the CPA since 2002) there 
is evidence that this is a challenging role for local authorities to fulfil. The local 
governance of the case study issue was led by the local PCT, through suggesting the item 
for scrutiny and then trying to engage with the local authority as an active partner in the 
health inequalities agenda throughout this inquiry. However, the scrutiny forum was 
unable to keep up with this agenda during the inquiry. This is an example of local 
government being encouraged to work in a governance context by central government and 
local partners, but failing to adapt fully to these conditions. This can largely be attributed 
to a lack of capacity but it also reflects the status of the health inequalities issue within the 
local authority due to the limited risk it posed to the council at the time of the inquiry. 
The health scrutiny function can be viewed as a pathfinder for a more formal external 
scrutiny role if the government follows up its thinking in its recent Ten year vision for local 
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government (see ODPM 2004 and 2005). The evidence from the case studies demonstrates 
that scrutiny can already fulfil an external governance role, through its engagement with the 
community leadership and well-being role/powers. However, the ghost ships inquiry has 
highlighted how external scrutiny can be (mis)directed to areas where there is limited 
potential to influence governance outcomes. Consequently, if the government pursues its 
plan to extend powers of external scrutiny so that the community leadership role is 
reinforced (ODPM 2005:17), it will need to take into account which areas of governance 
are amenable to scrutiny - in which areas of governance should the community lead? 
Furthermore, the capacity of scrutiny to exploit the opportunities of the community 
leadership role needs to be given higher levels of priority and resourcing by central 
government than the health scrutiny function has to date. Given the changing nature of 
governance, described above, this is a vital role for local authorities to perform. 
Constraints 
On the surface the ghost ships and flooding inquiries share a number of similarities in terms 
of the constraints for local government to become involved in the governance of the issues. 
They are both issues which are tightly regulated by central government. They both also 
involve what Barlow and Clarke (2002:87) argue used to be 'common resource property'-
namely air and water. However, the ghost ships issue represents a contested threat of 
pollution, whilst the flooding issue was concerned with the co-ordination of a privatised 
former public utility. Regulation occupies a central position in the privatisation of water, 
according to Bakker (2004). The process of regulation is undertaken by sanctioned actors -
including government, politicians, regulators, companies, labour and consumers (Bakker 
2003:ix). Bakker asserts that government appointed regulators (Ofwat and Water Voice) 
occupy a strategic role in the process of regulation, but they are not the only actors. Bakker 
(2003:3-4) views the privatisation of water as a process of socio-economic and socio-
environmental 're-regulation', through which the state has reconfigured its role. The issue 
differs from the ghost ships in this respect because the regulatory framework reflects, and 
more readily accommodates, the views of the public. A further difference between these 
issues was that the regulators were heavily involved in the ghost ships issue, largely leading 
the process in separation from scrutiny. Consequently, it was far easier for scrutiny to 
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create a space in the governance arrangements of the flooding issue and the local authority 
was less constrained by the regulatory framework as a result. 
The formal powers of local government in relation to the ghost ships case study are quite 
straightforward in that they relate to the planning role of a local authority. This function 
compels a local authority to grant or deny planning permission through taking (only) 
material considerations into account. However, whilst the planning powers ultimately 
proved to be crucial in this case study, they were also tightly prescribed in terms of their 
implementation, which simultaneously constrains the role of local authorities in the 
governance system. Furthermore, the statutory and regulatory roles ofthe EA and HSE101 
were constraining factors that limited the scope for the well-being powers of local 
authorities to affect the outcomes of this issue. Whilst the council was consulted about the 
contract, and the TFS, WML and exemption to the importation of asbestos in particular, the 
framework here was clear and the decisions of the regulatory agencies about whether Able 
UK was qualified to carry out the contract were the determining factors for this issue - that 
was until the planning issue emerged. These bodies have clear roles given to them in a 
hierarchical system controlled by central government. The sovereignty of central 
government over local government is significant in terms of the control the former can 
exert over the latter, according to Weir and Beetham (1999). Consequently, the 
responsibilities of actors within an active and tightly regulated system were determined by 
central government and there was limited scope for the 'opportunities' of the modernisation 
agenda to influence this. 
Kooiman (2003: 18) argues that, 'the more space an interaction creates the more freedom 
there is for actors to select the values, goals and interests they want to strive after. 
Conversely, the more inhibiting and controlled an interaction, the more it will influence 
action contrary to the aspirations of those participating in it.' The governance context for 
both the flooding and ghost ships issues were both tightly prescribed. However, the 
flooding inquiry was able to create enhanced policy space through the interactions it had 
with residents and the private sector. It has been argued that the 'space' for interaction was 
smaller for the ghost ships inquiry than for flooding and that the interactions occurred at a 
101 Which are outlined in the case study chapter. 
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higher level in the governance hierarchy. As a consequence the opportunities (highlighted 
above) that the local government modernisation agenda creates for the role of local 
authorities in local governance were correspondingly constrained. 
The skateboarding case study illustrates an issue in which the policy space for the local 
authority was relatively open. However, the council found itself constrained by the 
challenges that the global trend in skateboarding activity placed on its existing, and 
traditional, leisure service provision. The council was unable to generate a desirable 
partnership arrangement either through using central government grants or private 
investment to respond to the risk generated by this issue. Consequently, the local authority 
could not reach an agreement with potential partners over a how to improve social 
outcomes in relation to this issue. This highlights the potential for the requirement to work 
in partnerships constraining the outcomes of local government, whilst expending a lot of 
time and resources in attempting to achieve governance solutions. 
Stewart (2003:221) argues that, 'there is a general problem with the government's approach 
to local government and to the modernisation programme. There has been little 
understanding of the problems of managing with and through other organisations and in 
particular of the management of change in an inter-organisational setting.' The ghost ships 
and health inequalities support Stewart's argument in different respects. It has been argued 
here that the local authority had a number of roles (planning, community leadership and 
scrutiny) in relation to the ghost ships issue; the case study demonstrates that these roles 
were not effectively co-ordinated internally, and the lack of internal co-ordination was 
mirrored in the local authority's capacity to co-ordinate external processes. Whereas, the 
relative lack of success of the health inequalities inquiry highlights how the new health 
scrutiny function has been introduced with limited consideration given to the management 
of a changing role for local government within an inter-organisational setting. 
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Summary of section 9.3 
Stoker (2004:59) argues that New Labour's approach to local government has suggested a 
shift in the purpose or justification of state intervention and consequently a key issue is to 
design local institutions so that they can encourage private, business and voluntary sector 
contributions to achieving social outcomes. New Labour's approach (to governance) 
arguably extends the Conservatives' focus on efficiency to a focus on effectiveness, which 
implies clarity about intentions and hence a concern with outcomes (Stoker 2004:60). The 
local government modernisation agenda has equipped local authorities to function more 
effectively in this context as the powers of well-being, the community leadership role, and 
scrutiny can provide a greater space for local authorities to operate in, particularly in terms 
of encouraging private sector contributions to achieving social outcomes. However, local 
authorities are operating in a complex governance system. Consequently, the roles and 
responsibilities of other actors can be poorly understood by local authorities, which act as a 
constraint to local authorities achieving optimal outcomes in the governance system. 
Furthermore, tightly regulated issues, such as the ghost ships issue, can lead to local 
authorities having tightly constrained roles despite the local consequences of these issues 
demanding a response from a council as the representative body in the locality. 
9.4) Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to identifY the extent to which political and systemic risks are 
evident in the scrutiny case studies. Table four summarises the findings from this analysis 
in respect of each case study. In addition the influence of global forces has been 
demonstrated as an important driver in three respects: first, they contributed to each 
scrutiny issue being identified as problematic within the locality; second, the governance 
solutions available to local government are themselves shaped by endogenous policy 
responses to the influence of globalisation; and, third, local governance solutions may be by 
definition highly constrained in their ability to solve the local manifestations of global 
problems. 
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10) Scrutiny, Governance and the State 
10.1) Introduction 
This chapter continues the analysis begun in the previous chapter. In the first instance it 
focuses on research questions three and four, which are concerned with how far scrutiny is 
equipped to contribute to governance (and not just government) outcomes and how scrutiny 
is influencing wider processes of governance more generally. Next Stacey's (1996) 
agreement/certainty matrix is employed to understand the role and impact of scrutiny in 
managing the political and systemic risks outlined in the previous chapter. Finally, the case 
study data is analysed in relation to the fifth core research question, which is concerned 
with what the study of scrutiny is teaching us about the changing role of the state. In 
particular the role of the state is explored in the light of a number of key themes that have 
emerged from the analysis of the preceding four research questions. These themes 
comprise: risk to legitimacy; public/pressure group engagement; regulation; and 
certainty /agreement. 
10.2) Meeting the Aspirations, Expectations and Responsibilities of Scrutiny 
A central concern of this thesis is the role of scrutiny within the broader shift from 
government to governance. According to Rhodes (1996:655), 'the transformation of the 
public sector involves "less government" (or less rowing) but "more governance" (or more 
steering).' Thus, John (1997:255) argues that, 'the relative simplicity of government by 
large locally-elected authorities has given way to governance by networks of public, semi-
public and private organisations.' In this context there is an implied acceptance of the 
limits to (local) state action and a recognition of the considerable scope for contributions to 
solving societal problems from the voluntary and business sectors and individual citizens 
(Stoker 2004:59). According to Stoker (2004:59) governance suggests an end to direct, in-
house service provision and a more open-minded approach to procurement; it involves 
more negotiation and bargaining, which legitimises many stakeholders and participants; 
encourages the search for cons@t fi'Q_m the public beyond elective democracy; and suggests 
a key role for government as a facilitative leader. These developments have a fundamental 
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influence on scrutiny's operating environment, and particularly in relation to its 
aspirations, expectations, and responsibilities. 
The developments highlighted above represent an emerging and continuously developing 
context, in which more traditional forms of government operate to varying degrees 
depending on the issue. The focus of scrutiny must, therefore, increasingly fall outside the 
boundaries of government because while local government is a major (if not the major) 
actor in this context its powers are shared with many other organisations, especially in 
relation to service-delivery and regulation. Consequently, the scrutiny function has to 
develop an understanding of the changing nature of governance in general and, more 
especially, in relation to its particular local context and issues. The complexities and 
emergent nature of this governance system can place pressures on a local authority's 
resources and raise questions about the capacity of councillors and officers to fully 
understand these new contexts and their roles within it. It is, therefore, necessary to 
consider whether scrutiny has the powers, resources and ambition to embrace the other 
agencies and partnership relationships in the local governance system. 
The previous chapter highlighted the importance of globalisation, risk and governed 
interdependence to the case study issues, and the opportunities and constraints for local 
authorities to act within this context. We are now exploring the capacity, powers and 
resources of scrutiny to function in this context, for which interaction can be a key factor. 
Interaction is a central component of governance in two respects, according to Kooiman 
(2003:24). Firstly, interactions are significant in terms of the social-political governance 
interactions, and secondly, interaction acts as a means to deal with the diversity, complexity 
and dynamics of modem societies. Given the inherent flexibility of the scrutiny function, 
scrutiny forums are well placed to enter into governance interactions. These interactions 
can be between scrutiny and the responsible governance agencies (through which scrutiny 
can generate knowledge of the governance arrangements of the section/s of society it is 
investigating102), and between scrutiny and the public and interest groups (through which 
scrutiny can enter into social-political interactions, to seek to enhance its influence). 
102 The flooding and skateboarding inquires were particularly successful in adopting this approach. 
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Levels of public engagement proved to be a key determining factor in the outcomes of the 
scrutiny inquiries, particularly in relation to the aspirations, expectations and 
responsibilities placed on, or generated by scrutiny. Public engagement varied across the 
scrutiny case studies with the flooding inquiry representing the most sustained and coherent 
interactions between scrutiny and the public. The ghost ships inquiry also witnessed high 
levels of public engagement with scrutiny but this was more of a 'short burst' of 
engagement, resulting in lower levels of agreement about objectives. The skateboarding 
inquiry was successful in engaging with the public, through responding to public concerns 
about skateboarding and through affectively co-opting young skaters onto the forum. The 
health inequalities inquiry, however, failed to engage with the public, as no members of the 
public attended the scrutiny inquiry. 
The flooding inquiry provides a good example of how scrutiny can engage with high levels 
of public interest and effectively integrate the public's aspirations into a scrutiny inquiry. 
There were two (somewhat) contradictory (although not unrelated) consequences of this. 
Firstly, the public's aspiration was coherent and strongly felt- they could not understand 
how the flooding of their homes was allowed to happen under any circumstances. 
However, scrutiny did not have the powers to meet the public's aspirations by preventing 
this from happening, although it could exert influence over the main service provider. 
Secondly, the high levels of public involvement served to enhance the capacity and ability 
of scrutiny to influence the decision-making process, by giving extra weight to its voice103 • 
It was widely acknowledged (by council officers and Northumbrian Water) that the scrutiny 
process moved improvements to Hartlepool's water system up Northumbrian Water's 
agenda for improvements. This was achieved through an in-depth, evidence based inquiry 
with high levels of public engagement. Therefore, scrutiny was able to meet some of the 
aspirations and expectations it sought to engage with, and were placed on it. 
It is argued in the skateboarding case study that the inquiry was an example of the scrutiny 
process responding to and engaging with public opinion, although the issue did not provoke 
as strong a public response as the flooding and ghost ships inquiries. Nevertheless, a trend 
has emerged across the case studies of scrutiny being able to engage with public 
103 i.e. the forum could claim to be representing the public's views when making its recommendations. 
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aspirations, which reqmres a wider role for local government linked to the notion of 
community leadership and the representative legitimacy of local authorities in the face of 
political risks. Adopting this type of role requires scrutiny to develop a capacity to think 
beyond local government's traditional service delivery activities and responsibilities. This 
can be a challenging role for councillors and officers to adapt to, as the health inequalities 
inquiry proves. The NHS is a complex and specialised field, of which most members and 
officers have limited familiarity or understanding. Consequently, during the scoping of the 
inquiry it was agreed that the issue of health inequalities would serve the dual purpose of 
familiarising councillors with the workings of the health service, while exploring a key 
health issue. However, there was a lack of clarity in member and officer aspirations and 
expectations over the outcomes to be secured from the inquiry. 
The health inequalities case study also demonstrates considerable aspirations from central 
government for local government's role in relation to this issue. A Labour Party (2002) 
consultation document, Improving Health and Social Care, argued that extending the local 
government scrutiny role to encompass health seems logical. This document also suggests 
that local authorities are arguably best placed to facilitate health promotion. Furthermore, as 
community leaders, local authorities can provide a democratically accountable co-
ordination of the many relevant services - many of which are already provided by local 
government, including social care, education, housing, leisure and transport (Wistow and 
Banaras 2005:36). Despite creating these new powers and responsibilities for scrutiny, 
central government has made no additional resources available apart from a one off 
payment of £2.25 million to the Centre for Public Scrutiny (CFPS) to aid the long-term 
development of health scrutiny. However, given the broad equivalence in size of the 
council's budget and that available to Hartlepool PCT for purchasing health services for the 
same population104, it is possible to argue that the assistance provided to local government 
to fulfil this complex new role has been limited. In addition, the local health and social 
care scrutiny forum was regarded as a particularly weak forum within the authority in terms 
of its membership, whilst the officer support was lacking in knowledge and experience of 
the NHS 105• These factors combined to ensure that (internal) expectations were relatively 
104 Consequently, it could be ~ue<l that the responsibilities-oflocal~govemment scrutiny have in some 
respects been doubled. 
105 During the first year of formal health scrutiny. 
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low and, to that extent, accurately reflected the capacity and capability of health scrutiny in 
Hartlepool to fulfil its new responsibilities, i.e the forum focused on a learning and 
development role for its first inquiry, rather than seeking to influence the development of 
health services at this stage. 
The aspirations of the scrutiny function for the ghost ships inquiry were linked to the 
external scrutiny role as a response to external political pressures on councillors from local 
residents and pressure groups. In contrast the pressure to establish internal accountability 
received scant regard. Thus, the inquiry explored the implications for the local economy 
including employment, the town's image, the well-being of residents, and environmental 
impacts. Consequently, the aspirations for this inquiry were extensive, and through the 
terms of reference of the inquiry substantial expectations were raised amongst councillors 
and the public. The ability to call a public meeting for such an emotive issue was a 
powerful resource for scrutiny, and generated the capacity through which the aspirations of 
most of the actors could be expressed. In this respect scrutiny can be a vehicle for 
enhancing social-political governance interactions. However, fulfilling this role also places 
expectations on scrutiny to deal with the diversity, complexity and dynamics of the 
governance issue. So whilst a route was created into the governance of the ghost ships 
issue it is also apparent that the local authority struggled to affect the outcomes of the issue 
outside of its planning role. The flooding and skateboarding inquiries witnessed a similar 
relationship between the heightened expectations placed on scrutiny through successfully 
engaging with the aspirations of actors (most notably the public). Both of these inquiries 
(in particular flooding) were more successful in meeting the expectations of the public and 
partners they engaged with. 
By engaging with the public's aspirations (and those of partners) scrutiny can enhance the 
political and systemic legitimacy of the local authority. However, this also enhances the 
expectations and responsibilities on scrutiny to contribute to, or to deliver, governed 
interdependence. The flooding case study, in particular, demonstrated that scrutiny can 
play a lead role in achieving these outcomes. However, the ghost ships and health 
inequalities case studies show that the capacity and powers of scrutiny may not be 
sufficient to meet the responsibilities it generates for itself. In this respect public 
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engagement can be a double edged sword, potentially enhancing scrutiny's influence, while 
also inflating the expectations and perceived responsibilities of scrutiny. 
Kooiman (2003) account of the 'structural dimension of governing interactions' provides a 
further conceptual tool for understanding the difference between the case studies. He 
defines (2003:15) this as, 'the stable and enduring patterns, contexts or conditions ensuring 
that they (governing interactions) don't fall down or apart.' The structural dimensions of 
governing interactions point to the material, social and cultural contexts in which 
interactions come about; consisting of those circumstances that limit, broaden and at the 
same time condition its intentional level, this in turn encompasses: institutions, general 
social constructs, patterns of communication, material and technological possibilities, and 
societal power distributions (Kooiman 2003: 15). Consequently, the intentional, or actor, 
level of governing interactions is concerned with governing situations and these are situated 
within structural contexts, which can enable or constrain interactions. 
The case studies demonstrate the importance of gaining an understanding of the structural 
dimensions to governing interactions, for any given issue, prior to pursuing a scrutiny 
inquiry so that expectations can be kept to a realistic level. However, given the 
complexities of governance and governance interactions it is not always possible to gain 
such an understanding during the course of an inquiry, let alone prior to one. Given the 
limited powers of scrutiny to direct change within the governance system this can lead to 
scrutiny appearing not to fulfil its responsibilities. It is important to recognise, however, 
that the sources of such apparent 'failure' may lie both in the unrealistic expectations 
attached to any given inquiry and the inherent weaknesses of the functions, powers and 
resources of scrutiny, and local government, in the wider local governance system. It 
follows, therefore, that if scrutiny is to maximise its influence it must combine realism 
about its powers and resources with a proper understanding of the governing interactions 
within which it is structured and located. 
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10.3) Influence of scrutiny on wider processes of governance 
It has been argued, in the sections above, that governed interdependence is not always 
evident (in terms of either being recognised, or being present) in the governance system, 
and nor is it always considered whether it ought to be for the system to be legitimate and 
efficient. If, in practice, interdependencies are not being maximised then that might partly 
be because the agents in the system are so used to working separately, and do not know 
how to make the connections (or have the capacity to do so) between different 
agents/institutions in interorganisational networks. One of the roles of the LSP is to create 
capacity here for other actors but the case studies draw attention to limited interaction with 
the LSP in relation to the scrutiny inquiries. Nevertheless, scrutiny has a key role here, 
because by its nature it is a fluid and flexible tool, and is largely (but not entirely) a non-
hierarchical part of the governance system. The potential of scrutiny is to look across 
hierarchies and networks and make connections that the individual parts of the governance 
system may not see. It can, therefore, encourage/recommend strategies for maximising 
interdependencies in the interorganisational system of governance. To do so scrutiny's 
position within the power structures of a given issue are key. 
Stewart (2003:9) identifies two different concepts of the role of local government, these 
are; firstly, to provide services -many of which are required by national legislation, and 
secondly, as a political institution constituted for local self-government extending beyond 
the provision of these services. Consequently, scrutiny should seek to influence the local 
authority along both these lines. In relation to the former scrutiny provides a traditional 
government accountability role. The second role is more complex as scrutiny can influence 
the executive's role in relation to this and/or adopt this role itself. 
Johnson and Hatter (2004:5) outline a critical factor in the development of scrutiny; 'of the 
thirty-eight sections within Part II of the Local Government Act 2000, only one deals with 
"Overview and Scrutiny" ... the act is not prescriptive about how overview and scrutiny 
should be organised or what powers it should have; all that is outlined is what overview and 
scrutiny sho_uld achieve. It is thus up to the executive to confer powers on the overview and 
scrutiny committee rather than for overview and scrutiny to have them automatically by 
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right.' Consequently, scrutiny must seek to influence the executive and external partners 
but Johnson and Hatter (2004:9) assert that their interviews suggest there seems to be 
limited respect for the scrutiny function amongst elected members, it is viewed as a 
secondary function to the executive and largely peripheral. This view is borne out by my 
insider-research experience. The significance of this to the influence of scrutiny is that 
there has been, according to Johnson and Hatter (2004:9), 'the negative influence of self-
fulfilling prophecies in overview and scrutiny: many councillors believe it can achieve 
little, and so it has.' 
A recurrent theme of this chapter and chapter nine has been the development of a 
community leadership role in all the case studies, which is of considerable significance to 
the influence of scrutiny. Whether this has been linked to more formalised scrutiny powers 
(health inequalities), developed in conjunction with the executive (skateboarding), or 
advanced through scrutiny's investigations (flooding and ghost ships), this role has 
provided a path for scrutiny into the governance arrangements of the issues under 
investigation and, therefore, a route to influence wider processes of governance. This 
supports Stewart's (2003:12) argument that this is a positive role through which local 
authorities can respond to the challenges and opportunities facing them. However, a 
notable feature of the ghost ships case study is that a lot of time was spent on attempting to 
extend the values of scrutiny outwards with some, but generally limited, success. Scrutiny 
was unable to take a lead in co-ordinating this issue; however, given the responsibilities of 
regulatory bodies here it is not necessarily a role it should fulfil because of their technical 
expertise. Nevertheless, an important contradiction in the modernisation agenda is 
identified through the limitations this placed on the local authority to fulfil a community 
leadership role for a matter of considerable local concern. The flooding and skateboarding 
inquiries faired much better in this respect, the reasons for which are explained below. 
The flooding case study provides a good example of scrutiny influencing an issue for which 
the local authority had limited service delivery responsibilities. Consequently, the 
characteristics of scrutiny, in relation to this issue, as a local government reform bears less 
releyance to the executive-scrutiny split than it does to the community leadership role. As a 
result scrutiny functioned more as a governance rather than government actor during this 
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case study inquiry. This was achieved by adopting a policy development role in an area 
where the council was lacking a coherent policy to inform its interaction with 
Northumbrian Water, and where there were some shared objectives amongst partners about 
desired outcomes, which led to a relatively open space for scrutiny to exert its influence. 
Furthermore, a senior officer actively engaged with the scrutiny process in seeking to 
develop a policy here, which enhanced scrutiny's capacity and influence. It has also been 
argued in the previous section that the inquiry achieved two key requirements to enhance 
scrutiny's influence; knowledge - through in-depth and evidence based research - and 
public involvement. As the case study has demonstrated this served to augment scrutiny's 
capacity to: influence the executive to support a more co-ordinated governance role; and, 
influence Northumbrian Water's priorities for 'future works'. 
It has been argued earlier that the skateboarding inquiry has a number of similarities to the 
flooding inquiry. Over the course of the skateboarding inquiry the scrutiny forum 
developed its own routes into the governance system as it engaged with the public and 
interest groups (i.e. local skaters) over this issue. Senior officers from the community 
services department were also closely involved in supporting the scrutiny process. Scrutiny 
was instrumental in developing reasonably high levels of governed interdependence for this 
issue. This is particularly true from the local authority's perspective because various 
potential partnerships were explored through the scrutiny process and judged to be poor 
value for the local authority. The businesses and neighbouring local authorities may not 
have been pleased with the outcome (influenced by scrutiny) but strong connections 
between a variety of governance actors were in evidence in reaching this conclusion. 
However, this issue shows scrutiny being influential in an area of non-decision making. It 
is speculative to assert that had scrutiny made robust recommendations for further 
skateboard provision106 in the town, which required additional resources, that the executive 
may have rejected these. Nevertheless, the key factor here was there was not sufficient 
public pressure to influence scrutiny or the executive to recommend a change in leisure 
. . . 
service provision. 
106 Rather than the 'loose' recommendations that short term improvements forthe existing skate park should 
be 'looked at', and that in the longer term development of the sport should be pursued dependent on 
resources. 
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Through the government's health inequalities agenda and the health scrutiny powers, local 
authorities have a key role in tackling health inequalities which, by definition, makes the 
topic a legitimate one for the scrutiny of their internal functions (Wistow and Banaras 
2005:37). In addition, the community leadership role, with its emphasis on the well-being 
of local residents, places a clear responsibility on councils to examine the impact of health 
inequalities locally. In summary therefore, the role of scrutiny in relation to health 
inequalities can be fivefold: 
• to scrutinise internal local authority contributions to the reduction of health 
inequalities; 
• to scrutinise the work of local NHS bodies in addressing health inequalities; 
• to scrutinise partnership working between local authority, NHS and other bodies in 
this field; 
• to assess the impact of all these activities on health outcomes for local people; and 
• to make recommendations to the appropriate bodies in relation to scrutiny findings 
derived from the four roles above (Wistow and Banaras 2005:37). 
It should follow that scrutiny seeks to exert influence across all five of these roles. 
Nonetheless, it has been argued in the health inequalities case study chapter, earlier in this 
chapter and chapter nine, that in Hartlepool the scrutiny function did not meet these 
challenging new roles effectively. Indeed, in the previous section the limited capacity of 
councillors and scrutiny officers to fulfil the new health scrutiny role (at the time of the first 
health scrutiny inquiry) is reflected upon, as are the relatively low expectations that resulted 
from this. Furthermore, within the council the departmental lead for this issue was a 
'weak' presence in the scrutiny forum, who appeared unable to drive the issue forward in 
scrutiny. As a consequence the potential to influence the executive to fulfil the local 
authority's broader community leadership role was limited by these factors. In these 
circumstances a health scrutiny committee can do little more, especially in the first 
instance, than extend the understanding of officers and members about the issue locally, 
and then begin to form judgements about approaches geared towards tackling health 
inequalities thatare beingimplemente9.il1 the_l()(;B.Ii_ty. To do so scrutiny needs to run hard 
to catch up with NHS expertise before it can reasonably expect to influence policy 
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outcomes (Wistow and Banaras 2005:41). The consequences of the above points are quite 
pronounced in limiting the influence of scrutiny on wider processes of governance, which is 
somewhat surprising given the distinctive and more formalised role of scrutiny in relation 
to this issue. The tools to influence governance processes were (largely) in place, but the 
capacity was lacking, 
The ghost ships case study represents a missed opportunity for scrutiny, which has had 
serious ramifications for the political climate in the case study authority ever since, as non-
executive councillors' relationships with the executive and senior officers have 
progressively worsened. There is a lack of trust between these factions. Central to this is 
the perception amongst non executive members that they are not being provided with 
sufficient information and that they are not being included in running the council. Indeed, 
the Select Committee on Transport Local Government and the Regions (SCTLG&R 
2002:2) suggested that non-executive members feel excluded and less well-informed, 
which impacts on their role as 'community leaders'. The committee concluded that this has 
been too easily dismissed as a transitional, rather than inherent, problem with the 
legislation. However, during the ghost ships inquiry scrutiny (largely) missed the 
opportunity to focus on the internal dissatisfaction with political management 
arrangements, and, therefore, to make detailed recommendations about how the working 
relationship between executive and non-executive members should be developed. Scrutiny 
did recommend that the mayor should reconsider the use of informal cabinet to which it has 
had no response to date. However, this recommendation was not based on in-depth 
research, indeed the executive was not called to scrutiny to provide evidence107• 
Consequently, scrutiny missed a key area of influence for this inquiry. 
The ghost ships and health inequalities inquiries have a couple of common threads that 
contribute to the limited influence they exerted over these issues. Firstly, neither inquiry 
has been completed. Consequently, the influence ofthese inquiries has been limited to any 
interim recommendations they made and the informal influence the scrutiny process may 
have had over those coming into contact with it. The second thread may have contributed 
to the first, and is that for both case studies scrutiny was unable to take the lead for the 
107 Although most cabinet members attended the open public meeting on 31"1 October 2003. 
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issue. Indeed, they were both part of broad governance processes, where the local authority 
itself was one of a number partners operating in hierarchical governance arrangements. The 
'intentional levels' of interactions 108 and in particular the patterns of communications 
between actors and the institutional arrangements (Kooiman 2003: 15) were more 
constraining for these issues (for the ghost ships because actors were competing for a stake 
in the process in a limited policy space, and for health inequalities because the local 
authority had not yet come to terms with the complexity of the health scrutiny role) than for 
the flooding and skateboarding inquiries, where scrutiny could exert more influence 
through successfully becoming the lead governance actor for the issue. Finally, and despite 
the successes and failures of the case study inquiries, two areas of influence can be 
identified for scrutiny in the wider processes of governance. These are: firstly, creating 
conditions for governance (which relates to the notion of systemic risk - outlined in the 
previous chapter), and secondly, defusing political issues/risks. 
10.4) Certainty and Agreement in the Scrutiny Case Studies 
Both this chapter and chapter nine have identified a number of similarities and differences 
across the case studies, when analysed against the first four research questions109• It is, 
therefore, clear that governance arrangements, outcomes, and solutions vary by issue. 
Consequently, a key question emerges; how are we to understand these variations and what 
does it mean for the effective conduct of scrutiny in the future? 
As a reform of the local government modernisation agenda scrutiny can be seen to be 
entering into the governance of issues to minimise the risk of sub-optimal outcomes. To do 
so scrutiny needs a strategy and Stacey's (2000) certainty/agreement matrix provides a 
framework for doing this. Stacey proposed a matrix to help with management and 
leadership by identifying management decisions across two dimensions: the degree of 
certainty and the level of agreement (Zimmerman et al 2001: 13 7). The dimensions of the 
matrix are outlined below: 
108 See previous section. 
109 These were devised from the methodology, theoretical framework and policy analysis of the modernisation 
agenda. 
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• Close to certainty: cause-and-effect linkages can be determined. Often based on 
very similar issues/decisions that have been made in the past. 
• Far from certainty: these situations are often unique or new to decision-makers. 
Cause-and-effect linkages are not clear. 
• Agreement: The vertical axis measures the level of agreement about an issue or 
decision within the group, team or organisation (Zimmerman et al 2001: 137). 
Stacey (2000:86) argues that where causal connections are clear and objectives are shared, 
the conditions exist for actors to take decisions in a rational-logical way. However, the 
further they move away from these conditions the more the need for another approach 
becomes evident. Where the causal connections are clear but actors disagree, those with 
the greatest power will prevail; and where actors agree but the causal connections are 
unclear they will need to use judgement and intuitive modes of decision making, thinking 
laterally and using trial and error processes (Stacey 2000:86). 
The argument being developed here is that (in relation to scrutiny) there are inherent 
opportunities and limitations for individual scrutiny inquiries (as outlined in the first bullet-
point below), and therefore for its ability to exert control over an issue. There are also 
inherent opportunities and limitations for each case study issue (as outlined in the second 
bullet-point below). For example, if scrutiny is often used to 'solve' issues of high 
uncertainty and low agreement then it will be 'working against the grain', which may 
undermine members confidence in the process. This can be seen as contributing to the 
negative self-fulfilling prophecies of scrutiny members, which has been discussed above. 
Consequently, there are two issues that surface in relation to the certainty/agreement 
matrix: 
• Firstly; opportunities and constraints inherent in the scrutiny function - these are 
linked to the powers, resour~~J!Ild.cap~t.city of_~~;_rutiny, and the focus here is on the 
effectiveness of scrutiny in 'unpicking' the governance issue. 
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• Secondly; opportunities and constraints inherent in the individual governance issue. 
The notion of risk is very important to these; in terms of the risk that through 
governance acceptable/desirable solutions to issues will not be found. 
Consequently, sub-optimal governance outcomes are a risk to each of the scrutiny 
case studies at their inception. 
In relation to the first point it is possible to re-conceptualise scrutiny's role as a researcher 
in the governance system, particularly in relation to the policy development and review role 
of scrutiny based on developing in-depth and evidence based inquiries. Consequently, 
Stacey (2000:99) outlines the researcher (scrutiny) taking the position of the objective 
observer of the organisational system (governance arrangements for the case study issue), 
describing and prescribing modes of decision making and control appropriate for different 
situations. By adopting this analytical role scrutiny can bring the other governance actors 
together and encourage governed interdependence. However, a note of caution should be 
sounded here as members of the scrutiny process are not objective observers. They are 
elected members who are involved in party politics110, they respond to local constituency 
issues (often at the expense of working towards the bigger picture), and scrutiny support is 
part of the officer hierarchy which has its own competing pressures. 
If the scrutiny process is to be as effective as possible there needs to be an understanding 
that there are different routes to take according to the nature of the issue, for which it is 
necessary to understand how much agreement there is about the objectives, and how much 
certainty there is about the relationship between cause and effect (Zimmerman 2001: 136). 
Without this certainty and agreement there is limited potential for control. Consequently, 
Stacey (2000:99) argues that modes of decision making and control (must) change as levels 
of uncertainty and disagreement rise. Scrutiny is not a decision making function, so 
consequently it must seek to influence decision makers through responding to levels of 
certainty and agreement. 
110 And despite the government's guidance suggesting otherwise it is naive, and somewhat unreasonatile, to 
expect members elected as representatives of political parties to behave as though they were not members of 
political groups. 
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By applying Stacey's matrix to the scrutiny case studies the level of agreement and 
certainty (i.e. high, medium, or low111 ) will be explored prior to scrutiny's involvement in 
the issue and represented in figures one to four. The issue will then be plotted over the 
course of the scrutiny inquiry so that the development of the issue can be traced. It will 
then be possible to ascertain what strategy could have been used to maximise the influence 
of scrutiny, although it may be that the constraints inherent in the issue mean that little or 
nothing could have been done by scrutiny. 
Ghost Ships 
Figure 1: The Ghost Ships certainty/agreement. 
GHOST SHIPS 
CERTAINTY 
A. The first phase of the ghost ships issue is represented at point A on figure one and 
illustrates high levels of agreement and certainty about the issue. At this stage the 
only actors involved in the issue were those with direct involvement in the contract, 
whether in terms of negotiating, carrying out, or regulating it. All the regulatory 
111 Based on my perceptions as an insider researcher. 
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bodies agreed that Able UK was qualified to carry out the contract and that the 
necessary permissions were either in place, or were soon to be in place. 
B. Point B relates to the second phase of the ghost ships issue. This covers the period 
leading up to the referral of this issue from full council to scrutiny on 11th 
September 2003. A number of new actors had become involved in the process 
including the media, Friends of the Earth, local residents, and councillors. The 
issue became controversial and the levels of agreement began to decrease as the 
number of participants increased. Nevertheless, there were still high levels of 
certainty amongst the bodies responsible for the contract that it could be carried out 
in Hartlepool. Indeed the WML was issued on the 30th September by the EA after it 
had co-ordinated discussions with the council, HSE, Maritime Agency and Tees 
Port Authority112• However, the EA also admitted that they were aware at this stage 
of some confusion within the council over the planning permission to construct a 
dry dock. In summary, as the issue became increasingly public the level of 
agreement reduced. This in tum reduced levels of certainty, although the 
responsible bodies continued to push for the necessary permissions and licences to 
be in place. 
C. During the scrutiny inquiry a number of events outside the scrutiny process had a 
significant impact on the issue. Firstly, the council pre-empted scrutiny's findings 
and voted on 4th November 2003 that the government should be asked to ensure the 
ships were turned back. The impact of this was a further reduction in the level of 
agreement about the objectives, whilst the ships, themselves, still arrived in 
Hartlepool and as a result public hostility grew. A second key event outside of (but 
during) the scrutiny process was a high court ruling that the ships were not covered 
under Able UK's existing permission to construct a bund for the dismantling of 
marine structures. Subsequently, on 18th December 2003 the council's planning 
committee ruled the planning permission was not extant. Consequently, Able was 
unable to fulfil its part of the ship dismantling contract, and therefore the extent of 
certainty effectively colf~psed, there_qy undermining the extent of systemic 
112 According to evidence they provided at the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee 
(EF&RASC) meeting on 19th November 2003. 
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legitimacy in this case. For its part the scrutiny process had proven to be an 
effective forum for voicing public and interest group concerns, and for the various 
regulatory bodies and Able to respond to these. However, very little emerged from 
scrutiny meetings in terms of agreement between the opposing viewpoints. Outside 
of scrutiny the EA was forced to concede that the WML was no longer valid on 30th 
October 2003. Consequently, by late 2003 and early 2004 there was very little 
agreement or certainty about the issue. Four of the ships were in Hartlepool and it 
was unclear whether they would be allowed to stay, let alone be dismantled. 
D. In the months following the court rulings and planning committee decision in 
December 2003 the position was both clarified but remained in limbo. While 
agreement on ultimate objectives remained low there was a wide consensus that no 
further actions could immediately be taken. Able UK need to submit a new 
planning application for the construction of dry dock at its Graythorp site so as to be 
able to fulfil the contract. As part of this process they need to undergo a new 
environmental impact assessment, the terms of which need to be negotiated by the 
EA, Hartlepool Council and Able UK. I understand that the delay in the process has 
been due to a difference in opinion; largely between Able and the EA and the 
council over what this should contain. The scrutiny process, and the broader 
political process, has been put on hold whilst the planning issue is resolved. Some 
local residents 113 and interest groups remain in opposition to the ships being 
dismantled in Hartlepool. Nevertheless, at this stage there are relatively high levels 
of certainty and agreement over what needs to be done i.e. Able needs to submit a 
planning application before the situation can change. However, these could both 
deteriorate when the planning issue becomes 'live' and public. 
In summary, the ghost ships case study does not represent a great success for scrutiny in 
terms of governed interdependence. The reasons for this can be attributed to the fact that 
scrutiny was one of many actors staking a claim to this issue. It has been argued in the 
previous chapter that this case study is consistent with Beck's (1992) notion of 'recognised 
113 The issue surfaces reasonably frequently in the local newspapers letters pages, and has been raised a few 
times in council where it cannot be 'opened up' because of the planning issue. 
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modernisation risks', in which greater public involvement leads to many actors wanting to 
'have their say' over an issue but not from comparable technical precepts. In tum both 
certainty and agreement diminish. Indeed, the evidence from this case study supports 
Stacey's (2000) notion that where actors disagree, those with the greatest power will 
prevail. In this case these were the regulatory bodies initially and ultimately the council's 
planning committee and the high court. 
The way in which this item appeared on scrutiny's agenda is central to the limited efficacy 
ofthe scrutiny process. The referral from the responsible portfolio holder came to scrutiny 
whilst the levels of agreement and certainty were rapidly diminishing. Scrutiny lacked the 
influence and power to drive this issue forward. Nevertheless, the scrutiny committee 
attempted to adopt a lead governance actor role through focusing on the overall co-
ordination ofthe issue. Through this approach members' ofthe committee, and to a lesser 
extent the public, gained a better understanding of the issue. However, only limited 
improvements in certainty resulted because the level of agreement about causal connections 
remained low amongst the various actors involved in the process. 
It has been argued earlier in this chapter that if the committee had focused on the council's 
internal accountability processes that it may have led to a more cohesive view emerging 
from the council, through which scrutiny could have exerted greater influence. By 
undertaking such a broad line of inquiry the committee was exploring the issue across the 
wider governance system. However, the various actors involved in this issue network were 
not compelled to follow scrutiny's recommendations. The relative lack of importance 
external governance actors placed on the input of scrutiny is demonstrated through the 
mayor, and not scrutiny, being asked to respond to the EF&RASC's report into this matter. 
Indeed, it seems evident that scrutiny had been drawn into an issue for which it had very 
limited powers or competence. Whilst these weaknesses are apparent in most of the case 
studies, scrutiny especially lacked the capacity to become an effective governing actor in 
such a tightly regulated issue, operating across global, national and local levels. 
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Flooding 




A. Point A on the graph represents the position of the governance issue on the 
certainty/agreement matrix prior to the scrutiny process beginning. There were low 
levels of both certainty and agreement in the governance network for the flooding 
issue at this stage. There was a 'build-up' of public concern about flooding in 
Hartlepool leading up to the scrutiny inquiry. Certain (affected) sections of the 
public were hostile towards Northumbrian Water following a number oflocal floods 
from the sewage system. Consequently, the councillors exercised their community 
leadership role by selecting this topic for scrutiny and thereby responding to public 
opinion 114• Within the locality there were high levels of uncertainty amongst 
sections of the public, councillors and council officers over the responsibilities of 
different bodies for this issue. This was coupled with poor communications 
between Northumbrian Water, the council and the public during incidences of 
flooding. Consequently, there were low levels of certainty as a result of the limited 
114 In addition, from my insider-researcher perspective the public tone of hostility was reflected amongst 
councillors, which carried over into the early stages of the inquiry. 
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co-ordination within the network, and this was combined with high levels of 
disagreement115 over the level of service being provided. 
B. Despite differences in opinion over the level of protection that homes should receive 
from flooding, it was clear from the outset that the scrutiny forum, council officers 
and Northumbrian Water were in agreement about trying to address the town's 
flooding problems. The scrutiny process was successful in bringing Northumbrian 
Water, the council and residents together. This immediately improved the 
communications between the various actors and provided the policy space for those 
actors to develop more formal communication protocols through the scrutiny 
recommendations. However, the public scrutiny meetings were frequently fairly 
hostile and tense encounters. The public, and most councillors, could not 
understand how houses could be allowed to become flooded with sewage. Indeed, a 
key recommendation of the inquiry was that it is not acceptable for people to have 
their homes flooded with sewage. However, Northumbrian Water is only 
responsible for protecting homes from a one in twenty year rainfall event, a message 
they continued to emphasise in the forum and with partial success. Generally the 
scrutiny process proved to be successful in enhancing the levels of certainty and 
agreement for this issue, which is represented by Point B on the graph above. 
C. Following the scrutiny inquiry there were improved levels of agreement and 
certainty for this issue as a result of the investigation. It is demonstrated earlier in 
this chapter and the flooding case study that the scrutiny process for this issue did 
much to encourage improved co-ordination between service providers and the 
public. Therefore the level of certainty was high following the scrutiny inquiry. 
The level of agreement at this stage was medium to high because the public and 
councillors became much less hostile116 to Northumbrian Water, partly through their 
involvement in the scrutiny process and the better understanding of their statutory 
115 Particularly between residents plus councillors and Northumbrian Water. 
116 It should be noted that following the scrutiny process there have been no extreme rainfall events 
comparable to a numberofincidences prior4o_the_sc;_fl.ltil)y ~q!!!ry. F~,~rthermore, !htz c~ncl!;lsion of the 
scrutiny inquiry has closed down a forum for the public to vocalise -thcir-disagreeinerit with 'tl:le servictthey -
are provided with. Nevertheless, I would argue that there have been real improvements in terms of agreement 
for this issue. 
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responsibilities, and also because improvements were made to council policy and 
through Northumbrian Water prioritising future works in Hartlepool. However 
issues like new homes being built in the town and the water companies themselves 
providing the lists of properties at risk of flooding to the regulator remained 
unresolved from the forum's point of view. Nevertheless, there seemed to be a 
general acceptance that improvements had been secured as a result of the scrutiny 
inquiry. There was a tacit view within the forum that those aspects of the issue that 
scrutiny did not affect were beyond its scope because they were deemed to be 
matters for executive decision making or part of the national regulatory framework. 
This view suggests a lack of ambition on the part of scrutiny to influence external 
hierarchical regulatory frameworks, an acceptance of the limitations of internal 
hierarchical decision making structures on scrutiny outcomes, and a lack of 
awareness/understanding of the hierarchical governance arrangements for this issue 
within the forum. 
This case study represents a near complete turnaround in terms of certainty and agreement 
within the governance system for the flooding issue. It is clear from figure two that the 
scrutiny inquiry contributed to a progressive improvement in both of these. A key question 
emerges; why was it that scrutiny could actively contribute to a positive outcome in light of 
what was initially a very challenging issue? A key factor, which has been discussed earlier 
in this chapter, was that scrutiny was leading the process in a relatively open policy space. 
Furthermore, the scrutiny forum adopted the role of scrutiny as researcher, by describing 
and then prescribing modes of decision making and control for this issue. This is a strategy 
that worked for this issue because scrutiny was able to take the lead and the other actors 
were in broad agreement about the need for change and also over some of the causal 
connections required to achieve this i.e. improved co-ordination of communications 
between service providers and the public. 
The flooding case study has demonstrated that the scrutiny process was close to 
maximising its opportunities for this issue. Scrutiny was well positioned to encourage 
more effective management of the issue in the gov~n:t~n~e system, through its role as a 
researcher within this system, and the links the forum made to the local authority's 
258 
community leadership role. A further key factor in the efficacy of the scrutiny process was 
the governance issue itself. Initially the low levels of certainty and agreement seemed to 
suggest that scrutiny's influence would be tightly constrained. However, given the strength 
of public feeling, and a genuine desire amongst partners (within their pre-defined 
regulatory/legislative frameworks) to move away from the continued risk of sub-optimal 
governance outcomes. Consequently, the governance issues represented an environment 
the scrutiny process was able to actively engage in and generate higher levels agreement 
and certainty. 
Skateboarding 





A. Prior to the scrutiny mqmry skateboarding in Hartlepool had become an 
increasingly popular activity amongst young people. In response to requests from 
councillors, residents and young people for some form of skating provision in the 
town a small skate park had been built using funding from the NRF. However, 
skating remained a prominent (and some argued anti-social) activity in the town 
centre. Consequently, there were medium levels of agreement and low certainty 
about the issue prior to scrutiny's involvement. This related to the need for skating 
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to be explored in further detail through scrutiny but there was no consensus at this 
stage about what the outcomes of the inquiry could be. 
B. Point B represents the conclusion of the first phase of the scrutiny inquiry. On 18th 
November 2002 the forum recommended that the council should not allocate 
£35,000 of the council's reserves to a private company to 'pump-prime' the 
development of a large indoor skate park in the town. This was rejected largely on 
the basis that the owner of this facility owed the council about £60,000 in rates and 
had managed a number of failed businesses. The remit of the inquiry to explore 
skating provision in the town, with particular reference to the Mill House skate park 
had been overtaken by the reserves issue during this stage of the inquiry. The 
consequence of this was that there were relatively high levels of agreement 
(particularly within the local authority's political structure), in relation to scrutiny's 
recommendation but there were only minor improvements to the certainty of the 
issue through scrutiny's role as a researcher in the certainty/agreement matrix .. 
C. This phase of the inquiry (represented by point C) explored the possible 
developments of mobile and indoor skating facilities in the town. Neither of these 
options were deemed to be worthwhile investments by the forum. Consequently, no 
permanent governance arrangements were established for this issue because there 
was insufficient agreement amongst actors over how to develop these. During this 
stage of the process the forum met with a number of potential partners and also 
young skaters. In addition a 'skateboarding survey' of 71 young people was 
undertaken and fed back to the forum. Furthermore, indoor skate parks in nearby 
Thomaby and Redcar, and a mobile skate park in Sedgefield, were visited by the 
forum and young skaters. Consequently, through the scrutiny process members 
gained a much clearer understanding of skating provision in the sub-region and the 
interests of skaters. The demand for skating in the town was for more challenging 
and larger skating facilities. However, it was recognised that the sub-region was 
already over-supplied with these facilities. It was agreed that building a new park in 
the town, or entering into partnership arrangements for either an existing indoor 
park or a mobile skate park would not be prudent given the council's tight financial 
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circumstances. The forum also made some loose recommendations about the future 
development of skating in the town, which were not reported to the council's 
executive. 
D. Following the conclusion of the skateboarding inquiry there has been little 
development in terms of outcomes, which will have disappointed some of the young 
skaters who became involved in the scrutiny process and expected improvements 
from this 117. This is represented in point D on the graph above where the level of 
certainty remains constant but the agreement decreases a little. 
The skateboarding scrutiny case study demonstrates a progressive improvement in the 
certainty and agreement amongst actors for this issue during the inquiry. However, I have 
speculated 118 that the levels of agreement will have deteriorated as a result of the outcomes 
of the inquiry. Some members stressed that the forum could not guarantee any 
improvements to skating in the town as a result of its inquiry. However, by involving 
young people in the inquiry their aspirations were raised above what scrutiny can deliver on 
its own, or even what it was inclined to recommend should be delivered in this case. This 
is a common problem with scrutiny i.e. it needs to use public opinion to enhance its 
influence but often ends up falling short of the expectations of the public because of its 
limited powers within the governance system. Consequently, the constraint of no decision 
making powers for scrutiny can be overcome, to some extent, through its ability to bring 
additional 'voices' into the governance interactions. The adoption of this approach, and 
especially where there are shared objectives, adds weight to scrutiny's influence. 
117 See section 9.4 
118 I also discussed this briefly with a couple of the skaters. 
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Health Inequalities 
Figure 4: Health Inequalities certainty/agreement 
HEALTH INEQUALITIES 
CERTAINTY 
A. Prior to scrutiny there were reasonably high levels of agreement about the topic 
selection of this issue between actors in the governance network. During a scrutiny 
workshop attended by representatives from all the local health partners a number of 
potential topics for the first scrutiny inquiry under the new health scrutiny 
legislation were put forward. The topic of health inequalities was subsequently 
selected by the forum because it was a cross-cutting issue central to the town's 
health profile/outcomes. However, it should be recognised that, whilst there was no 
vocal dissent in the governance network over the selection of this issue, the level of 
agreement at point A on figure four reflects the fact that there was relatively little to 
agree at this stage other than the uncontroversial notion that health inequalities are 
high in Hartlepool, that this was bad for the town's residents and, therefore, should 
be scrutinised. 
It was intended that the remit of the inquiry would serve to provide a useful 
introduction to the health scrutiny function. Indeed, the broad scope of the topic 
served to introduce councillors to a wide range of functions of the health service, 
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but it also proved to be a complex first inquiry to undertake. Consequently, there 
was limited certainty about how the inquiry would be conducted at this stage and 
how it could contribute to outcomes. 
B. The health inequalities case study has illustrated how the focus of the scrutiny 
inquiry was narrowed down from health inequalities, to inequalities in mortality, 
and finally to inequalities in mortality resulting from CHD and lung cancer. As a 
result of this there was an increase in the certainty around the issue, in terms of the 
causal connections leading to health inequalities. However, one of the key factors 
emerging from the health inequalities case study was the low levels of member 
engagement during the inquiry and a lack of capacity to drive the process forward. 
This lack of ownership meant that the certainty about the causal connections in the 
governance network for this issue was diluted somewhat, because most members 
appeared to not be following the progressive development of the line of inquiry. 
Consequently, the forum was unable to command a sufficient understanding ofthe 
health inequalities agenda (either nationally or locally) to develop any 
recommendations for its inquiry during the municipal year, and subsequently chose 
to pursue an alternative inquiry the following year. As a result of these factors 
point B represents a minor improvement in both certainty and agreement following 
the inquiry. 
A key element of the health inequalities case study has been the relatively poor quality of 
membership of the health and social care scrutiny forum. It is widely regarded to be the 
weakest scrutiny forum in the council, and this is particularly unfortunate given the 
demanding role the new health scrutiny function places upon it. Figure three highlights the 
limited impact of the scrutiny inquiry on the levels of certainty and agreement. The 
scrutiny topic was selected in partnership between the local authority and NHS, but the 
forum was unable to tap into or sustain the momentum generated at the initial workshop. 
The lack of capacity (among members and officers) to 'unpick' a complex cross-cutting 
issue constituted a substantial internal constraint on their ability to embrace an external 
governance issue. 
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This case study draws attention to a real concern about the implications of governance on 
local authority scrutiny, namely that the arrangements and issues scrutiny forums are 
increasingly being tasked with exploring require in-depth understanding from lay members 
about organisations they have limited experience of. In relation to this case study there was 
a well defined formal role for scrutiny (under the health scrutiny powers) and a stated 
willingness amongst actors to work in partnership. However, the scrutiny forum was 
unable to utilise the opportunities present in the governance system largely because of the 
complex challenges the governance issue posed for members and officers capacity. 
However, it should be recognised that the initial remit of the inquiry highlighted the role of 
the investigation as a learning exercise under the new health scrutiny powers. 
Consequently, there are mitigating reasons for the lack of more tangible outcomes 
emerging from the inquiry. 
Summary to Section 10.4 
This section has accounted for the variations in the scrutiny process and outcomes within 
the framework provided by Stacey's agreement/certainty matrix. This framework 
effectively focuses attention on factors which are fundamental to the governability of each 
of the case studies. Stacey's framework can also be used prospectively to develop decision 
making (and therefore scrutiny) strategies, which provide a better fit with the nature of 
individual issues and the levels of certainty and agreement surrounding them. This 
conclusion is developed and applied in the next chapter so as to generate a better 
understanding of the limitations and possibilities of scrutiny in the context of the wider role 
of the state in governance. In the meantime, however, a number of cross-cutting themes 
have emerged from the case study that have significance for the role of the state and 
scrutiny's place within it. 
1 0.5) Cross-cutting themes 
The 'governance drivers' section of the previous chapter draws on Weiss's (2003) 
conception of high levels of risk leading to high levels of governed interdependence. 
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Through the 'scrutiny window' that the insider-researcher perspective of this study 
provides, risks are manifested here through risk to the political and systemic legitimacy of 
the local authority. Consequently, following Weiss's argument, we would expect a 
hierarchy of governed interdependence approaches to emerge for the scrutiny issues in 
correlation to the risk to legitimacy for these issues. However, in practice a mixed picture 
emerges from these issues due to the interactions between a number of key dimensions that 
have been alluded to in earlier discussions. These are: 
• Risk to legitimacy; 
• Public/pressure group engagement; 
• Regulation and hierarchy; and 
e Certainty and agreement. 
I would like to return to each of these dimensions and the implications they have for the 
role ofthe state in governance. 
Risk to legitimacy 
It has been argued in the previous chapter that each of the case study issues posed a 
political and/or systemic risk to the legitimacy of the local authority within the local 
governance system. The various levels of risk have been outlined in table four (in chapter 
nine). Local authorities and their elected members have a role here in two, not unrelated, 
respects. These are: 
1. as elected representatives responding to risks to their political legitimacy; and 
2. through the broader community leadership role, which encourages the local 
authority to respond to systemic, and political, governance risks. 
It was argued earlier in this chapter that scrutiny often reduced the political ris1cs to the 
legitimacy ofthe local authority within each case study issues. In the examples of the ghost 
ships, flooding, skateboarding and to a_lesser extent.the healtbine~ualiti!'S inq1.1iry, it did so 
more through carrying out its investigations, rather than through any great impact it had 
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over policy development (with the notable exception of the flooding inquiry). There are 
benefits from this type of accountability. As Leach (2005:6) argues an important feature of 
'holding to account' is that it takes place; scrutiny can be regarded as effective if it 
stimulates an informed public debate about an issue, whatever the outcome. 
Sullivan (2003:360) asserts that the new political management arrangements for local 
authorities were set out in terms of improving vertical accountability. However, she also 
argues that the scrutiny function has limited resources and lacks the sanctions to enforce 
accountability (Sullivan 2003:361). The evidence from the case studies confirms the views 
of both Leach and Sullivan. Thus, they suggest that scrutiny can enhance accountability to 
some extent, while also lacking the powers and resources to be fully effective. Indeed, it 
was noticeable that, at times, 119 referrals to scrutiny were designed to create a 'buffer' 
between those taking decisions and the public, not least through using scrutiny to give the 
impression of holding decision makers to account. The ghost ships inquiry provides a good 
example of how the legitimacy of the authority can be enhanced without a corresponding 
improvement to governed interdependence. The high levels of public interest in this issue 
created correspondingly greater levels of political risk for the authority, which the referral 
to scrutiny helped to manage through its public engagement and investigatory roles. 
Despite the investigation of such an issue clearly falling within the community leadership 
and well-being roles (as articulated in the modernisation literature), this case study 
demonstrates that neither scrutiny nor the wider local authority is in any sense equipped to 
fulfil such a role in the face of global and national influences/pressures of the kinds 
experienced here. 
Corry et al (2004:22) see the governance challenge as twofold: firstly, to establish 
mechanisms to allow 'owners' (participants- both users and providers) to exercise control 
over institutions they are not directly involved in running, and secondly, to get a range of 
institutions to co-operate where issues demand it. In short Corry et al (2004:22) argue that, 
'governance issues are about how to get the levers of control right and about how to 
establish the basis for co-ordination.' The case studies have demonstrated thatthe nature of 
governance issues vary across the local governance system, which complicates the task of 
119 In my overall experience as an insider researcher. 
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getting the levers right. Nevertheless, a common pattern emerged across the case studies, 
which was scrutiny's use of the community leadership role, often in conjunction with the 
well-being powers, as a basis for becoming involved in governance issues, and to respond 
to risks to legitimacy. Indeed, Randle and Hatter (2005:4) argue that the community 
leadership role is critical because it, 'builds on their (councils) unique and overarching 
democratic legitimacy, it offers them influence over a wider range of public services than 
they are directly responsible for and it strengthens their accountability and offers the chance 
to really prioritise local needs.' However, the varied outcomes across the case studies 
suggest that this lever was not always adequate in terms of providing the local authority and 
scrutiny in particular, with control over, and co-ordination of, these issues. 
Beck argues (1992:48) that, 'the commonality of dangers confronts the pluralistic structure 
of interest group organisations with almost insoluble problems. It confuses the mutually 
worked out and well worn compromise routines.' Beck is arguing that these dangers are 
not politically reforged into preventive risk management policies, and it is unclear what sort 
of politics or political institutions would be capable of that. The scrutiny case studies are 
examples of the local authority, through the local government modernisation agenda 
attempting to 'forge' preventive risk management policies. However, it has been argued 
that they are more successful in reducing political risk to the local authority (and the 
broader political legitimacy of the hierarchical governance system) than systemic 
governance risks. This is because, through the community leadership and well-being roles, 
the rationale is there for local authorities and scrutiny to become involved in all the issues 
affecting the well-being of their residents but the governability of some issues are not 
receptive to a co-ordinating role by scrutiny. As discussed above evidence from the case 
studies supports the notion that these roles not only provide a route into governance 
arrangements for scrutiny but they place additional responsibilities on the local authority 
that it is not necessarily equipped to meet. 
Corry et al argue (2004:21) that the tendency oflocal partnership arrangements is for 'much 
talk' and 'occasional' action, and that to deliver more action requires a local decision 
making process that can divert the resources and priorities of the partner organisations. 
Currently LSPs are the bodies best placed to fulfil this role; these are discussed in more 
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detail in chapter four. However, the scrutiny case studies have shown that LSPs do not 
encompass the governance arrangements for every scrutiny issue, and that whilst scrutiny 
inquiries can usefully 'tap' into the powers of well-being and the community leadership 
role to extend their influence, governance interactions between scrutiny and the LSP are 
underdeveloped120• As a consequence, Randle and Hatter (2005) argue that a new and 
central community leadership role for local government is required with increased financial 
freedom and formal scrutiny powers over all local agencies and locally provided services. 
There is also evidence from the case studies to support Habermas' concern with the 
legitimacy of the political order. Harbermas argues that 'late capitalism' is characterised by 
oligopolistic corporations and state intervention to support or compensate for market 
mechanisms, which require legitimation (Outhwaite 1994:68). This is provided through 
formal representative democracy and a structurally depoliticised sphere, which secures 
mass loyalty but keeps participation below a level which would bring to consciousness the 
contradiction between administratively socialised production and the continued private 
appropriation of surplus value (Habermas 1976:36 in Outhwaite 1994:68). Outhwaite 
(1994:69) argues that the contrast here between legitimation and 'mass loyalty' seems 
much too simple to do justice to the complexity between these. Nonetheless, there is an 
underlying argument here that supports the idea that scrutiny fulfils an accountability role 
in local government and governance that engages with public aspirations but often fails to 
meet their expectations because of a lack of formal powers. Indeed, Stewart (2003:93) 
argues that, as a result of the reform of political structures, backbench councillors' fears 
about the representative role they were being asked to fulfil were reinforced by the 
government giving no clear indication over how they would influence decision makers. It 
could be argued, therefore, that scrutiny attempts to increase participation to enhance the 
local authority's representative role (within the governance system) and consequently its 
legitimacy, but by doing so it is deflecting public opinion away from decision makers in the 
governance system. 
Public/pressure group engagement 
120 This is at least true for Hartlepool. 
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The notion of public and pressure group engagement in the governance Issues under 
examination is closely related to the levels of political risk apparent for each issue. 
However, as well as providing an issue for local authorities to respond to in their 
representative capacity the case studies have also demonstrated public engagement can 
provide a powerful tool for scrutiny to use to enhance its influence. Furthermore, involving 
and engaging the public in the scrutiny issues demonstrates a shift to governance in terms 
of making connections to the communities to enhance the transformative capacity of the 
state. 
Johnson and Hatter (2004:5) argue that through the new political management structures it 
was hoped that greater transparency, clarity and public responsiveness would reinvigorate 
local politics. They assert that the government hoped there would be increased public 
involvement by making it easier and more worthwhile for them to become involved. The 
case studies demonstrate that it was relatively easy for scrutiny to engage with the public 
where there were high levels of interest in the issue under investigation. However, it has 
been argued, earlier in this chapter, that the expectations of the public are not so easily met. 
This largely relates to the role and responsibilities of the local authority in the governance 
system for an issue, and those of the actors it is engaging with. 
Bums (2000:969) argues that, 'virtually the whole of the local democracy debate has 
centred on how to bring in the community. The reality is that there are only communit(ies), 
and the issue for policymakers is how to bring all their voices into the democratic system.' 
The ghost ships case study highlights how scrutiny can bring a variety of voices into the 
democratic system but it did so for an issue that the democratic system had a limited role in, 
in comparison to the regulators. Indeed, the case studies generally point to scrutiny being 
an effective tool for responding to the 'communities' Bums talks about. The more salient 
issue here is the complexities in governance that can create varying amounts of influence 
for scrutiny (and the local democratic system) in the governance of different issues. 
Consequently, public involvement can enhance scrutiny's potential to generate governed 
interdependencies but only where the responsible bodies are willing to respond to this (e.g. 
Northumbrian Water was responsive to public opinion by making some service 
improvements). 
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Corry et al (2004:21) argue that direct elections for public service/sector bodies such as 
health and police services, might deliver more action through partnerships locally and at the 
same time be seen as a gain for local democracy. This could complement the role of local 
authorities, which struggle to extend their strand of representative democracy across the 
whole local governance system currently121 • The case studies demonstrate that scrutiny can 
have some impact on levels of public engagement and provide examples of meaningful 
involvement by the public in the scrutiny process. However, there are significant 
limitations on the extent to which scrutiny can be an effective tool for extending public 
involvement in local governance as a whole. In particular, during my time as an insider-
researcher at the case study authority, the five scrutiny forums conducted on average 
between one and two major in-depth (internal or external) inquiries during a municipal 
year. Thus, large numbers of other issues cannot be covered by scrutiny or the council in 
its representative capacity. 
Regulation and Hierarchy 
Kooiman (2003: 120) argues that there has been a move away from traditional mechanisms 
of legal constraints and bureaucratic rules in 'hierarchical governance' to more subtle forms 
of regulation and oversight. Despite the forces of localisation and globalisation the nation 
state retains a key role in allocating regulatory capacity and authority to local governance 
(Painter and Goodwin 2000:52). Within the UK, Painter and Goodwin (2000) talk of a lack 
of regulatory capacity for the local state to cope with 'uneven development'. Corry et al 
(2004:11) argue that, 'we need more decisions about public services and more solutions to 
the problems of communities taken at a local level. Our current systems of decision 
making centralise too much power in Whitehall.' Indeed, Kooiman (2003: 117 -118) argues 
that in modem public governance top-down control is still an important mode of controlling 
complex activities, but given the nature of modem public organisations as highly complex 
and diverse 'cobwebs', many of the 'controlling efforts' are at odds with each other. The 
consequences of hierarchy, and the potential incompatibility of different hierarchical 
influences, impacts on scrutiny in a number of w~ys: 
121 Although, in my view local authorities should have the key co-ordinating role in the local governance 
system. 
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• Firstly, and most directly, scrutiny operates in local political and executive 
hierarchies, which may be a constraint on its ability to carry out its inquiries and 
secure the implementation of its recommendations. 
• Secondly, the role of scrutiny is constrained by the extent to which the powers of 
local government are defined by the centre. 
• Thirdly, the content of scrutiny recommendations and the extent to which they are 
likely to be implemented are also constrained by national policy and other 
hierarchical influences from the centre, some of which may be contradictory rather 
than mutually reinforcing. 
For all of these reasons, the extent to which scrutiny can challenge or dilute the over-
concentration of power at the centre is severely limited as both the ghost ships and health 
inequalities 122 case studies have demonstrated. 
Jayasuriya (2005:22) argues that the regulatory state's function is the 'governance of 
governance' that is to provide the framework around which new sites of governance are 
configured so that the state takes on the supervisory functions of meta-governance. It has 
been argued earlier in the thesis that through the shift to governance local authorities are 
increasingly one actor (albeit the key one) amongst many in the local governance 
arrangements. The varied outcomes of the scrutiny case studies have suggested there is, at 
times, an uncertain role for local authorities in governance, which calls into question the co-
ordinating role of the national state over the governance arrangements. Indeed, Stewart 
(2003:253-254) identifies a number problems in the central-local relationship that need to 
be overcome by central government, these are: 
• The model of command and control leading to over-prescription, over-inspection 
and over-regulation; 
122 Through the very limited ability of local government to influence NHS priorities because of the dominant 
influence national targets and NSFs. 
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• The lack of joined-up government leading to a failure to consider the full impact of 
the modernisation programme for departments or the interrelationship between 
initiatives; 
• The absence of any adequate overview of developments in central-local relations, so 
there has been little consideration of central government action upon local 
authorities; and 
• Attitudes in the culture of central government that prevent a recognition of the 
strengths of local government and its councillors and officers. 
Corry et al (2004:30) support this argument by claiming that improvements (to local 
governance) will be slow if 'siloism' and an unwillingness to let go is reflected at the 
centre, 'Whitehall needs to give serious consideration to how it can perform the role of 
supporting local governance systems with a less centrally-driven and silo-based approach.' 
Furthermore, local authorities need the ability to influence other bodies and to work 
effectively with them so as to be able to genuinely respond to the needs of communities 
(Corry et al 2004:40). By clarifying the role/responsibilities of the national and local state 
in governance the role of scrutiny in governance issues will be simplified and it will be 
easier for scrutiny to know where to exert its influence when responding to problematic 
issues. 
Loughlin and Scott (1997:213) argue that, 'the separation of policy making from the 
operational functions has been at the heart of a set of public sector reforms commonly 
referred to as New Public Management.' The consequences of these reforms still strongly 
impact on the role of authorities today. However, the community leadership role and 
powers of well-being have been a notable reaction on the part of the current government, 
through the local government modernisation agenda, to equip local authorities to function 
in this new regulatory governance context. However, it has been argued that the 
modernisation agenda does not always equip local authorities sufficiently to have a 
meaningful role in all circumstances. Furthermore, the government's rhetoric about the 
importance of local government as leaders in the local governance system is not reinforced 
with the s1.1fficient capacity to regulat~ locally, or the fina11cial freedom to support this. 
Local authorities have to create a role for themselves in local governance arrangements. 
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The case studies highlight that this can be a success (for example, the flooding inquiry) or a 
failure (ghost ships). 
Certainty and Agreement 
The application of the Stacey matrix on certainty and agreement to the scrutiny case studies 
has ·usefully highlighted the notion of the governability of the case study issues. Not all 
issues are equally receptive to scrutiny in terms of optimising outcomes and generating 
governed interdependencies. Consequently, scrutiny must adopt a role as researcher to get 
an understanding of the governance issue, the certainty and agreement amongst governance 
actors over the causal connections for the issue, and also for their desired outcomes. 
Strengthening the external scrutiny role123 along the lines suggested for health scrutiny (see 
pages 184 and 239) would enhance the capacity of scrutiny to fulfil the researcher role 
within the governance system because governance actors would be compelled to cooperate 
with scrutiny. An approach of this kind would help to optimise the effectiveness of 
scrutiny in describing and then prescribing modes of decision making. 
The scrutiny case studies have demonstrated that where there are low levels of agreement 
and certainty the governance actors with most power prevail. In the ghost ships case study 
these were regulatory bodies initially and ultimately the council's planning committee and 
the high court. The case studies also demonstrate that there are often high levels of 
uncertainty amongst actors and the public over causal connections and responsibilities for 
governance issues. The case studies also reveal that scrutiny can play an important role in 
enhancing certainty over the course of an inquiry. However, generating agreement can be 
harder to achieve. The scrutiny case studies illustrate a lack of ambition and poor tracking 
of decisions (particularly in relation to external actors) when it came to extending its 
recommendations across the governance system, which has resulted in limited acceptance 
of scrutiny's recommendations by partners. 
123 This argument is developed further in section 11.6. 
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1 0.6) Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that scrutiny can be an effective tool for responding to 
challenges to the legitimacy of the local authority, within the governance system. Scrutiny 
is capable of engaging with the public's aspirations and as such fulfils the representative 
role of local government. The community leadership role is central to providing the 
rationale for scrutiny to become involved in governance issues. However, scrutiny often 
lacks the power, influence, capacity and resources to take the lead for governance issues, 
thereby, failing to fully live up to the expectations and responsibilities generated by 
adopting the community leadership role. The Stacey matrix on certainty and agreement 
suggests that where agreement about objectives and certainty about causal connections are 
low then the actors with most power will prevail. This in part explains why scrutiny is not 
always successful in developing governed interdependencies for governance issues. 
However, by adopting a role as 'researcher' scrutiny can enhance the certainty amongst 
governance actors over an issue, which in tum can foster partnership working and enhance 
the agreement about governance solutions. To do so scrutiny must be well supported and 
members need to be provided with specialist training with regard to their role in the 
governance system. The final chapter contains reflections on empirically and theoretically 
founded opportunities and possibilities for strengthening the scrutiny function in 
governance. 
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11) Conclusions: Limits and Possibilities of Local Government Scrutiny in 
Governance 
11.1) Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the implications for practice and theory of the 
limitations and possibilities of scrutiny in the local governance system. The case studies 
usefully inform two opposing, or 'polarised', views of scrutiny in the governance system. 
These views will then be situated within a broader discussion of failure in approaches to 
governing. The next two sections focus on the overall implications, derived from this 
study, for scrutiny processes and outcomes within the wider systems of local governance. 
The subsequent section draws out a series of practical recommendations to improve the 
performance of scrutiny within this context. I will turn to some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the study, before reaching some final conclusions about the limits and 
possibilities of local government scrutiny in governance. 
11.2) Polarised Views of Scrutiny 
The successes and failures of the scrutiny case studies can be used to highlight two 
'polarised' views of the role of local government scrutiny in the wider system of 
governance. Firstly, scrutiny can provide a valuable governance role in localities. It allows 
councillors (as elected representatives) to look across, and potentially improve, governance 
arrangements for an issue. The case studies have shown how scrutiny can enhance the 
legitimacy of governance arrangements, and local government itself, through contributing 
to improving governed interdependence and the accountability of the whole system. The 
most notable example of this is the flooding case study. 
However, the case studies also illustrate a view of scrutiny 'at odds' with the governance 
system. In this view the rhetoric of central government, largely centring on the community 
leadership role, provides a route for scrutiny into the governance system but once scrutiny 
becomes involved in an issue on this basis its role can be unclear. Furthermore, scrutiny 
often lacks the capacity, resources and powers to establish its position here amongst 
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partners, let alone to take the lead in co-ordinating them. In Kooiman's (2003) terms, 
therefore, the structural context of governance constrains the intentional or actor level124 of 
interactions to such an extent that scrutiny lacks the space within which to perform a 
meaningful role. This view is illustrated, in both chapters nine and ten, by the ghost ships 
case study in particular. 
Because these vtews of scrutiny are polarised, they focus on extreme tendencies of 
scrutiny's role within the governance system. Therefore, most examples of scrutiny 
inquiries in the governance system fall somewhere between these optimistic and pessimistic 
views of the scrutiny process, and to a large extent this is dependent on the nature of the 
issue under investigation. However, there are lessons that can be learnt from the scrutiny 
case studies that can help to develop optimal strategies/processes for the scrutiny of 
governance issues. 
11.3) Failure in Governance and Governing 
Having established that the scrutiny case studies draw attention to two polarised views of 
scrutiny, it is important to ground the discussion here within a brief exploration of the 
notion of governance failure. Indeed, Ormerod (2005:239) argues that when administering 
public policy, even when models are simple and rules are easily understood, there are 
complex interactions between agencies. He continues to assert that the interactions create 
such uncertainty about the future consequence of actions that the ability to plan actions in 
great detail and bring about intended consequences is very limited. Governance is 
concerned with the management of change and the reduction of complexity (Rosenau 
2001 : 17 4 ). Indeed, it has been argued earlier in this thesis that governance is a societal 
'response' to persistent and changing governing 'demands', set against ever growing 
societal diversity, dynamics and complexity (Kooiman 2003:3). Therefore the context I am 
addressing is not based on a simple model, which implies the complex interactions 
Ormerod describes will be intensified in a governance context. Indeed, Jessop (2003:5) 
argues that given the, 'growing structural_ comQ_lexity and opacity of the social world, 
124 Kooiman's (2003) view of this is applied to the case studies in the previous chapter. 
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failure is the most likely outcome of most attempts to govern it in terms of multiple 
objectives over extended spatial and temporal horizons - whatever co-ordination 
mechanism is adopted.' The focus of this thesis has been scrutiny's role as an 
accountability and co-ordinating mechanism in this context. 
Indeed the application of the 'Stacey Matrix' to the scrutiny case studies in the previous 
chapter has illustrated the difficulties in achieving certainty and agreement across complex 
governance arrangements, between the various actors. The investigative role of scrutiny is 
concerned with positioning scrutiny as effectively as possible in relation to the certainty 
and agreement matrix. Scrutiny's contribution to the resolution of governance issues 
depends on its capacity to influence decision makers. Such influence, in tum, is dependent 
on scrutiny clarifying the issue, bringing partners together, and ultimately suggesting 
strategies that increase certainty and reduce disagreement in relation to the issue being 
scrutinised. 
Stoker (2000b: 104-1 05) talks about two tiers of governance failure that can usefully be 
applied to a discussion of the limits and possibilities of local government scrutiny in the 
governance system. Failure at the lower tier arises from the breakdown of ongoing 
reflection and negotiation among partners, while Stoker (2000b: 1 05) argues, 'the higher tier 
of governance failure must be based on an assessment of its capacity to produce more 
effective long-term outcomes than could have been produced using markets or imperative 
co-ordination by the state.' According to Stoker (2000b: 1 05) the lower tier of governance 
failure relates to the 'doing' (i.e. process) of governance, while the higher tier relates to its 
'impact' (i.e. outcome). The next two sections focus on the findings from the scrutiny case 
studies in relation to processes and outcomes. 
11.4) Implications on Scrutiny Processes 
In chapter two I identified some evaluative criteria for 'good' scrutiny. These have been 
applied to the scrutiny case studies in table 6, which pulls together the findings from the 
evaluative criteria across t11e case studies. The findings from this ~ble are discussed in 
more detail below. 
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Table 6: Scrutiny Process Findings 
Case Study Links to Engagement of Links to Partners Links to Acbievability Tractability Added Tracking 
Executive Non-Executive Public Value Decisions 
Councillors 
Ghost Ships The majority of the High in the All key actors High levels of Low-poorly Low - scrutiny Issue Chief Executive I 
cabinet attends committee. High provide involvement defined role for lacks the tools clarified reports back to 
sec meeting on outside the written/verbal during meeting scrutiny in to effect the locally. Committee on 
31/10/03. committee. evidence to sec on 31110/03. governance outcomes of Political risk interim 
However, scrutiny meeting on arrangements. the issue, to the recommendation 
does not make 31110/03. No C-L role not given the council s on 11/5/04. 
I effective internal subsequent effective here. normative and reduced. Mayor does not. 
accountability involvement. organisational Planning issue I 
connections. configuration 'muddies waters' 
ofthe issue. here. 
J 
Flooding: Good. Knowledge Forum members Good links to High levels of Scrutiny Issue is Issue Internal tracking 
I generated through highly engaged, service provider. public effectively improved clarification reasonably 
the inquiry and extends to all Links to regulators engagement adopts within the and policy effective. ' 
public engagement councillors largely neglected. throughout the community regulatory development External tracking I 
I strengthen through series of scrutiny leadership role. framework. . Political a significant 
scrutiny's links to public meetings. process. Creates Not effective and systemic weakness of the 
executive through possibilities for in seeking to risk reduced. inquiry. 
' 
enhanced the scrutiny change this 
I influence. inquiry. framework. 
Case Study Links to Engagement of L inks to Partners Links to Achieva bility Tractability Added Tracking 
Executive Non-Executive Public Value Decisions 
Councillors 
Skateboarding Good. Referrals High in the Strong connections Effectively Scrutiny Relatively Issue None. 
from the executive forum. Limited during the engaged with effectively open space to clarification, 
with a view to links to members investigation. the section of adopts affect policy some policy 
scrutiny aiding outside. Recommendations the public who community development. development 
policy discourage are passionate leadership role. However, lack but largely 
development. development of about Creates of political e.g. of non-
General agreement long-term skateboarding. possibilities for will tore- decision 
over outcomes. partnership the scrutiny prioritise making 




Health None 12' Low in the Worked closely Meetings not Scrutiny lacks Complex Some issue Incomplete 
Inequalities forum. None with local PCT and attended by the capacity but has issue. Proves clarification. inquiry 
outside the NEPHO. public. clear route into difficult to No policy 











125 Involvement of responsible portfolio holder would have come later in the inquiry. 
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Scrutiny's relationship to the executive is a critical factor in the influence it exerts. Leach 
(2002:85) argues that scrutiny's power is limited to the power to influence; consequently, 
the executive can choose to ignore, treat dismissively, or make positive noises but do 
nothing about scrutiny recommendations. A further constraint on the influence of scrutiny 
is the effect that concentrating power in the hands of the executive has had on officer and 
member relations. Consequently, Stewart (2003:88-89) argues that it is difficult for chief 
officers to see their responsibilities as being to the whole council, rather than to the 
executive. In Ashworth and Snape's (2004:545) audit of scrutiny research they argue that 
holding the executive to account is seen as the most problematic role for scrutiny because 
in reality cabinet members and senior officers would prefer other roles to be carried out. 
Consequently, scrutiny's influence is often constrained in this respect. 
It is asserted in the evaluative criteria that effective links between scrutiny and the 
executive will lead to a more coherent view emerging from a local authority in relation to 
governance issues. The flooding and skateboarding inquiries partially support Leach's 
(2002:85) notion that scrutiny reports can add value if they convince the executive to 
change its decision/adopt a policy, or re-examine its preferred decision and provide further 
justification for this. In addition, the flooding case study also provides evidence of scrutiny 
influencing external partners outside of the executive's influence. The role of the ghost 
ships inquiry in improving the political legitimacy of the council as a whole, and the 
executive in particular, has been discussed in some detail in the previous chapter. It was 
also argued that the referral from the responsible portfolio holder supports Leach's 
(2002:82) argument that strong connections between the executive and scrutiny can be 
largely advantageous to the executive, as in this instance these diverted a contentious issue, 
and the accountability for this, away from the responsible decision maker. Scrutiny 
allowed itself to focus on the broad (and largely intractable) governance issues, rather than 
on strengthening the accountability of the executive. The health inequalities inquiry had 
not reached the stage when it would get evidence from the council's executive, or seek to 
make recommendations to it on the basis of its findings. 
The efficacy of scrutiny relies on motivated members to drive the process forward. The 
ghost ships, flooding and skateboarding case studies provide evidence of members of the 
forums being engaged in the scrutiny process. Through the links that the flooding inquiry 
made to the neighbourhood forums 126 the forum was able to extend its influence to the 
majority of councillors within the case study authority. The contribution of a departmental 
lead officer looking to develop policy through scrutiny enhanced already high levels of 
member engagement, whilst the links to the neighbourhood forums further extended the 
influence of scrutiny by engaging the majority of councillors in the process. However, 
holding joint meetings with neighbourhood forums for all scrutiny inquires would have 
implications for scrutiny resources and also democratic services support. Nevertheless, it 
could be argued that links between neighbourhood forums and scrutiny should be pursued 
selectively for high risk issues with a specific neighbourhood focus. The ghost ships 
inquiry engaged non-executive councillors in a less systematic fashion, and was largely 
related to the high levels of publicity surrounding the issue. The health inequalities case 
study, in which lower levels of member engagement were evident, is more typical of my 
experience during the research period. Early in 2006 (six years after the introduction of 
scrutiny in the case study authority) members were consulted about their views on the 
scrutiny process as part of an externally facilitated training programme. A common view 
was that the levels of interest and engagement of most councillors had diminished 
significantly compared with the committee system. 
With the exception of the health inequalities inquiry none of the external partners involved 
in the scrutiny inquiries were compelled to attend scrutiny meetings or provide evidence. 
However, the vast majority of organisations asked to attend scrutiny did so, and those who 
could (or would) not attend provided written evidence. More tellingly on a number of 
occasions scrutiny failed to ask external bodies like Ofwat (flooding) to attend, or bodies 
such as Able UK or the EA (ghost ships) to re-attend. Whilst each of the case studies 
demonstrated reasonably good partnership working during the inquiries, scrutiny struggled 
to maintain such relationships with partners once the inquiries were complete. There was a 
lack of political (and officer) will to pursue recommendations through the wider 
governance networks as the _flooding _ case _stu~y qe_rnonstrated in relation to its 
126 These meetings were attended by thirty-three out of forty-seven councillors. 
281 
recommendations to Ofwat and central government. This weakness can be attributed, to a 
significant degree, to a lack of ambition and capacity amongst scrutiny members and 
officers. In general, therefore, scrutiny seemed better able to operate at the level of 
horizontal relationships in local networks rather than to exert an upwards influence on 
hierarchical governance arrangements. 
There is also some evidence here, on the part of officers, not wishing to offend partners by 
'subjecting' them to the scrutiny process. This supports Leach's (2005:28-29) view that 
there is a delicate balancing act between holding partners to account without undermining 
the potential for future 'joint working'. However, Leach (2005:29) also argues that if 
scrutiny committees are to become public champions in relation to community leadership 
issues, then upsetting partners is a risk that has to be taken. However, aside from health 
scrutiny, the lack of formal powers for scrutiny in the governance system tends to question 
Snape et al's (2002:107) notion that, 'overview and scrutiny provides the public space and 
political process to ensure openness, transparency, accountability, responsibility and sound 
ethical conduct amongst the entire network of any one council's partnership working.' 
In practice one of the striking findings from the analysis across all four case studies was 
that the LSP had almost no involvement in the scrutiny process127• However, it was also 
notable that the LSP, itself, did not directly engage in any of the four case study issues. 
The potential interrelationship between scrutiny and the LSP does not appear to have been 
appreciated or pursued by either party. Given that the council's and LSP's performance 
assessments have highlighted the strengths of partnership working in the locality, this gap 
is all the more significant. However, it should also be recognised that the LSP tends to 
focus on strategic planning and the overall vision for a locality rather than on one off 
issues, of the kind which have been the focus of the case studies (with the exception of 
health inequalities128) inquiries. 
127 With the exception the community empowennent network's involvement in the skateboarding inquiry. It 
is worth noting that, even in this case, the network's involvement is more readily explained by one of its 
employees also being a councillor rather than as a result of the relationship between scrutiny and the LSP. 
128 For which the LSP's involvement fonned part of the (incomplete) project plan for the inquiry. 
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It has been argued in chapters nine and ten that public engagement can play a critical role in 
enhancing the influence of scrutiny by adding extra weight to the recommendations of 
scrutiny. It has also been argued that this can ultimately enhance the aspirations, 
expectations and responsibilities placed on a scrutiny inquiry, sometimes beyond the scope 
and capacity of scrutiny to fulfil them. Nevertheless, public engagement through scrutiny is 
an important means for councillors to fulfil their community leadership role and to enhance 
the influence of scrutiny. 
The 'achievability' criterion covers the extent to which scrutiny has the expertise, powers 
and resources to conduct a successful inquiry. It is also closely related to the notion of 
'scrutiny as a researcher' within the governance system 129 and, therefore, to the 
opportunities and constraints of scrutiny in relation to the governance issue. The 
achievability of scrutiny inquiries closely relates to the potential of the community 
leadership role to impact on issue under investigation. The flooding and skateboarding 
inquiries provide examples of the scrutiny function effectively engaging with the 
community leadership role, which has been discussed in some detail earlier in the thesis. 
However, the ghost ships case study demonstrates limitations on the effectiveness of 
scrutiny in a context where the community leadership role was itself severely constrained 
by hierarchical and other external interests. In this instance local authority leadership was 
unable to compete with these other interests, which were also seeking to exercise a 
leadership role in the relation to the issue. 
Whilst the scrutiny process may have high levels of achievability in principle, it may not be 
'tractable'. The latter criterion is contingent on the characteristics of the issue under 
investigation, rather than those of the scrutiny process. The ghost ships issue proved to be 
the most intractable largely because the issue and potential responses were determined by 
other bodies outside the local authority's sphere of effective influence. Indeed its statutory 
responsibilities as a planning authority constrained its ability to develop and engage in a 
local debate about the broader non-planning issues. In the health inequalities case study, 
tractability has been enhanced by virtue of the new scrutiny powers and the accompanying 
added legitimacy. However, the capacity of members and officers limited the potential of 
129 Which is developed in 'Certainty and Agreement' section of chapter ten. 
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scrutiny to affect the issue. The converse was true for the flooding inquiry, where scrutiny 
lacked the equivalent source of legitimacy but nevertheless proved to be successful. 
The application of Stacey's (2000) certainty/agreement matrix to the case studies draws 
attention to the investigative role of scrutiny in the governance system. The implications of 
the analysis here is that scrutiny must seek to position itself as well as possible in relation 
the issue it is investigating. Consequently, Table 6 draws attention to two forms of added 
value, which have resulted from the case studies; issue clarification and policy 
development. The former is concerned with the 'scrutiny as researcher role' in the 
governance system and is often central to how scrutiny positions itself in relation to the 
governance issue. This leads to the policy development strand of scrutiny, which provided 
added value for the flooding and skateboarding inquiries. This will be explored in further 
detail in the scrutiny outcomes section below. Nevertheless, the case studies broadly 
illustrate a fifty per cent success rate for scrutiny in relation to this role, which suggests 
scrutiny can have valuable role in influencing policy makers in the local governance 
system. 
Each of the scrutiny case studies led to issue clarification, to some extent. It has been 
argued earlier in this thesis that the remit of the health inequalities inquiry was the most 
explicitly tied to this function, due to its role in the development of the new health scrutiny 
role. Despite this qualification the organisational complexity of the NHS and the low levels 
of member engagement in the inquiry resulted in only partial success in issue clarification. 
The flooding and skateboarding inquiries were more successful here because of the high 
levels of member engagement, although the role of the regulatory framework in the 
flooding inquiry was perhaps understated leading to some confusion when it came to policy 
development. The ghost ships case study was relatively successful in clarifying the 
governance issue but the planning problem meant that scrutiny was unable to move towards 
policy development. In any case it has been suggested earlier in the thesis that scrutiny's 
influence would have been severely constrained by the broad focus of the inquiry given the 
constraints on it within the intentional level of interactions for this issue. 
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The scrutiny case studies demonstrate a general weakness on the part of the case study 
authority (officers and members alike) to track scrutiny recommendations. On a number of 
occasions scrutiny did not communicate its formal recommendations to other governance 
actors, notably to Ofwat and DEFRA in the flooding inquiry. This suggests a systems 
failure to follow-up the outcome of scrutiny inquiries. The need to create and maintain a 
scrutiny database, integrated into the scrutiny work programme, has now been recognised. 
Ideally scrutiny recommendations should be reported to the relevant bodies at the 
conclusion of each inquiry and reports on progress sought after a notified period. A basic 
weakness of process has been highlighted here. At one level it can be explained by 
congested scrutiny timetables and low levels of officer support including a long term senior 
officer vacancy. At a more fundamental level, however, the persistence of such process 
and staffing raised questions about the priority accorded to scrutiny within the authority. 
11.5) Implications on Scrutiny Outcomes 
Table 7 outlines the outcomes of the scrutiny inquiries in terms of: the 'internal consensus' 
generated within the scrutiny committee/forum as a result of an inquiry; the 'local authority 
acceptance' resulting from a scrutiny inquiry; and 'acceptance by other governance actors' 
of scrutiny findings/recommendations. 
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Internal Local Authority 
Consensus Accei>_tance 
sec unanimously 
agreed its interim 
findings. 
The forum was united 
in agreeing a series of 
recommendations on 
30/9/03. On the 
25/11/03 the forum 
stood by a 
recommendation 
challenged by the 
executive. 
The forum reached an 
internal consensus over 
a series of 
recommendations 
during this inquiry. 
The Chief Executive responded to 
scrutiny's interim findings on 
behalf of the cabinet. It was 
argued that the council had not 
been provided with sufficient 
information to lead, co-ordinate, 
or involve the public in the issue 
at an earlier stage in its 
development. 
The mayor has not responded to 
scrutiny's recommendation to 
reconsider the use of informal 
cabinet. 
3m November 2003 cabinet 
approved most of scrutiny's 
recommendations but asked that it 
reconsider recommendation in 
relation to an embargo on further 
development in the local plan. 
The forum stood by its 
recommendations on the basis 
that no evidence or guarantees 
had been presented to scrutiny to 
suggest further development 
would not lead to further 
flooding. The cabinet did not 
accept the recommendation that 
the council should take 
responsibility for developing a 
contingency fund for flooding 
victims. 
The recommendations that 
financial reserves were not used 
to support the Jesters proposal 
was accepted by council. The 
mayor accepted the 
recommendation that the 
authority should not enter into a 
Tees Valley partnership for a 
mobile skatepark. There is no 
cabinet record of the general short 
and long term recommendations 
about skating provision from the 
fmal report. 
Forum approved interim Not applicable. 
findings at last meeting 
of2003/4 municipal 
year, and agreed to 
continue inquiry in the 
following year. 
However, the topic was 
not selected for further 
scrutiny at the start of 
the 2004/5 municipal 
year. 
Acceptance by Other 
Governance Actors 
Not applicable. 
Northumbrian Water (at least 
tacitly) accepted that it needed 
to work more effectively with 
partners and communicate 
better with the public. 
Furthermore, improvements to 
Hartlepool's sewage were 
reprioritised following the 
scrutiny inquiry. 
Recommendations to other 
governance actors not 
extended. 
The governance actors 
involved in this issue 
ultimately had to accept that, 
on the basis of scrutiny's 
recommendations, the local 
authority did not want to 
invest in the partnerships on 
offer. The lack of tracking for 
this issue means that little is 
known about their views about 
this, although it is expected 
they will have been 




Across the case studies there was broad agreement over the recommendations/findings that 
each inquiry generated. None of the case study inquiries had to resort to voting over the 
recommendations130 as a broad consensus emerged amongst the members over the course 
of the inquiries. This suggests that for these issues overt party politics played a limited role 
in decision making and that the evidence based development of the investigations led 
members to reach similar conclusions about the issues. The health inequalities inquiry 
resulted in the forum accepting the interim findings presented to them at the end of the 
2003/4 municipal year and agreeing to carry over the inquiry into the following year. 
However, the case study also highlights that following the introduction of a new scrutiny 
framework during the 2004/5 municipal year the forum failed to reselect this topic for its 
work programme. 
The general picture emerging from the case studies in relation to 'local authority 
acceptance' was that the local authority, and more particularly its executive, accepted 
scrutiny's recommendations (at least in part) once a scrutiny inquiry was complete. The 
skateboarding inquiry made a number of recommendations to the mayor that amounted to 
not allocating funding to enter into a variety of partnership arrangements. The case that the 
scrutiny forum made to the mayor was based on enhanced certainty about the issue, 
although it is always easier to agree to a recommendation to not spend money than to do so. 
The flooding inquiry adopted a similarly in-depth approach to the policy development role, 
which was combined with high levels of member and public engagement. This also led to 
scrutiny's recommendations being largely accepted by the executive. The ghost ships 
inquiry is still incomplete. However, a series of interim recommendations were agreed. 
Some months later the chief executive responded to them on behalf of the cabinet, arguing 
that the local authority was not in a position to lead on this issue due to the lack information 
available at the time. The health inequalities inquiry was not only incomplete but also did 
not produce any interim recommendations, in the belief that the inquiry would restart at the 
beginning of the next municipal year. 
The case studies show that scrutiny was less successful securing 'acceptance by other 
governance actors' for its recommendations. The ghost ships and health inequalities were 
130 Which has happened at a number of meetings I have attended for other inquiries. 
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both incomplete due to a variety of factors outlined above. The flooding inquiry made a 
number of recommendations to external partners. Northumbrian Water broadly agreed that 
communications at the time of flooding incidence needed to be improved and also moved 
Hartlepool up its list of service improvements. However, there is no record of the 
recommendations to Ofwat and DEFRA being reported to these bodies, or reports back 
from those organisations. It is critical that scrutiny officers follow up the recommendations 
of the scrutiny forums and request a formal response from the bodies that it has made these 
to. The importance of tracking scrutiny recommendations has been highlighted above and a 
scrutiny database has been suggested as a way to monitor this more effectively. This would 
also serve to prompt officers to pursue external recommendations more vigorously because 
scrutiny members would be more aware of what they had recommended and what was, or 
was not, being done about it. 
11.6) Recommendations for Practice 
Scrutiny is an imperfect tool in an imperfect system. The sections on scrutiny processes 
and outcomes highlight a number of weaknesses in the scrutiny processes relating to 
capacity, expertise, powers and resources 131 • This finding is supported by Ashworth and 
Snape's (2004:544) audit of scrutiny research which suggests that the overview and 
scrutiny function was not initially perceived as a sufficient counterbalance to the executive. 
This view has been supported by later research, which identifies a lack of 'teeth' or 
influence, inadequate officer support and the impact of party politics as contributory factors 
towards an imbalance in councillor roles (Ibid). The external scrutiny role has remained 
marginal because members have generally preferred to concentrate on perfecting the 
process before moving onto this broader role (Ibid 2004:550). Consequently, it can be 
argued that the overview and scrutiny process has struggled to become a fully functioning 
and embedded component of local authorities' political management structures. The 
implication for scrutiny in the broader governance system is to question whether local 
authorities are equipped to fulfil an additional, and complex, duty. It has also been argued 
131 There are numerous good,practice guides to scrutiny, though it was never the intention of this thesis to add 
to them (but see for example Ashworth 2001, Ashworth and Hunt, Ashworth and Snape 2004, Dungey 2001, 
Johnson and Hatter 2004, Leach 2002 and 2005, Leach et al 2003, Snape 2002, Snape et al 2002, and Snape 
and Taylor 2001 ). 
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above that governance itself is prone to failure and scrutiny's (constrained) role in this is 
often poorly defined. 
Ashworth and Snape's (2004) audit of scrutiny research identifies a general dissatisfaction 
amongst scrutiny and non-executive councillors. It has similarly become evident through 
my insider-research placement that most non-executive and scrutiny councillors are 
dissatisfied with the scrutiny function and the new political management arrangements 
more generally. This is significant because the scrutiny case studies all demonstrate the 
effectiveness of scrutiny in reducing the political risk to the legitimacy of the local 
authority as a whole, and the executive in particular. The case studies suggest that scrutiny 
has been less successful in terms of enhancing systemic legitimacy through governed 
interdependence. Nevertheless, it has been argued that scrutiny creates a governance role 
for itself in issues of public concern, and that this is encouraged by the community 
leadership role. Once scrutiny adopts this role it becomes a forum for a variety of 
aspirations, expectations and, ultimately, responsibilities within the governance system. 
These often enhance the influence of scrutiny through public engagement. However, in 
practice scrutiny's role in the governance system is often poorly defined and it lacks the 
capacity, powers and resources to meet the challenges and responsibilities facing it. As a 
consequence scrutiny members often feel that they are managing the political risks to the 
council and the wider governance system, but they do not feel that they have the same 
impact on the systemic risks i.e. in terms of affecting policy. This view is closely 
associated with Skelcher's (2003) argument that the functional sovereignty of councils has 
been fragmented by the shift to contracting and partnerships. The experience of conducting 
these case studies, and my participant observer role more generally, suggests that members 
in this authority have struggled to 'come to terms' with the changing role of the council. 
As a result, they have not only failed to take full advantage of the opportunities that 
scrutiny potentially offers but they have also generated tensions within the new political 
management structures, which contributes to the sense of powerlessness of the non-
executive. 
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To counteract the sense of powerlessness of scrutiny members in the wider governance 
system, the five roles accorded to health scrutiny in chapter eight can usefully be applied to 
external scrutiny more generally: 
• to scrutinise internal local authority contributions to the governance issue; 
• to scrutinise the work of responsible actors in relation to the governance issue; 
• to scrutinise partnership working between the responsible actors and the local 
authority in the governance system; 
• to assess the impact of all these activities on local people; and 
• to make recommendations to the appropriate bodies in relation to scrutiny findings 
derived from the four roles above. 
Snape et al (2002: 1 06) recommend that every council should have clauses in their 
constitutions making explicit the role of scrutiny in community leadership, and in 
developing and employing the well-being power. This would certainly help to develop 
internal consistency about a key outlet into the governance system for scrutiny, although if 
it is too tightly defined it may result in a key role for scrutiny in governance becoming 
constrained. The role of the local authority and, therefore, scrutiny needs to be clarified 
further in relation to this role in the governance system. The ODPM's (2004) The Future of 
Local Government has suggested that health scrutiny powers are extended across the local 
governance system. This view is supported here as it will improve scrutiny members' and 
officers' awareness of their role in local governance arrangements, while also improving 
the awareness of actors in these governance arrangements of scrutiny. This new power 
would also compel them to attend even if they do not like what scrutiny is saying. 
In theory extending external scrutiny powers to encompass LAAs would enable scrutiny to 
have a more effective role in managing systemic risks and enhancing systemic legitimacy. 
It would provide a mechanism for combining vertical and horizontal accountability within 
the governance system. However, LAAs involve complex negotiations between senior 
officers, the LSP, other partners, the regional Government Office, and Whitehall. 
Consequently, there is limited room and scope for scrutiny to affect this process and 
scrutiny members would need training and high levels of officer support to effectively 
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engage in the process. Furthermore, Stewart (2003) argues that unless the machinery of 
central government can respond on a joined-up basis to joined-up government at a local 
level, then the potential for community planning will not be fully recognised. Nevertheless, 
extending scrutiny's role and powers to the LAA process would embed the scrutiny process 
beyond its current local authority base. 
Recently there has been a shift in government thinking to considering whether there should 
be a more formal requirement for executives to act on scrutiny findings (ODPM 2005: 17). 
What form this may take has yet to be determined, but has the potential to offset some of 
the concerns, highlighted in the thesis, about the role scrutiny performs in limiting risk to 
political legitimacy. However, it may also be problematic in terms of its implications for a 
local authority's internal accountability - if scrutiny is taking decisions then what is 
holding it to account? A simpler way forward may be to strengthen scrutiny powers to hold 
the executive to account by compelling cabinet to respond fully to scrutiny 
recommendations, rather than allowing them to be merely noted. This could be further 
enhanced by making it compulsory to have a joint public meeting between scrutiny and the 
executive when scrutiny recommendations are not accepted. These meetings would most 
likely attract the interest of local media enhancing the influence and accountability of 
scrutiny. It would also serve to place the spotlight on the scrutiny process and the validity 
of the recommendations it makes. Consequently, a more robust and openly accountable 
process would emerge - scrutiny would provide a more effective counterbalance to the 
executive, and the work of scrutiny itself would be more open to challenge. 
Three further developments would serve to enhance the role of scrutiny within local 
authorities and the governance system. Firstly, the next round of CPA inspections may 
focus more closely on the performance of scrutiny in local authorities. Stewart (2003) 
highlights a number of problems with the inspection process for local authorities, which 
have been discussed earlier in the thesis. However, despite the weaknesses of external 
inspectors adequately monitoring the performance of local authorities over week long 
inspections, the CPA process is taken very seriously within local authorities. 
Cons~ql)ently, the great~r eiJlphasi~ on scru~~ny.th~ough this process could serve to refocus 
chief officers and executive councillors' commitment to the scrutiny process, ensure that it 
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becomes better resourced and that its voice is given more weight internally. Secondly, the 
government has added an additional strand to the next round of CPA (2006:6) Corporate 
Assessments, which will focus on whether, 'the council, with its partners, has the capacity 
it needs to achieve its change and deliver its priorities.' It is important that this will not 
only focus on local capacity to deliver priorities but also the role of central government in 
defining and enhancing the capacity of the local authority and its partners to meet priorities. 
Furthermore, given the importance (in theory at least) of scrutiny in the governance system, 
the CPA process should bring the role of scrutiny into the new focus it is placing on local 
partnership working. Finally, given the increasing centrality of LSPs in local governance 
(ODPM 2005a) and the lack of engagement between the LSP and scrutiny in the case 
studies, the findings from this research suggest that a formalisation of relationships through 
protocols could enhance the scrutiny/LSP relationship. 
Many of these recommendations for practice will have implications on the capacity of 
scrutiny members and officers (and local authority officers more generally). It should be 
recognised that scrutiny already places potentially unsustainable demands on them due to 
the large range of topics that could in principle be explored. In the past members and 
officers developed expertise in set areas under the committee system, whereas now the 
tendency is to move across a wide range of specialist topics, not all of which fall under the 
direct responsibilities and established knowledge base of the local authority. 
11.7) Strengths and Weaknesses of the Study 
This study has a number of inherent strengths arising from the research strategy. First, the 
close engagement with the case study authority through the insider research perspective 
provided comprehensive access to most relevant internal processes; The insider role was 
then combined with a literature review of the local government modernisation agenda. This 
was combined with the development of a broader theoretical/conceptual framework rooted 
in a further literature review. By adopting a case study approach in conjunction with the 
insider research perspective, it has enabled me to consider the case studies in great depth, 
and test ideas alongside the review of literature and development of concepts. This 
approach has been founded in the development of key research questions derived from the 
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literature review and emerging conceptual framework. In tum the latter have been used to 
analyse the findings from the scrutiny case studies. The combination of the methods 
described above provides an element of informal triangulation within the research strategy. 
Finally, the interrelationship of findings and conceptual development provided a framework 
within which conclusions were drawn and recommendations advanced. 
There are a number of weaknesses in the study that need addressing here. First, there is a 
danger that the benefits of the work placement, in terms of the access it provided, would be 
offset by a tendency towards subjectivity given the proximity of the researcher to the issue 
and actors132 involved. However, this tendency was minimised through adopting a 
reflexive133 approach to working, by standing outside of the case study issues and 
considering my position within these. The tendencies towards subjectivity have been 
further minimised through the triangulation mentioned above and by returning to (and re-
drafting) the case studies a minimum of a year after they were completed. This provided a 
new (more critical) perspective to the case studies. A second weakness of the study, 
resulting from the ethnographic approach, was that no surveys or questionnaires with 
participants were completed. Consequently, the study lacks the insight this approach 
generates. However, it was felt that doing so would conflict with the insider researcher role 
and, therefore, reduce the benefits of this approach. Thirdly, the agenda for the thesis was 
essentially 'given' to me through the issues pursued on the scrutiny work programme 
during my three years based as an insider researcher in the local authority. The focus of the 
thesis (on governance) acted as a filter for the scrutiny topics to select from and the case 
studies were chosen from the relatively small number of 'eligible' inquiries. At a different 
time, and in a different authority, a different set of topics may have led to different 
conclusions. However, this potential weakness has been addressed through the 
development of a wider conceptual framework and a broad knowledge of the local 
government modernisation agenda, which in tum generated the research questions through 
which trre",case studies are analysed. 
132 Particularly towards a :pro~ locJll authority bi~ against other partners. _ 
133 Jessop (2003:7) refers to reflexivity as, 'the ability and commitment to uncover and make explicit to 
oneselfthe nature of one's intentions, projects, and actions and their conditions of possibility; and, in this 
context, to about them, critique them, and act upon any lessons that have been learnt.' 
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The work placement in the case study authority, which enabled me to develop an insider 
researcher I participant observer role in the local authority, was agreed on the basis that the 
local authority would not interfere with my academic research. In exchange the council 
gained a part-time scrutiny support officer, whilst agreeing to share information for my 
study. It is possible that a conflict of interest may have arisen during the conduct of the 
research. Fortunately this did not occur. If it had done so, the matter would have been 
dealt with at joint supervision session between me, my manager and my academic 
supervisor. The vast majority of information in the case studies is in any case available 
through access to information, as the minutes and reports from meetings are a matter of 
public record. Furthermore, each of the scrutiny meetings were open to the public to attend 
and advertised in the local press and notices as such. The insider research provided a 
greater depth in understanding of these events, and has offered insights into the internal 
processes surrounding these public events, without betraying any professional Given the 
nature of the access agreed, and the highly publicised ghost ships case study, the local 
authority has not been anonymised. 
11.8) Conclusion 
Having worked as a scrutiny officer for nearly four years, albeit in a local authority with 
unusual political circumstances given the inexperience and lack of political allegiances of 
the elected mayor, I have drawn the following conclusions about scrutiny's role within the 
governance system. The governance network in which the local government scrutiny 
function operates varies by issue. It can include international, national, regional, local and 
neighbourhood actors from the public, private, community and voluntary sectors. Scrutiny 
can play an important role in these governance arrangements, which can largely be justified 
through the community leadership role. However, the governance arrangements scrutiny 
becomes engaged in often involve complex accountability, regulatory and performance 
management arrangements, which can limit and constrain the possibilities of the scrutiny 
function. The lack of formal decision-making powers for scrut~ny are a significant 
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weakness of the function 134, which can mean that bodies with competing aims and clearly 
defined responsibilities and functions can effectively ignore scrutiny's recommendations 
because they have their own accountability arrangements to central government or 
regulators that often take precedence over their responsibilities to scrutiny. Consequently, 
scrutiny can seek to influence and agree shared objectives with governance actors but this is 
often done from an imperfect understanding of a complex system. Moreover, while it can 
reach firm conclusions as a result of its inquiries, its lack of executive decision-making 
powers are an inevitable limitation on the function and restrict it to an influencing role. In 
this respect, the scrutiny function is consistent with the New Labour emphasis on evidence-
based decision making. However, its lack of decision making powers at any point in the 
governance system leaves its processes open to abuse especially as the legitimacy of the 
role of scrutiny in governance has yet to be established. 
Scrutiny is an expression of the new political system in local government. This thesis has 
drawn attention to a number of possibilities for this role, but to maximise these scrutiny 
needs to be properly resourced. Furthermore, the role and legitimacy of the scrutiny 
function need to become accepted, not only by the executive, but also by non-executive 
councillors. The role of scrutiny is situated within the context of the changing role of local 
.authorities within the governance system. Consequently, the question arises as to how can 
scrutiny support and enhance the community leadership role as a means of functioning in 
this changing system? The evidence from the case studies suggests that the 
interrelationship between scrutiny and the community leadership role can become 
confusing. This is largely due to the lack of legitimacy for scrutiny within the wider 
governance system. To make scrutiny work more effectively action must be taken to 
strengthen the resourcing and acceptance of the function within local government, and 
provide it with a clearly defined external scrutiny role linked to the notion of community 
leadership. The complexities and competing pressures of the governance system demand a 
refocusing of scrutiny along these lines. 
134 However, it has been argued above that in the current system decision making powers would further 
confuse the role of scrutiny in governance. 
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Appendix A- Community Strategy Themes 
Jobs and the Economy 
Aim: Develop a more enterprising, vigorous and diverse local economy that will attract 
investment, be globally competitive and create more employment opportunities for local 
people. (Hartlepool Partnership 2002:11) 
The objectives ofthis theme are grouped into the following categories: 
• Knowledge driven economy; 
• Sites and infrastructure; 
• Business investment and support; 
• Image and Tourism; 
• Town centre; and 
• Community (Hartlepool Partnership 2002:11 ). 
Key Partnerships and Plans -lots of these, beyond my scope? Some (a lot) ofthese are 
Council Plans). Council leading on them, and feeding into the Community strategy, whilst 
theme partners also feeding back on them to the Council. 
Lifelong Learning and Skills 
Aim: Help all individuals, groups and organisations realise their full potential, ensure the 
highest quality opportunities in education, lifelong learning and training, and raise 
standards of attainment. (Hartlepool Partnership 2002: 13) 
Objectives: 
• Early years and childcare; 
• Achievement; 
• Service providers and facilities; and 
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• Support and access (Hartlepool Partnership 2002: 13). 
Health and Care 
Aim: Ensure access to the highest quality health, social care, and support services, and 
improve the health, life expectancy and well-being of the community. (Hartlepool 
Partnership 2002: 16) 
Objectives: 
• Protecting and improving health; 
• Services; 
• Saving lives; and 
• Vulnerable people (Hartlepool Partnership 2002:16). 
Community Safety 
Aim: Make Hartle pool a safer place by reducing crime, disorder and fear of crime. 
(Hartlepool Partnership 2002: 19) 
Objectives: 
• Crime; 
• Drug misuse; 
• Young people; 
• Disorder and anti-social behaviour; 
• Deliberate fires; 
• Business crime; and 
• Fear of crime (Hartlepool Partnership 2002: 19). 
Environment and Housing 
297 
Aim: Secure a more attractive and sustainable environment that is safe, clean and tidy, a 





• Use of resources; and 
• Housing (Hartlepool Partnership 2002:21-22). 
Culture and Leisure 
Aim: Ensure a wide range of good quality, affordable and accessible leisure and cultural 
opportunities. (Hartlepool Partnership 2002:24) 
Objectives: 
• Create a strong, positive cultural identity; 
o Enable people to express local identity; 
• Access to leisure and cultural services; and 
• Create diversity in activities and facilities (Hartlepool Partnership 2002:24). 
Strengthening Communities 
Aim: Empower individuals, groups and communities, and increase the involvement of 
citizens in all decisions that affect their lives. (Hartlepool Partnership 2002:25) 
Objectives: 
• Introduce new democratic structures; 
• Fully value and support voluntary and community sectors; 
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• Develop community capacity; 
e Increase participation in consultation; 
• Improve the accessibility of services and information; and 
e Increase understanding and collaboration. 
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Appendix B -Data Collection from Scrutiny and 'other' Council Meetings. 
In addition, to the documented sources of written evidence listed below a research diary 
was kept, which consists of detailed notes taken at each of the meetings listed. Further 
notes were taken (to complement the research diary) drawing on 'desk based' research and 
preparatory discussions with key actors over the course of each of the scrutiny case studies. 
'GHOST SIDPS' -CASE STUDY 
3/10/03: Joint Meeting ofNeighbourhood Consultative Forums 
• Minutes; and 
• Report ofthe Chief Executive and the Director of Regeneration and Planning 
Community Meeting: Ships Dismantling Proposals 
28/1 0/03: Scrutiny Co-ordinating Committee 
o Minutes; 
• Report of the Principal Strategy and Development Officer (Scrutiny Support) 
Inquiry into the Proposed Dismantling of US Navy Ships by Able UK (Scoping 
Paper); and 
• Emails tabled at meeting of correspondence between Acting Head of Regeneration 
and Planning and the HSE. 
31 I 1 0/03: Scrutiny Co-ordinating Committee 
• Minutes; 
• Presentation- Able UK 
• Presentation - HSE; 
• Presentation - EA; 
• Presentation - English Nature; 
• Presentation - INCA; 
• Presentation - Harbour Master; 
• Presentation- ChiefExecutive ofHBC; 
• Presentation (verbal only)- Tees Valley Regeneration; 
• Presentation- Friends of the Earth; and 
• Written Submissions: DEFRA, Greenpeace, R.S.P.B, One Northeast, and 
Hartlepool TUC. 
4/11/03: 'Extraordinary' Council Meeting 
• Minutes. 
16/12/03: Scrutiny Co-ordinating Committee 
• Minutes; 
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• Report of the Principal Strategy and Development Officer (Scrutiny Support) The 
Proposed Dismantling of US Navy Ships by Able UK- Interim Report; and 
• Presentation Ghosts Ships Review- Scrutiny Support. 
1115/04: Scrutiny Co-ordinating Committee 
• Minutes; and 
• Report of the Chief Executive The Dismantling of Ships by Able UK 
FLOODING- CASE STUDY 
25/03/03: Environmental Stewardship and Regeneration Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; and 
• Report of the Democratic Services Manager Flooding Inquiry - Scoping Paper 
11/7/03: Environmental Stewardship and Regeneration Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; and 
• Presentation by the Head of Technical Services Flooding 
22/7/03: Environmental Stewardship and Regeneration Scrutiny Forum- Site Visit to 
Flooding 'Hotspots' 
• No papers for this meeting - as usual I took notes. 
19-21/8/03: Joint meetings ofEnvironmental Stewardship and Regeneration Scrutiny 
Forum and the North, South, and Central Neighbourhood Forums 
• Minutes. 
2/9/03: Environmental Stewardship and Regeneration Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; 
• Presentation by the Environment Agency Flooding; and 
o Presentation by Northumbrian Water Flooding 
30/9/03: Environmental Stewardship and Regeneration Scrutiny Forum 
o Minutes; and 
• Report ofthe Environmental Stewardship and Regeneration Scrutiny Forum Draft 
Findings of the Inquiry into the Causes of Flooding in Hartlepool 
16/10/03: Environmental Stewardship and Regeneration Scrutiny Forum- Evening 
Meeting 
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• Minutes; and 
• Report of the Environmental Stewardship and Regeneration Scrutiny Forum 
Findings of the Inquiry into the Causes of Flooding in Hartlepool 
3/11/03: Cabinet 
• Minutes; and 
• Report of the Environmental Stewardship and Regeneration Scrutiny Forum 
Findings of the Inquiry into the Causes of Flooding in Hartle pool 
25/11103: Environmental Stewardship and Regeneration Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; and 
• Report of the Principal Strategy Development Officer (Scrutiny Support) Inquiry 
into the causes of Flooding in Hartlepool. The relationship between development 
and the amount of flow in the sewerage system. 
15/12/03: Cabinet 
• Minutes; and 
• Report of the Environmental Stewardship and Regeneration Scrutiny Forum 
Findings of the Inquiry into the Causes of Flooding in Hartlepool in respect of the 
Granting of Planning Permission in Areas Experiencing Flooding. 
SKATEBOARDING- CASE STUDY 
17/9/02: Culture and Learning Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; and 
• Report of Democratic Services Manager Skateboarding Issues- Briefing Note I 
17/10/02: Council 
• Minutes 
5/11102: Culture and Learning Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; and 
• Report of the Director of Community Services Skateboarding Issues in Hartlepool. 
12 & 18/11/02: Culture and Learning Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; and 
• Report of the Director of Community Services Skateboarding Issues in Hartlepool 




12/8/03: Culture and Learning Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; and 
• Report of the Principal Strategy Development Officer (Scrutiny Support) 
Skateboarding Inquiry Scoping Paper 
19/08/03: Culture and Learning Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; and 
• Presentation Leisure Services Officer Darlington Borough Council Proposed 
Development of Tees Valley Mobile Skatepark 
16/9/03: Culture and Learning Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; and 
• Report of the Director of Community Services Skateboarding Inquiry: Findings 
from Site Visit to Mobile Skatepark 
26/9/03: Culture and Learning Scrutiny Forum- Site Visits to Redcar and Thornaby Indoor 
Skateparks 
• No papers for this meeting- as usual I took notes. 
14/10/03: Culture and Learning Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; and 
• Report of the Principal Strategy Development Officer (Scrutiny Support) 
Skateboarding Inquiry Findings and Future Course of Action 
HEALTH INEQUALITIES- CASE STUDY 
5/8/03: Health and Social Care Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; and 
e Report of the Democratic Services Manager Health Scrutiny- Scrutiny Topic 
Selection 
18/11103: Health and Social Care Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; and 
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• Report of Principal Strategy and Research Officer Health Inequalities- Scoping 
Report 
20/1/04: Health and Social Care Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; and 
• Presentation by the North East Public Health Observatory on Health Inequalities 
and Mortality 
16/3/04: Health and Social Care Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; 
• Report of Principal Strategy and Research Officer Health Inequalities: Mortality 
from CHD and Lung Cancer- Scoping Report; and 
• Presentation by the Acting Director of Public Health, Hartlepool PCT Health 
Inequalities: Mortality from CHD and Lung Cancer in Hartlepool 
20/4/04: Health and Social Care Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; 
• Presentation by Hartlepool PCT Planning and Commissioning Services to Reduce 
Health Inequalities; and 
• Report of Principal Strategy and Research Officer Health Inequalities - Interim 
Report. 
5/8/04: Health and Social Care Scrutiny Forum 
• Minutes; 
• Report of Principal Strategy and Research Officer Update on Health Inequalities 
Inquiry; and 
• Report of Principal Strategy and Research Officer Health Inequalities - The Local 
Authority Contribution 




Acheson Report (1998) Independent Inquiry into Inequalities and Health, The Stationery 
Office, London 
Ashworth, R (2001) Councillor Perceptions of New Scrutiny Arrangements in Welsh Local 
Government, Local & Regional Government Research Unit, CardiffUniversity. 
Ashworth, R (2003) Toothless Tigers? Councillors Perceptions of New Scrutiny 
Arrangements in Welsh Local Government, ppl-18 in, Local Government Studies, Vol.29, 
No.2. 
Ashworth, R (2004) Under Scrutiny? Evaluating the Impact of Modernization on Public 
Sector Professions in the UK, Full paper submitted to BAM 2004 30th July 2004, 
University of St. Andrews. 
Ashworth and Hunt (2003) Evaluating the Effectiveness of Local Scrutiny: Report to Case 
Study Authorities Centre for Local and Regional Government Research, Cardiff University. 
Ashworth, Rand Sketcher, C (2005) Evaluation of the Local Government Modernisation 
Agenda: Accountability, ODPM, London. 
Ashworth, R and Snape, S (2004) An Overview of Scrutiny: A triumph of context over 
structure, pp538-556 in Local Government Studies, Vol. 30, No.4 
Audit Commission (1988) The Competitive Council The Audit Commission, London. 
Audit Commission (2002) Hartlepool Borough Council: Corporate Assessment, Audit 
Commission, London. 
Audit Commission (2004) People, Places and Prosperity, Audit Commission, London. 
Audit Commission (2006) CPA 2005: Key Lines of enquiry for corporate assessment, 
Audit Commission, London. 
Baggot, R (2004) Health and Healthcare in Britain, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
Bakker, K (2003) An Uncooperative Commodity, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Balloch, S. and Taylor, M (2001) Partnership working: policy and practice. Policy Press, 
Bristol 
Bang, H.P (2004) Culture Governance: Governing Self-Reflexive Modernity, pp157-190, in 
Public Administration, vol 82, No.I. 
305 
Batty, C & Hilton, 1 (2003) From Command and Control to Self-confidence in 
Government: meeting the challenge in Doncaster, in International Review of 
Administrative Sciences, Vol. 69, No.2. 
Bauman, Z (1987) Legislators and Interpreters, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Bauman, Z ( 1992) Intimations of Postmodernity, New York and London, Routledge. 
Bauman, Z (1998) Globalization: The Human Consequences, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Barlow and Clarke (2002) Blue Gold: The battle against corporate theft of the world's 
water, Earthscan Publications Ltd, London. 
Beck, U ( 1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity Sage Publications Ltd, London. 
Beck, U (1999) World Risk Society, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Bennett, R.J, Fuller, C, & Ramsden, M (2004) Local Government and Local Economic 
Development in Britain: An evaluation of developments under Labour, pp209-274 in, 
Progress and Planning Vol. 62. 
Bevir, M and Rhodes R.A.W (2003) Searching for Civil Society: Changing Patterns of 
Governance in Britain, pp41-62 in, Public Administration, 2003, Vol. 81, No.1. 
Bevir, M, Rhodes, R.A.W, and Weller, P (2003) Traditions ofGovernance: Interpreting the 
Changing role of the Public Sector, ppl-17 in, Public Administration, 2003, Vol. 81, No.1. 
Bjorvatn, K and Cappelen, A.W. (2004) Globalisation, inequality and redistribution, CeGE 
Discussion Paper 33, Georg-August-Universitat Gottingen. 
Black Report (1980) Inequalities in Health (DHSS) 
Blackman, T (1995) Urban Policy in Practice London and New York, Routledge. 
Blackman, T (2006 forthcoming) Globalisation and Public Policy, in Ritzer, G (ed) 
Blackwell Companion to Globalisation, Blackwell, Oxford. 
Blair, T (1998) Leading the way: A new vision for local government London: Institute of 
Public Policy Research. 
Blair, T (2004) Speech at the Guardian Public Services Summit 29/1/04. 
Boivaird, T & Lofller, E (2002) Moving from Excellence Models of Local Service Delivery 
to Benchmarking 'Good Local Governance', in International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, Vol. 68, No. 1. 
Burns, D (2000) Can Local Democracy Survive Governance? pp963-973, in Urban Studies 
2000, Vol. 37, No. 5-6. 
Byrne ( 1990) Local Government in Britain, Penguin Books, London. 
306 
Byrne, D ( 1999) Social Exclusion Open University Press, Buckingham. 
Champion, D and Stowell, F.A (2003), Validating Action Research Field Studies: PEArL, 
pp21-36 in, Systematic Practise and Action Research, Vol. 16, No.1. 
Clark, M and Stewart, J (1997) Handling the wicked issues. INLOGOV Discussion paper, 
University ofBirmingham. 
Clegg, S (1990) Modem Organizations. Organization Studies in the Postmodem World. 
Sage Publications Ltd., London. 
Cole, M (2001) Executive and Scrutiny Reforms: The Agenda and its impact at Devon 
County Council, ppl9-34, in Local Government Studies, vol.27, No.4. 
The Commission on Social Justice (1993a) The Justice Gap, IPPR. 
The Commission on Social Justice (1993b) Social Justice in a Changing World, IPPR. 
The Commission on Social Justice (1994) Social Justice: Strategies for Neighbourhood 
Renewal, Vintage, London. 
Considine, M (2002) The end of the line? Accountable governance in the age of networks, 
partnerships, and joined-up service. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration and Institutions, Vol 15, No. 1: pp21-40. 
Corrigan, P (2000) OVerview and Scrutiny: A practitioner's guide. I&DeA. 
Corry, D, Hatter, W, Parker, I, Randle, A, and Stoker, G (2004) Joining-Up Local 
Democracy: Governance Systems for New Localism New Local Government Network, 
London. 
Davies, J S (2002) The Governance of Urban Regeneration: A Critique of the 'Governing 
Without Government' Critique, pp301-322, in, Public Administration, Vol. 80 No.2, 2002. 
Denzin, N .K (1999) Evaluating Qualitative Research in the Postructural Moment, pp311-
329 in Bryman, A & Burgess, R.G. (eds) Qualitative Research Vol 3. Sage Publications, 
London. 
Department of Health (2002) Tackling Health Inequalities: Summary of the 2002 Cross-
Cutting Review, Department of Health Publications, London 
Department of Health (2003a) OVerview and Scrutiny of Health- Guidance, Department of 
Health Publications, London. 
Department ofHealth (2003b) Tackling Health Inequalities: A Programme for Action, 
Department of Health Publications, London. 
307 
Department of Health (2003c) A Guide to the NHS for Members and Officers of Health 
Scrutiny Committees, Department of Health Publications, London. 
The Deputy Prime Minister (2002) The Government's Response to the Transport, Local 
Government and Regional Affairs Select Committee's Fourteenth Report on How the Local 
Government Act 2000 is Working, HMSO, London. 
DETR (1998) Modern Local Government: In touch with the people, The Stationary Office, 
London. 
DETR (1998b) Modernising Local Government: Improving Services through Best Value. 
The Stationary Office, London. 
DETR (1999) Local Government Act 1999, The Stationary Office, London. 
DETR (2000) Joining it up Locally Policy Action Team 17, The Stationary Office, London. 
DETR (2001) Local Strategic Partnerships: Government Guidance, The Stationary Office, 
London. 
Director of Public Health and Well-being for Hartlepool (2005) Annual Report of the 
Director of Public Health and Well-being for Hartlepool 2003-2004, Hartlepool Primary 
Care Trust and Hartlepool Partnership, Hartlepool. 
Dopson, S (2003) The potential of the case study method for organisational analysis 
pp217-226, in, Policy and Politics Vol 31 No. 2. 
Dungey, 1 (2001) Open to Scrutiny, LGIU, London. 
Dunleavy,P (1997)- Introduction: 'New Times' in British Politics, pp1-19 in, Dunleavy, P, 
Gamble, A, Holloway,! and Peele, G (eds)- Developments in British Politics, Macmillan 
Press Ltd., Basingstoke. 
Dunleavy, P and O'Leary, B (1987) Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal 
Democracy, Macmillan Press Ltd., London. 
Ernst, 1 (1994) Whose Utility? The Social Impact of Public Utility Privatization and 
Regulation in Britain Open University Press, Milton Keynes. 
Gains, F, Greasley, S, and Stoker, G (2004) A Summary of Research Evidence on New 
Council Constitutions in Local Government, ELG Evaluation Team, ODPM. 
Gamble, A (1997) Conclusions: Politics 2000, pp355-376, in, P.Dunleavy et al (eds) 
Developments in British Politics, Macmillan Press Ltd., Basingstoke. 
Game, C (2002) Speaking at a conference in Northumbria University on 20111102 
308 
Giddens, A ( 1991) - Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modem Age, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, California. 
Giddens, A (1998) The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy Polity Press, 
Cambridge. 
Giddens, A (1999a) Globalisation: Reith Lecture 1 BBC, London 
Giddens, A (1999b) Risk: Reith Lecture 2 BBC, Hong Kong. 
Giddens, A (1999c) Democracy: Reith Lecture 3 BBC, London. 
Giddens, A (2000) The Third Way and its Critics Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Gowland, B (2002) The Assembly Scrutiny Process: Greater London Authority, District 
Audit. 
Goss, S (2001) Making Local Governance Work: Networks, relationships and the 
management of change, Palgrave, Basingstoke. 
Greene, 0 (1997) Environmental Issues, pp313-338 in, Baylis, J and Smith, S The 
Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to International Relations, Oxford 
University Press. 
Greig, R. and Poxton, R. (200 1) Nice Process - but did joint commissioning change 
anyone's life? pp16-21 in Managing Community Care, 9. 
Ham, C (2004) Health Policy in Britain Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hambleton, R (1992) Rethinking Management in Local Government, Papers in Planning 
Research 130, Cardiff: Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Wales 
College, Cardiff. 
Habermas, J. (1976), Legitimation Crisis, Heinemann, London. 
Hartlepool Borough Council (2002) Hartlepool Borough Council Constitution Hartlepool 
Borough Council, Hartlepool. 
Hartlepool Partnership (2002) Hartlepool Community Strategy Hartlepool Partnership, 
Hartlepool. 
Hay, C (1995) Structure and Agency, pp189-206, in D.Marsh & G.Stoker (eds)- Theory 
and Methods in Political Science, Macmillan Press Ltd, London. 
Health and Social Care Act (2001) http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010015.htm 
Health Development Agency (2001) Closing the Gap: Setting Local Targets to Reduce 
Health Inequalities. HAD, London. 
309 
Health Development Agency (2003) Local Government Scrutiny of Health: Using the new 
power to tackle health inequalities, Health Development Agency, London. 
Held, D, McGrew, A, Goldblatt, D, and Perraton, J (1999) Global Transformations: 
Politics, Economics and Culture Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Hemsley-Brown, J, Cunningham, M, Morton, R, and Sharp, S (2002) Education Decision-
making under scrutiny: The impact of local government modernisation, The National 
Foundation of Education Research, Slough. 
Hirst (2000) Democracy and Governance, ppl3-35, in Pierre, J (ed) Debating Governance: 
Authority Steering, and Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Hirst, P & Thompson, G (1996) Globalization in Question, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Hood, C and James, 0 ( 1997) The Central Executive, pp 177-204, in, P .Dunleavy et al 
(eds)- Developments in British Politics, Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke. 
House of Commons (2000) Local Authorities (Functions and Responsibilities) (England) 
Regulations 2000. Statutory Instrument 2853, HMSO. 
House of Commons (2002) The Local Authority (Overview and Scrutiny Committees 
Health Scrutiny Functions) Regulations 2002. Statutory Instrument No. 3048, HMSO 
House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (2004) Dismantling 
Defunct Ships in the UK The Stationery Office, London. 
Hutton, W (1995) The State We're In Random House, London. 
Hutton, W (2002) Trends in Governance, Report for the British Council. 
Hutton, W (2003) The World We're In, Abacus, London. 
Integrated Care Network (2004) Integrated Working a Guide, Integrated Care Network, 
Short Run Press, Exeter. 
Jackson, B & Segel, P (2004) Why Inequality Matters, Catalyst, London. 
Jacobs, G (1970) The Participant Observer, George Braziller Inc., New York. 
Jayasuriya, K (2005) Capacity Beyond the Boundary: New Regulatory State, 
Fragmentation and Relational Capacity, pp19-37, in Painter, M and Pierre, J (eds) 
Challenges to State Policy Capacity, Palgrave. 
Jessop, B (2000) Governance Failure- ppl1-32, in Gerry Stoker (eds)- The New Politics 
of British Local Governance, Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke. 
Jessop, B (2003) Governance and Metagovernance: On Reflexivity, Requisite Variety, and 
Requisite Irony, published by the Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, 
310 
Lancaster LA1 4YN, UK, at http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/socilology/papers/Jessop-
Governance -and-Metagovernance.pdf 
John. P (1997) Local Governance, pp253-276 in, P.Dunleavy et at (eds)- Developments in 
British Politics, Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke. 
John , P& Cole,A (2000) Policy Networks and Local Political Leadership in Britain & 
France in Gerry Stoker (eds)- The New Politics of British Local Governance, Macmillan 
Press Ltd, Basingstoke. 
Johnson, K & Hatter, W (2004) Realising the Potential of Scrutiny: Research and 
Recommendations on the Overview and Scrutiny Function in Local Government, New 
Local Government Netork, London. 
Johnson, C and Osborne, SP (2003) Local Strategic Partnerships, Neighbourhood Renewal 
and the Limits to Co-Governance, pp147-154 in, Public Money & Management Vol. 23 No. 
3. 
Jones, G & Stewart, J (2002) Central-Local Relations Since the Layfield Report, pp7-28, in 
Vol. 28, No.3, Local Government Studies. 
Judd, D (2000) Strong Leadership, pp951-961 in, Urban Studies, Vol. 37, No.5-6. 
Jupp, N. (2000) Working Together, London: Demos. 
King, R & Kendall, G (2004) The State, Democracy and Globalization, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
Kjaer, A.M. (2004) Governance, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Knight, T., Smith,J. and Cropper, S. (2001) Developing sustainable collaboration: learning 
from theory and practise, Primary Health Care Research and Development, 2: pp 139-148. 
Kooiman, J (2003) Governing as Governance, Sage Publications Ltd., London. 
Labour Party ( 1997) -New Labour because Britain Deserves Better, London, Labour 
Party. 
Labour National Policy Reform (2002), Improving Health and Social Care - Consultation 
Paper, http://www.lga.gov.uk/Documents/Labourgroup/PDFLink/consultationDocs/ 
Leach, S (2002) Is There a Future for Overview and Scrutiny, pp83-89 in, Local 
Governance, Vol. 28, no. 2. 
Leach, S (2005) Practice, progress and potential: an assessment of the local government 
overview and scrutiny function CfPS,. London. 
311 
Leach, Sand Wilson, D (2002) Rethinking Local Political Leadership, pp665-689, in 
Public Administration, Vol. 80, no. 4. 
Leach, S, Sketcher, C, Lloyd-Jones, C, Copus, C, Dunstan, E, Hall, D, and Taylor, F (2003) 
Strengthening Local Democracy: Making the Most of the Constitution, ODPM, London. 
Llewellyn, N (200 1) The Role of Storytelling and Narrative in a Modernisation Initiative, 
pp35-58 in, Local Government Studies, Vol. 27 No.4. 
Local Government Association (LGA) (2003) Powering up: making the most of the power 
of well-being, LGA Publications, London. 
Local Government Chronicle, 8th February 1997. 
Local Government Chronicle, 23rd January 1998. 
Local Government Chronicle, 30th January 1998. 
Local Government Chronicle, 13th February 1998. 
Local Government Chronicle, 20th February 1998. 
Local Government Chronicle, 6th March 1998. 
Local Government Chronicle, 20th March 1998. 
Local Government Chronicle, 29th May 1998. 
Local Government Chronicle, 7th August 1998. 
Local Government Chronicle, 28th August 1998. 
Local Government Chronicle, 8th September 2000. 
Local Government Chronicle, 5th November 2004. 
Local Government Chronicle, 7th January 2005. 
Local Government Chronicle, 18th February 2005. 
London Borough of Camden (2002) Scrutiny Good Practice Guide. 
Long, N (2003) The Effective Executive, Local Government Information Unit. 
Loughlin, M & Scott, C (1997) The Regulatory State, pp205-219 in P.Dunleavy et al (eds) 
Developments in British Politics, Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke. 
Lukes, S (1974) Power: A Radical View, Macmillan Press Ltd., Basingstoke. 
Lyon, D (1994) Postmodernity Open University Press, Bristol 
Mackintosh, M (1993) Partnership: Issues of policy and negotiation, pp21 0-224, in, Local 
Economy, Vol 7, no. 3. 
Maer, Land Sandford, M (2004) The Development of Scrutiny in the UK: A review of 
procedures and practice, London, The Constitution Unit, UCL. 
312 
Morris, L (1995) Social Divisions: Economic Decline and Social Structural Change, Press 
Ltd, UCL. 
Needham, C (2002) Consultation: A Cure for Local Government?, pp699-714, in, Vol. 55 
Parliamentary Affairs. 
Newman, J (2001) Modernising Governance: New Labour, Policy and Society, Sage 
Publications Ltd, London. 
O'Neill, 0 (2002a) Spreading Suspicion: Reith Lecture 1 BBC, London. 
O'Neill, 0 (2002b) Called to Account: Reith Lecture 3 BBC, London. 
O'Neill, 0 (2002c) Trust and Transparency: Reith Lecture 4 BBC, London. 
O'Neill, 0 (2002d) Licence to Deceive: Reith Lecture 5 BBC, London. 
ODPM (2004) The Future of Local Government: Developing a 10 year vision, ODPM, 
London. 
ODPM (2005) Vibrant Local Leadership, ODPM, London. 
ODPM (2005a) Local Strategic Partnerships: Shaping their future -A Consultation Paper, 
ODPM, London 
OFWAT (2002) Levels of Service for the Waterlndustry in England and Wales 2001/2, 
OFW AT, Birmingham. 
OPSR (2002) - Reforming our Public Services in Principles and Practice, Office of Public 
Services Reform. 
Ormerod, P (2005) Why Most Things Fail: Evolution, Extinction and Economics, Faber and 
Faber Limited, London. 
Osborne, D & Gaebler, T (1992)- Reinventing Government: how the entrepreneurial spirit 
is transforming the public sector, Plume (Penguin) New York. 
Outhwaite (1994) Habermas: A Critical Introduction, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Painter, J (1991) Regulation Theory and Local Government, pp23-44, in Local Government 
Studies, Vol. 17, No. 6. 
Painter J, Goodwin M. (2000) Local governance after Fordism: a regulationist perspective, 
pp33-53 in, Stoker, G ( ed) The new politics of British local governance, ed., Macmillan, 
Basingstoke. 
Painter, C, Isaac-Henry, K & McAnulla, S (2003) Modernising Local Government: Micro-
0rga11isationa/Refonn and Changing Local Configurations, pp31-53 in, Local 
Government Studies, Vol. 29, No.4. 
313 
Painter, M and Pierre, J (2005) Unpacking Policy Capacity: Issues and Themes, ppl-19, in 
Painter, M and Pierre, J (eds) Challenges to State Policy Capacity, Palgrave Macmillan 
Ltd, Basingstoke, Hampshire. 
Pearson, 200 1 
Pierre, J (2000) Introduction: Understanding Governance, pp 1-10, in Pierre, J ( ed) 
Debating Governance: Authority Steering, and Democracy, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Pierre, J (2000) Conclusions: Governance beyond State Strength, pp241-246, in Pierre, J 
(ed) Debating Governance: Authority Steering, and Democracy, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Pierre, J and Peters, G (2000) Governance, Politics and the State, Macmillan, London. 
PIU (Performance and Innovation Unit, Cabinet Office) (2000) Reaching Out: The Role of 
Central Government at Regional and Local and Level, The Stationery Office, Norwich. 
Pollitt, C, Bathgate, K, Caulfield, J, Smullen, A, and Talbot, C (2001) Agency Fever? 
Analysis of an international policy fashion. pp271-290 in, Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis Vol. 3, No. 3. 
Pollitt, C (2003) The Essential Public Manager, Open University Press, Maidenhead. 
Pratchett, L (2002) Local Government: From Modernisation to Consolidation, pp331-346 
in, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 55. 
Quest Network (2002) A Resource Pack for Local Strategic Partnerships, The Quest Trust, 
Bath. 
Randle, A and Hatter, W (2005) Making Community Leadership Real, NLGN, London. 
Reilly, M and Eynon, C (2003) Miserable Measures: The range and severity of measures of 
deprivation for the County Durham and Tees Valley area. Public Health Intelligence 
Service, Middlesbrough. 
Rhodes, R.A.W (1996) The New Governance: Governing without Government, in Political 
Studies, XLIV, 652-667. 
Rhodes, R.A.W (1997) Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, 
Reflexivity and Accountability Open University Press, Buckingham. 
Rhodes, R.A.W (1999) Forward: governance and networks, in G.Stoker (ed) The New 
Management of British Local Governance. Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
314 
Ritchie, J and Lewis, J (2003) Genera/ising from Qualitative Research, pp263-286 in 
Ritchie, J and Lewis, J (eds), Qualitative Research: A Guide for Social Researchers, Sage, 
London. 
Rittel, H and Webber, M (1973) Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, in Elsevier 
Scientific Publishing Company ,Inc Po/icySciences, 4, 155-169 
Robson, C (1993) Real World Research: A resource for social scientists and practitioner-
researchers, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford. 
Robson, C (2002) Real World Research: A resource for social scientists and practitioner-
researchers. Second Edition, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford. 
Rosenau, J.N (2000) Change, Complexity, and Governance in Globalizing Space, in Pierre, 
J (ed) Debating Governance: Authority Steering, and Democracy, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Salmen, L.F (1987) Listen to the People Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Sanderson, I, Percy-Smith, J, and Dowson, L (2001) The Role of Research in 'Modern' 
Local Government, pp59-78 in, Local Government Studies, Vol. 27, No.3. 
Scharpf, F (1999) Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
Schon, D.A (1987) Educating the Reflective Practitioner Tossey-Bass Inc. Publishers. 
Secretary of State for Health (1998) Our Healthier Nation, Cm 3852, London, The 
Stationery Office. 
Secretary of State for Health ( 1999) Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation, Cm 4386, 
London, The Stationery Office. 
Secretary of State for Health (2002) Local Authority (Overview and Scrutiny Committees 
Health Scrutiny Functions) Regulations 2002, SI 3048, London, The Stationery Office. 
Select Committee on Transport Local Government and the Region (SCTLG&R) (2002) 
How the Local Government Act 2000 is Working, The Stationary Office, London. 
SEU (2001) A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal- National Strategy Action 
Plan, Cabinet Office, London. 
Silverman, D (2000) Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook, Sage 
Publications Ltd, London. 
Sketcher, C (2003} Beyond the Sovereign Council: The New Governance of Local 
Communities, Paper for PSA Conference Leicester 
315 
Skinner, K (2004), Foreword, in Skinner, K (ed) Community Leadership and Public 
Health: The role of local authorities, The Smith Institute, London. 
Smith, S & Baylis, J (1997) Introduction, pp1-12 in, Baylis, J & Smith, S (eds) The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Snape, S (2002) The Fourteen Steps to Scrutiny Success, pp91-101, in Local Governance,, 
Vol. 28, no. 2. 
Snape, S, Leach, S, & Copus, C (2002) The Development of Overview and Scrutiny in 
Local Government, OPDM, London. 
Snape, S and Taylor, F (2001) A Hard Nut to Crack? Making Oveverview and Scrutiny 
Work, Local Government Association, London. 
Stacey, R (1996) Strategic Management and Organizational Dynamics. Pitman Publishing, 
London. 
Stacey, R (2000) Strategic Management and Organisational Dynamics: The challenge of 
complexity, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow, England. 
Stewart, J (2003) Modernising British Local Government, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke. 
Stoker, G (1998) Governance as Theory: Five Propositions, pp17-28, in International 
Social Science Journal, Vol. 155. 
Gerry Stoker (2000) Introduction, pp1-9, in Gerry Stoker (eds) The New Politics of British 
Local Governance, Macmillan Press Ltd., Basingstoke. 
Stoker, G (2000b) The Challenge of Urban Governance, pp91-109 in Pierre, J (ed) 
Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Stoker, G (2002) Life is a Lottery: New Labour's Strategy for the reform of devolved 
governance, pp417-434 in, Public Administration, Vol. 80, No.3. 
Stoker, G, John, P, Gains, F, Rao, N, & Harding, A (2002)- Report of ELG Survey 
Findings for ODPM Advisory Group, Department of Government: Manchester University, 
Manchester. 
Stoker, G (2004)- Transforming Local Governance: From Thatcherism to New Labour, 
Palgr~ve. 
316 
Sullivan, H (2003) New Forms of Local Accountability: Coming to terms with 'many 
hands'? pp353-369 in, Policy and Politics, Vol. 31, No.2. 
Sweeting and Ball (2002) Overview and scrutiny of leadership: the experience of Bristol 
City Council, pp201-212 in, Local Governance, Vol. 28, No.3. 
Taylor-Gooby, P (2002) The Silver Age of the Welfare State: Perspectives on Resilience, 
pp597 -621 in, Journal of Social Policy, Vol.31, No.4. 
Taylor-Hart, J (1971) The Inverse Care Law pp405-412, in, Lancet, 27, February. 
Wanless, D (2002) Securing our Future Health: Taking a Long-Term View- Final Report. 
HM Treasury, London 
Wanless, D (2004) Securing Good Health for the Whole Population- Final Report. HM 
Treasury, London. 
Watson, M and Hay, C (2003) The discourse ofglobalisation and the logic ofno 
alternative: rendering the contingent necessary in the political economy of New Labour, 
pp289-305, in Policy and Politics, Vol 31 no 3. 
Watson, T ( 1994) In Search of Management: Culture, chaos and control in managerial 
work, Routledge, London. 
Weir,S & Beetham,D (1999)- Political Power and Democratic Control in Great Britain, 
Routledge. 
Weiss, L (2003) Is the state being 'transformed' by globalisation, pp293-317 in, Weiss, L 
(ed.) States in the Global Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wilson, D (2001) Local Government: Balancing Diversity and Uniformity, pp289-307 in, 
Parliamentary Affairs, 2001, Vol. 54. 
Wilson, D & Game, C (2002) Local Government in the United Kingdom - Third Edition, 
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
Wistow, G (2001) Modernisation, the NHS Plan and Healthy Communities, pp334-351 in, 
Journal of Management in Medicine, Vol. 15, No. 5. 
Wistow, J & Banaras, S (2005) Implementing Health Scrutiny: Meeting the Challenge in 
one Local Authority, pp34-42, in Journal oflntegrated Care, vol 13 Issue 4. 
Yin, R.K ( 1972) Participant-Observation and the Development of Urban Neighbourhood 
Policy The New York Institute, New York. 
Yin, R.K. (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage Publications Ltd., 
London. 
317 
Zimmerman, B, Lindberg, C, and Pisek, P (2001) Edgeware: Insights from complexity 
science for health care leaders, VHA Inc., Irving, Texas, USA. 
6, P, Leat, D, Seltzer, K, and Stoker, G (2002) Towards Holistic Governance: The New 
Reform Agenda, Palgrave, Basingstoke. 
318 
